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TO
THE MEMORY 
OF
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an in-depth study of the vicissitudes of the 
property rights of the Hindu female, and the eventual enactment of 
s. l*f of the [Indian] Hindu Succession Act, 1 9 under which she 
was accorded the right, for the first time, to be the absolute owner 
of any property legally in her possession.
In dealing with Article of the Indian Constitution and the 
egalitarianism inherent in it, Chapter One introduces the background 
to, and the provisions of, the "Hindu Code", of which s. l^f is an 
integral part, as it also draws attention to the pressing necessity 
in India for the promulgation of a uniform civil code.
Chapter Two ^is a study of the traditional concept of widowhood 
in the light of s as trie injunctions, and the ambivalence in attitudes 
towards the widow and her remarriage in present-day India.
Chapter Three explores the characteristics of the "limited estate", 
a system of female inheritance peculiar to Anglo-Hindu Jurisprudence, 
while the right to maintenance prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Mainte­
nance Act, 1956* and as interpreted in case-law, has been enumerated 
in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five examines the Hindu Women's Ri^ its to Property Act,
1937» the express purpose of which was to give "better rights" to 
women, its effects on the inheritance pattern generally, and its 
drawbacks.
Chapter Six is a study of s. l*f, its successful effects, as also 
the problems of construction with special reference to the difficulties 
encountered in the judicial interpretation of sub-s. (2) of s. 1*K
"\kc co.\cLudi^ cVw.pt«/brings out the salient features of the work, and 
offers suggestions how best to resolve, either judicially, the areas 
of ambiguity, or by legislative amendment, such anomalies as have 
inadvertently crept in throu^i oversight and as a consequence of 
piecemeal legislation.
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preface
The purpose which this investigation is intended to serve is 
sufficiently indicated by its title. The inheritance pattern leading 
to the enactment of s. l^f of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956» is the story 
of the emergent awareness^and the urgency that it assumed in certain, 
sections, of the Constitutional promise of equality to women in 
Independent India. The departure from tradition in this respect, and 
the destruction in large measure by the "Hindu Code" of the system known 
to the Anglo-Hindu Jurisprudence, heralds in the abstract a new dawn, 
and s. l*f in particular, in consigning the legal "limited estate" to 
the oblivion it so richly deserved, the means to achieving the economic 
independence which must necessarily be the corner-stone for the eman­
cipation of the Hindu female in the fullest sense of the term.
But while de .jure equality may be one step in the process of this
kU ^
emancipation, factual equality continues to elude^ and the myth^ kept alive 
of the innate intellectual and temperamental imbalances as between men 
and women. A great deal has been written about the Indian woman - as 
much by Indian men as by others - and much doubtless will continue to 
be written: her role, her status, her place and so on. But the postur­
ings of equality, the incessant prating, are a convenient facade behind 
which the unacceptable face of an unequal society persists in taking 
refuge. Almost nowhere in the Sovereign Socialist Secular Democracy 
of the Republic of India is the Hindu female's status on par with that 
of her male counterpart, and frequently it is much to her disadvantage.^ "
1. Gail Omvedt observes: "I have on several occasions heard upper class 
Indians say to show their liberalism: 'I only believe in two castes — 
men and women,' and the author's comment: "Undoubtedly there is 
little question here as to who is the Brahmin who the Sudra," is a 
telling indictment of the realities of Indian social conditions 
today. See'Caste, Class and Women's liberation," M. Barnabas et. al. 
ed., Challenges of Societies in Tradition, (Mad., Macmillan, 1978)7” 
23&-52, at 251, f.n. 2.
In the family itself, to adapt Engels' general observation, there is 
no doubt but that while the husband is still the bourgeois, the wife 
represents the proletariat.^ "
The inclusion in a legal thesis of a chapter which projects the 
psychology of the Hindu widow - whose estate typified the woman's 
estate generally - is to indicate that if, despite the Legislative in­
tendment, traditional attitudes linger on, women are equally to blame 
for their implicit acquiesence in the predicament they are in. The 
temptation to forego liberty and remain a "thing" is the consequence 
of centuries of conditioning, of over-dependence and of the strong 
environmental forces of educational and social tradition, and today by 
subjugating the ethical urge to affirm her existence as an individual 
in her own right, the Hindu woman''evades at once both economic risk and
the metaphysical risk of a liberty in which ends and aims must be con-
2trived without assistance."
From the legal perspective, that the law in present day India has 
only partly fulfilled its role of social engineering and much else 
besides remains to be done, is evident when we consider the plight of 
females in the minority communities. As yet the vast tracts of their 
personal laws - not without their own archaic and eccentric features - 
are, either through callous indifference, or because of political ex­
pediency, left untouched, and this is where the Introductory chapter 
plays its part in the questions that it poses: Whither the furtherance
of the egalitarian ideal? Whither Art. ***+ of the Constitution and the 
promise of a uniform civil code?
1. F. Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, (Lend., Laurence and Wishart. 
1968), **68-593, at 510. ~
2. S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex. H.M. Parshley tr. and ed., (Harmonds- 
worth, Penguin, 1982), Intro., at 21.
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The right of the female to maintenance in the traditional Hindu 
law, its interpretation in case-law and the importance that it assumed 
in the context of s. 1*+, the arise of the "limited estate", its re­
assertion in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937t - the 
professed aim of which was to give "better rights" to women - and its 
demise finally in 1956* have been dwelt upon. In the treatment of s. 1**, 
special emphasis has been placed on the difficulties of interpretation, 
and in areas of controversy, what seemed the correct construction, pro­
jected. But such propositions as have been put forward are by their 
very nature tentative, for nothing is gained by assuming that the scope 
of a rule is clear when in fact the position is otherwise; and while 
those submissions might not emerge as the eventual solution, that is of 
little moment provided that the existence and nature of the problems are 
clearly apprehended.
Much thought has been given to the order and arrangement of the 
material, but in the attempt to explain the new legislation in the con­
text of the old law, a certain overlap became inevitable though the 
quite extensive use of cross references has, to a considerable extent, 
obviated this problem.
In the presentation of the study, this writer was mindful at every 
stage of a compelling danger: Where the sensibilities are sharpened
to a heightened perception of the inequities that the female of the 
species must endure in male—dominated societies, the susceptibility 
towards a subjective handling of potentially emotive material had to be 
guarded against. The attempt throughout has been to maintain the balance, 
to keep perspective in sight, and like the Imagination of that "inventor 
of harmonies”, the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, to reconcile "a more 
than usual state of emotion with a more than usual order."
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION --- TOWARDS THE FURTHERANCE OF THE EGALITARIAN IDEAL *
AS MBODIED IN ARTICLE 44 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
"The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep, ^
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep."
Robert Frost,
From 'Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening'
I, The Secular Nature of the Indian Constitution
In a land as vast and populous as India, it is only to be expected
that there would be a corresponding diversity  cultural, linguishland
religious. In particular, in the religious sphere, "no other country 
can compare in the vast expanse covered from animism and stone worship 
to the highest theological and metaphysical absolutes and universals. 
Apart from the Hindu majority, there are sizcokU, minorities of Muslims, 
Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians among many others, and in this respect 
few would challenge Arnold Toynbee's characterisation of this civilisa­
tion as one displaying a "manifest tendency towards an outlook that is 
predominantly religious." In the light of this fact the emergence of
India as a secular State in the mid-twentieth century must be regarded as
2a significant social, political and religious phenomenon.
The problem of Independent India as a secular State is a complex 
one. The rich diversity of religious life, the legacy of the British 
rule, the struggle for independence, the communalism that spread in its
wake, and finally the partition of the country --  all of these factors
and many others are a part of the complex pattern.
1. A.J. Dastoor, "Secularism and National Integration", G.L. Chanda- 
varkar et al., ed., Law, Society and Education, (Bom., Somaiya,
1973), 100-14, at 100.
2. D.E.Smith, India as a Secular State, (Princeton, Univ. Press, 19&3), 
Preface, at vii.
The British having established their suzeranity in India, then 
made efforts to introduce in the country a systematic and modern legal 
framework. Contractual transactions, commercial affairs, family 
relations, and transfer and succession of property were all regulated 
by the so-called religious laws and customs of the parties approaching 
a court. The law or custom of one or the other religion thus formed 
the Rule of Decision in every case. To the British rulers the system 
appeared complicated and anachronistic. This they set out to change .The 
religion-based criminal laws of India were reformed piecemeal,which process 
eventually culminated in the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure 
in 1859, and the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure in i860 
and 1861 respectively. Along similar lines was also enacted the Iniian 
Evidence Act of 1872.
Likewise the British could also have given to the country a civil 
code. This they did not do, for though they had often enough exercised 
their powers and responsibilities as rulers to tinker with, or to adjust 
the native personal laws of India before 1857, (the abolition of sati 
and female infanticide being the chief among them), the Mutiny was a 
severe shock from which British confidence never recovered. It was 
therefore determined that there should be no interferences with the 
religions of the subject peoples, and the principal personal laws were 
classified as Hreligious.It must also be admitted that the adherence 
by the different religious communities to their respective personal laws 
was a device which the British used conveniently and dexterously, as 
indirectly tending to keep the subject peoples and the body politic of 
India divided. The result was the birth of a system of communal personal 
laws which has survived in the entire subcontinent to the present day.
1. J.D.M. Derrett, The Death of a Marriage law, (hereinafter referred 
to as DML), (New Delhi, Vikas, 1978), at 7*f.
However with the dawn of Independence a new spirit has set in,
and the search for national int egret ion is on. In its Preamble, the
Constitution of India has declared that the people of India has resolved
to constitute India into a “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic
Republic,"'1' and to secure to all her citizens justice - social, economic
and political, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship,
2
equality of status and opportunity ... In substance these provisions
involved a commitment to the ideal of creating a new social order based
on social equality and political and economic justice. The aim of the
Constitution being professedly secular, there is no place for the
multiplicity of personal laws now prevalent, some of them "revealed",
which constantly interfere in, and erode the ends by means of which a
more just society may be achieved.
However, religious freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution under
Articles 25-28 is confined IK its application to personal matters like
the individual's right to religious profession, his right to adhere to,
and practise the tenets of his faith. But beyond that the State reserves
to itself the right to interfere considerably in "regulating or
restricting any economic, financial and political or other secular
3
activity which may be associated with religious practice," and for
Zj.
"providing for social welfare and reform ...," thereby laying down the 
framework of Indian secularism which is a concept quite from what
it stands for in the West.
1. S. 2 of The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act. 1976» providest
"In the Preamble to the Constitution, -
(a) for the words "Sovereign Democratic Republic," the words
"Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic" shall be substituted}."
2. Preamble to the Constitution of India.
3. Art. 25 (2) (a).
4. Art. 25 (2) (b).
Rufus M. Jones defines secularism as "a way of life and an 
interpretation of life that include only the natural order of things, 
and that do not find God, or a realm of spiritual reality essential for 
life and thought."^ This definition of secularism sums up in essence 
the prevalent assumption in the West that there exists a kind of 
antinomy between religion and secularism; certainty the emphasis on the 
separation of State and religion in the western countries is historically 
rooted in the conflict between the spiritual power as represented by the 
Christian Church, and the temporal power as represented by the king from 
time to time. Christianity itself set the tone in the now oft-quoted
dictum "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and
2unto God the things that are God’s," which in effect is generally believed 
to mean that it is not the function of the State to promote, regulate, 
direct or otherwise interfere in religion. Similarly political power 
is outside the scope of religion’s legitimate aims.
However the secularism that is contemplated by the Indian 
Constitution does not postulate an inevitable and inexorable conflict 
between temporal and spiritual power, and in fact the scheme adopted by 
the Constitution is to evolve a rational synthesis between the legitimate 
claims of the spiritual and the temporal power, and the working definition 
of secularism by Smith might well sum up the nature of Indian secularism 
as embodied in the Constitution*
"(T)he secular state is a 3tate which guarantees individual 
and corporate freedom of religion, deals with the individual 
as a citizen irrespective of his religion, is not con­
stitutionally connected to a particular religion, nor does 
it seek either to promote or interfere with religion." 3
1. Cited in V.P. Luthera, The Concept of the Secular State in India, 
(Cal, O.U.P., 197*0 t atl^T
2. Matt. 22. 21.
3. Smith, op. cit., at 6
Religion then becomes each man's ultimate concern, thereby bringing 
under the roof of religion even those most eager to abolish it, and 
religious liberty is founded on the idea of rights* every citizen, 
wherever he lives, has the right to believe or not to believe as he 
chooses, to practise the faith he wishes to practise or to practise none, 
and the secular state is one that makes no pretence to competence in 
religious matters, and remains scrupulously neutral in weighing the
merits of competing religious bodies. In brief then, in the words of 
Maritain the birth of such a secular faith occurs when*
"(M)en possessing quite different, even opposite 
metaphysical and religious outlooks, can converge, 
not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by 
virtue of analogical similitude in practical 
principles, towards the same practical conclusions, 
and can share in the same practical secular faith, 
provided they similarly revere, perhaps for quite 
diverse reasons, truth and intelligence, human 
dignity, freedom, brotherly love and the absolute 
value of moral good." 1
Based on such a premise Mr Justice Gajendragadkar states autho­
ritatively,". .. the Indian Constitution is not anti-god or anti-religion j
it treats all religions alike and requires all of them to function within
2their legitimate bounds," and quotes with approval Dr. Radhakrishnan,
who as the then Vice President of India affirmed "I want to state
authoritatively that secularism does not mean irreligion. It means we
respect all faiths and religions. Our State does not identify itself
•a
with any particular religion."
1. J. Maritain, Man and the State. (Chicago, Univ. Press, 1951)» a*t 111
2. P.B. Gajendragadkar, Secularism and the Constitution of India, (Bom, 
Univ. Press, 1971)» at 5a-
3. Ibid.
To this end Art. 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of 
conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, 
while Art. 26 deals with the freedom to manage religious affairs, subject 
however to public order, morality and health. In other words should 
the State feel that the practice of any form of religion is detrimental 
to public welfare, and violates any existing secular law, such rights 
as guaranteed by these two Articles are to be subject to modification.
The Indian Constitution therefore insists that while the pursuit 
of religion in the abstract - "philosophy, ethics or morality if you 
like - religion which is inspired by the spirit of human inquiry into 
the Unknown, the cause of the Universe and the eternal verities,"1 for 
moral and spiritual development, is a quest, peculiarly the individual's 
own, yet the laws that govern his personal life is a secular matter, 
social in character, and all persons should be governed by the same 
principles of personal law, based on reason, justice, equity and good 
conscience.
In a symposium in memory of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru entitled 
Socialism, Democracy and Secularism, Dr. Abu Sayeed Ayyub, the Muslim 
editor of Quest, had the following revealing remarks to make*
"(l)t is just as well that it (India) is not secular in 
the Western sense of complete separation between Church 
and State, for It reserves to itself the right to 
intervene in the interest of necessary social reform 
in matters which customarily come under the pursuit 
of religion, ... Whatever ancient scriptures might 
say, bigamy (not to say polygamy) shocks the moral 
sense of modem man. Ancient scriptures hardly kept 
the balance even as between man and woman, Brahmin 
and Sudra, Momin (Muslim) and Kafir (Non-Muslim),
Christian and Heathen. No modem state can permit 
the perpetuation of such inequalities." 2
1. Gajendragadkar, op. cit., at kZ.
2. Cited in Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, (hereinafter 
referred to as RISI), iLond, Faber and Faber, 1968). at $16.
2. The Argument In Favour Of Codification
In a country like India therefore, where her peoples are faced 
with such inconsistencies and injustices as are bound to occur due to 
a rigid adherence to antiquated and obsolete rules and customs, it is 
essential then for the law to provide for legislation by means of which 
there would be a systematic and coherent system of personal law' embracing 
the entire body of citizens alike.
The dynamic role of law as an instrument of social change is now
a well-accepted thesis, for there is no other peaceful persuasive means
of bringing about the socio-economic Renaissance desired in a democratic
set-up. The Constitution of India is the fundamental law and the source
of all legislation - whether social or otherwise. The Fundamental Rights
and Directive Principles of State Policy which are contained respectively
in Parts III and IV of the Constitution constitute the basic core of it.
The Fundamental Rights assure individual freedom, and the Directive
Principles direct the State to bring in a social order In which justice -
social, political and economic, prevails.1
The earlier view that in case of conflict between the Fundamental
Rights and the Directive Principles, the latter have to conform to, and
2
run subsidiary to the former, was later amended, and the Court emphasized 
that both the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles are part of
3
the Constitution, and they have to be so reconciled as to give effect to both.
1. K.D. Gangrade, Social Legislation in India. Vol. 1, (New Delhi, 
Concept, 1978), at 1.
2. The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, A.I.R. 195^ S*C. 226.
3. In re Kerala Education Bill. A.I.R. 195® S.C. 916.
Rather the latest position is that the Courts seem inclined to give 
preferential treatment to the Directive Principles. In State of Kerala 
v. N.M. Thomas t^  a service rule of the State of Kerala which allotted 
extended time to the clerical staff belonging to ,-the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes for the passing of a qualifying test, was challenged 
by the staff belonging to other communities on the ground that such rule 
violated Art. 16 (l) which guarantees equality of opportunity in matters 
relating to employment, and also Art. 16 (2) which prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of caste, race, religion, etc. The State defended the rule 
on the ground that this was merely implementing the Directive Principle 
in Art. 45. The Supreme Court accepting the contention of the State 
upheld the rule.
However, in spite of the importance now being placed on the 
2
Directive Principles, they still remain essentially a matter of State 
policy which is moulded and shaped according to the exigencies of the 
circumstances, and it is against this backdrop that we must examine 
Art. 44, which if implemented, would be in consonance with the secular 
character of the Constitution. The multifarious personal laws, with 
all their contradictions and anomalies would be wiped away at one 
fell swoop, and in their place would appear a code of lawB governing 
all impartially and alike.
1. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490.
2. Art. 31 C now saves any law enacted to implement any or all the 
Directive Principles from being questioned in a court of law on the 
ground of inconsistency with any of the rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 
19, and 31. Vide the Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution
of India.
3. For a comprehension account of such contradictions and anomalies 
which in itself provides a compelling case for codification see 
Derrett, RISI, op. cit., 54-2-4. See also T. Mahmood, "On Securing 
a Common Civil Code," T. Mahmood, An Indian Civil Code and 
Islamic law. (Bom, Tripathi, 1976), at 10-11.
The tendency is towards codification in the modem world and 
India cannot afford to lag behind. Art. 13 of the Charter of the 
United Nations envisages the active encouragement and progressive 
development of the international law and its codification, and in the 
same field, we may well adapt for our own purposes the clear-sighted 
vision of Oppenheim to the effect that,/lack of precision which is k ^  
natural to a large number of the rules of law on account of its slow 
growth must inevitably create a movement for its codification with a 
view to the systematisation and unification of agreed principles on 
the one hand, and the reconciling of hitherto divergent views on the 
other, as also consideration for those which are not adequately 
regulated.^ In sum then, codification thus leads to a system of law 
that is simple, certain, lucid and uniform, incapable (one hopes) of 
giving rise to disputes, and easily intelligible.
In India however, this is a task fraught with many difficulties, 
for as we have already observed, it is a land of many faiths, of many 
racial and cultural minorities. The added difficulty is that these 
religions have many socio-religious obligations in respect of marriage, 
divorce, family life and succession. But while these races, linguistic 
groups, minorities and faiths have to be respected, a line must be 
drawn in favour of a Uniform Civil Code for the sake of the larger 
interest of the nation and the State. The sociological aspects of 
religions need to be separated so thats
"(R)eligion in the Constitution should be interpreted 
to mean one's belief and faith ... Similarly, customary 
law, and such customs as are sociological need to be 
separated from religion in the context of the modem 
world. India must get rid of those shackles of the past 
which are a restriction on social freedom, social progress, 
and socio-economic awareness of the current times." 2
1. L. Oppenheim, International law. Vol. 1, 8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed., 
(Lond, Longmans, Green, 1955)# at 57 Tf.
2. P.B. Mukharji, "Uniform Civil Code," N. Khodie ed., Readings in 
Uniform Civil Code, (Bom, Thacker, 1975)* 3*9 at 7*
3. The Hostile Reaction Towards Codification
Opposition to such a step however, was naturally to be expected, 
specially from the more conservative sections of the intelligentsia.
i.-
An avowedly metaphysical argument against the uniform civil code is
that, family laws and personal laws of various communities in India
are of divine origin, and therefore not to be tampered with, as they
would naturally controvert certain religious doctrines. This in fact
was the argument advanced most vocally on the floor of Parliament, when
the Bills for the reform of the Hindu law were introduced in Parliament.
Muslim members advanced the same argument in their opposition to the
introduction of the uniform civil code.^
It is of course conveniently forgotten that although the Hindus
and Muslims have claimed all their laws as of divine origin, for almost
a century they have been governed by one single law of Crime, Contract,
Tort, Evidence,Procedure and the like, which are neither the laws of
the Muslims nor of the Hindus, and have no divine traces in them. They
2
are essentially civil laws - laws, which as we have already seen, our 
British rulers thought best to give us, and which are, barring the 
Criminal law in Pakistan, still the laws in the entire subcontinent. 
Carrying the argument forward, these vehement opponents of reform point 
out that no person is authorised to put such amendments into effect since 
no Hindu or Muslim as the case may be, may legislate contrary to the 
tenor of the Vedas or the Qur'an. Interpretation of these holy writs 
could only be done by those specially qualified in that science, and 
such persons are few, or not represented at all in Parliament. The
1. Discussed below at 30-1.
2. Discussed above at 21.
argument runs on that even if authority could be conceded to a modern 
legislative body, it would be inexpedient in a secular state to 
legislate in such a way as to subvert religious tenets by making it 
either difficult to put such tenets into practice, or easy to evade 
them altogether.
It is also pointed out that, if the reformers insist upon a code
of a comprehensive nature, they must have a residual law to rely on in
the event of a casus omissus, that is to say, where a problem turns out
to be incapable of solution by reference to the terms of the statute. In
the absence of a residual law, undue confusion and absurd anomalies are
bound to occur sooner or later, giving rise to increased litigation, for
the law would hardly be more certain until the Supreme Court had pronounced
on every ambiguous point in the Code.^
This attitude, and the apprehension on the part of Muslims in
India that the law of the majority community would be foisted on them
in the garb of a civil code, were the reasons for the vociferous protests
in the Consitituent Assembly concerning the issue. Mohammed Ismail was
of the view that a secular state should not interfere with the personal law of
a people, which was part of their faith, their culture, their way of life.
He claimed that the European countries, including Yugoslavia protected
2
the Mussulmans in the matter of family law and personal status.
Naziru&din Ahmed pleaded that abrogation of personal law should not be 
treated as regulation of secular affairs surrounding religion, or as a 
measure of social welfare and reform. He pointed out that even the
British who had enacted uniform Civil and Criminal codes nevertheless
3
left the personal laws untouched. Pocker Sahib felt that no community
1. The arguments set forth above have been adapted for my purposes from 
Derrett, Hindu law Past and Present, (hereinafter referred to as HLFP) 
(Cal, A. Mukherjee, 1957), 38
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, (l9^ 8-*f9)t (hereinafter referred to 
as C.A.D.), Vol. VII at 5^ 0-1.
3. Ibid, at 5^ 1-3-
r>
favoured uniformity of civil laws; organisations, both Hindu and Muslim, 
questioned the competence of the Constituent Assembly to interfere with 
religious laws. Art. 44 (35 as it was then) was thus antagonistic to 
religious freedom and hence "a tyrannous measure".'*' Hussain Imam won­
dered whether there could be "uniformity of civil law in a diverse 
country like ours ... when there are eleven or twelve legislative bodies 
(entitled to) legislate on subjects like marriage, divorce, succession
according to the requirements of their own people and their own 
2circumstances."
A similar hostility was very much in evidence when the first step
towards the coai^jfication of the Hindu law was taken in the codifying
Acts of 1955-56, known as the "Hindu Code", which however is still a
system of personal law applicable to people on the grounds of their 
3
religion. The history of the relevant enactment shows that the masses
belonging to the Hindu, Sikh, and other allied religious did not accept
the new laws with any great pleasure. There was in fact, a great deal
of resentment expressed in Parliament. In 1951# the Hindu Code Bill
was subjected to severe criticism by some members as a measure which
amounted to discrimination between different sections of citizens on
the ground of religion, while during the debate on the Hindu Marriage
Eill, J.B. Kripalani thundere:!:
"(l)f we are a democratic State, we must make laws not 
for one community alone. Today the Hindu community 
is for monogamy... Will the Government introduce a 
bill for monogamy for the Muslim community... (for) 
every community in India?... I tell you this is the ^ 
democratic way, for the other is the communal way...,
1. Ibid., at 544-6.
2. Ibid., at 546.
3. Derrett, HISI, op. cit., at 321.
4. Lok Sabha Debates, (1955) # H# Vol. I, Col. 7376.
to which Dr. Ambedkar's effective rejoinder was that since the Constitution 
permitted, differential treatment of different communities, the Government 
could not be charged with,practising discrimination.1
4. The Imperative Nature Of The Directive In Article 44
However, whatever differences of opinion there may be, and however 
vehement, there is no avoiding or ignoring the directive laid down in 
Art. 44 of the Constitution that,
"(T)he State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a 
uniform civil code throughout the territory of India."
But like all other Directive Principles specified in the Constitution,
the provision of Art. 44 too "shall not be enforceable by any court" but
is "nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country," and has
2
to be applied by the State "in making laws."
By virtue of the powers vested in it under List III Entry 5* in the 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the Legislature could have enacted 
such a code straightaway, but taking into account that in the mandate of 
Art. 44, the accent is on. the words endeavour to secure, it (the Legislature) 
has desisted from such a step. Rather Art. 44 envisages the Legislature 
and the Executive leading the nation at the end of an evolutionary process, 
to the era of uniformity in civil laws. Moreover if and when the State 
fulfils the duty imposed on it by Art. 44, its action will be constitutionally 
protected by Art. 25 (2) which empowers the State to regulate by law "secular 
activities associated with religious practice," and to embark upon pro­
grammes of "social welfare and reform."
On the other hand the more enlightened opinion is that codification 
of Indian Personal laws as laid down in the Constitution is an object of
1. Ibid.
2. Art. 37 of the Constitution.
national policy (Art. 44), which when implemented would bring about the
i
unification of all laws, leading to a unity which alone would satisfy 
national aspirations. The personal laws, they also point out, are 
overdue for reform in certain respects, which cry aloud for amendment 
in the face of undoubted political and social developments in the last 
more than half century. Thus the present complexity, uncertainty and 
rigidity, which is unique in the civilised world, profits none but the 
legal profession; it gives rise to unlimited injustice and fraud since 
the public often hestitate to enter upon litigation which may turn out 
to be not merely hazardous, but intolerably dilatory and expensive.
In short then, the results of the present situation are so dis­
tressing that there is no advantage in delay, and the implementation 
of Art. 44 should go forward without further ado, whereby the people 
would be subject to a more homogeneous, less anomalous and less self­
contradictory set of laws.1
5. The Cautious Stance Towards the Implementation of Art. 44
An analysis of the various attitudes towards Art. 44 reveals that
judicial opinion is in favour of the view that a uniform civil code is not
necessarily to be enacted at a stretch. It may be enacted in fragments,
either community-wise, or subject-wise. In State of Bombay v. Narasu 
2
Appa Mali. Gajendragadkar J., had expressed just such views. In the Bame
case Chagla C. J., (as he then was), also states clearly
"(T)he scheme of the Constitution seems to be to leave 
personal law unaffected except where specific provision 
is made with regard to it, and leave it to the 
Legislatures in future to modify and improve it, aid 
ultimately to put on the Btatute book a common and 
uniform Code." 3
1. Derrett, HLPP, op. cit., at 4l.
2. A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84.
3. Ibid, at 89.
By implication then, the court seems to have expressed the opinion that 
since Muslims and other minorities were not prepared to accept and work 
social reform, the enactment of an all-embracing civil code may be 
lawfully deferred though not shelved altogether. r
The same note of caution is struck by others who likewise believe 
that unseemly haste is unwarranted. Thus*
"(o)f course, life - a nation's life - is complex, sensitive, 
explosive, and deserves careful creative steering. In 
such a perspective, as important as the goal, is the social 
strategy of attaining the goal. One wrong step forward may 
well be two forced steps backward." 1
Of the Orientalists it is well worth heeding a leading authority*
"(T)he greatest need of the moment, as it seems to me, is 
to convince them (Indian Muslims) that their personal law, 
as this is at present administered in India, stands in 
urgent need of reform... Another crying need, at this 
juncture, is to convince the majority community that there 
is no urgency about the implementation of Art. 44 of the 
Directive Principles of the Constitution. These principles 
are not mandatory as such; and the impatience in this 
matter shown by Justice K.S. Hedge (cf. K.S. Heqd©,
"Directive Principles of the State Policy," in I.S.C. J.
50-72, (1971))» and many others seem to me misplaced.
It has inevitably given rise to a marked feeling of 
insecurity in the Muslim community which is damaging to 
the best interests of the state." 2
In short therefore, "hasten slowly,"^ but hasten surely, must in the 
end be the formula, for securing a common civil code can only temporarily 
be held up; it cannot be shelved forever.
6. The "Hindu Code"
The way had already been prepared by the slow trickle of legislative 
reforms enacted during the period of the British"1 presence in India. The
1. V.R. Krishna Iyer/Foreword,T. Mahmood, An Indian Civil Code and 
Islamic Law, op. cit., at VII.
2. J.N.D. Anderson, "Muslim Personal Law in India," . Readings in 
Uniform Civil Code, op. cit., 4l-6l, at 42.
3. J.D.M. Derrett "The Indian Civil Code or Code of Family Law," ibid 
21-38, at 23.
Caste Disabilities Removal Act. I85O, the Hindu Widows * Remarriage Act I856, 
the Age of Consent Act l891. the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) 
Act^  1928, the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929* the Hindu 
Gains of Learning Act 1930. the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1^937 
and the Hindu Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act 1946, 
were all departures from the sastra and were merely intended to give relief 
to those who felt the Inadequacies of the ancient law.
But these were erratic efforts at best, and in view of the guarantees
in the Constitution to the citizens of India, of equality before the law,1
2
of equal protection of the laws and of the prohibition against dis- 
crimination "on grounds only of religion , race, caste, sex ...» enlightened 
Hindu public opinion was committed to bringing the law into line with modem 
social developments. Thus immediately on Independence Parliament directed 
its attention to the needB of the majority community by reintroducing in 
the Legislature, a comprehensive measure covering the most important areas 
of the Hindu law, in the form of the long pending "Hindu Code" Bill with a 
view to reforming the personal law of the Hindus to suit the changing times. 
This in turn was to be followed by legislation affecting other communities 
so as to bring uniformity and certainty into Indian family law.
However, when the Hindu Code Bill did come up for consideration 
before Parliament in 195^ » such was the violent opposition from the more 
orthodox sections of the Hindu community that, eventually only four 
clauses were passed; Parliament was forced to shelve the project tem­
porarily and resign itself to a period of further postponement of the
5
implementation of the Directive contained in Art. 44 of the Constitution.
1. Art. 14
2. Ibid.
3. Art. 150) *
4. See above at 31.
5- For the history of the Hindu Code Bill see Chapter Six.
But such stagnation was not to be for long, and the Special Marriage 
Act of 1954, enabling any two Indians wishing to marry, to adopt a common 
and secular law of marriage and inheritance, gave a fresh impetus to the 
reforming zeal already so much in evidence among the elite of the majority 
community, and this directly led to the enactment of what we have already 
referred to as the "Hindu Code." The passing of the Hindu Marriage Act in 
1955 was followed in quick succession by the Hindu Succession Act^l956t 
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Actl956 and the Hindu Minority and 
Guardianship Actj1956. Thus was taken the first pragmatic step towards 
achieving the greater target. It was a momentous step, "a great step 
forward in social legislation,"1 which "for width of scope and boldness
z 2
of innovation can be compared only with the Code Napoleon." The technical 
aims of the codifications were to unify the law of the Hindus relating to 
marriage, succession, guardianship, minority, adoption and maintenance. 
Certainty of the law was another object, and (most importantly for our
purposes), the equality of the sexes and the elimination of restrictive
3
and antique rules. We will now proceed to examine to what extent this 
last-named objective is fulfilled in the various fields which these 
enactments encompass.
(l) Marriage
With a view to ameliorating the lot of the Hindu wife, bound as she 
was by convention, tradition and ancient notions of subordination to the 
husband and the family, the Legislature taking its courage in both hands 
as it were, passed the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 (hereinafter referred to
1. C.C. Biswas, the then Law Minister, Hindustan Times, (New Delhi),
July 29, 1952.
2. Derrett, RISI, op. cit., at 326
3. G-D Sontheimer, "Recent Developments in Hindu law," ICLQ, Supplementary 
Publication No 8, 1964, 32-45 at 34.
as the HMA), and the changes that this, as amended by the Marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the ML(A)A), have brought 
about are fundamental and far-reaching in that they are significant 
departures from the traditional Hindu concept of carriage as evaluated 
in the sastra.
(a) Registration
For all that it envisages an essentially Hindu marriage in 
conformity with the customary rites pertaining to either party,  ^in view 
of the difficulty of proving such marriages with any degree of precision, 
s. 8 makes a break with the past, and in providing for the registration 
of Hindu marriages is, it is submitted, an safeguardi0-3
such future matrimonial misdemeanour as may be in the contemplation of 
the Hindu husband.
(b) Monogamy
In laying down the principle of monogamy by prescribing that, a
valid marriage may only be solemnised provided that neither party has a
2
spouse living at the time of such marriage, the HMA renders polygamous
o
marriages null and void, and bigamy punishable under ss. of the
Indian Penal Code.
Laudatory as this measure might seem because in consonance with
modem notions of justice and "fair play”,
"(Y)et a careful consideration of bigamy within the context* 
of modem Indian law has revealed that the bigamously 
married Hindu woman lies in a legal no - man's land, so 
that she cannot claim any of the advantages to which a 
concubine was entitled under the old law* Karayanaswami v. 
Padmanabhan, A.I.R. 1966 Mad 39^." 5
1. MA, s* 7(1).
2. Ibid. s. 5(1).
3. Ibid, s. 11.
*+. Ibid, s. 17.
5. Derrett, HIS I, op. cit., at 358, 2.
It could well be argued that such a provision would be violative of Art.
15 (l) of the Constitution (supra, at 35), as being discriminatory on the 
ground of sex. But the question that invariably arises is* discrimination 
against which sex? Certainly not against the male as the qualified poly­
gamy that it envisages, gives him the freedom to contract a second marriage, 
while the wife is simultaneously protected from the disgrace and ignominy 
that are reserved, upon divorce, for females in India. In fact, such a 
measure would, it is submitted, be in consonance with Art. 15 (3)> infra, 
atJ^9, f.n. Equally, should the polygamously married wife be dissatis­
fied with the union, the option of divorce - however distasteful - is al­
ways open to her under s. 13 (2) (l) of the HMA, 1955* infra, at ^9.
Heed too should have been paid to Kane's warning that, as in­
sistence on monogamy is opposed by many, some compromise might have been 
arrived at as regards classes to whom two wives are an advantageand
H (S)hould not a carefully regulated polygamy in cases of in­
fertility, mental instability and the like be a lesser evil 
than annulment directly leading to immorality or other abuses?*’ 2
(c) Chi Id-Marriages Discouraged
Since its amendment in 1976, the Act has, in theory at least, done 
away with the evil of child marriages, and stipulates as one of the desirable 
requisites of a Hindu marriage that, the bridegroom should have completed the 
age of twenty-one and the bride the age of eighteen years However non- 
observance of this clause does not render, nor is there any other provision 
in the Act which renders void or voidable, a marriage violative of this clause.
Ho doubt s. 18 (b) contemplates that the parties to a marriage in con­
travention of s. 5 (iii) are punishable with simple imprisonment which may
extend to fifteen days or with a fine which may extend to Rs 1,000 or with 
a
both. But such lenient penalisation, it is submitted, is no effective check,
1. P.V. Kane. History of Dharmasastra. (hereinafter referred to as HD).
Vol. Ill, (Poona, BORI, 1973), 82^ .
2. So J.D.M.Derrett rationalises*A Critique of Modern Hindu Law (herein­
after referred to as Critique), (Bom. Tripathi, 1970). at 309-10.
3. HMA, s. 5 (iii), and this is in line with the requirements in the Child 
Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act. 1978 applicable to all communities
in India.
4. Although decisions in Palasetti v. Sriramulu A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 375»
Suramma v. Ganpath A.I.R. 1975 A.P. 193, and Krishna v. Tulsan A.I.R.
1978 P. A H. 305 indicate the view that marriages in contravention of 
s. 5 (iii) are void ab initio, it is however submitted that the F.B. 
ruling of the A.P. High Court is more in keeping with the legislative 
intendment. It was held in Venkataramana v. State, A.I.R. 1977 A.P. ^3 
(F.B.), that though the parties concerned are liable to punishment under 
s. 18, and should the requirements of s. 13 (2) (iv) (to the effect that 
the wife repudiates the marriage contracted earlier, after she has reached 
the age of fifteen and before she has completed the age of eighteen years), 
be met with, a decree for divorce at the instance of the wife may be 
granted* barring these two consequences there are no other consequences 
from the contravention of s. 5 (iii)- See also Durjyodhan v. Bangapati, 
A.I.R. 1977 Or. 36. Similarly the Punjab High Court has held in Mohinder 
Kaur v. Major Singh A.I.R. 1971 P. A H. 17^ that, a marriage in violation 
of s. 5 (iii) not being a nullity, it cannot be pleaded in defence to a 
petition for restitution of conjugal rights.
and the reality is that such marriages, with^attendant consequences , VKe'vn 
continue to be endemic in the country. %
(d) Voidable Marriages
The Act also provides for a further alleviation from the miseries
of an indissoluble marriage tie in that, so far as the wife is concerned,
a marriage is voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity should
she so desire on grounds of her husband's impotence,^- insanity and 
2
epilepsy, and that the consent to the marriage had been obtained by
3
force or fraud.
(e) Remarriage
As a necessary corollary to the right of divorce as contemplated in 
s. 13 (l), 13 (l-A) and 13 (2)**, s. 15 of the HMA stipulates that, a 
woman whose marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce, may law­
fully marry again^ where there is no right of appeal against the decree,
1. HMA, s. 12 (l) (a). Impotency signifies physical and incurable in­
capacity to consummate the marriage, Mathuram v. Vijayarara, (1979)
2 M.L.J. 301 (F.B.).
2. HMA, s. 2 (1) (b). For such unsoundness of mind as rendered the
respondent incapable of giving valid assent to the marriage resulting
in its dissolution, see Anima v. Probodh A.I.R. 1969 Gal. 30*+? Pronob 
Kumar v. Krishna, A.I.R. 1975 Gal. 109.
3* HMA, s. 12 (l) (c). Prior to the amendments of 1976, some decisions
had taken the view that the term "fraud" was restricted to deception 
in relation to the marriage ceremonies or, to the identity of the 
party marrying. See Raghunath v. Vi.jaya, A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 132j 
Ra.jaram v. Deepabai, A.I.R. 1974 M.P. 52? Madhusadan v. Chandrika, 
A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 17*+? Padmaja v. Sivaraman, /197^/K.L.T. 213.
An interesting illustration of this attitude is to be found in 
Ranibala v. Debnath (1969) 73 C.W.N. 751 which held that, where a 
woman marries without informing her husband of her previous unchastity, 
the fact that the husband would not have married her had he known 
of it, would not amount to "fraud" as contemplated in s. 12 (l) (c) 
so as to vitiate the marriage. This however cannot hold true anymore 
as, what is "fraud" is now expressly set out in the amended sub-s. 
as "fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material 
fact or circumstances concerning the respondent."
4. Discussed below.
5. The widow was granted such right under the HWRA, 1856.
or if there is one, the appeal time has expired without any appeal being 
preferred or, where any appeal is preferred, after it had been dismissed.
The effect of the deletion by the ML(A)A of the Proviso stipulating a 
one-year waiting before remarriage is that the parties may remarry soon 
thereafter.
In regard however to the validity of a fresh marriage contracted 
before the expiry of the period of limitation for presenting an appeal, 
or where an appeal had been presented, during the pendency of the appeal, 
the observation in Lila Gupta v. Laxml Narain  ^that, "... there is good 
ground for saying that a contention that a marriage solemnised in violation
2
of the main provision in s. 15 is a nullity cannot be summarily rejected..."
3is indicative that such marriage is indeed void ab initio.
However, the rule contained in s. 15 inhibiting the remarriage of
persons divorced under the HMA does not apply to divorced persons who have
taken advantage of s. 29 (2) and been divorced by caste customary tribunal
or under the provisions of a continued statute. It might be argued with
some show of plausibility that the rule in s. 15 applies to all persons
whose divorce has been obtained by decree, and that it is a rule about
capacity to marry and not a rule relating to conditions of a divorce. The
better view seems to be that s. 15 is an integral part of the divorce
Bection of the HMA and its words are applicable only to the machinery of
that Act, and to hold otherwise would be an unjustifiable discrimination
against those whose marriages are dissolved by- decree rather than by
4
award or agreement.
1. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1351.
2. Ibid.,at 1362 (Per Pathak,J.,).
3. Nagabhushanam v. Nagcndramma, A.I.R. 1955 A. P. 181.
4. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu law, (hereinafter referred to 
as IMHL), (Bom., O.U.P.. 1963). at 240.
(2) Matrimonial Reliefs
(a) Restitution of Conjugal Rights *
As a safeguard against hasty decisions to divorce and so as to give the
parties to a marriage time and opportunity to reconsider, s. 9 lays down
that when either the husband or the wife has without reasonable excuse
withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply
to the court for restitution of conjugal rights.
Normally withdrawing from the society of the spouse suggests separation
and living apart with the intention not to come back. However it was held in
Raineshchandra v. Premiata ~^ that mere temporary withdrawal by the wife from
the society of the husband did not amount to withdrawal when she had no
animus to withdraw permanently from such society. Neither could it be said
that the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband if it is a case
2
of enforced separation necessitated by the service conditions of the wife.
1. A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 15. See also Ratnaprabhabai v. Seshrao, A.I.R. 1972 
Bom. 182.
2. Shantl v. Ramesh, (1971) All. L.J. 67? Pravinben v. Sureshbhal, A.I.R.
1975 Guj. 69? Mlrchumal v. Devi Bal, A.I.R. 1977 Raj. 113* It is how­
ever submitted that the dicta in Garg v. Garg, A.I.R. 1978 Del. 296, 
requires careful reconsideration. Drawing amply from analogies of 
English law, the Delhi High Court was of the view that, if the 
dharmasastra preached that, the wife should always submit to the 
husband whatever the circumstances of each of them, that was only an 
ideal aimed at by the authors; that the basic principles on which the 
location of the matrimonial home is to be determined are based on the 
common conveniences of the spouses and balance of circumstances; that 
the principle that, the wife is not entitled to separate residence 
and maintenance except under justified circumstances, and otherwise 
the spouses are expected to live together in the matrimonial home, is 
only where the wife depends on the husband financially. Where the 
circumstances are equally balanced in favour of the wife and the 
husband, neither of them is entitled to sue the other for restitution 
of conjugal rights. It was further pointed out that M y  law which 
gave exclusive rights to the husband to decide upon the matrimonial 
home without considering the merits of the wife's claim would be 
contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution. One need not have any great 
depth of understanding of the marriage law to approve Raghavachriar's 
observation that, "The Delhi decision overlooks the fact that the Hindu 
marriage is still not wholly secular and carries much religious sig­
nificance. Relaxation of the ancient rule needed in the case of work­
ing wives who are better situated than their husbands to choose the 
matrimonial home, does not call for a repudiation of the rule itself...
Nor is it useful to invoke the analogies of English law in this matter 
in view of the differences in the conditions and culture of this 
country." N.R. Raghavachariar^ Hindu law. Principles and Precedents, 7th ed. 
Vol. 11 f (Kad. M.L.J ., Office 1980), 932.
But while this was one approach, the other viewpoint adopted by the 
courts was that, as a Hindu wife on marriage passed to her husband's family, 
it enjoined on her the duty of attendance, obedience to the husband and to 
live with him wherever he chose to reside,^ " and this is as much a rule today 
as it ever was. Taking into account the changed social and economic at­
mosphere where not infrequently the wife is as much the bread winner as the
2
husband, the court nevertheless held in Surjit Kaur v. Ujjal Singh that, the
husband acting bona fide, is entitled to determine the locus of the matri­
monial home in such cases.
A petition for restitution of conjugal rights is however not main­
tainable on the ground of withdrawal from the society of the petitioner 
unless it is shown that the withdrawal is without reasonable excuse. The 
grounds for judicial separation, nullity of marriage and divorce have been 
recognised by the courts to be valid grounds for separate living disentitling 
the other spouse to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
(b) Judicial Separation
It is also open to either of the spouses to apply for a decree of 
judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in s. 13 (l)» and
additionally to the wife, on any of the grounds specified in s. 13 (2)^ .
This particular provision of the HMA, like that contained in s. 9 
is a measure aimed at reconciliation, and valuable in India even without 
reference to a possible petition for divorce, since it is the remedy 
appropriate to spouses in communities where divorce and remarriage are 
still disliked or are socially and economically impracticable.-'*
1. Surinder v. Gurdeep, A.I.R. 1973 P. & H. 13*f, Radhakrishnan v. Dhanalakshmi, 
A.I.R. 1975 Mad.331.
2. (1978) 80 Punj. L.R. 693.
3. Discussed below.
5. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 206.
(c) Divorce
Hindus have, perhaps from the very beginning of their civilisation, 
regarded marriage as a sacrament, as a tie which once tied cannot be un­
tied the intention of the sacrament being
"(t)o make the husband and the wife one, physically and 
psychically, for secular and spiritual purposes, for this 
life and for after-lives." 2
The dharmasastra had thus established a high concept of marriage,
and an orthodox marriage in the Brahma form was final, the bride having
entered her husband's family for good. She might be "supersededby another
wife on account of a few specified reasons but divorce as such was impossible.
True, among certain communities of the lower castes women did possess more
freedom, and customary divorce and remarriage were not unknown at any time
in Indian history, but this was not the law according to fcrahmanical
standards to which the others aspired.
In modem times however, the growing realisation of the fallibility
of human decisions, not least of all in their choice of marriage partners,
had resulted in an ever growing awareness of divorce as a necessary though
unhappy corollary to marriage, and despite injunctions of sacred scriptures
to the contrary, divorce laws were passed in India in 1947 and 1949 in
Bombay and Madras respectively. The HMA as amended by the ML(A)A 1976,
merely consolidates that position and extends its jurisdiction to the whole 
If
of India, so that both husband and wife may now petition a court for 
divorce on specified grounds. S. 13 HMA is therefore, it is submitted, 
a shift from the sacramental to the contractual concept of marriage, a bold
1. P. Diwan, "Evolution of the Hindu Law of Marriage* Prom Sacramental 
Marriage to Breakdown-Divorce," Sontheimer and Aithal ed., Indology 
and Law* Studies in Honour of Professor J. Duncan M. Derrett (herein­
after referred to as IL), (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner VerlagT"* 1982),
248-70, at 248.
2. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 287.
3. Sontheimer, "Recent Developments in Hindu Law", op. cit., at 35.
4. Except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. S. 1 (2), HMA.
declaration that the Hindu marriage is in effect nothing else if not a
civil contract,'1 a legal rather than a sacramental union which may be
terminated by a decree of dissolution by the Court.
The wife (and likewise the husband), may now present a petition for
divorce on the ground of her husband's "voluntary sexual intercourse" with
2
any person other than herself. It is significant that the word "adultery"
has been removed from the amended clause and judicial construction has been
that even a single act of sexual intercourse subsequent to the marriage with
3
a person other than the spouse will be enough to sustain a case, 
ifCruelty which in the unamended Act was a ground for judicial se­
paration has been incorporated by the amendment of 1976 as a reason for 
divorce, and though it is difficult to define exactly what constitutes 
cruelty in all cases, the conduct complained of must be much higher than 
the ordinary wear and tear of married life.^ In Abraham v. Abraham,^  it 
was held that any conduct which causes disgrace to the wife, and annoyance 
and indignity amounts to legal cruelty; and the courts must determine not 
whether the petitioner has proved the charge of cruelty having regard to 
English law, but whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with 
such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in that person's mind 
that it will be harmful or injurious for that person to live with the
7
respondent. It may include cases other than those of injury and harm to
1. It is noteworthy that, while in Harbhajan v. Smt. Brij Balab, A.I.R. 
196^ Punj. 359f marriage was still held to be a sacrament under the 
HMA.the M.P. Hi^i Court, in defining the general character of a Hindu 
marriage stressed that, whatever else it is^is also undoubtedly a A, 
contract with coequal rights. See Dhedu v. Mst. Malhanbai, A.I.R.
1966 M.P. 252.
2. HMA, s. 13 (1) (i).
3. Mahalingam v, Amsavalli (1956) 2 M.L.J. 289. Subramanlyam v. Ponnak-
shiammal A.I.R. 195^ Mys. 4l. Valliammal v. Singaram, (1966) 2 M.L.J.
T&J.
4. HMA, s. 13 (1) (i-a).
5. Parihar v. Parihar, A.I.R. I978 Raj. 1**0.
6. A.I.R. 1959 Ker. 75-
7. Dastane v. Dastane, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 153^ - Followed in Suresh Kumar v. 
Smt. Suman, A.I.R. 1983 All. 225; Mrs. Suresh Bala v. Ma.lor uurmoninder, 
A.I.R. I983 Del. 230.
one's body, limb or health.1 It may be physical or mental. It may be by
2
words, gestures or mere silence , violence or non-violence. Thus^while
3
incompatibility of temperament will not amount to cruelty, neglect and
a
coldness leading to melancholia in the wife would. Demand by the husband
for excessive sexual intercourse leading to impairment of the wife's health,
has been construed as cruelty in Kusum Lata v. Kamla Prasad,-* and though
mere refusal of sexual intercourse is not cruelty per se, persistent
refusal would amount to cruelty.^ Cruelty may also be construed if harm
is done to reputation or social position. Where the husband brings false
charges of immorality against the wife, accuses her of adultery and persists
in such accusations, such behaviour would undermine the health of any decent
0
woman and would support her claim for relief. In sura then, in construing
cruelty, the economic position of the parties, culture, temperament, status
in life are factors to be considered, and must be judged on the basis of the
9
evidence on record and the totality of the circumstances of the case.
What constitutes "desertion" which has also been added to the grounds 
for divorce under s. 13 (l) (l-b) is a course of conduct and may either be 
actual or constructive.1^ It is in essence a repudiation of the duties
1. In Jagannadhan v. Savithramma, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 377* it was held that 
cruelty does not lie in merely beating the spouse/
2. Dr. Narayan v. Mrs. Sucheta, A.I.R. 1970 Bom. 312.
3. Dastane v. Dastane, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 153^ . See also Raraesh v. Nandita,
(1979) 1 C.W.R. 17.
*f. Kaushalya v. Vi jay Singh A.I.R. 1973 Raj* 269.
5. A.I.R. 1965 All. 280.
6. Nighawan v. Nighawan, A.I.R. 1973 0el. 200.
7. Susheela v. Gopalkrishna, (1975) K.L.T. 72.
8. Kuppuswami v. Alagammal, A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 391j Iqbal Kaur v. Pritam
Singh. A.I.R. 1963 Punj. 2^ 2j Umribai v. Chittar, A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 205| 
Smt. Bhago v. Bant Singh, (1972) 7^ Punj. L.R. 71*
9. Jia Lai v. Sarla Devi, A.I.R. 1978 J. & K. 69. See also Sreepadachar v. 
Vasantha Bai, A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 232? Neera v. Kishan, A.I.R. 1975
All. 337.
10. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 207-
inherent in marriage, or a determination to put an end to the matrimonial 
relationship as a living reality.^ " The Supreme Court has explained that,
"(F)or the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting 
spouse is concerned., two essential coalitions must be there, 
viz (i) the factum of separation and (ii) the intention to 
bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). 
Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted 
spouse is concerned: (i) the absence of consent, and
(ii) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse 
leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention 
aforesaid." 2
Once therefore the animus or intention never to return to conjugal
society is established, the offence of desertion de facto commences, and
it is immaterial that the parties are under the same roof, for desertion
3
is a withdrawal not from a place but from a state of things. Constructive 
desertion on the other hand, includes conduct of such a character that the 
spouse is either forced to depart or forced to remain without enjoyment of 
a constituent right to which he or she is entitled by virtue of the 
marriage. If one spouse by his words and conduct compels the other spouse 
to leave the matrimonial home, the former would be guilty of desertion 
though it is the latter who physically separates from the other and leaves 
the marital home.^ In sum then, in deciding the question of desertion, the 
Court has to look at the conduct of both the spouses and it must be remem­
bered that there is no substantial difference between a husband leaving 
his wife animus deserendi, and a husband who by his conduct with like 
intention brings cohabitation to an end by compelling his wife to depart 
from the matrimonial home.^ Where however the wife is living apart with
1. This in essence is the definition of the term in Rangaswami v. Aravin- 
dammal, A.I.R. 1957 Mad- 2^ 3* lachman v. Meena, A.I.R. 1964- S.C. 40; 
Mallappa v. Neelawwa, A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 59* Chakradhar v. Kumudini, (1971) 
1 C.W.R. 737; Labh Kaur v. Naraln Singh. A.I.R. 1976 P. & H. 3i7-
2. Bepinchandra v. Prabhavati, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 176 at 183.
3. Ouha v. Guha, A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 266.
4. Derrett, IMHL, 0£. cit., 207-8.
5. Rangaswami v. Arayindammal, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 2^ 3* Rohinl v. Karendra, 
A.I.R. 1972 S.C. *»59> Tara Chand v. Naraln Devi. A.I.R. I976 P. & H. 390.
6. Shrivastava v. Shrivastava, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 3^ 9.
her hushand's consent, this would not amount to desertion.1
Further reasons for the dissolution of marriage are: ceasing to be a
2 3Hindu by conversion, incurable insanity in its wider implication, leprosy
in a virulent and incurable form, venereal disease in a communicable form,
renunciation of the world by entering a religious order, ^ of not having been
heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more, non-resumption
of co-habitation for a period of one year or more after the passing of a
0
decree for judicial separation, and non-restitution of conjugal rights for
a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for such 
o
restitution.
In taking cognizance of the two last-named grounds, we must however 
beware of the pitfalls that the Indian wife faces when we consider the 
application of s. 23 (l) (a) to s. 13 (l-A). S. 23 (l) (a) HMA, inhibits 
the Court from granting a divorce to a petitioner who has successfully 
proved his "grounds," if the petitioner is in any way taking advantage of 
his own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief.10
A certain pedestrian approach and a quite singular lack of imagination 
and compassion is nowhere more evident than in decisions11 - not least
1. Suresh Kumar v. Smt. Suman, A.I.R. 1983 All. 225.
2. HMA, s. 13 (l) (ii). The judgement in Vilayat Raj v. Smt. Sunila,
A.I.R. 1983 Del. 35V confirms this.
3. Ibid., s. 13 (1) (iii).
4. Ibid., s. 13 (1) (iv).
5. Ibid., s. 13 (1) (v).
6. Ibid, s. 13 (1) (vi).
7. Ibid. b. 13 (1) (vii).
8. Ibid, s. 13 (l-A) (i).
9. Ibid. s. 13 (l-A) (ii).
10. J.D.M. Derrett, "When is an *0wn Wrong* Not a Wrong?" (1981) 1 M.L.j(j), 
1-4, at 1.
11. See for instance, Bulaq Kaur v. Gurdey Singh. A.I.R. 1963 Punj. 493?
Ramkali v. Gopal Pass, 11971) I.L.R. 1 Del. 6 (F.B.){ Suryakantam v.
Ranga Rao, (1973) 1 An. W.R. 158} Madhulkar v. Sarla, A.I.R. 1973 1
Bom. 55? Bimla Devi v. Singh Raj, A.I.R. 1977 P. k K. 16?l Bimla v. k F‘f 
Bakhta war, A.I.R. 1977 P- & H. 6 9 (F.B.)| Smt. Ga.ina Devi v. Purus ho tarn 
A.I.R. 1977 Del. 178? Anil v. Sudhaben, A.I.R. 197# Guj. 74; Bai Mani v. 
Jayanti Lai, A.I.R. 1979 Guj. 209.a1ivime.’g.h jQo.au. j4cajv.V>\nA » A.I.R. 
1981 1U*
' ‘ iw the Supreme Court's^ ■—  that, a "wrong*1 which had in the first place
caused the “breakdown of the marriage, is not a "wrong” within the meaning
of s. 23 (l) (a). For the application of the section, the petitioner under
s. 13 (l-A) (invariably the husband, Indian wives placing too high a premium
on their marriages, however nominal, seldom petition for divorce, whatever
their sufferings), must be disabled by his conduct subsequent to the 
3
decree, or in other words
"(t)o be a "wrong” it must be located between the first 
decree and the instant petition and the suggestion was 
that if the wrong constituted a ground upon which the 
wife originally obtained relief it was, as it were, 
expended “by the decree granting that relief.” 4
Such a retrograde view is specially to the disadvantage of wives and, 
it is submitted;entirely inequitable and a misinterpretation of s. 13 (l-A) 
which
"(a)dds a further remedy to ss. 9 and 10, a further con­
sequence to those remedies, and must be Judged not merely 
as an additional ground for divorce but also as part of 
the conception of matrimonial relief by stages, instead of 
by precipitate action." 5
The opposite, and by far the more acceptable view, because in con­
sonance with Justice, is based on the eminently equitable principle that, 
the Court must not grant relief to a party taking advantage of his own 
wrong. This view is indicated in a number of rulings^ not least in that of
7
a single bench decision of the Madras High Court in Soundarammal v. Sundara.
1. Dharmendra v. Usha, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2218.
2. Derrett, "When is an 'Own Wrong*..." op. cit., at 2
3. Emphasis mine.
*+. Derrett, "When is an "Own Wrong...," op. cit., at 2.
5. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 360,
6. See Chaaan Ial v. Mohinder Devi. A.I.R. 1968 P. & H.237* Sval v. Syal, 
A.I.R. 1968 P. & H . Laxmibai v. Laxmi Chand. A.I.R. I968 Bom. 332; 
Someshwaiuv. Lee la vat hi A. I. R. 1968 Mys. 27*+. Where however the peti- 
tioner husband is not guilty of creating obstruction and is, in fact 
found willing to take back the respondent and resume marital relations, 
s. 23 (l) (a) can have no application. See Rameshwari v. Kiroashankar, 
A.I.R. 1975 BaJ. 28. "
7. A.I.R. 1980 Mad. 29^ . See also Raghubai v. Satpal, A.I.R. 1973 P- & H.117.
That the signs are promising is evident in that the lead provided by the 
Madras High Court was subsequently endorsed in Geeta Lakshmi v. S ares wars 
Rao, A.I.R, 1983 A.P. Ill; Murahari v. Vasantha» A. I. R. 19W  A.P. 5^ 5 
P.P. Mehta v. Smt. Saro.i, A.I.R. 198^  Delhi 159? Veena v. Avinash, A.I.R.
The husband having allowed his wife to depart, contracted a bigamous
marriage and subsequently petitioned for divorce. In turning down ’the
petition, Sathiadev J., was quite clear that where the husband's "wrong"
originating before the judicial relief that founds the petition under
s. 13 (l-A), continues unabated during that year, so that resumption of
cohabitation is prevented by him (with or without specific intention on
his part to that end), he cannot turn that judicial relief into the first
stage of divorce in his own interest.'*'
Divorce by mutual consent has also been incorporated in the Act by
the Amendment of 1976, provided that the parties have been living separately
for a year or more, that they have not been able to live together, and that
2
they have agreed that the marriage should be terminated. Under this section 
no other ground is necessary for it would not be a reasonable and practical
3
construction of the provision apart from being contrary to its clear meaning.
Further grounds in the HMA for termination of the marriage, available 
4to the wife alone , are that under s. 13 (2) (i) the pre-Act polygamous 
marriage of the husband entitles any wife to sue for divorce provided that 
the other wife (or wives) is alive at the time of the filing of the petition.-'* 
For the offences of rape, sodomy and bestiality on the husband's part, the 
wife iB entitled to claim relief under s. 13 (2) (ii).
The ML(A)A additionally provides that if a maintenance order has been 
passed in favour of the wife under s. 18, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 
1956 (hereinafter referred to as HAMA), or under s. 125 of the Cr.P.G. 1973»
1. Summarised at Derrett, "When is iW 'Own Wrong'...", op. cit., at 3*(cD^ ty
2. HMA, s. 13 - B, provided however that such consent has not been procured 
by force, fraud or undue influence.
3. So it was held in Ravishankar v. Sharda, A.I.R. 1978 K.P. *J4.
4. This, it is submitted, is in consonance with Art. 15 (3) of* the Con­
stitution to the effect that, "Nothing in this article shall prevent 
the State from making special provision for women and children."
5. HMA, s. 13 (2) (i). The reason for this rule is obvious. Since the Act
cannot pronounce as invalid polygamous marriages contracted prior to its
enactment, this section nevertheless offers relief to such wives sis may 
desire escape from the miseries of such union. It was held in Ialitamma 
v. Kerman, (A.I.R. 1966 Mys. 178), that where the first wife sues for 
divorce under this section, it is not open to the husband to plead any 
conduct or disability on her part to bar the suit.
and since then cohabitation has not been resumed for one year or upward, 
the wife may sue for divorce.^ So too, a wife may repudiate a marriage 
contracted earlier once she has completed fifteen years of age, but before 
she has attained the age of eighteen, whether or not the marriage was 
consummated. ^
However as we review the quite extensive provisions of the HMA, there
is no escaping the fact that the statute derives much of its inspiration
from the English matrimonial laws-7 notwithstanding the assertion that,
"(i)n our reforms of matrimonial law we display a unique 
conservation; the feeling, the psychosis is that Hindus 
are still a very conservative people and would not 
tolerate any rapid or radical reform." *+
The provisions for divorce were without doubt introduced as a counter­
balance to the introduction of monogamy. If a man might not marry a second 
wife in the lifetime of the first, it was obvious that, he must in some 
circumstances of hardship be able to divorce his first wife, and in keeping 
with the changing times, similar rights had to be conceded to the wife.-*
In the westernised societies this makes sense, for the monogamous marriage 
regime, with its complicated law of marriage and divorce was built upon the 
hypothesis that the union was due to the choice of the parties, and this 
always creates expectations and mutual reliance which may vtum out to be 
ill-founded.6
1. HMA, s. 13 (2) (iii).
2. Ibid, s. 13 (2) (iv), analogous to the "Option of PubertyHn Islamic law,
g+
3. In its 71 Report of 1980» the Law Commission has proposed a further 
ground for divorce, i.e. the theory of irretrievable break-down of 
marriage modelled on s. 2, English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973* This 
recommendation has been accepted by the Government, and is soon to be 
passed as law. See Diwan, "Evolution of the Hindu Law of Marriage 1 , 
IL, op. cit., at 267.
A. Ibid., at 258.
5. J.D.M. Derrett, "A Coparcener's Wife's Jeopardy," (197*0 76 Bom. L.R.(j), 
9-11, at 9.
6. J.D.M. Derrett, "A Round-Up of Bigamous Marriages," (1967) 69 Bom. 
LJR.(J), 84-93 at 85.
In India on the other hand, they are not resorted to, either for 
considerations of financial settlement by the erring husband, given the 
problems of female remarriage, or more importantly, because they would 
defeat the very purpose for which such marriages are in the first place 
arranged, i.e. for the social advancement and prestige of the family. 
Conversely, in those instances where the law is resorted to, it is this very 
collapse of the prestige-structure, the insult to the family, rather than 
the husband's infidelity to his first wife which motivates such litigation.^
In this amorphous state
"(t)he problem, so far as we are concerned, is what is the 
law doing towards the easing of the matrimonial tensions 
caused by the betrothal system, and what, if anything, does 
it do to prevent bigamous marriages which society itself 
would condemn? It is interesting to see how society is 
adjusting itself to the new laws, and still more interesting 
to see how the Courts are facing up to their unenviable 
responsibility." 2
(3) Succession
The Hindu Succession Act 195&» (hereinafter referred to as the HSA),
"an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among 
Hindus, is of particular significance in that the break with the traditional
law is nowhere more violent than in the provisions of s. 14- which regulates
4*women's rights of inheritance to a Hindu dying intestate.
Since the main scheme of the Act was to improve the legal status of
Hindu women, and to establish equality as between the sexes with regard to
property rights, the effect of s. 14- is to abolish the old legal "limited"
§
estate, and to give to the Hindu female absolute rights over any property
1. Ibid, at 86.
2. Ibid, at 86-7. pA.eo.wvUc.
4. For a detailed discussion, of the effects of s. 14 and the incidents
thereof, see Chapter Six,
5. For an assessment of the "limited estate".See Chapter Three,
acquired either before or after the Act, provided Bhe is "possessed""^  of 
it, and this regardless of the school of law under which she is governed.
The result for the widow has been that, such limited estate as she became 
entitled to under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (hereinafter 
referred to as the HWRPA), is now converted to an absolute tenure under 
s. 1*4 (1) HSA.
At one time the question which agitated the judicial mind was as to 
the effect of s. 1*4 on a grant of land to a female in lieu of her main­
tenance. The conservative stance that a bare right of maintenance not 
being a right to property, it is not a pre-existing right as such and there­
fore beyond the pale of s. 1*4- (l), may now in the face of the authoritative
2ruling of the Supreme Court, be regarded as effectively quashed. The 
present position is that where the female was given lands by settlement or 
agreement or compromise, such grants for maintenance when made to widows of 
the family or unmarried daughters or widowed daughters in special circum­
stances are prima facie in recognition of a right previously acquired, and 
notwithstanding any restrictions in the instrument, come under s. 1*4- (l),
A question now remains whether s. 1*4- (l) will apply to grants made to 
females by will, or by settlement inter vivos on the part of persons who are 
under an obligation to maintain them, or whose estates would, in the ordinary 
way, be liable for their maintenance under the HAMA. In view of the con­
flict of decisions, it has to be kept in mind that, the intention of Par­
liament was to abolish the legal limited estate, while preserving to anyone 
who had the right to convey property to the woman the natural and obvious 
right of conveying it subject to a limitation of his own choice.
1. For the judicial interpretation of the word in its wider implication
see infra, at *468 ff.
2. Tu las anna v. Sesha Reddi . A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19*4*4 , infra at 602
3. J.D.M. Derrett, "landmarks in Family Law in 1977/” (1978) K.L.T. (j), 1% 
at 13.
*4. J.D.M. Derrett, "Section 1*4 (2) of the HSAt A Disturbing Decision 
from A.P. , (1969) 71 Bora. L.R.(j), 62-72, at 6*4.
-33-
As the testator or settlor can discriminate against males, and give 
them limited estates, even when they are dependants, he can equally dis­
criminate against females, provided that their rights of maintenance are 
not .jeopardised thereby.'*'
The sensible way out of this impasse is, it is submitted, that where 
the female has a subsisting right of maintenance, as for instance the widow 
out of the joint stock, she takes absolutely under s. (l). On the other 
hand, where the testator had full disposing power, she must take subject 
to any limitations written in the will, and her estate will then be the 
"restricted1* estate envisaged in s. l*f (2).
In regard to the order of succession to males, s. 8 provides for
simultaneous succession which is now confined to the inner family, and those
to inherit preferentially under class I of the Schedule are daughter, widow, 
mother, son, son's survivors and son's surviving widow including the 
predeceased grandson's widow as well as daughter's children if the daughter 
is dead. Widows (if many as could be the oase in marriages performed 
before 195*0 aH  take jointly one share, and all other heirs who are sur­
vivors of dead sons and daughters take one share between them. This has 
meant in effect that the widow, mother and daughter now take a share each, 
equal to that of the son. It is noteworthy that amongst the twelve of what 
one may call the first or the primary heirs, no less than eight are females.
Because s. 1^- (l) envisages an absolute tenure after 17^ h June 195^ » 
the Hindu female now constitutes a fresh stock of descent, and devolution 
of her property after her death, as distinct from her father's or husband's 
as the case may be, is governed by s. 15.
As we have already noted, the share that a female heir takes becomes
her absolute property under s. 14. As a special provision however; s. 23 
of the HSA specifies that, despite the female heir's right of residence, 
the family dwelling - house may not be partitioned at their volition except
1. Derrett, "landmarks in Family law ...," op. cit., at 13-
when the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein.
This might at first glance seem a violation of that independence of 
decision which is of the essence of absolute ownership. But as Derrett 
points out,'*' s. 23 is soundly based on Hindu psychology* while a female 
sharer cannot be ousted from her rightful share however inconvenient it 
might be for the male sharers to give it to her, it would also be wrong to 
allow the female heirs to demand partition of the house (for them to occupy 
or sell) before the male heirs actually divide the property. The purpose 
of the section, not to intrude a stranger into a family dwelling-house is 
clear and a wide interpretation is consistent with its purpose.
This restriction apart, the right of residence is assured to all
female heirs of class I except daughters unless they are unmarried, widowed,
deserted by, or separated from their husbands. This confining of the rule
to daughters only is difficult to understand, for the same reasoning would
apply perhaps with greater force to a mother, to a son's daughter, or a
3
daughter's daughter.
Unchastity on the part of the wife, and, except to the extent as 
provided in s. 24, the remarriage of the widow after the coming into effect 
of the HSAjdoes not disentitle such females from inheriting. S. 24- on the 
other hand removes from the list of intestate heirs appearing in the 
Schedule certain widows of close relations, e.g. the son's widow, or brother's 
widow, if she has married again before the intestate dies. The fundamental
1. See Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 251 where he also draws our attention 
to Raghunandan v. Rambalak, A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 206, and Katara v. Smt. 
Hoshiari, (1967) All. L.J. 1031, where the meaning and purpose of the 
section are usefully investigated.
2. It must however be kept in mind that the restriction imposed by this
section has no application to widows who inherited under the HWHPA 1937?
and to that effect it was held in Upendranath v. Chintamani, A.I.R. 1963
Cal. 22, that since under such circumstances, the succession to the
intestates' estate, would be governed by the HWRPA 1937» the widow was
entitled to claim partition of the family dwelling house, as the right
which had already accrued to her had not been abrogated by s. 4 of the 
HSA.
3. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 252. The same author further suggests
that "If the Act is to be amended this may be reconsidered."
rule is that a female who, though a widow, if one of the family, is entitled 
to consideration as a possible heiress. But if she has already married 
again by the time the propositus dies, she is no longer a member of the 
family.^
A significant omission in s. 2k is the father's widow, and this, it is 
submitted, is inequitable, for by the parity of reasoning applicable to 
the son's or brother's widow, the step-mother on her remarriage must also
2
forfeit the right to inherit from the family to which she no longer belongs.
The provisions in regard to women in the HSA are thus most salutary,
despite certain obvious faults and weaknesses, a step, it is submitted,,
towards the greater goal of equality, and when at last the Uniform Civil
Code is drawn up, there can be no doubt but that s. Ik will have a part
to play.
(k) Maintenance
The categories and degrees of female relatives who are entitled to 
maintenance under the HAMA is an indication of the care that the Legislature 
took to provide for the maintenance of all women who are intimately con­
nected with the joint-family by reason of birth or marriage, and is again 
an instance of the great divide that exists between the sastric injunctions 
and the modern law as envisaged in the Hindu Code.
(a) The Hindu's liability to maintain:
(i) The wife
The wife, whatever her conduct is entitled to claim maintenance from
her husband, irrespective of whether he possesses property of any particular
3 kkind and independently of any distinct demand for it. The problem arises
1. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 253*
2. Ibid.
3. Kandswami v. Angammal, A.I.R. i960 Mad. 2*1-8.
Kagendramma v. Ramakotayya, A.I.R. 195^ Mad. 713*
where a woman lives separately from her husband. Normally she is under
an obligation to live wherever he chooses, within reason1, and pre-nuptial
2agreement to a different effect is not binding upon him.
However, s. 18 (2) of the HAMA now provides^for cases where for a
3 Ifnumber of specified and non-specified reasons , the wife-provided that
she is not unchaste or has ceased to be a Hindu-* —  is entitled to live
separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance.
(ii) The widowed daughter-in-law
Formerly the rights of the daughter-in-law extended, if at all, to the 
separate as well as the copacenary property of the deceased father-in-law.
It was unenforceable during the father-in-law's lifetime (being treated
as a moral obligation), but upon his death it attached to his property as
6 7a legal liability. With the aid of the Pious Obligation maintenance for
the three years prior to the father-in-law's death might be recovered from
Q
his male issue.
Under s. 19 of the HAMA however, the maintenance of the daughter-in- 
law is a statutory liability, and after her husband's death, the father-in-law
1. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 172.
2. Takait v. Basanta, I.L.R. (1901) 28 Cal. 751.
3. HAMA, s. 18 (2) (a)-(f), the grounds being the husband's desertion, or 
cruelty, or if he suffers from virulent leprosy, or if there is any 
other wife living, or if he habitually resides with, or keeps a con­
cubine in the house, or has ceased to be a Hindu.
k. Ibid, s. 18 (2) (g), i.e. "if there is any other cause justifying her
living separately."
5. Ibid, s. 18 (3).
6. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 17^ .
7. Derrett explains the concept in ibid, at 310-11 as the sons', sons' sons', 
and sons' sons' sons' (usually for convenience called the "male issue"), 
liability to pay to the extent of their interest in Mitaksara joint- 
family property, the private, untainted pre-partition debts of their rale 
lineal ancestors. The word 'debt' expresses the Sanskrit rfliam, which in­
cludes failure to pay a sum morally due but undetermined '(because irre­
coverable) during the lifetime of the father: Nachimuthu v. Balasubra- 
mania, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. ^50; Rupa v. Sriyabati A.I.R. 1955 Or. 26,
8. Rupa v. Sriyabati cited above.
is under a legal obligation to maintain her^ if she has no property or 
2
earnings, and neither her husband's estate nor the estate of her deceased 
parents^ nor the means of her living children nor their estates when they 
are dead, can maintain her. But the obligation extends only to copar­
cenary property out of which the daughter-in-law has not obtained a share, 
and ceases on her remarriage.^ Where the father-in-law is possessed of both 
ancestral and self-acquired property, it was held in Jal v. Pala^ that, if the 
father-in-law could well maintain his other dependants and himself out of 
his self-acquired property, the whole income, if necessary, of the ancestral 
property may be allotted to the daughter-in-law for her maintenance.
• (iii) Children and aged parents
Under s. 20 (l) of the HAMA., a Hindu^ is under a legal obligation 
during his or her lifetime to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate 
children, as also his or her aged or infirm parents whether he or she 
possesses any property or not, for the obligation to maintain these re­
lations is personal and legal in character and arises from the very existence
0
of the relationship between the parties.
1. HAMA, s. 19 (1).
2. Ibid, Proviso, s. 19 (l).
3. Ibid, s. 19 (1) (a).
*+. Ibid, s. 19 (1) (b).
5. Ibid, s. 19 (2). This was explained by Ramaswami J., in Animuthu v.
Gandhiammal A.I.R. 1977,Mad. 372, at 37*+ thus: "... where there is no 
factual obtaining of a share in the coparcenary property a widow could 
claim maintenance against the coparcenary property from her father-in- 
law ... Though her right to a share both in the separate and self­
acquired property as well as the interest in the coparcenary property 
of her deceased husband is not liable to be divested on the ground of 
remarriage, her right to maintenance under ss. 19 and 22 will cease on 
such remarriage."
6. A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 391.
7. It must be noted that the HAMA, "by providing that "a Hindu is bound
during his or her lifetime ..." equally extends the scope of this
particular obligation to mothers and daughters as to fathers and sons.
8. Nanak JJhand v. Chandra Kishore, A.I.R. 1969 Del. 235 at 2*+5- Bal Satva v.
Varalakshmi. A.I.R. 1976 A.P. 365 at 368.
(iii-a) Children
Formerly the legitimate minor child and major unmarried daughter 
were entitled to maintenance from the father and the right extended to 
his separate property and to his interest in joint family property. The
* e*
illegitimate daughter was confined to her remedy under the Cr. P.C. This 
prevented her from enjoying the ampler rights available at Hindu law to the 
major unmarried daughter, for under the Code the putative father is not 
liable to maintain a child beyond majority, nor has the daughter any right 
through the father, against his joint-family property for any purpose, 
including marriage expenses or dowry. ^
Under s. 20 (l) HAM however, both parents are liable to maintain
2
minor legitimate and illegitimate chiljdren provided the latter are not
3
converted from Hinduism, but in the case of an unmarried daughter, this
obligation extends only in so far as she is unable to maintain herself out
ifof her own earnings or other property. There are some doubts as to whether 
in view of the expression "unmarried daughter" in s. 20 (3), a major un­
married daughter's entitlement to maintenance under the traditional law 
remains intact, but since such rights have not been expressly abrogated, 
the better view appears to be that they still subsist.-*
(iii-b) Aged Parents
S. 20 (l) includes within its purview the maintenance of aged parents 
and is a departure from the traditional law in that it imposes on the Hindu, 
be it son or daughter, the duty of maintaining his or her aged or infirm
1. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit.. at *fl.
2. HAM, s. 20 (2).
3. S. 2*f, ibid, lays downs "no person shall be entitled to claim main­
tenance under this Chapter if he or she has ceased to be a Hindu by 
conversion to another religion."
*f. Ibid, s. 20 (3).
5* Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at *fO-l. If the term "unmarried daughter* 
includes a major unmarried daughter, it must likewise include divorced
and widowed daughters, and in Khanta v. Shyam, A.I.R. 1973 Cal. 112. 
it was held that where on her husbands death she was left destitute, 
the daughter was an "unmarried daughter" within the meaning of s. 20 (.3).
parents.
The obligation is personal and does not depend on the inheritance of 
any property. As the only condition superadded to this obligation is the 
condition in s. 20 (3) that, the parents must be unable to maintain them­
selves out of their earnings or other properties respectively,^ - it would 
follow that even an unchaste mother may have to be maintained by her son
"for the statute lays down no condition and the former law insisted upon 
„2none.
Though the Explanation to s. 20 specifies that "parent" includes a
childless step-mother, step-mothers are not entitled to be main- •
3
tained by step-sons when their own sons are capable of maintaining them.
But where provision has been made for maintenance and it has been lost or 
squandered, there seems to be no rule of law which would prevent the parent 
having recourse to the child for maintenance, and all agreements are open 
to review under s. 25 HAMA if there has been a material change of circum­
stances.^
(b) Maintenance of Dependants of the Deceased
Formerly maintenance out of the estate of a deceased male fell into 
two categoriesj firstly came those who were maintained by him during his 
lifetime as a matter of obligation. Secondly came those whom he was morally 
but not legally obliged to maintain during his lifetime, but whose main­
tenance became a legal obligation upon his estate after his death, and the
1. It has been rightly pointed out in Mst. Samu v. Shah.ji, A.I.R. 1961 Raj.
207, at 209 that, "The Court will, as under the former law refuse main­
tenance to a mother or a step-mother who has already inherited a son's
share or taken a share at partition," for this is violative of the con­
dition in s. 20 (3). On the other hand, "There is nothing therein (in 
the HAMA) which would militate against the mother to claim a share at
a partition between the sons ... if it is available to her under the 
ordinary Hindu law," at 20S.
2. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at ^ 3«
3. Hemansrini v. Kedar, (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 115*
Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at ky-k.
heirs could not, under the old system evade the moral duties which the 
propositus himself might evade.^  *
December, 1956 saw significant changes, and under the HAMA those who 
claim to be dependants and who are not disqualified, may be entitled to be
tv*
maintained for life or until forfeiture or until the limit specified in the
2
statute as the case may be out of the net estate, at the expense of the
heirs and legatees, provided that the latter are not themselves dependants,
and provided that such claims would not reduce the incomes of the latter
below the amount which the Court would award them if the situation were 
3
reversed.
4S.. 22 of the HAMA thus provides that the heirs of a deceased Hindu
are liable to maintain dependants who have not obtained by testamentary or
intestate succession any share in the estate of a Hindu,^ and where the
deceased died after the HAMA had come into force. ^ The female dependants
7
as enumerated in the Act are the mother who, in order to be maintained out 
of her deceased child's estate does not have to be old and infirm which is a
Q
condition under s. 20j the widow so long as she does not remarry* the un-
o
married daughter, grand-daughter and great-grand-daughter provided and to
1. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 420-1.
2. HAMA, ss. 21, 24.
3. Ibid, s. 22 (4).
4. In Gulzara Singh v. Smt. Te.j Kaur, A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 288, it was held 
that the expression "heir’* used in s. 22 includes all those on whom the 
estate of the deceased devolves whether on intestacy or by means of a 
testamentary instrument like a will. The principle is that whoever gets 
the estate of the deceased or a part of it must, in proportion get along 
with it a corresponding obligation or burden of maintaining the depen­
dants of the deceased.
5. HAMA, s. 22 (2)
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, s. 21 (ii).
8. Ibid, s. 21 (iii).
9. An unmarried daughter who has taken a share in the deceased father's pro­
perty as an heir under the HSA 1956, cannot claim any further right as
against the other heirs for her maintenance and marriage expenses. See
Kapur Kaur v. Kishen Singh, A.I.R. 1970 Punj. 270} Lalithamba v. Ven- 
katalaxmi (1970) 1 An. w7r. 245.
the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a
grand-daughter from her father's or mother's estate, and in the case of a
great-grand-daughter from, the estate of the father or mother or the
paternal grandparents•^  In the case of a male propositus, the widowed 
2
daughter provided and to the extent that she is unable to obtain main-
3
tenance from her husband's estate, from her son or daughter or the estate 
kof either of them or from her father-in-law, or his father or the estate 
of either of them^  is additionally an heir, as also the son's widow or the 
widow of a predeceased son so long as she does not remarry provided and to 
the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband's estate, 
or from her son or daughter or their estate, and in the case of the grand­
son's widow, also from the father-in-law's estate;^ and the illegitimate
7
daughter so long as she remains unmarried.
(c) Inconsistencies and Omissions
The list of female dependants is thus long though not exhaustive as 
we shall presently see, and despite the generally favourable trend that the 
HAMA sets, certain inconsistencies and omissions are at once evident to which 
we must now turn our attention.
(i) Daughters
The term 'unmarried' in s. 21 (v) must connote both widowed and 
divorced daughters as well, but while special provision is made for the 
widowed daughter in s. 21 (vi), we are left wondering whether equity does
1. HAMA, s. 21 (v).
2. Ibid, s. 21 (vi).
3. Ibid, s. 21 (vi) (a).
k. Ibid, s. 21 (vi) (b).
5. Ibid, s. 21 (vi) (c).
6. Ibid, s. 21 (vii).
7. Ibid, s. 21 (ix).
not demand that a divorced daughter deprived of her alimony he also included 
in the list of dependants. Moreoever in the commendable recognition of the 
rights of the illegitimate daughter, it is again baffling that a distinction 
should be made and her dependancy restricted to wso long as she remains 
unmarried,"'*' which would naturally suggest ’’until her (first) marriage."
Not everyone would agree that, in the contemplation of these revised rules, 
there should be a distinction between a legitimate and an illegitimate 
daughter, and it is submitted that, in construing the relevant provisions, 
the Courts should extend the latitude of the interpretation to give a wider 
definition than the literal and narrow construction of the sub-sections would 
suggest.
Attention must also be drawn to the wording of s. 21 (vi) according
3
to which the widowed daughter of the male propositus only has a claim. The 
omission of the word "her" can only be regarded as a slip of the pen when 
we consider the scheme of the HAMA in its entirety, and it is to be hoped 
that in considering such amendments as may be necessary, Parliament will 
amend the phrase to include "his or her" and thus bring it in line with the 
general scope of the Act which envisages the liability of both males and 
females towards the new class of dependants.
(ii) Paternal Grandmother
The Hindu Code has considerably weakened the structure of the joint- 
family, and with nuclear families on the increase, a source of considerable 
anxiety is the omission of the paternal grandmother from the list of
1. HAMA, s. 21 (ix).
2. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., 267.
3. Contrast this with the wording of s. 21 (vii) where however the word
"his" is correct, .as the rights of the widowed daughter-in-law can figure 
only in the patrilineal joint-family or in a social context analogous to
it: Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 26?.
The plea does not include the maternal grandmother as the patrilineal 
character of the family, whether joint or nuclear, is bound to continue.
dependants in the HAMA. As her position now stands, she is not an heir 
either, and all that survives is her right of maintenance; hut unless such 
right is made a charge on the estate which the heirs or legatees take, there 
will not infrequently be indigent grandmothers whose maintenance is not 
actually a charge on the estate in the hands of their grandchildren*:
: It is to be devoutly hoped that this omission be rectified,
and paternal grandparents be given their due and recognised as dependants in 
such future amendments of the Act as may be in the contemplation of Parliament.
(iii) Concubines
The absence of the concubine from the list of dependants also re­
quires careful reconsideration, for the legal right which she had heretofore 
enjoyed has been thoughtlessly diminished under the HAMA. At traditional 
law, the concubine faithful to her deceased paramour, could obtain mainte­
nance out of his interest in the joint-family property for her life so long 
as she remained faithful.'*'
After 1956 the combined effect of the new succession and maintenance 
laws has been to cut down her claims drastically. She has no right as a 
dependant; there is no obligation which the law directly acknowledges bind­
ing upon the sons to maintain their father's concubine. The paramour must 
provide, if at all, for her by his will, but all testamentary bequests are
liable to be cut down by the claims of the dependants whom the law acknow-
2
ledges, and in any event if the deceased fails to leave such a legacy there 
is normally no remedy. In the event of a legacy, the concubine must, in the 
normal course of events, contend against the machinations of the legitimate 
family.^
4In a Supreme Court ruling, it was held that a permanently kept
1. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 422.
2. Derrett, "A Round-up..." on. cit., at 91.
?. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 81.
4. Gopala Rao v. Sitharam Anma, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1970.
concubine whose paramour had died before the Act, is entitled to claim
*
maintenance for herself and her children out of the paramour's estate, for 
the HAMA could not interfere with her vested rights.'*' And by parity of 
reasoning her rights against joint-family property will remain unaffected 
if her paramour's interest passes by survivorship under s. 6 of the ISA 
which lays down:
" (w)here a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this 
Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a.
Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the 
property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving 
members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: 
Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female 
specified in Class 1 of the Schedule or a male relative 
specified in that class who claims through such female relative, 
the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary 
property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, 
as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.”
However those will be comparatively rare cases after 195& where the 
paramour dies joint with any coparcener or owner of an interest in copar­
cenary property but leaves no surviving female relative in class I of the
2Schedule to the H5A and no daughter's son, and in any case in view of the
rights of the large number of persons who can legitimately claim to be
3
dependantsj claims by concubines would prima facie be a waste of time.
It has been persuasively pleaded that the way out of this problem 
may be for the heirs and legatees to show, as against the claims of the 
dependants, that there is a concubine of the deceased who must somehow be 
maintained unless the whole family is to lose face, and it would then not 
be inequitable for a sympathetic judge' to allocate some property to her as
1. And this is in accord with the decision in Gowardan v. Gangabai, A. I.H.
1964 M.P. 168, to the effect that, while s. 21 read with s. 22 of the
HAMA creates new rights and liabilities relating to maintenance, it does 
not affect the old Hindu law regarding the rig^ it to maintenance in 
respect of coparcenary property.
2. The list of heirs in class 1 of the Schedule to the HSA who oust the
concubine's rights are daughter, widow, mother, and the son of a
predeceased daughter.
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 422.
4. See Derrett at ibid.
a creditor of the estate even in the absence of proof of any legacy or 
testamentary contract. "*■
Were this to happen in every case, we could all heave a sigh of 
relief and consider the problem settled. But this solution is based on the 
hypothesis of congeniality and good-will as between the parties, and the 
reality as we all know, could well be a different story. A far more simple- 
expedient, it is submitted, is to carry on the traditional spirit of the 
ancient law and amend s.22 so as to include the concubine in the list of 
dependants, and thus make her rights more realistic and definitive.
(5) Adoption
In so far as adoption is concerned, the HAMA is more an amending than 
2
a codifying Act, for the whole concept of adoption has undergone radical 
changes with far-reaching consequences.
Adoptions according to traditional Hindu principles take place in 
order to provide a male Hindu with an heir who will perform his sraddha 
ceremonies after his death. However in actual practice many adoptions took 
place among Hindus for other reasons besides the technical one. Kindness to 
friends or relatives with many sons but small assets, the desire to keep a 
particular branch of the extended family alive and to prevent a failure of 
lineal succession to a particular estate, the desire on the part of the 
widow to be supported in her old age, and especially in the case of widow- 
adopters, a desire to deprive relations of a share of the family property —  
these motives were associated with the religious motive, and it was only
1. The observations of Iravati Karve are pertinent here for as she points 
out, HA concubine is a woman who lives with a man for the whole of his 
life and one would expect that he should be made to provide for her... 
This omission (of her rights in the Hindu Code), goes against natural 
justice, serves no moral purpose and unnecessarily restricts the law 
only to one community:" Hindu Society - An Interpretation, (Poona, 
Deccan College, 1961), at 150.
2. S.V. Gupte, Hindu Law of Adoption, Maintenance, Minority and Guardian­
ship, (Bom. Tripathi, 1970), at 223.
3. Derrett, Critique, on. cit., at 124.
in 1933 that the Privy Council in Amarendra v. Santan Singh'*' finally laid
to
down that adoption was essentially a spiritual affair, the secular motive
2
being only secondary.
The fiction of "relation back" at Mitak^ara law, i.e. the notion that
3
the adoption must relate back to the death of the adoptive father, is also 
an indication that, in the end^  adoption is for the Hindu nothing, if not a 
spiritual sacramental affair. Carried to its logical conclusion the incon­
venience ana injustice it caused might well be imagined, and the Supreme
kCourt in Shrinivas v. Narayan at last authoritatively determined that the 
claim of the adopted son to divest a vested estate rests on a legal fiction 
and the legal fiction must not be extended so as to lead to unjust results.
The HAMA departs in certain essential aspects from the traditional 
Hindu law, and while like the HSA, the notion of equality as between the 
sexes has been extended by the HAMA in certain areas of adoption, it is 
nevertheless submitted that a certain male buxs is evident in some of its 
provisions which stress the Hindu male's rights over and above those of tv%e. 
female !s.
(a) The Female's Capacity in Regard to Giving in Adoption
The HAMA provides that the father, the mother, the guardian with the 
Court's permission can alone give a child in adoption."*
The father's capacity to give is absolute,provided that he is not of
1. A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 155.
2. . The Supreme Court in Chandrasekhara v. Kulandeivalu. A.I.R. 19&3 S.C.
185, confirms the view that the object of adoption was principally 
religious and not material.
3. This theory has resulted in grave difficulties, for the spiritual needs 
of the father being paramount, the adoption of a son by the widow had
the effect of disturbing titles to already vested separate and joint-
family properties.
k. A.I.R. 195^ S.C. 379* The rule is further developed and confirmed in
Krishnamurthi v. Dhruwarajt A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 59*
5. HAMA, s. 9 (1).
unsound mind, or has renounced the world. But this absolute right is
subject to one condition, namely that the mother must give her consent where
she is not incapacitated by reason of insanity, renunciation of the world
2or by ceasing to be a Hindu.
Apart from this, the right accorded to the mother under s. 9 (3) is to 
the effect that a mother may give her legitimate or illegitimate child in 
adoption if the father (of the legitimate child) is dead, or has renounced 
the world, or has ceased to be a Hindu. In effect then, the Act deprives a 
married woman to give in adoption in her own right, and the living, undis­
qualified, father's consent does not validate a gift in adoption by the 
mother. On the other hand, a mother may give her illegitimate child in 
adoption irrespective of the existence or qualification of the putative 
father, since "father” in the relevant section of the Act cannot include a 
putative father.
Explanation (i) to s. 9 makes clear that the expression "mother" does 
not include adoptive mother, and in view of this explanation it was held in
cr
Dhanraj v. Suraj Bai^ that neither can the term "mother” be held to include 
by implication the step-mother. The result of this is that where the husband 
has died or is disqualified, while the natural mother may give her child in 
adoption under s. 9 (3)» the adoptive mother is deprived of any such right, 
and in view of the Supreme Court reasoning,^ neither can a step-mother her 
step-child.
(b) The Female's Capacity in Regard to Taking in Adoption
The respective capacities of a male and of a female Hindu to take in 
adoption vary, and as in the case of the capacity to give, so the capacity
1. 
2.
3.
b.
Ibid, s. 9 (3). He must also not have ceased to be a Hindu. 
Ibid, s. 9 (2).
Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 97-8.
Ibid, at 98.
to take is essential to the adoption's validity.
2The husband may of course take a child in adoption. However whereas} 
under the former law, the husband could adopt without the consent of the 
wife or wives and even against her wishes, the consent of the wife under 
the HAMA  ^is a pre-requisite for the validity of the husband's adoption.
Such consent may be dispensed with if she has ceased to be a Hindu or has 
renounced the world, or has been judicially declared of unsound mind.
It is interesting to contrast that, while essentially it is only the 
wife's consent that validates the adoption of the husband, the HAM in laying 
down that it is only the female Hindu who is of sound mind, who is not a 
minor,  ^who is single,  ^or if married the marriage has been dissolved by 
divorce, the husband's death or his renunciation of the world, his ceasing 
to be a Hindu, or of being of unsound mind, distinctly makes clear that it 
is not within the jurisdiction of the married woman to adopt even with the 
consent of her husband.
No doubt by her husband's adoption, a female Hindu "adopts" by
3
becoming the adoptive mother of a child.adopted by her husband. But in the 
end the adoption is not hers: it is her husband's.
(c) Adoption by a Single Woman
Parliament has now made it possible for a single woman, be she un-
9 10married, divorced or widowed to adopt provided she is of sound mind and
1. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 101.
2. HAMA, s. 7.
3. Ibid, expl. to s. 7.
Ibid. s. 8 (a).
5* Ibid, s. 8 (b).
6. Ibid, s. 8 (c).
7- Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 10^f.
8. Ibid.
9. •
/■No 
_^/
00•wf
10. Ibid, s. 8 (a).
not a minor. She may adopt not only a son but a daughter as well, and
this new right is both revolutionary and fundamentally oppose! to the
genius of the Hindu law j-rhere the adoption of a girl, serving no sacra-
2
mental purpose, is an unheard-of concept. 3-
Should the unmarried, divorced or widowed woman wish to adopt, she
will not adopt to anyone else, and where she marries or remarries, as the
case may be, the husband becomes the step-father of the adopted child.
The child’s entitlement to be maintained attaches to the new mother only,
and it is not open to the step-father to adopt him or her to himself, as
3
the adoptive mother is barred from giving in adoption.
All such adoptions, by women capable, of independent adoption under 
the provisions of the HAMA are legal, but only those by widows within the 
sastric conception of such adoptions can also be sacramental. This is 
reinforced when we consider that, though the new law allows all widows to 
adopt, nevertheless if the mother-in-law adopts after the daughter-in-law, 
Ke.v* adoption will still"* be void as offending against the principle that 
a woman with a son's son cannot adopt, and this is in effect the triumph 
of the sacramental principle over the principle that "law must enable 
rather than disenable."^
(d) The Doctrine of "Relation Back" and the HAMA
The doctrine of "relation back" in Anglo-Hindu jurisprudence refers to
the system where the adopted son was considered as having been bom on the
1. Ibid, s. 8 (b).
2. Raghavachariar, op. cit., at 1166-7.
3. HAMA, s. 9 Expl. (1).
b. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 131.
5. It has long been settle! that, once extinguished, a widow's capacity 
to adopt could not be revived, and in Gurunath v. Kamalabai, A.I.R.
1955 S.C. 206, the Supreme Court relying on Bhooban v. Ram, (1865)
10 M.I.A. 279, and Pudma v. Ct. of Wards, (l8Sl) L.R. 8 iTA. 229, estab­
lished that "The power of a widow to adopt comes to an end by the 
interposition of a grandson or son's widow competent to adopt." See 
aleo Venkalakr-hml v. Jaggnatha, A.I.R. 19^ 3 Mad. J2.6.
6. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 133*
date of the adoptive father's death where the widow adopted to her deceased 
husband. The consequence of this was that all those properties which had 
vested in others but which belonged to the adoptive father at the time of his 
death, wjexe recoverable by the adoptive son, except such of those properties 
which had been alienated by the intermediate owner for legal purposes, i.e. 
for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.
As can well be imagined, this gave rise to endless difficulties. Every­
one was agreed that the chaos caused in respect of property rights was a
disgrace and should be stopped,'1' and s, 12 proviso (c) of the HAMA by laying 
down that
"(t)he adopted child shall not divest any person of any
estate which vested in him or her before the adoption,"
appeared to have done precisely that, and to this effect it was held in
2Arumugha v. Valliammal, that, as the widow adopts only to herself, such
adoption in no way affects the devolution or enjoyment of property by others.
As against this provision however, one has to take into account the
effect of s. 12 of the HAMA which unambiguously states that,
"... from the date of the adoption ••. all the ties of the 
child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to 
be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in 
the adoptive family."
The inevitable contradiction of these provisions had the effect of 
puzzling the judiciary severely. On the one hand it was thought that an 
adoption made after the Act came into force could give the adoptee no rights 
at all? while on the other hand it was felt that he was a member of his 
adoptive father's family and could participate in its property. The techni­
cal meaning of 'vested' came into view, and the unresolved question was 
whether property owned but not vested in the owner, e.g. an interest in 
MitSksara coparcenary property came within s. 12, prov. ( c ) Th a t
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Adoption and Relation Back: The Position in 1971,"
(1971) 73 Bom. L.R. (j), 3I-3 5 at 31.
2. A.I.R. 1969 Mad, 72, See also Hanumantha v. Hanumayya, (1964) 1 An.W.R. 
156.
3. Derrett, "Adoption and Relation Back.,.," op. cit., at 32.
"relation-back" is still alive albeit in residual form in view of proviso (c) 
to s. 12, is now confirmed by the Supreme Court, ^ and the widow's adoptee, 
provided he is adopted in the Anglo-Hindu sense of a dattaka adoption, may
2"divest" the sole surviving coparcener, with all the old ancillary reliefs,
as he could an alienee of property improperly alienated by the widow prior 
to 1956. However, where the widow becomes full owner under s. of the 
HSA, she is saved from the operation of relation back on the principle 
that an estate once vested cannot be divested.
(6) Guardianship and Custody
The Hindu Code has made comprehensive provisions for the guardianship 
and custody of minor children, and in this aspect too, women have their 
part to play. -
(a) Guardianship under the HAMA
The term "guardian" in the Explanation (l)(a) to s£ of the HAMA would 
include a female having the care of the person of a child, or of both his 
person and his property who has been appointed as such by the will of the 
child's father or mother, or by the Court where both the parents are dead, 
or have renounced the world, or abandoned the child, or are of unsound mind, 
or the parentage of the child is not known.^
(b) Guardianship under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
The HMGA further regulates the guardianship of a "minor", which according
1. See Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761* Sitabai V. Ramchandra, 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. ~wr.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "Adoptions The Whole Hog," (1971) 7^ Bom. L.R. (j),
97-9, at 99.
3. For a detailed discussion of the effects of "relation back" in the light 
of the HSA and the HAMA, see Chapter Six, at 5^7 ff.
4. HAMA, s. 9, Expl. (1) (a).
5- Ibid, s. 9, Expl. (1) (b).
6. Ibid. s. 9 (**).
7. Hereinafter referred to as the HMGA.
to the Act means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years, 
while the guardian is "a person having the care of the person of a minor
or of his property or of.both his person and property/’ and these may he
7 beither natural guardians,^  or testamentary guardians, or guardians
appointed or declared by a Court.^
(i) Natural Guardians
Under ss. 6 and 7 of the HMGA, the natural guardians in respect of 
the person as well as the property (excluding the undivided interest in
joint-family property if any), are, in the case of a legitimate boy (in-
6 7cluidng an adopted son), and a legitimate unmarried girl (including an
8 9adopted daughter), is first the father and after him the mother, and re­
marriage as such does not operate as a disqualification to guardianship.^ 
Custody (which is granted specifically by the court on terms, usually 
as a concomitant to matrimonial relief decreed to a parent),^ would
1?
normally be with the mother until the minor reaches the age of five. “ Yet
should the mother neglect the child, custody will be given to the father
13at his application.
1. Ibid., s. b (a).
2. Ibid., s. b (b).
3. Ibid., s. b (i).
b. Ibid., s. ^  (ii).
5* Ibid., s. b (iii).
6. Ibid., s. 7.
7. Ibid, s. 6 (a).
8. "The provisions of the HMGA, (which refers only to a 'son1) must not be
read in too narrow a sense”: Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 116-7*
9* HMGA, s. 6 (a). Katrilineal families are now equally bound by the
rule. See Raghavan v. Lakshmikutty, A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 193*
10. See Bakshi Ram v. Mst. Shula Devi, A.I.R. i960 Punj. 30b; Kusa v.
Baishnab, A.I.R. 1966 Or. 60.
11. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at ^8.
12. HMGA, s. 6 (a).
In the case of an illegitimate (unadopted) boy, or an illegitimate,
unmarried (unadopted) girl, the mother is the first natural guardian,^ - and
2after her the father, assuming his paternity can be established; provided
3however that neither the mother nor the father has ceased to be a Hindu, 
or has renounced the world by becoming an ascetic. The Explanation to 
s. 6 also makes clear that for the purposes of guardianship, a step­
mother or a step-father may not be considered.
m
(ii) Testamentary Guardianship
Though the statute gives the father, entitled to act as the natural 
guardian of his minor legitimate children, the right to appoint by will, 
a guardian in respect of the minor's person or property or both,  ^never­
theless such testamentary guardianship shall not commence during the 
mother's life-time, but may operate after her death.^
The mother, if not disqualified, has the right to appoint a guardian
by will in respect of the child *s person or property or both if the 
child is her legitimate child and she is a widow, or the father is dis-
7
qualified from acting as guardian. In the event that a father appoints 
a guardian to take over guardianship after the mother's death, and she in 
her turn makes a valid testamentary appointment of a guardian to the same 
child, the father's appointment must be presumed to be extinguished.
As the natural guardian of her minor illegitimate children, the mother
has a similar right to appoint a guardian by will in respect of the minor's
1. See Kanwal Singh v. N.K. Singh, A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 331.
2. KHGA, s. 6 (b).
3. Ibid, Proviso (a) to s. 6.
Ibid, Proviso (b) to s. 6.
5. Ibid, s. 9 (1).
6. Ibid, s. 9 (2).
person or property or both.
It is noteworthy that though the fundamental proposition common to
both the modem and former systems embodied in s. 13 is that,in the
appointment of any person as guardian "the welfare of the minor shall
« 2be of paramount consideration, and if the court is satisfied that his
or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor, such
person shall not be entitled to the guardianship, nevertheless
"(l)t is well to remember that though in all cases of custody
and guardianship the welfare of the minor is the paramount 
consideration, it is not the only consideration‘.the claims of u 
an unimpeachable parent for example, must be given due weight, k -
From the foregoing it is clear that the "Hindu Code" is in many ways
a clear break from tradition, and despite numerous inconsistencies
and anomalies that GYt, inevitably the result of piecemeal legislation,
it anticipates the dawn of an era of uniformity and egalitarianism in
the personal law of the Hindus.
7„ Muslim ^ Intransigence towards Codification
The Hindu Code has thus given, by and large, uniform laws of marriage., 
divorce;, minority, guardianship^ adoption, maintenance and succession to all 
those Indians not professing Islam, Christianity; Judaism or the Zorastrian 
faith. These enactments have changed the face of its personal law to such
i
an extent that the majority community has little concern at present about 
either reform of its personal law, or of its replacement by a common civil 
code. The Christians and Parsis have taken no noticeable objection to the
merger of their personal laws into a common civil code
1. Ibid, s. 9 W .
2. Ibid, s. 13 (1).
3* Ibid, s. 13 (2), and this provision has been amply vindicated in
several well-testified judgments. See for instance, Balaram v.
Ra.iani, A.I.R. 196*f Pat. 505? Kusa v. Baishnab, A.I.R. 196^ Or. 60; 
Subramanyam v. Santa, A.I.R. I967 A.P. 29*+? Santha v. Cherukutty,
A.I.R. 1972 Ker. 71? C.S. Reddy v. Yamuna Reddy. A.I.R. 1975 Kant.
13^ ? Mohinl v. Virender, A.I.R. I977 S.C. 1359.
4. Derrett, IMHL op. cit., at 50, who then cites English decisions to 
support this rule of equity: Re 0. (infants), (1962) 2 All E.R. 10;
In Re L. (1962) 3 All. E.R. 1 (CA) the adulterous mother failing to 
obtain custody of her two young daughters in the latter decision.
either. The fast dwindling Jewish minority too, it is commonly assumed,
would not present any major obstacle to the idea of reforming their religious
law or, of its replacement by a unified personal law, as Israel has already
taken the lead in this matter and set the example for Indian Jews to follow
in their own country.
The rUccX is the Muslim citizen whose intractability in
regard to the question of the reform, much less abolition, of his personal
law, is perhaps the only impediment in achieving the ideal laid down in
Article 44. Speaking of Muslim law, Lord Macmillan points out that
"Obedience "to the law is still for the Mohamedan (sic) not a matter of
ethical duty or social expediency, but a matter of religion."^ To what
extent such a statement is true, we will duly examine, but certainly the
Muslims in India continue to urge that a great deal of their personal law
has religious sanction behind it. An irrational objection is so much moire
serious than a rational one because one cannot convince anyone of its falsity.
2If Muslims think their law is religious, it is religious. To adapt a com­
ment from D.E. Smith, most scholars would hold that if for a thousand years 
Muslims have regarded a particular social practice as part of their religion,
it is a part of religion, and we are wasting our breath if we try to tell 
3
them otherwise.
The pertinent question however is * Does amendment or abrogation of the 
Muslim law violate the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims as 
guaranteed by Art. 25 (l) of the Constitution? Muslim law purports to be 
based on the commandments of God in His revelations through the Prophet 
Mohammed in the Qur?an and the Sunnah, the precepts of the Prophet, which 
together form the Shariah (Shariat in Urdu) or fiqh, the jurisprudence of
1. Law and Other Things, (Camb.,Univ. Press, 1937)» at 59*
2. Derrett, RISI, op. cit., at 535*
3. Ibid.
Islam. It is therefore^  on the face of it, sacrosanct for the true believer, 
and the Shariat Convention held in Bombay in December, 1979 gave voice 
to the view that Muslim Personal law in India being divine, it is immutable, 
so that any attempt by the Government to reform it by direct or indirect 
legislation would be considered by the Muslims as interference in religion 
which they would not tolerate under any circumstances.^
It is submitted however that, the Shariah as we know it today was
never an integral part of Islam as preached by Mohammed and followed by the
early Muslims. It was the outcome of a complex historical evolution extend-
2
ing over a period of three centuries, which had assimilated in itself a .
considerable amount of Pre-Islamic customary tribal law, and inevitably,
elements from other established ancient laws as well. It was not until the 
+Vi
10 century that Shariah law was cast in a rigid mould. It remained 
practically unchanged for nearly a thousand years, till legal developments 
during the present century in countries of West Asia completely dispelled 
the notion of the Shariah as a rigid and immutable system. Similarly in 
India too, Islamic law proper, that is, the Shariah or fiqh in its pristine 
purity, has never really been known.
With the takeover of India by the British, for all that it became a
matter of policy for the rulers to adjudicate on the basis of the various
personal religious laws of the subject people, nevertheless as the courts 
of the East India Company gave place to the Crown, English judges presiding 
over the Indian Courts were instructed that where no specific rules were 
laid down they were to act according to "equity and good conscience,
1. See T. Mahmood, Muslim Personal Law, (New Dehli, Vikas, 1977)» at 153»
2. N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic law, (Edinburgh, Univ. Press, 1964), 
at 4.
3. Art. XXIII of the Regulation of 1772 expressly provided that "(i)n suits 
regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages and 
institutions, the laws of the Koran, with respect to the Mahomedans, and 
those of the Shaster with respect to the Gentoos, and where only one of 
the parties shall be a Mahomedan or Gentoo, the laws and usages of the 
defendants shall invariably be adhered to."
See references to A.A. A. Fyzee given by Derrett
(which was) generally interpreted to mean the rules of English law if found 
applicable to Indian society and circumstances."^
Thus the system known as "Muhammadan law" in India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, is the Shariah as modified by English law, both common and 
statutory, and Equity in the varying social and cultural conditions of the 
subcontinent. "Muhammadan Law," an expression introduced by European scholars 
and lawyers is therefore a convenient expression for that portion of the 
Islamic civil law which is applied in the subcontinent to the adherents of 
Islam as a personal law.
It is therefore clear that what is now known in India as the Muslim.
2
personal law, has in its fabric much more man-made than scriptural rules.
However,whatever the true state of the Muslim personal law, reform as such,
is anathema to the Indian Muslims at large. Muslims continue to consider
their family law as based on the Shariah, as something synonymous with their
physical and spiritual identity, something which maintains them as a distinct
community. They find in every suggestion for reform, an organised effort, if
not a conspiracy to wipe out their culture from the soil of India rather than
a device to bring about social change. This is an emotion expressive of their
feeling of insecurity and desire for self-preservation which has increased
since the partition of the country, because they consider themselves left
out and leaderless. Whether justified or not these feelings cannot be lightly 
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brushed aside.
1. Waghela v. Sheikh Masludin, (1887) L.R. 14 I. A. 89 at 96.
2. In fact the process of corruption of the law was evident much earlier 
in the Islamic world itself. The precepts of the Prophet were mani­
pulated by the ecclesiastics who were not infrequently stooges of 
sovereigns and despots and "canons were invented, theories started, 
traditions discovered and glosses put upon his (Mohammed's) words 
utterly at variance with their spirit..." See S. Ameer Ali, The Spirit 
of Islam, (Cal. S.K. Lahiri, 1902), at 163. Kumayun Kabir confirms 
this view. See Changes in Muslim Personal Law, (New Dehli, XXVI 
International Congress of Orientalists, 19&4 )* Fore word," at V.
3. R. Agarwal, "Uniform Civil Code: A Formula Not a Solution," T.
Mahmood ed., Family Law and Social Change: A Festschrift for A. A. A.
Fyzee (Bom., Tripathi, 1975)» 110-44 atll6-7. It would be idle to 
speculate that this merely reflects Muslim male thinking, that the 
Muslim female would fain break free of the system which in not a 
few instances is in derogation of the egalitarianism which modern 
times demand. The illiterate and unenlightened apart, naturally prone
P.T.O.
The reasons for this are to be found in various heterogeneous factors 
naive beliefs and nebulous ideas of the nature of Muslim personal law wide­
spread ignorance of the Islamic sociology itself, the mischief done by irre­
verent criticism of traditional Muslim usages (supposedly based on religion)
made by irresponsible ultra-progressive modernists^ the generally hostile
2attitude of the Hindu masses - and even the intelligentsia - towards the 
Islamic philosophy, and above all religious sentiments, invariably misguided 
by short-sighted maulvis. The ulema threatened as they must surely feel at
as they are to confuse faith with baseless superstitions and fancies, 
among the more progressive sections too, a certain ambivalence of atti­
tude is perceptible, and reform, per se, of their law is not an alto­
gether acceptable proposition. The reasons for this are not far to 
seek. In the vitiated atmosphere of communalism which surfaces every 
so often, in the discriminations, real or imagined, that they must 
contend with, in the general indifference towards the language to 
which the overwhelming majority owe allegience, (if only because it 
is the principcdl vehicle for Muslim religious thought in India) they, 
like their menfolk3feel threatened, and their priority as they see it 
is the preservation and perpetuation of their cultural identity as 
distinct from the majority community - a goal for which they are often 
enough prepared to their aspirations as females for what they
believe to be the larger interest of the community. Superadded to 
this is the indoctrinated faith that Muslim personal law is sacrosanct 
because divinely ordained. An illuminating instance of this is the 
unwillingness of Begum Zeenat Kauser, editor of Bano (New Delhi), a 
leading Urdu monthly for women, to endorse the civil marriage law as 
it "violates the sanctity of nikah", her insistence that Muslims 
must marry within the community - and this from a woman journalist 
known for her strong support of women's causes. See T. Mahmood,
Civil Marriage Law, (Bom., Tripathi, 1978)» at ^ 5*
1. See for instance the comment of Khalid, J., in Mohammed Hard fa v.
Pathuma Beevi, (1972) K.L.T. 5^2 at 5^» where in expressing his sharp 
disapproval of the High Court's earlier judgment in Pathayi v Moideen, 
(1965) K.L.T. 763, in which the errforceqUlity of a divorce, unilaterally 
pronounced by a husband under compulsion, or in jest or in anger was 
upheld,the learned Judge indicts Muslim personal law as a "monstrosity".
2. P.B. Ganjendragadkar in his Convocation Address in 19&9 chose to tell 
students of the Aligarh Muslim University that, "I know that your per­
sonal law is part of the Qur'an but what the Qur'an says is today 
irrelevant. Therefore you must come forward and accept a Uniform 
Civil Code." In the same vein, K.S. Hegde in his Address to the 
Seminar on Islamic law held at the Indian Law Institute in 1972, re­
quested a visiting foreign scholar of Islamic Jurisprudence (Prof.
J.N.P. Anderson of London University), to explain to the seminar the 
"unsuitability (of Muslim law) for a society like ours." See 
"Welcome Address," T. Mahmood ed., Islamic Law in Modem India, (Bom., 
Tripathi, 1972), at
what to them might seem an upheaval of a tradition and a social system from
which, after all, they derive their not inconsiderable power and prestige,
are invariably intolerant of any alternative system, irrespective of its
merits. As such, they encourage the common Muslim to believe that it will be
a major sin (Gunah-e-Kabira) to adhere to any principles of marriage, divorce
and succession other than those laid down in the Qur'an and Sunnah or by their
interpreters. Generally ignorant of what Muslim personal law is, or what a
uniform civil code would mean, the common Muslim believes simply and firmly,
that enforcement of such a code would mean the abandonment of a very essential
part of the faith, making him liable to divine punishment on and after the
Day of Judgment. And the influence of these ideas are so deep-rooted that
they ridicule and dismiss as chicanery the arguments that the planned civil
code would derive its most progressive, its most commendable elements from
Islamic jurisprudence, and would in fact be much nearer the Islamic legal
system than to any other classical personal law.^
Sadly this attitude of rigidity is given greater credibility when in
the context of Indian Islam and reform, an eminent authority asserts that he
"totally admits the position of Maulana Ihtishara ul Haq who wrote 'In Islam
the provision of the Holy Koran and the Sunnah, be they in the form of basic
principles or individual laws, are authoritative and final for all epochs
2
between the time of revelation and doomsday. *" It is submitted that in
1. T. Mahmood, "Family law Reforms Perspectives in Modem India," in 
Family Law and Social Change, op. cit., 93-109 at 103.
2. Derrett, RISI, op. cit., at 535-6. From whatever obscure realms of Islamic 
theology the good Maulana may have surfaced, it is pertinent to contrast 
sharply with this attitude the view of Mr. Justice Ameer Ali (member of the 
Privy Council and himself a Maulvi to boot), the undoubted veracity of 
whose authority on matters Islamic may not be put to doubt. He pleads that 
for anyone to suppose that the man who extolled the sovereignity of Rea­
son as the highest of virtues should "ever (have) contemplated that even 
those injunctions which were called forth by the passing necessities of a 
semi-civilised people should become immutable to the end of the world, is 
doing an injustice to the Prophet of Islamj": The Spirit of Islam, op. cit. 
at 161: so that "the present stagnation of the Mussalman communities is 
principally due to the notion which has fixed itself on the minds of the 
generality of Moslems that, the right to the exercise of private judgment 
ceased with the early legists, that its exercise in modem times is sinful,
... and (to) abandon (their) judgment absolutely to the interpretations of 
men who lived in the ninth century and could have no conception of the 
necessities of the nineteenth, " (Ibid, at 162), and now the tail-end of the 
twentieth century, it is submitted.
Isla-i ye- , (and that too is a moot question in the light of changes in
West Asian Islamic countries), in the context of Indian Islam with its
many admixtures, no. For as we have already seen, Muslim personal law in
/
India is "by no means to be equated with the Sharia," and that the true 
position is that "in the case of Muslim litigants a few rules of law 
drawn from the Sharia with an admixture of English law are applied, pro­
vided they are not against justice and equity,"'*' so that to name the 
present system of Muslim personal law as Shariah is political euphemism, 
not scientific nomenclature, since rules tempered by non-Islamic juris­
prudence and administered under non-Islamic laws cannot be termed Shariah 
"by any elasticity of interpretation.
There is thus no, or at least, there should not be any valid reason
2
why the Muslim personal law should not be amended in favour of the uni­
form civil code. But Muslim intransigence being what it is at the moment, 
there is need for caution as we have already seen. Even those secularist 
Muslims, who are in favour of adopting the uniform civil code in place of 
personal laws, advise restraint. Their writings indicate that the stra­
tegy they favour as a first step towards the uniform civil code should 
be a progressive codification of the Muslim personal law itself, for, as 
they explain, a community which has, for several centuries, been used to
3
such tremendous diversities inside its own separate law of personal status
may really find it difficult to switch on overnight to a common civil code
h,
shared by all Indians irrespective of caste and creed.
1. A.A.A. F^zee, Times of India (Bom), Jan. 31» 1972.
2. Ameer Ali in anticipating the present pressing necessity for such re­
form had this to say as early as 1880: "To me it appears that great 
changes are due in the social institutions and the personal laws of the 
Mussalmans. How they will be achieved, whether by a general Synod of 
Moslem doctors or by the direct action of the Legislature it is im­
possible to say." 4 Mahommedan Law, 5th ed., Vol II., (Cal, Thacker, 
Spink, 1929), Preface to the First Edition^at VIII.
3. This interpersonal conflict of laws is admirably brought out in
D. Pearl, "Intersect Conflict of Laws amongst Muslims in the Indian 
Sub-Continent," Family Law and Social Change, op. cit., ^ 7-60.
Pearl indicates a similar strategy. See ibid. at 60.
Amongst the various institutions of Muslim law most frequently talked 
about are arbitrary polygamy, unilateral divorce, and iniquitous succession 
rights of men and women. It is not within the scope of this tract to discuss 
in detail as to how reform may be, and in fact, has been effected in certain 
other parts of the Islamic world. However contemporary legislation in W. 
Asia, N. Africa, and other Muslim regions (including Pakistan and Bangladesh) 
show quite clearly that Islam is fully aware of what one writer calls 
" juristic tricks"^ or as another puts it, "it (Islam) provides remedies 
against its own injunctions should they prove irksome, and has authorised 
even utilization of subterfuges," while yet another suggests that
"(t)he very fact that Muslim personal law prescribed certain 
methods and techniques for its development, suggest that it 
was never intended to be static. If some of these methods 
and techniques have become obsolete or impractical in the 
changed Constitutional set-up, they need to be supplemented 
by methods and techniques used to developing any other branch 
of law in this country, and^  be comes necessary to allow the ^
Muslim personal law in this country to receive its evolutionary
growth consistent with the changing social, moral and economic
values, by means of these methods and techniques." 3
Under such circumstances, it is but meet that Indian Muslims should
sit up and take note of the fact that what has been done in other Islamic
countries may well be done in India, and that the measure of reform in that
part of the law that is still specifically Islamic which has been introduced
in country after country over the last forty years, constitute at one and
the same time, a most significant example of modernism in Islam, where
theology and law always go hand in hand, and also a fascinating illustration
Zj.
of how a theoretically immutable law can in fact be amended in practice.
The other great objection in the minds of the Muslim masses is, as we 
have noted above, their mistaken belief that the projected Code would be a 
replica of Hindu jurisprudence, in their eyes an abomination to which they
1. Derrett, RISI, op. cit., at 536.
2. A. Hussain, Cited in T. Mahmood, Muslim Personal Law, pp. cit., at 1^ 9.
3* M. Imam, "Muslim law Reforms in India and Uniform Civil Code" M. Imam
ed., Minorities and the Law, (Bom, Tripathi, 1972)^385-^1?» at 385*
J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in the Modern World, (H.Y., N. Y. Univ. 
Press, 1959), at 18-9.
would never give in. This is a fallacious notion since a large number of 
the Hindu 5 as trie doctrines have been abandoned under modem Hindu law it­
self, and if the "civil code promised in Art. 44 of the Constitution will be 
like the Hindu Code,"'*' it will only be because of the secular nature of the 
Hindu Code. In fact the uniform civil code as contemplated by the Constitu­
tion visualises among other secular ideals, a contractual-cum-sacramental 
concept of marriage, complete freedom of both men and women in regard to 
marital choice, solemnization of marriage without any religious ceremonies, 
the independent status of the wife in her husband's home, facility of 
dissolution of marriage in special circumstances available to both spouses, 
and the unqualified validity of the marriage of a widow or divorcee - ideas 
all of which Islamic law, purged of its irrelevances and time-worn tradi­
tional interpretation, stands for. Krishna Iyer J., (as he then was), has 
also tried to dispel such doubts as Muslims entertain about the contents of 
the common civil code. In a thought provoking paper he explains
"(A) family code embracing the whole nation, need not be an 
adaption of the Hindu system... but a synthesis of the good 
in our diverse personal law, an eclectic, not exotic product, 
a picking and choosing from many systems, so as to save our 
ethos and to express the genius of our culture." 2
In the light of the foregoing, that is, that the future civil code of 
India will nothin essence, be much different from an enlightened and liberal 
view of the Islamic legal principles and the conflicts between the two only 
minimal, it is time for Indian Muslims to wake up to the realities, to 
realise that, if Muslim personal law could, in the recent pastjbe reformed in 
a large number of Muslim countries, that, if so far they could have accepted 
what for lack of a better term may be called "Anglo-Muhammadan law," that, if 
they could have accepted British intervention in the form of the Shariat Act 
1937* and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 as also numerous other
1. Derrett, RISI, op. cit., at ^ 6.
2. "Reform of the Muslim Personal law," Islamic Law in Modem India, 
op. cit., 17-33 at 17.
indirect legislation,^" then surely we must realise that changing social 
conditions must now give to the Indian government the same right that the 
British once exercised, i.e. the right to legislate so as to fulfil the
promise of "justice, social and economic,"'" so as to ensure the "dignity
3 4of the individual"- and to bring about the "unity of the nation," given
by the makers of modem India, for the law not being immutable, as we
have already seen, there can be no legitimate objection to intervention.
3 Towards the Unification of the Personal Laws
However despite Muslim intractability, and for all that the Muslim 
law as such' remains untouched and the uniform civil code therefore a goal 
of the not too imminent future, attempts have been made to subjugate 
existing personal laws including Muslim law, to a common law for all in 
the greater interest of society as a whole.
(l) The Special Marriage Act, 195^^
Keeping in mind the sensibilities of the various religious groups, 
and without touching the personal laws, but mindful at the same time of 
the insistent nature of Article 44, Parliament turned its attention to 
putting on the statute book a common secular law of marriage, divorce and 
inheritance for all Indians irrespective of their religious affiliations, 
and the SMA which may well be said to form the core of the future unified 
family law in India, was passed in 195^ *
Though not free from anomalies, the SMA is nevertheless a compre­
hensive piece of legislation, and marks the beginning of an era of 
significant social reform and change.
1. As for instance, the Caste Diabilities Removal Act 1850, the rules 
relating to legitimacy contained in the Evidence Act 1872, the Majority 
Act 1875» the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, and the Child Marriage 
Restraint Act 1929.
2. Preamble to the Indian Constitution.
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
5. Hereinafter referred to as the SMA.
(a) Marriage
Essentially secular in character, the statute as amended in 19&3»
1970 and by the ML(A)A in 1976, enables any two Indians except those living
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,'*" married to, or intending to marry each
2
other, to take recourse to its provisions*
(i) Registration
3
The SMA provides for the registration of all marriages solemnised
under the Act, and extends the scope of its application in that a marriage
originally solemnised under any of the personal laws may, without regard to
the time of its solemnisation, be registered by the parties under Chapter
III provided that it satisfies the conditions laid down in s. 15 . 
c
The effect of the registration is that such marriages would be deemed 
to have been solemnised under the SMA, and would extend to the parties to 
the registration such rights in matters relating to marriage, divorce and 
succession, as are denied to them under their personal laws.
(ii) Conditions of a Valid Marriage
Marriage being a solemn social contract based on secular principles
6
under the SMA, the statute prescribes no religious ceremonies or rituals, 
the conditions relating to it merely specifying that, neither party has 
a spouse living at the time? that neither party suffers from recurrent 
attacks of insanity or epilepsy so as to render him or her incapable of
1. SMA, s. 2.
2. The Foreign Marriage Act, 19&9 took away the extra-territorial applica^ - 
tion of the SMA. Since then its provisions are applicable only to 
marriages solemnised in India.
3. SMA, s. 15.
4. The conditions being that (a) a ceremony of marriage has been performed
between the parties, and that (b)-^ ), neither of them* has more than one
spouse living, is an idiot or lunatic, is less than twenty-one years of
age, or is within the degrees of prohibited relationship.
4. SMA, s. 18. 5. Ibid, s. 12 (2).
6. Ibid, s. 4 (a). 7. Ibid, s. 4 (b) (iii).
1 2 giving valid assent, or unfit for marriage or the procreation of children,
F*
that the male has completed the age of twenty-one years and the female the 
3
age of eighteen, and that the parties are not within the degrees of
L
prohibited relationship.
The SMA thus envisages strict monogamy, and in making bigamy a penal 
offence-'* offers a welcome alternative to polygamous or potentially poly­
gamous marriages. While strict monogamy is now the rule of law among the 
Hindus, Pars is and Christians, the Muslim personal law according to its 
traditional interpretation allows for a plurality of marriages, and the 
Muslim female seeking protection against the harsh regime of such unions,' 
may now take recourse to the provisions of the SMA, It is also to be noted 
that, a polygamous marriage under Muslim law cannot afterwards be registered 
as a civil marriage under the SMA, unless at the time of the registration, 
the husband has only one spouse living.
(b) Matrimonial Reliefs
The rapidly changing socio-economic conditions of society, the wider 
literacy among women, their newly acquired economic independence and the
1. Ibid, s. 4 (b) (i).
2. Ibid. s. 4 (b) (ii).
3. Ibid, s. 4 (c).
4. Ibid, s. 4 (d). Parts I and II of the First Schedule of the Act enume­
rate the degrees of "prohibited relationship", and most of those
"prohibited" in the SMA, are not "allowed" relationship in any of the 
personal laws either. The exception is that while first cousins —  
paternal and maternal —  are within the degree of prohibited relation­
ship under the SMA, Hindu law apart, this is wholly opposed to other 
personal laws. Among the Muslims of India such marriages are very common, 
as Muslim law allows marriage with all first cousins on the paternal as 
well as the maternal side. The resulting anomaly has been pointed out
by T. Mahmood, Civil Marriage Law: Perspectives and Prospects, op. cit.at 
28, to the effect that, "The SMA, thus leans towards the traditional 
Hindu law in putting restrictions on marriage with a first cousin, while 
it contravenes the same in allowing free marital relationship with all 
second cousins," so that "whereas a Hindu man who cannot lawfully marry 
his second (paternal) cousin under the HMA... can straightaway take the 
same girl as his wife under the SKA, a Muslim whose personal law allows 
him to marry his first cousin (paternal or maternal), is denied the 
facility of contracting a civil marriage with her.'*’
5. Ibid, s. 44.
freedom which emanate? from it —  all these have done r/uch to erode the 
traditional attitude towards marriage, and the SMA in envisaging it in 
modem contractual terms also provides for matrimonial reliefs to both 
husband and wife in consonance with the guarantees of equality enshrined 
in the Constitution.
(i) Restitution of Conjugal Rights
S. 22 of the SMA provides for a decree for the restitution of con­
jugal rights to either spouse where the other has withdrawn from his or 
her society without resonable cause.
Though it has been suggested that the Act be amended to do away with 
this provision altogether,^  and there is undoubtedly always the possibility 
that the party in the wrong may merely by not complying with the decree 
make it a ground for divorce, it is nevertheless submitted that, like the 
relief for judicial separation, this provision might well in cases, provide 
the parties concerned with time for sober reflection, and thus prevent 
hasty and ill-considered divorces.
(ii) Judicial Separation
2
A decree for judicial separation may be obtained by either party on
any of the grounds for divorce under s. 27 (l) and (Li) of the SMA as
also on the ground of failure to comply with a decree for the restitution
4
of conjugal rights.
(iii) Void Marriages
The contravention of any of the conditions laid down for a valid
1. See P. Diwan, "Restitution of Conjugal Rights and the Law Commission’s 
Recommendation for Reform," V. Bagga ed., Studies in the Hindu Marriage 
and the Special Marriage Acts, (Bom., Tripathi, 1978), 128-49; and
S.G. Bhatt, "Restitution of Conjugal Rights —  Should It Continue?” 
150-7, ibid.
2. SMA, s. 23 (1).
3. Tfcid, s. 23 (1) (c).
4. ibia, s. 23 (1) (b).
marriage renders such marriage null and void. The impotence of the
ft
respondent at the time of the marriage and thereafter, is also a ground for
p
nullity, and it is open to either party to present a petition for a dec-
3
laration of such nullity.
(iv) Voidable Marriages
A marriage is, under the Act voidable at the option of the aggrieved
party and may, in the case of a woman, be annulled by a decree of nullity
c
on the grounds of wilful non-consummation of the marriage, or that consent 
for the marriage was obtained by force or coercion,^ provided that the 
petition has been presented within one year after the coercion had ceased 
or the fraud discovered,' and that there had been no married life together 
since the cessation of the coercion or the discovery of the fraud as the 
case may be.
(v) Divorce
The SMA also provides for the dissolution of marriages, for all 
that divorce is not a concept unknown in the various personal laws preva­
lent in Indiai As indicated earlier, even among the Hindus, despite the 
emphasis that the sastra places on the sacramental nature of marriage, it 
was sanctioned in certain communities either by caste custom or by statute.
However the laws regulating divorce in other communities are not 
without their own peculiarly uneven and erratic features. In the study of 
the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as IDA), applicable to
1. SMA, s. 2b (1) (i). 2. Ibid., s. 2k (1) (ii)
3. Ibid., s. 2b (1). b. Ibid., s. 25.
5- Ibid., s. 25 (i) 6. Ibid., s. 25 (ii)
7. Ibid., s. 25, Proviso (a) 8. Ibid., s. 25, Proviso
Christians, there is evidence in certain of its provisions, of a definite
bias in favour of men. Under s. 10 for instance, whereas a single isolated
act of adultery on the wife's part is a valid ground for the granting of a
divorce, a wife on the other hand, may sue only if the husband's adultery
is coupled with an additional ground such as bigamy, incest, desertion or
cruelty for a period of at least two years,^ though the Act does give her
the edge over men in that additional grounds available to the wife is the
2
husband's offence of rape, sodomy and bestiality.
Horeoever, a significant omission in the IDA, in terms of modem
needs is that it does not envisage the grant of a divorce "on collusion,”
"d 3
i.e. merely on grounds of mutual consent.
There is a similar lack of this provision in the Parsi Marriage and
Divorce Act, 1936, though in the contemplation of an equal right of divorce
on grounds of adultery, it has removed the invidious distinction that
bexisted between husband and wife in the old Act.
1. IDA, s. 10.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, ss. 12, 14. Dr. J* Minattur's comments are relevant in this 
respect. He pleads "This Act (the IDA) was modelled after English 
enactments for matrimonial reliefs adopted about the middle of the 
last century. Over a hundred years later the United Kingdom pre­
scribed by legislation a single valid ground for divorce, i.e. 
irretrievable break-down of marriage. If in 1869 the idea was that 
Indian Christians would do well to follow in the footsteps of the 
British in obtaining matrimonial reliefs, is there any valid reason 
to assume that they should be governed by rules different from those 
applicable to the British after the passage of a century? If irre­
trievable break-down of marriage is made the only ground for judicial 
declaration of divorce applicable to all communities and religious 
groups in India, there will be equality of treatment not only between 
men and women but also between various religious groups": "Women and 
the law: Constitutional Rights and Continuing Inequality," A.de Souza 
ed., Women in Contemporary India, (New Delhi, Kanohar, 1975), 96-109 
at 99. This was in 1975, an  ^in 1976 the ML(A)A amended both the SMA 
and the HMA to include the concept of divorce by mutual consent.
4. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, I865 "served the needs of Parsis 
satisfactorily for more than seventy years, when it was revised to 
remove some anomalies revealed by experience and to bring it more in 
line with the changing views and circumstances of the community.": P.K. 
Irani, "The Personal law of the Parsis of India," J.N.D. Anderson ed., 
Family Law in Asia and Africa, (Lond., George Allen and Unwin, 1963),
273-300 at 253.
The Muslim practices in regard to divorce are perhaps the most ini­
quitous of all. Comparatively rare as its occurance is among the Muslims 
of India, -wives are nevertheless always under the threat of the possibi- 
lity of repudiation by divorce at the unilateral declaration of their 
husbands for any or for no reason at all. It is true that Muslims are 
agreed that to divorce the wife for an inadequate reason is sinful, but 
the divorce, if pronounced, is nonetheless regarded as legally valid and 
binding. And the ridiculously wide scope of validity given to the triple 
formulae of repudiation^ which brings the marriage relationship to an 
abrupt end even where this is not really desired by either party, is fur­
ther reinforced when we consider that, in the classical Hanafi law—  the 
dominant Sunni School in India—  divorces pronounced under compulsion, 
intoxication, or such anger as to make the husband temporarily insane, 
are nevertheless valid and binding.
No such latitude is however accorded to the wife in the traditional
law whether in the indulgence of polyandry or in any right to repudiate 
2
her husband. True there is the Khiyar-ul-Sulugh or "option of puberty," 
that is, the right vested in the minor —  male and female —  to ratify or 
rescind, on attaining puberty, the marriage contracted on his or her behalf 
during minority by any person other than his or her father or paternal 
grandfather, and in the case of the female minor, this option of repudia­
tion must be exercised immediately on attaining puberty.
There is also the system of Khul under which the wife may, should 
the husband prove amenable, \r\demnify him with money or valuables to obtain 
her release from the marriage; and in the tiny community of Muslims in the. 
Laccadives Island, there is prevalent the system of fasaq whereby under cer­
tain circumstances, a Muslim wife is accorded the legal right to sever the
1. "Talaq," "Talaq," "Talaq;" "itself an innovation not dreamed of by the 
founder of Islam...": J.N.D. Anderson, "The Eclipse of the Patriarchal 
Family in Contemporary Islamic Law," Family La::.., op. cit., 221-3^
at 217. It may be mentioned here that the triple talaq formulae has no 
validity in Shia Islam.
2. Anderson, above, 221 ff.
marital tie by uttering the formula of divorce dictated by the Qadi.
But these are marginal instances at best, and it was only after the 
passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Carriages Act. 1939 (hereinafter re­
ferred to as the DMMA), that Muslim women in India came to benefit from a 
more contemporary approach to divorce. Under the Act, Muslim wives are 
accorded the right to seek judicial divorce in a court of law on the grounds
specified therein, to initiate divorce proceedings and obtain a valid divorce
2
without the husband's consent.
Commendable as these provisions are, other aspects of the Act leave 
much to be desired. Thus while it secures the wife's mahr or dower, it makes 
no provisions for her maintenance, and neither is she awarded custody of non­
minor children. Most objectionable, however because most restrictive, is the 
stipulation that, provided that the marriage has not been consummated, grounds
available to the wife for divorce are the husband's interference with her
3 ^right to own and control property, to practise her own religion and to
regulate her own moral life.^ In effect, the consummation of the marriage
being the condonation of the husband's misbehaviour, cases would be rare
indeed where the wife could in practice resort to the benefits available to
her under this section.
1. A.R. Kutty, Marriage and Kinship in an Island Society, (New Delhi, 
National, 1972), at l$f. See also L.Dubey, Matriliny and Islam, (New 
Delhi, National, 1969), at 72. Dr. Uinattur is of the opinion that an 
opportunity for the judicial recognition of the doctrine of fasaq was 
lost in 1975 when the Kerala High Court ruled in Moyin v. Nafeesa, (1972) 
K.L.T. 7^ 5, that the right of Muslim women to obtain divorce is exclu­
sively governed by the DMMA, 1939. See his "Women and the Law...,"
op. cit., at 100.
2. A. J. Almenas-Lipowsky, The Position of Indian Women in the Light of Legal 
Reform. (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975), at 57-8.
3. DMMA, s. 2 (viii) (c).
Ibid, s. 2 (viii) (d).
5. Ibid, s. 2 (viii) (e).
In view of the foregoing, the grounds for divorce in the SMA —  sub­
stantially the same as those in the HMA  ^—  are particularly welcome, and in 
according her exactly similar rights to those of her husband, in this as in 
other areas, the Act does away with the iniquities of the personal systems 
of law. Such anomalies as have crept in, and such provisions which in the 
climate of social change may lose relevance need not now assume permanence 
or immutability, for having no divine saction behind it, the SMA will always 
be open to revision and amendment.
(c) Succession
The SMA, when originally enacted in 195^  provided that whenever two 
persons registered a marriage under its provisions, their respective personal 
laws (which could be either the same or different), would cease to regulate 
succession to their and their descendant's property, and they would thence­
forth be governed by the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 
(hereinafter referred to as ISA). This had the effect of establishing a
measure of equality in matters of succession and inheritance as between males 
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and females although the rights of the heirs could also be regulated by will.
(i) The Effect of the ML(A)A on Non-Hindu Intra-, and Inter-Communal 
Marriages
As the position now stands after the amendments of the ML(A)At in all
cases, parties to marriages contracted under the SMA, whether intra-communal
(except in the case of Hindus), or inter-communal will be governed by the 
provisions of the ISA as of old. The ML(A)A effects no changes at all.
1. Except that conversion to another faith is not a ground for dissolution 
of marriage under the SMA, religion having no part to play in the scheme 
of the statute.
2. The ISA gives equal rights to sons and daughters, and the same rigjvt over
property to the surviving spouse. A widow under its provisions is entitled 
to -j of the property, and her share increases to sole ownership in the 
absence of lineal descendants and kindred.
(ii) The Effect of the ML(A)A on Hinf.u Intra-Goirimunal Marriages
S. 21 (a) of the £MA now provides that so long as the parties con­
tracting a civil marriage belong to the Hindu religion within the broad 
meaning of the term as understood in the Hindu Code of 1950-56, they will 
not be subject to the provisions of the ISA for purposes of succession and 
inheritance, but to their own personal law. The reason for this is obvious. 
The H5A has had the effect of radicalising the Hindu law of succession, and 
the inclusion of nearer heirs in Class I of the Schedule who take equally, 
and of remoter heirs in Class II who likewise share equally after the Class 
I heirs, and s. 14 which contemplates absoluteness of ownership by a Hindu 
female of any property possessed and acquired by her whether before or 
after the commencement of the HSA —  all this renders unnecessary and even 
retrogade, any deviation from the personal law.
Similarly s. 19 of the SMA effecting severance from the joint-family 
so as to subject the coparcener's interest to the ISA, is restricted in 
its application to cases of inter-religious marriages.
(d) Maintenance
S. 36 of the SMA contemplates the payment of alimony pendente lite to 
the indigent wife having regard to the husband's income, while s. 37 pro­
vides for the payment to the divorced wife, of permanent alimony and main­
tenance by making it a charge on the husband's property if necessary.
The secular and egalitarian character of the Act is thus comprehen­
sively set forth; what it aims to achieve is the type of the "secular" In­
dian woman free from religious conventions of subordination to the husband 
and the family, one who occupies pride of place as equal to men in society 
and in the family.'*' That such a woman does not in reality exist as yet, any­
one remotely familiar with Indian conditions will know. But if the SMA
is a step forward towards the ideal of equality to which the Constitution as­
pires, a major break-through towards the achieving of the uniform civil 
code, we may yet look forward to the day when the social and legal position 
accorded to her in the statute book is translated into reality.
(2) The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the DPA),
is applicable to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir,'*’
and is an attempt towards the amelioration of an evil which shows no signs
of abating, rooted as it is in a social set-up where marriages of mutual
choice result in disrepute and loss of social standing, and in particular
where parents are under the burden of moral and religous responsibilities
to marry their daughters cost what it may.
The Act makes it an offence to give, take, or demand a dowry, or to
abet the giving or taking of a dowry, and anyone found guilty of this offence
shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or
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with fine which may extend to Rs. 5000, or with both. Where a dowry is in 
fact given (for under the maxim factum valet the transfer though prohibited, 
is valid) the woman in connection with whose marriage.it is given is herself 
entitled to it, but should she die before receiving it, her heirs are 
entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being. Agree­
ments for giving or taking dowries have been declared void,^  but where in 
contravention of the Act, a dowry is paid and then the marriage fails to
take place, the dowry cannot be recovered by way of suit, for it was an
7
illegal contract and the parties are jln pari delicto.
1. DPA, s. 1 (2). 2. Ibid, ss. 3 and
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 1^ 5- The maxiiri is e*Plained at 2^ 2, f. n. 3-
4. DPA, s. 6 (1).
5. Ibid, s. 6 (3).
6. Ibid, s.
7. Ramekbal v. Harihari, A.I.R. 1962 Pat. 3^ 3*
In the definition of "dowry” in s. 2 as "consideration of the
1 lamarriage," wedding presents have been expressly excluded, and expected­
ly, gifts of sums of money and costly and lavish "presents" to the bride­
groom are now by no means rare and the circumvention of the law is there­
by achieved. However the definition does exclude from its purview the
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Muslim system of mahr or dower, and rightly so, it is submitted as 
dowry and mahr are concepts worlds apart.
The force of the Act is also considerably weakened in that the
3
offences under the Act are non-cognizable, and prosecutions may be
instituted only with the consent of the State Government in the case of
Zj.
the offence of demanding a dowry. This would imply that the demanding 
of dowry is a greater offence than the giving of it. But for any tan­
gible result, it is submitted that such differentiations are best not 
made for one is in the end as contributory a cause as the other.
That deeply religious attitudes and the fear of social stigma on 
the part of parents play their part in the spread of this pernicious 
system, we have already seen. As against this, there is the greed on 
the other side the desire for gain, for now that marriage is compulsorily 
monogamous, the power of parents of an unmarried man of good earning- 
capacity to hold out for a high "dowry" is great.
But if the HMA*s insistence on monogamy has resulted in a dearth of 
acceptable bridegrooms, another provision of the same statute projects new 
hope for the future. Now that the HMA has dispensed with the notion of guar­
dianship in marriage once the girl reaches the age of eighteen years, the 
time seems to be imminent when, parental orthodoxy and opposition notwith­
standing, marriages of mutual choice will be the norm rather than the
1. DPA, s. 2.
la.This is confirmed in Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab. A. I.R. 1982 P. & H.
372 at 333. But as against this see S. Shah selected and introduced,
"Indian Women Speak Out Against Dowry," Third World-Second Sex, M.
Davies compiled, (Lond., Zed Press, 1983), 201-13.
2. Ibid., s. 2 (b). 3- Ibid., s. 8.
k. Ibid., s. k. 5- Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at* 1^+6.
exception, and freed then from the strangulating grip of avarice from 
which parents in arranged marriages suffer no less than their hapless 
female offspring,^ we may hopefully look forward to the day when the Indian 
bride is cherished for her personal accomplishments of charm and character 
rather than for the wealth she brings to her new home.
(3) The Cr. P.G., 1973
The wife's right to be maintained by her husband is an important
consequence of marriage and has been given statutory recognition in the
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personal laws of the Hindu, Christian, Jewish and Parsi"^  communities in
cases of nullity, judicial separation, or divorce. In the Muslim personal 
law however, and whatever codification of it is to be found in the DMMA., 
though the husband is under an obligation to maintain his wife during co­
verture,^  in the event of the termination of the marriage, this obligation
7
extends only to the period of iddat and thereafter his liability is over. 
This is in addition to her entitlement to mahr which is immediately 
payable on divorce.
In view of this, s. *f88 (3) of the old Cr. P.C. empowering criminal 
courts to pass orders for maintenance of wives (including Muslim wives), 
whose husbands had neglected to provide the same, was the object of much 
agitation and dissension among Muslims who claimed that the remedy for such a 
wife was restricted to the Islamic provisions to the exclusion of s. *f88(3).
1. The DPA has been in action for well over two decades, and yet gruesome 
reporting of bride-burning in the homes of dissatisfied "in-laws "-not 
uncommon to this day-in Indian newspapers is indicative of the true 
state of affairs.
2. HMA, ss. 2*4—25; HAMA, s. 18.
3. IDA, ss. 36-37.
Ibid.
5. SS. 39-*fl Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936.
6. Failure by the husband to provide maintenance to the wife for a period 
of two years is a ground of divorce under the provisions of the DMMA.
7. The period of waiting incumbent on the wife after the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce to determine her pregnancy or other-
wise.
Generally unsympathetic to the Muslim attitude of rigid adherence 
to the personal law, Hecyte's J's, (as he then was) characteristic note of 
impatience is struck when, in dimissing such claims he laid down in
Syed Ahmed v. Nagath Taj Begum  ^that
”(T)he plea of personal law makes no appeal to me. The 
Cr. P.G. is the law of the land, and not of any community.
If there is a conflict between the law enacted by the 
legislature and the personal law, then the former prevails. ..
There is no constitutional guarantee to respect the personal 
law of any community... It is true that the personal law of 
the Muslims as such has not been changed. But if they come 
within the mischief of s. **88 Cr. P.G. they shall be governed 
by its provisions notwithstanding their personal law.” 2
Neither was Krishna Iyer J., (as he then was), amenable to such pleas,
and in emphasising the constitutionality of s. *1-88 (3) pointed out that,
"(T)he Indian Constitution directs that the State should 
endeavour to have a Uniform Civil Code applicable to the 
entire Indian community, and indeed when motivated by a 
high public policy s. **88 has made such a law. It would 
be improper for an Indian Court to exclude any section 
of the community bom and bred on Indian soil from the 
benefit of that law." 3
In 197*4- however, the revised Cr. P.C. of 1973 came into effect with,
for our purposes, rather noteworthy changes. The old s. **88 was replaced
by s. 125 in the new Code. It enacts that if
"(a)ny person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses 
to maintain (a) his wife... a magistrate of the first class 
may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal order such person 
to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife...”
1. A.I.R. 1958 Mys. 128.
2. Ibid, at 131- See also Badruddin v. Aisha Begum (1957) 55 All. L.J. 
300 where Oak J., laid down that if the wife applies for maintenance 
the Criminal Court is bound to follow the provisions of s. **88
Cr. P.C. though the Civil Court may not accept the principle of the 
section.
3. Shahulameedu v. Subaida Beevi, (1970) K.L.T. ** at 6.
and goes on to elaborate in Expl. (b) that
M(a) wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has 
obtained a divorce from, her husband, and has not remarried." 1
It is thus clear that while under the old Code, the wife could claim
maintenance even if she was able to maintain herself, s. 125 new
Code specifies that she may claim maintenance only if she is "unable to
maintain herself." While there is no doubt that this particular section
was legislated with a view to social justice and equity, it is submitted
that the wording is not free from ambiguity. Would a "wife" who is able-
bodied and capable of earning be exempt from the benefits of s. 125? This
2
question was cursorily glanced at in Kunhi Moyin v. Pathumma, where the 
enactment was taken at its face value, but was the subject of more thorough
3
examination in a Gujarat case, where Mehta,J., rightly pointed out that 
merely because a person is found to be able-bodied and capable of earning, 
it cannot be said that he or she is able to earn. It requires, in addition, 
education or experience, finance, push and pull, and in particular in a 
country where female illiteracy and general unemployment are rampaQit, and 
in a society where economic independence of females is still a rarity, if a 
wife is presumed to be able to maintain herself merely because she is sound
1. It was held in Mushaque Mondal v. Joy sum Bibi, (1976 ) 2 C.L. J. 27, 
that when a woman has been divorced and has not remarried, there is 
no bar to her applying for maintenance if she has been divorced by 
the respondent husband prior to the coming into operation of the new 
Code. To the same effect are the rulings in Razakhan v. Mumtaz Khatoon, 
(1976) 1 An. W.R. 1, and Mohamad Khan v. Mehrunnisa, 1.L.IL (1977)
1 Kant. ^59, Lai,, J., elaborating in the latter that, the expression 
"who has been divorced by," along with the other expression "has 
obtained a divorce from," clearly means that both the contingencies 
were contemplated, viz. the wife having been given a divorce before 
the commencement of s. 125 of the Code, as well as the wife who has 
obtained a divorce after such commencement.
2. (1976) K.L.T. 87.
3. Nirmala Bhanji v. Jayantilal, (1976) 17 Guj. L.R. 5^7-
-yb-
of tody an^  mind, then
"(t)he whole purpose of preventing vagrancy which is 
contemplated in s. 125 would be lost, and there would 
be husbands who would be encouraged to neglect to 
maintain their wives at a mature age, when in spite of 
having an able body, they would be totally incapable of 
earning their livelihood... Such a situation would 
obviously become intolerable, and could never have been 
desired by the legislature which enacted s. 125 of the 
Cr. P.C. in its pursuit of an enlightened policy of 
preventing vagrancy." 1
However the most revolutionary change is the definition of the word 
"wife" in s. 125 as distinct from its meaning under the old s. 8^8. For 
whereas under the latter, a wife had the right of maintenance, but a 
divorced wife did not, for the first time that right is conferred on the 
divorced wife under s. 125 which is in accord with social justice, for, it 
is submitted, it imports from the West —  and in this it harmonises with 
the SMA —  the concept of alimony for the wife alone in Indian matri­
monial proceedings. Explaining this Raju and Rao JJ., pointed out that 
the section being "both remedial and beneficial in character ... It is the
duty of the judge to construe the statute in such a manner as to suppress
2
the mischief and advance the remedy."
Referring to the social nature of the enactment Khalid,J., 
elucidated;
"(T)his departure from the earlier law is a milestone in 
social legislation, conferring benefits to a particular 
group of women in need of it... What the legislature has 
done is to import a legal fiction to create an artificial 
status, for the only purpose of enabling the wife who is 
divorced and has not remarried, to claim maintenance, so as 
to prevent vagrancy and to protect such women from poverty 
and starvation... This provision is a highly salutory one, 
and is meant to alleviate the sufferings of divorced 
woman, and to cause a little deterrent to erring and 
callous husbands." 3
The Supreme Court confirms this position and in a recent decision
1. Ibid, at *f60-l.
2. Reza Khan v. Mumtaz Khatoon, (1976) 1 An. W.R.l, at
3. Kunhi Moyin v. Pathumma, (1976) K.L.T. 87, at 92-3*
Krishna Iyer C.J. (as he then was) stressed that, a
"(A)rt. 15 (3) has compelling, compassionate relevance in 
the context of s. 125... (and) Parliament in keeping with 
Art. 15 (**)... made a special provision (in s. 125) to help 
women in distress, cast away by divorce. Protection against 
moral and material abandonment manifest in Art. 39 is part of 
social and economic justice specificated in Art. 38, fulfilment 
of which is fundamental to the governance of the country 
(Art. 37).” 1
So much then for the explanation. It now remains for us to examine 
judicial opinion in regard to the interpretation of the section and see 
how far it is in consonance with the intention of the legislative body.
What for instance, would be the solution should s. 125 clash with the 
personal or customary law of the parties? Keeping in mind the nature and 
express purpose of the enactment, the courts were unanimous in holding
that s. 125 is indeed above and beyond any personal law.
2In the Kunhi Moyin case where the contention was that the definition 
of "wife” in the Code is an invasion of Muslim personal law, for according 
to it, a husband is liable to maintain his wife after divorce only during 
the period of idclat, and not beyond,the court in refusing to countenance 
this maintained that, "the new definition of wife does not violate the 
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Art. 25 (l) of the Constitution. The 
definition of s. 125 (l) comes within "the providing for social welfare and 
reform" legislation contained in Art. 25 (2), and hence the challenge under 
Art. 25 is not available to the petitioners, as "the Cr. P.C. transcends the 
personal law of the parties."
3
In the same vein the Bombay H.C. in Khurshid Khan v. Husnabanu, laid 
down that the principlesof Muslim law relating to iddat are not relevant
1. Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Chothia. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. at 3^ 5* Where 
the wife herself on just grounds refuses to live with her husband, as 
for example on grounds of his impotence, Fazl Ali J., held in 
Sirajmohmedkhan v. Hafizunnisa, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1972, that as this 
was tantamount to mental and legal cruelty, she was entitled to live 
apart, and the husband was bound to pay her maintenance according to 
his means, under s. 125, Cr. P.C.
2. (1976) K.L.T. 3?. 3. (1976) 7i 3on., L.3. 2*9.
when considering the provisions of s. 125 of the Code of Cr. P.C. 73, for
" (t)here is nothing in s, 125 or Chapter IX~*~ of the 
Cr. P.C. 73 which excludes Muslim women from the benefits 
of s. 125... The enactment is consistent with Art. 44 of 
the Constitution contemplating the uniform civil code,” 2
and therefore
" (t)here is nothing in Muslim law or culture to prevent 
Parliament from making or conferring a right on the divorced 
Muslim wife to claim maintenance against her quondom husband, 
so long as she remained unmarried, even after the iddat 
period.” 3
It is however submitted, that the learned judges in the foregoing 
cases, overlooked the provisions of s. 127 (3) in ruling that s. 125 tran­
scends the personal law of the parties. To say as it was said in the
4Khurshid Khan case that there is nothing in Chapter IX which excludes
Muslim women from the benefits of s. 125* is an erroneous notion and their
Lordships would have done well to have kept in mind the provisions of 
s. 127 (3) in the same Chapter IX which provides that,
" (W)here any order has been made under s. 125 in favour of
a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce 
from, her husband, the Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied 
that
(a) ...
(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she 
has received... the whole of the sum which under any 
customary or personal law applicable to the parties, 
was payable to the parties on such divorce, cancel 
such order..
That s.127 (3) (h) is therefore clearly a limitation of the right of 
the wife as envisaged in s. \25,^ is the literal interpretation of the section 
in Aluri Sambiah v. Shaikh Zahirabi,^  where the ruling however was that 
s. 127 (3) could come into operation only if at the time of divorce, the 
divorced woman is paid the whole of her unpaid dower, prompt and deferred,
1. Emphasis mine. A grave error, as is pointed out immediately below.
2. Khurshid Khan v. Husnabanu, (1976) 78 Bom. L.R. 24,at 24l.
3. Ibid, at 242. 4. Cited above.
5. Doubtless motivated by the majority community's anxiety to secure 
Muslim votes. See J.D.M. Derrett, "Muslim Ex-Wives: A Note of Caution," 
(1976) K. L.T. (J,), 33-35 who notes at 35. "that *1 cannot conceal my opi­
nion that Parliament made this strange exception in order to quiet 
Muslim agitation against the whole prospect."
6. (1977) 2 An.W.R. 418.
failing which s. 125 would still be in operation.
A fuller exposition of this attitude is to be found in Rukhasana
Parvin v. Shaikh Mohamed Hussein -^ where it was explained at some length
that, though the divorced Muslim wife was certainly not exempt from the
purview of s. 125, that is only part of the whole scheme contemplated by
the new Cr. P.C. regulating right of maintenance. The court held that
while s. 125 is a provision of general application, cl. (b) of sub-sec (3)
of s. 127 is the only provision in which reference to customary or personal
law is found. Therefore though no words of restriction of the right to
claim maintenance are to be found in s. 125 itself, if what was due to her
under the personal law has been paid to her, and the requirements of sub-sec
(3) are satisfied, there can be no order made under s. 125. In the event
that a divorced Muslim wife is paid the amount of maintenance due during
the period of iddat together with mahr, she is not entitled to an order for
further maintenance under s. 125. The F.B. in Kamalashi Kumar v. Sankaran 
2
Sadasivan, concurred with the above judgment, and in fact relying heavily 
on it, pointed out that while there are no words restricting the right to 
entertain an application for maintenance in s. 127 itself, the rule of 
harmonious construction required that s. 127 (3) (b) must be read and under­
stood as a proviso to s. 125* It was further elaborated that in s. 127 (3)
(b), a sum under the customary or personal law payable on divorce would 
surely not mean "maintenance" which could certainly have been done, if such 
was the legislative intent in plainer, simpler and more direct language.
Thus the sum referred to in s. 127 (3) (h) need not be restricted to main­
tenance in the well understood sense of the term, but may cover any sum or 
amount payable on divorce under the customary or personal law of the parties. 
Khalid J. dissenting from the above view in Mohammed v. Sainabi,
1. (1977) 79 Bom. L. R. 123. See also Hamid Khan v. Jammi Bai, l.L.R.
(1978) M.P. 595.
2. A.I.R. 1979 Ker. 116 (F3).
3. (1976) K.L.T. 711.
interpreted the new enactment in a more equitable spirit to rule that a 
Kuslim husband could successfully resist his ex-wife's claim for mainte­
nance after iddat, only if he establishes a custom that certain customary 
dues, if paid at the time of divorce, would disentitle the wife from 
claiming maintenance. The payment of mahr would not however affect a 
discharge of a claim for maintenance, because the claim for mahr is a 
valuable right available to the wife, and this claim is a charge over the 
properties of the husband. Therefore payment of mahr will not operate as 
payment of customary dues in discharge of the claim for maintenance.
However by far the most balanced interpretation, because in consonance
with the spirit of equity and natural justice, is the remarkable Supreme
I
Court decision in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Chothia^  where Krishna Iyer, J., 
accepting that proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or pexv 
sonal law would operate as a bar to the wife's claim for maintenance under 
s. 127 (3) 00» nevertheless carried the equitable principle to its logical 
conclusion to maintain that, the quantum of such sum must be more or less 
sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance. Stressing the inherently 
social nature of the enactment, the learned Judge was firmly of the view 
that though the payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal 
law requirement would have to be considered in the reduction of maintenance 
rate, nevertheless such amounts would not annihilate that rate unless it is 
a reasonable substitute. For, his Lordship explained, the purposes of the 
payment under any customary or personal law must be to obviate the desti­
tution of the divorcee, and to provide her with the wherewithal to maintain 
herself.
What therefore emerges from the foregoing is that, where s. 125 of 
the Cr. P.C. is a step forward towards the achieving of the uniform civil 
code in that, in its remedial purview it includes all wives and ex-wives,
1. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 362, above at 99.
the hostility of the Muslims towards the enactment on the basis that it
to
is in conflict with Islamic principles under which a husband is bound to 
maintain the divorced wife only during the period of iddat, together with 
the political expediency of appeasement by the majority of the minority, 
has resulted in the incorporation of s. 127 (3) (h). The effect of the 
two sections read together and the judicial interpretation thereto is 
that, though the courts could grant maintenance to the divorced wife, at 
the time of so doing they should give due consideration as to whether she 
had already realised from her husband in full, her post-divorce entitlement 
under the personal law of the parties, and so as not to defeat the social 
purpose of s. 125, this amount must, according to the Supreme Court, be 
adequate for her maintenance.^
Muslim obscurantists should have done well to have understood, in 
connection with iddat , that what was specified by the law-giver of Islam 
as the minimum incumbent, could, only be erroneously regarded as an immu­
table principle by the critics of the provision. It is steps like these 
that come in the way of social legislation - Muslim sensitiveness to the 
point of suspicious touchiness. Alienated from the mainstream of life,
backward-looking and steeped in orthodoxy, they are themselves much to
blame for the predicament that they find themselves in.
9. Is There Any Justification for the Muslim Attitude?
But it is submitted, a great deal of their uncertainty, their inward- 
looking attitude is also the result of the much vaunted secularism of India.
1. A point of vievr followed in Hajuben v. Ibrahim, (1977) 1? Guj. L. R.
133, (Cri. Rev.) and happily reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Fazlumbi v. Khader, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1738, Krishna Iyer J., reiterating 
at 1735: "... Section 125-127 is a secular code deliberately designed 
to protect destitute women who are victims of neglect during marriage 
and after divorce. It is rooted in the State’s responsibility for the 
welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined 
to members of one religion or region but the whole community of woman­
hood. "
Is the Constitution really secular? They ask themselves, and do the lofty 
ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity really prevail? Or do 
Hindu feelings and sentiments take precedence in the Constitution over 
those of other communities? Hindus constitute the majority community, and 
yet Hinduism is not the religion of India, nor are Hindus entitled to any 
preferential treatment, or the rights and obligations attached thereto. No 
doubt there can be no nobler document than the Indian Constitution, but as 
one studies its provisions closely, one cannot help but be aware that Hindu 
sentiments and feelings have in fact been given voice to in what is 
professedly a secular Constitution.
(l) Article 25> Explanation 1
Art. 25, f o r instance promises to all citizens freedom of conscience,
and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion, and then goes
on in Explanation 1 to make special provisions for the Sikhs, i.e.
”(T)he wearing and carrying of kirpans (daggers) shall be
deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.”
It may of course be argued that the carrying of kirpans is deemed by the 
Sikhs to be an essential part of their religion, but we must keep in mind 
that this freedom is qualified in Art. 25 in that it must be "subject to 
public order, morality and health,” and ”to the other provisions of this 
Part.” It is submitted that in the potentially volatile communal atmo­
sphere that has marred the scene from time to time in Independent India, 
the wearing of kirpans could well have been prohibited on the basis of
public order, specially where another provision in Part II stipulates the
“1right to "assemble peacefully and without arms. This is therefore an
unnecessary, and it is submitted, a wholly unwarranted concession to Sikh
2
religious sentiments.
1. Emphasis mine. It is submitted that recent events in the Punjab and the 
neighbouring Capital would bear out the veracity of this statement.
2. What mey at first sight seem merely a theoretical concession consi­
dering that Sikhs in India are not given to wearing these vicious 
weapons on their persons, may well be insisted upon in abnormal cir­
cumstances, as a Constitutional guarantee.
(2) Article 290 (A)
There is also, in a secular Constitution, no justification for the 
inclusion of Art. 290(A)Which runs as follows:
"(A) sum of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall 
be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of 
the State of Kerala, every year to the Travancore Davaswom 
Fund; and a sum of thirteen lakhs and fifty thousand rupees 
shall be charged on, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund 
of the State of Tamil Nadu every year to the Devaswom Fund 
established in the State for the maintenance of Hindu temples 
and shrines in the territories transferred to the State on the 
1st of November 1956 from the state of Travancore-Cochin."
There is no explanation in the Constitution as to why this should be so;
and in the face of this puzzling provision why, one is tempted to ask, is
such a privilege accorded to merely Hindu temples and shrines? Why not to
mosques, churches, synagogues and agiaris as well?
(3) Article kQ
But above all* the Article that seems to have sparked off the most 
controversy, and roused the ire and suspicion of the minorities at large 
and that of Muslims in particular, and has led them to doubt the secular 
nature of the Constitution is Art. of the Directive Principles. It reads:
"(T)he State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and 
animal husbandry on modem and scientific lines, and shall 
in particular take steps for preserving and improving the 
breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves, 
and other milch and drought cattle.”
Quite clearly the Article prohibits the slaughter of, among others, 
the cow. The cow is, no doubt an animal of economic value, and is part of 
the cattle-wealth of a country. In India she has religious significance 
as well. Hindus in general regard the cow as "Mata"; she is associated 
with the Lord Krishna, and was revered by the Hindu sages and rsis as 
sacred. She is ”a unifying sentiment" for Hindus, and "no higher dharma 
has been prescribed" for them "than her protection. "_L The same sentiments
1. K.:i. ilunshi, P.D. , (1951), Part II. Vol. VIII, at 3513-21.
were expressed in the Constituent Assembly
"(G)reat importance has been attached to this question 
from the time of Lord Krishna... Cow protection is not 
only a matter of religion with us; it is also a 
cultural and economic question." 1
And again:
"(T)he entire universe was treated as one and the cow is 
the symbol of that oneness of life and are we not going 
to maintain it? Brahma-Hatya and Go-Hatya - the killing 
of the learned man, the scientist, the philosopher or the 
sage, and the killing of a cow - are on a par. (Sic). If 
we do not allow the killing of a scientist or a sage in 
this land, it shall certainly be ordained by this House 
that no cow shall be killed." 2 (Sic)
And yet again:
"(W)e want that India should declare today that the whole 
human world as well as the whole animal world is free today
and will be protected. The cow is the representative of
the animal kingdom... Our Hindu society, or our Indian 
society has included the cow in our fold. It is just like 
our mother," 3
and while a person may not run to kill a man who has killed his mother
wife or children, he will certainly
"(r)un at a man, if that man does not want to protect the 
cow or wants to kill her." ^ (sic)
Strong sentiments these, and undoubtedly exaggerated, but revelatory 
nonetheless. Thus when the appeal was raised that cow breeding and 
preservation was necessary, not for milk supply alone, but also for eco- 
nomic purposes, it stood suspect in the eyes of non-Hindus. Small wonder 
then that members of the minority communities in the Constituent Assembly 
held the view that the incorporation of the Article was a concession to
1. S.G. Das, C.A.D. , op. cit. , at 571. It is worth noting that the state­
ment acknowledges implicitly, the essentially religious nature of the 
sentiment.
2. R. Vira, ibid, 575-6.
3. R.V. Dhulekar, ibid., at 576-7. Ibid.
5. Pandit T.D. Bhargava had this to say: "Therefore I submit we should con­
sider it (the preservation of the cow) from an economic point of view... 
cattle which are regarded as useless are not really so... because we are 
in need of manure (and) it be a nilch eow or not (it) is a moving manure 
factors'-." Ibid, at 570.
thn religious sentiment of the majority, the Hindus, rather than a purely
•>
economic measure, and accused the Government of
" (l)ending itself to a subterfuge and camouflouge 
legislation that is not prepared honestly to say that 
we wish to ban cow slaughter, yet they do it in an 
indirect, devious and dishonest manner." 1
This view is given greater credence, when we consider that there 
are a large number of useless cattle in the country including cows. They 
do not produce milk and are worthless for breeding and work purposes. Thus 
in a country where the quality of the cattle is in general very poor, where 
there is a great shortage of fodder even for useful cattle, and where the 
dire need is to improve the quality of the livestock, if it is in the
1. Frank Anthony, representative of the Anglo-Indian community, P.P., op. 
cit., at 3*4-95* It is interesting in this respect to compare Art. 25(a) 
of the Swiss Constitution: "The bleeding of slaughter animals which 
have not been previously stunned is expressly forbidden; this provi­
sion applies to all methods of slaughter and to all kinds of livestock, 
so that while the Swiss Constitution provides for a single compas­
sionate rule to apply to all kinds of livestock, the Indian Constitutio 
singles out "cow" for special protection. In the light of this, and 
despite assertions to the contrary, it can therefore reasonably be con­
cluded that special emphasis has been laid on the cow, and which then 
leads us to the irrevocable conclusion that Art. 48 is indeed a con­
cession to Hindu religious sentiment, an opinion with which K.S Hegde 
concu.£S<-.See his Directive Principles of State Policy, (New Delhi, 
National, 1972), at 49, as does Smith, op. cit., at 433 when in assess­
ing the attitude of the Supreme Court in the M.H. Quareshi Case (A.I.R. 
1958 S.C. 731)» he declares that, "... there was more than a hint of 
criticism in the Court's passing allusion to the situation in which 
the Hindu sentiment for the divinity and sanctity attributed to the 
cow has to be propped up by legislative compulsion." It is also worth 
noting that though Gagendragadkar, J., was a member of the Supreme Court 
Bench which decided the 195^  cow slaughter case, on reconsideration he 
had this to say "If the advocates of a total ban on the slaughter of 
cows and all their progeny consider what the ultimate implications of 
their claim would be for non-Hindu citizens of India, they will realise 
that their claim, in substance, amounts to converting the secular 
democracy of India into a theocratic state," citing Gandhi to the 
effect that "'Just as Shariat cannot be imposed on the non-Muslims, 
the Hindu law cannot be imposed on the non-Hindus.’ * (Secularism and 
the Constitution of India, op. cit., at 131). Pertinent to this obser­
vation is the pithy comment that "... the minority might well suffer 
from the thoughtless or perverse arrangements which the majority might 
think fit to enact as laws, and communal harmony is best achieved if 
each individual is not only free to practise his religion but is also., 
free from the religions of his fellow citizens, whether his own, or 
another community.: J.D.M. Derrett, "Examples of Freedom of Religion 
in Modem India," Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 10, 1977»
2^-51, at *42.
general interest of the national economy that milch arf drought cattle 
should "or- preserved, their breeds improved, and their slaughter prohibited, 
then surely it is equally in the interest of the economy that those useless 
cattle, which are an obstacle to economic growth', cease to be. Quite on 
the contrary, such cows are being kept and maintained in what are called 
Gosadans, at momumental public expenditure. It was estimated *by the 
Supreme Court in 195^ that Rs 18 or 19 per head p.a. was being spent on 
their welfare, incongruous in a country which found it difficult to spend 
more than Rs 5 per capita p.a. on the education of its people.^
(a) Judicial interpretation of Article 48
Judicial interpretation of this important but sensitive issue indi­
cates a certain ambivalence of attitude though it tends to tilt generally
2
in favour of Hindu sentiment. In the now celebrated cow slaughter case, 
the petitioners, Muslim butchers, questioned the constitutionality of 
certain legislative enactments banning the slaughter of certain animals 
including cows, passed by the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh, on the ground that they were violative of the economic and 
religious freedoms as guaranteed by Arts. 19 (l) (g)^  and 25 (l) of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court however held that whereas the total pro­
hibition of the slaughter of she-buffaloes, breeding and working bulls with­
out prescribing any test as to their age and unfitness, as envisaged in
1. M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731 a^t 751.
2. M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 195^ S.C. 73^ « Followed in 
A.H. Quaraishi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 196IS.C. 448.
3. "All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to 
carry on any occupation, trade or business."
4. "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other 
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom 
of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate 
religion."
the provisions of those Acts was violative of Art. 19 (!) (5} of the 
Constitution, nevertheless in so far as the said Acts prohibited the 
slaughter of cows of all*ages, such prohibition was valid and in conso­
nance with Art. 4^-8. In the event therefore, the sacrifice of a cow on the 
Idu'lazha festival not being an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to 
exhibit his religious belief, they, Muslims, had to forego this one alter- 
native in the general interest‘d so as to subserve the sentimental require­
ments of the majority community, "this from the Indian viewpoint not being
2
a deprivation of any moment.” In sum then, we have here the peculiarly
paradoxical situation where in a secular state there is, not to mince words,
"the imposition of a religious and ethical belief by a majority on a 
3
minority.
However, when the very same issue was again the subject of litigation
4in Mohd Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court reversed its
earlier dicta in the M.H. Quareshi case  ^to hold that a notification issued
by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh under the Madhya Pradesh Act 1956,
resulting in the prohibition of the slaughter of bulls and bullocks was
indeed a subterfuge measure, and as such
"(a) prohibition imposed on the exercise of a fundamental 
right to carry on an occupation, trade and business will 
not be regarded as reasonable (since) it is imposed not
in the interest of the general public, but merely to
respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section 
of people whose way of life, belief or thought is not 
the same as that of the claimant." 6
1. Per Das C. J. , A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731 at 7^ 0.
2. Derrett, HIS I, op. cit., at kJZ. Note the undertone of irony here.
3. P.K. Irani, "Social Justice and the Constitution," 
and Education, op. cit. , 158-80, at 17^-.
Lav, Society
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 93.
5. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731.
6. Mohd. Faruk's Case, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 93, at 96-97. ('Per Shah J.,).
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0 >) Sample Survey of Hindu Ambivalence
This conflict of decisions is indicative of a certain dichotomy of 
thinking, a certain ambivalence of attitude, and* one can only hope that, 
considering the number of weightier unresolved points of law that the 
courts are daily faced with, the cow-slaughter question is now, at least 
judicially a closed chapter in view of the latest Supreme Court pro­
nouncement in the Mohd. Faruk Case. 1
Meanwhile educated, "liberal" Hindu opinion continues to be in a
quandry. While fully receptive to the fact that, "India is a secular
2State formally declared as such by the Constitution," so that "cow
slaughter cannot be totally banned without infringing the fundamental
3
rights of Indian Muslims," the same author pleads eloquently and emo­
tionally that, in an issue as sensitive and delicate as this, Hindu sen-
if
timents should be given due consideration by the Court "as Hindus in 
general do respect cows as they do different gods,"-* and "to most Hindus 
'the cow is Heaven the cow is Earth, the cow is Vishnu Lord of Life,'"^
7
for not to do so may lead to communal riots.
1. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 93-
2. N.R. Chakrabarti, Contemporary Problems in Hindu Religious Endowments,
Ph.I) Dissertation, (Unpublished), London University, 1982, at *44.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, at 4-3.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, at 44.
7. Ibid, at 4-3. It is worth noting that in the State of West Bengal there
is no law against cow-slaughter, and recently when the suggestion for
such legislation was mooted to the Chief Minister, Mr. Jyoti Basu, he
is reported to have retorted, "Over my dead body." And to the credit of 
the Bengalis it has to be admitted that for all their volatility, there 
has never, in the history of the State, been communal riots on grounds 
such as those Dr. Chakrabarti apprehends. Are the Hindus of West Bengal^
one is tempted to ask, any less Hindus than those of the rest of the
Gariga Valley? Or is it that, a long tradition of culture and learning 
irees —  at least a sizeable number of them —  from the rigid intole­
rance evident in the more backward regions of Irk in?
(c) A Proiect/^  Solution ^ v ■ ■ ■ i ■ %
Inconclusive and inchoate as arguments such as these are, they do 
nothing to resolve this prickly issue, nothing to alleviate Muslim 
apprehension that, such rights as the Constitution does guarantee them 
are always subject to reintcrpretation in favour of the majority community.
3mall wonder then at their intractability.'
So as to strike a delicate balance between Hindu sensibilities on 
the one hand, an' the undoubted right of Muslims and other minorities to 
whom beef is a legitimate item of diet on the other, it is submitted that, 
perhaps the ideal solution might be the enactment of a Central ' kvfc' .. . 
banning the slaughter of cows in public places only, while stringently 
safeguarding, at the same time, the constitutional rights of minorities to 
the two vital freedoms, those of religion and trade, free of every inter­
ference and harassment. A partial precedent for just such a legislation 
may be found in the dicta in Kitab v. Santi,^  where Muslims having killed 
a cow in full view of protesting Hindus, the offenders (because their act 
was an insult to the Hindus and undertaken with that object), were 
convicted under s. 298 of the Indian Penal Code which lays down that,
"(W)hoiev£V‘with deliberate intention of wounding the 
religious feelings of any person... places any object 
in the sight of that person, shall be punished..."
To conclude, Art. 44 of the Directive Principles envisages, as we 
have already seen, a laudable and noble ideal, a truly secular society 
where all are subject to a uniform set of civil laws. The greatest 
impediment in its implementation, as we have also seen, is the rigidity 
of obscurantist Muslim opinion, bom as it is of their fear of losing 
their identity as a community, of being submerged in the majority main­
stream. The concessions to Hindu sentiment in the Constitution do nothing 
to alleviate such fears. It is essential therefore that to reassure them of
the bona fides of the Constitution, and to restore their faith in ..it, 
a more careful study of the Constitution be made, and such concessions 
as have advertently or inadvertently been made in deference to the feel­
ings of the majority community, be amended or abrogated altogether.
This would go a long way towards assuring the minorities that all 
are equal in the eye of the Constitution, the supreme law of the country, 
and the implementation of Art. 44 and the ushering in of an era of har­
monious uniformity in the personal lavs in India, would then not be the 
distant ideal as it seems now, practically speaking, but a living reality.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HINDU WIDOW IN TRADITION AND IN MODERNITY
*But I heard a reed of Coolaney say - 
'When the wind has laughed and murmured and sung, 
The lonely of heart is withered away.1
W.B. Yeats^ 
From * The Land of Heart's Desire*
1^  Introduction
Widowhood, the natural and inevitable corollary of marriage, is 
the cessation of the interpersonal relations with the marital partner, 
and while the result of it may be the removal of specific sets of 
duties or restrictions on time or movement, and a greater degree of 
freedom and independence, in the couple based structure of a given' 
society which stigmatises singleness, there is a corresponding loss of 
the social role of wife, and with it loss of status, of respect and 
consideration.^
This is properly indicated by the word "widow" itself, which is
—  Zderived from the Sanskrit vidhava meaning "empty", a harsh and hurtful
term, for while wifehood is the apotheosis of the fulfilment of the 
destiny traditionally offered to women by society, and the only means 
of their integration in the community, the woman in her single state is,
1. And this is true as much of traditional cultures as of the
countries of the West, and perhaps nowhere more so than in the 
advanced and aggressive, materially oriented American society.
Thus the very revealing and perceptive observation that, "Because 
of the much married nature of American society, being a widow 
places many women in a rather stigmatic relation with others, self- 
consciousness modifying many interactions.": H.Z. Lapota, Widowhood 
in an American City, (Camb., Mass., Schenkman, 1973) at 91*
2. In folk etymology "void of a man."
socially viewed, so much wastage.
This is specially true of cultures which derive their ethics from 
religious tenets, and any effort to comprehend the unique position of 
the widow and her lot in Hindu society must of necessity be based on 
the social status of the traditional Hindu wife in her own milieu.
2 The Hindu Wife in Tradition
Religion in general, and Hinduism perhaps more so than any other, 
emphasises the sanctity of marriage. It is for the Hindu one of the 
ten samskars or sacraments necessary for the regeneration of men of
2
the twice-born classes and the only sacrament for women and sudras.
The aims of a Hindu marriage being dharma (righteousness), praja 
(progeny) and rati (pleasure) in that order, marriage was desired not 
so much for sex or even for progeny, as for obtaining a partner for 
the fulfilment of one's religious duties.^
Accordingly the Hindu is enjoined to enter gphasthasrama, (houseWolAe^A 
and marriage assumed the greater importance, as it was only in 
his capacity as a married householder that he was capable, together 
with his wife, of fulfilling the obligation laid upon him to pay the 
three ynas, deva pna (debt towards God), ygi pna (debt towards the 
sages) and pitp yija (debt towards ancestors) and to beget sons. These 
duties achieved, he could only then turn his mind to the attainment of
if
ultimate salvation (mokfea).
1. S. de Beauvoir, op, cit,, at 447*
2. Manu II. 67, G. Buhler, tr., The s cf Manu, F, I.ax Muller, ed.,
S.B.E. Vol. XXV, (Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1880).
3* K.M, Kapadia, Marriage and Family in India, (Lond., O.U.P., 1955) 
at 159*
4. A. Avasthi, Hindu Marriage in Continuity and Change, (Luck., Pradeep
Prakashan, r I ^  1 9 ), Intro., at VTI.
Thus to describe the Hindu marriage as a mere sociological factor 
would be to miss its real significance, to do less than justice to 
its uniquely sacramental aspect. Nor is it merely a mechanical imi­
tation of the cosmic union of the male and female principles. It is
2essentially a re-enactment of the myth of creation, a metaphysical 
transformation of the mundane biological man-woman association into a 
celestial sacred relationship which transcends even the cycles of 
time. Of all the samskars, marriage alone could therefore bring 
about the spiritual metamorphosis of man and lead him on to that ulti­
mate aim of human life, the attainment of mokga.
Nor could the r&le of women be minimised when it came to ful­
filling the second aim of marriage, praja, the procreation of progeny 
for the perpetuation of the family. The birth of a son to carry on 
the household worship was for the Hindu a vital necessity. In popular 
belief, in the absence of a son, putra, a man goes to the hell called 
Put,-* and his ancestors* spirits likewise suffer, for unable to be fed
1. Consider and contrast in this respect the concept of marriage as 
being not merely ansgencj of sexual behaviour, but an economic 
institution which in various ways affects the proprietary rights of 
the parties, *'a relation of one or more men to one or more women 
which is recognised by custom or law and involves certain rights 
and duties both in the case of parties and in case of children born 
of it." : E. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, Vol. I, 
(Lond., Macmillan, 189*0, at 26.
*2. S.P. Nagendra, Forward at Avasthi, op.cit., who then goes on to 
quote the marriage formula, "I am Heaven, thou art Earth, I the 
Chant, thou the Verses; let us be one and bring forth offspring," 
and "Wherewith Agni grasped the right hand of this earth, therefore 
grasp I thy hand...," to indicate that in thus doing what the gods 
did, the Hindu participates in a life of fullness and immortality.
3. See Vi5pu,XV.44-6, J. Jolly, tr,, The Institutes of Visnu, F. Max 
Miiller, ed., S.B.E. Vol. VII, (Oxon, Clarendon Press/\830). 
"Because he saves (trayte) his father from the hell called Put 
therefore (a male child) is called putra (protector from Put, son) 
by Svayambhu himself.
"He (the father) throws his debt on him (the son) and the father
(continued on next page)
with the pindas (rice balls) at the rites in their honour, they are
1
doomed to eternal hunger and misery.
The perpetuation of the family and the desire for male progeny 
is rooted in the Rgveda and perfectly understandable for the Aryan in­
vaders having colonised a rich and fertile land, held and owned by a 
powerful and infinitely more civilised race, were easily outnumbered 
by their enemies. They must have very often felt for, and deprecated
the comparative dearth of men, and the Vedic father's longing for a 
2male child was the natural consequence of the desire for more
warriors on whom would depend not merely the perpetuation but also the
survival of the race.
(continued from previous page)
obtains immortality, if he sees the face of a living son.
"Through a son he conquers the worlds, through a grandson he obtains 
immortality, and through the son's grandson he gains the world of 
the son."
1. An impressive legend meant to illustrate this is told more than 
once in the Mahabharata, that of the great penitent Jaratkaru, who 
in the course of his wanderings comes across hunger-racked, 
emaciated, woeful beings hanging head down in a cave, clinging to 
the single root of a certain plant which itself holds on only by a 
thread, and which in turn is being greedily gnawed at by a mouse. 
Moved to compassion and ready to part with what his penances might 
have earned him to redeem the misery of those wretched creatures, 
the ascetic discovers to his dismay and amazement that they are 
none other than his own ancestors, r$is of strict piety who are 
nevertheless doomed for the very asceticism practised by the last 
of their seeds. At this needless to say, Jaratkaru that "famous 
knower of the Vedas and Vedailgas", then sheds his continence, 
acquires a wife and begets a son and thus rescues his forbears from 
their dreadful torment. For a more detailed account of this and 
other stories from the Mahabharata illustrating the same point see 
J.J. Meyer, Sexual Life in Ancient India, Vol. I, (Lond., George 
Routledge, 1930), at 14? ff.
2. This longing for male progeny is dwelt upon time and again in the 
Vedic hymns. Thus:
(a) "To him who worships, Soma gives the milch-cow, a fleet steed 
and a man of active knowledge
Skilled in home duties, meet for holy synod, for council meet, 
a glory to his father." : RV. 1. 91. 20, R.T. H.Griffith, tr.f
Hymns of the ggveda, Vol I, (Benares, E.J.Lazarus, 1889).
(b) "0 Dawn enriched with holy rites bestow on us the wondrous gift
Not unnaturally therefore, with this emphasis on dharma as the 
chief object of a Hindu marriage, and the begetting of a son the para­
mount duty of a Hindu, the importance of the woman becomes singular, 
and the birth of a daughter as potential mother not altogether un­
welcome. Add to this the fact that while the men were engrossed in 
the work of conquest and consolidation, women were constructively
engaged in agriculture and the manufacture of cloth, bows and arrows
1
and other war materials. They were thus useful members of society 
whose co-operation was valuable in securing victory in war and pros­
perity in peace, and therefore not to be patronised or held in contempt.
That women were not the morally low preatures that they were to 
be regarded at a later date, is made abundantly clear by the frequent
pronouncements in the ggveda in praise of them. "Many a woman even
2more often is kindlier than a godless and miserly man," we are told.
(continued from previous page)
Wherewith we may support children and children's sons." : RV. 1. 92. 
13, ibid.
(c)"As holy food, Agni, to thine invoker give wealth in cattle, 
lasting rich in marvels,
To us be born a son, and spreading off-spring, Agni be this thy 
gracious will to us-ward." : RV. III. I. 23, ibid.
(d)"Soma to the Gandharva, and to Agni the Gandharva gave
And Agni hath bestowed on me riches and sons and this my spouse." : 
RV. X. 83. M, ibid., Vol. IV, (1892).
(e)"Be ye not parted; dwell ye here; reach the full time of human life. 
With sons and grandsons sport and play, rejoicing in our own 
abode." : RV. X. 83. 42, ibid.
(f)"0 bounteous Indra, make this bride blest in her sons and fortunate 
Vouchsafe to her ten sons, and make her husband the eleventh man.": 
RV. X. 85. 43, ibid.
1. A.S. Altekar, The Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation, 2nd ed., 
(Banaras, Motilal Banarasidass, 1936), at 342.
2. RV. 5. 6l. 6, F. Max Muller, tr., Vedic Hymns, F. Max Muller, ed.,
S.B.E, Vol. XXXII, (Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1891)*
It was well recognised that the wife was the ornament of the house,
2 4 3nay, she was herself the home, her husband*s companion and friend,
and immediately after marriage, she is asked to shoulder her
responsibilities as mistress of the house, and just as the ocean
rules over the rivers of the world, so must she as queen of the house,
5
hold sway over her husband's father, mother, brothers and sisters.
There is thus enough evidence to indicate that in the hoary 
antiquity of the period of the Vedas, the position of the wife was am 
exalted one. She was no slave,subject to the absolute dominion of her 
husband, but as his indispensable companion in the performance of 
ceremonies and sacrifices before the household fire, and as the mother 
of sons, the respect accorded to her is in some measure comparable to 
the status of the mater-familias of early Roman law.
However, while the husband protected and maintained his wife, she 
in turn owed a duty of obedience to him.^ The Vedic word for the 
couple dampati etymologically means the joint owners of the house. In 
actual practice however, as with all patriarchal societies, the Hindu 
husband as the senior partner was vested with the ultimate supreme 
authority, and under his general guidance the wife's position was one
1. RV. 1. 66. 3i Griffith, op.cit.
2. RV. 3- 53. ibid.
3. The union of marriage cements this bond of friendship. Thus :
"Nigh they approached one-minded with their spouses, kneeling
to him adorable paid worship
Friend finding in his own friend's eye protection, they made 
their own the bodies which they chastened." : RV. 1. 72. 5i ibid.
RV. X. 83. 26, ibid.
5. RV. X. 83. 46, ibid.
6. This is disputed by Altekar, op.cit., who points out at 93 that, 
"The Vedic marriage ritual, however, does not enjoin the duty of
obedience upon the wife. Both parties take the same vow."
of honourable subordination.
However to assume that this ideal of equality prevailed uni­
versally in the Vedic age would be to idealise, and to attribute in
some measure Utopian qualities to it, which in the light of the many
utterances in derogation of women, the age ill deserves. While on 
the one hand, the Rgveda extols the virtues of women, on the other
hand it is of the view that the mind of woman brooks no discipline,
2and neither is it worthy of any merit. Urvd-St in describing the
nature of her own sex confesses that with women there can be no last-
3
ing friendship, and likens their hearts to those of hyenas; and, 
goes on the sacred text, even Indra has observed that women cannot 
control themselves.
Thus we come across diametrically opposing views and the task of 
reconciling them so as to determine which of them was representative 
of the age as a whole is no easy task from this distance of time. How­
ever, it is submitted that what does seem to emerge is that the honour
and reverence which women derived, emanated from their r&les as wives 
and mothers. Intrinsic merit as such seems not to have been a quality 
attributed to them, and with the spread of polygyny and the dis­
sensions and disputes that must invariably accompany it, the less 
attractive - though perfectly understandable - traits of woman's
1. Ibid., at 92-3» Thus the same author indisputably refutes his own 
suggestion that the duty of obedience was/(required of the Vedic K, ia.oJs 
wife. It is a truism of universal application that whatever the 
position might theoretically be, society imposes and impresses upon 
each age its own chosen norms of behaviour and conduct.
2. RV. VIII. 3. 17, Griffith, op.cit.
3. RV. X. 95. 15, ibid. ~
4. RV.Virr.. 33. 17, ibid.
nature seemed to have lent a certain veracity to the opprobrium 
heaped upon her. *
It has often been observed, and certainly with truth, that the 
Aryans were by and large committed to the ideal of ekpatnltva (one
"j
wife), and instances of polygyny where they did occur were regarded 
with disapproval. In one place a doubly wedded man smitten with
anxiety is made to exclaim that biting cares devoured him as rival
T 2 
wives’ (sapatnls) enclosing ribs oppressed him from every side. We
are similarly treated to an entire hymn devoted to the rantings of a
jealous wife and her fulminations against a more favoured rival. ^
Confined in the earlier stages to the aristocratic classes only,
if
for whom in imitation of the gods, it was a matter of pride and 
status to acquire several wives, the practice seems to have gradually 
spread. The wife’s barrenness or the birth of female children only, 
or the neglect on her part of religious observances so as to render 
her unfit for participation in religious yajnas (sacrifices), all 
these reasons together with the inspiration derived from the llite, 
inevitably opened the doors for a more widespread practice of polygyny 
in the light of which the more slanderous utterances against women ove- 
if not acceptable, at least understandable.
With the advent of the dharmasastric period, the Hindu way of 
life seems to have undergone a certain definite transformation and 
transmutation down the centuries. A mass of sacred literature grew up 
- the prototype of which may be said to be the laws of Manu - which
1. Avasthi, op.cit., at b^.
2. RV. 1. 105. 8, Griffith, op.cit. 3. RV. X. 1^ 5* 1-*S ibid.
b. RV. VII. 26. 3, ibid., refers to Indra the king of gods as having 
taken and possessed spouses like so many castles. See also RV. VII. 
18. 2. ibid.
while accepting the authority of the Vedas, reflected the course of 
change, and it is obvious now that whatever any revered scriptures 
may say, as in this case the Vedas, each age makes its own norms 
which are rationalised and institutionalised by individuals. This 
literature reflects both the sacred and secular aspects of con­
temporary life, and women, their position and status in society, the
ideals held before them and the demanding standards expected of them,
1
all of which emerge from a study of these texts.
That women were the objects of respect even in ages following the
Vedic period may be inferred from references even in the dharmasastra.
Manu the great lawgiver, has many a good word for women side by side
with his depreciatory comments. He unequivocally assigns to them the
status of presiding deities in the house, and indeed wives who are
destined to bear children, who secure many blessings, who are worthy
of worship and irradiate their dwellings are in no wise less than the
2goddess of fortune who resides in the houses of men. Likewise
"(w)here women are honoured, there the gods are 
pleased; but where they are not honoured, no 
sacred rites yield rewards.”3
According to the sage, as the first duty of the husband was to require
and to obtain unreservedly her co-operation in all religious acts,
,!(L)et man and woman united in marriage constantly 
exert themselves that (they may not be) disunited 
(and) may not violate their mutual fidelity,1'^
5and this may be the summary of the highest law for husband and wife.
1. P. Mukherjee, Hindu Women, (Cal, Orient Longmans, 1973), at 3*
2. Manu, IX. 26, op.cit.
3. Ibid., III. 36.
4. Ibid., IX. 102.
3. Ibid., IX. 101.
But, it may be noted, Manu also says that from food cooked in
f 1
the evening the wife should offer fralis but without mantras. The
process of the degradation of women had clearly begun, for the
robbing her of her right to repeat the Vedic mantras soon gave way to
an even firmer stricture that the wife is not authorised to perform
2religious acts independently of her husband or without his consent.
Kane draws our attention to Vigflu, 25. 15 which ordains that there is
no separate yajna for women (independently of the husband), nor vrata
(vows) nor fasts (without his consent). Similarly Katyayana propounds
a sweeping rule: "Whatever a woman does to secure spiritual benefit
after death without the consent of her father (when she is unmarried),
or her husband or her son, becomes fruitless for the purpose intended.1*^
Not only that
”(B)ut for disloyalty to her husband, a wife is 
censured among men and (in her next life) she is 
born in the womb of a jackal and tormented by diseases,
[the punishment of her sin^’1^
5
and her perpetual tutelage declared, the woman’s subordination is 
complete. Nor, in the opinion of the renowned rsi^does she 
deserve any better, for from birth her character is tainted with a
1. Ibid., III. 121.
2. P.V. Kane, History of the Dharmasastra (hereinafter referred to as
H.D.), 2nd ed., Vol. II, Part I, (Poona, BORI, 197*0 at 558.
3. Ibid., at 559*
k. Manu. IX. 30, op.cit.
5* "Her father protects (her) in childhood, (her) husband protects 
her in youth, and (her) sons protect her in old age; a woman 
is never fit for independence.11 : Ibid., IX. 2. See also
Ibid., V. 1^ 8. The same sentiment is echoed in numerous smrtis 
among them, Baudh. II. 2. Mf-6, G. Buhler, tr., The Sacred Laws of 
the Aryas, Part II, F. Max Muller, ed., S.B.E., Vol XIV,
(Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1882); Vas. V. 2, ibid.; Vis. XXV. 13» 
op.cit.
love of bed, of seat and of ornament; impure desires, wrath, dis-
honesty, malice and bad conduct motivate her; uestitute of strength
and of the knowledge of Vedic texts, she is as impure as falsehood
itself and for one such Mno sacramental rite is performed with.
2sacred texts, thus the law is settled.11
Thus being the morally low and degraded creature that she is in
the dharmasSstra (none of which is attributed to an authoress), strict
fidelity and devotion to the husband are stressed as the guiding
principles of a woman*s life for
”(T)hough destitute of virtue, or seeking pleasure 
(elsewhere) or devoid of good qualities, yet the 
husband must be constantly worshipped as a god by 
a faithful wife.'1-^
This ideal of pativrata, i.e. being devoted to the husband, not merely
implied fidelity, but made service to him the only duty of the wife,
her sole joy in life and the realisation of her innermost self
(antaratma); and while polygyny was given legitimacy, for the wife,
because she was a satl ("true" wife), mores were evolved to commit her
to be devoted to the husband even after his death. Thus Manu enjoins:
H(A) faithful wife, who desires to dwell (after 
death) with her husband, must never do anything 
that might displease him who took her hand, whether 
he be alive or dead."
The ideal of pativrata, and correspondingly, the notion of
chastity,so insisted upon by the Brahmanical tradition, naturally led
to what in later ages was to become one of the greater evils of the
1. Manu IX. 17, op.cit.
2. Ibid. IX. 18.
3. Manu V. 15^ » op.cit., an idea that was to have a profound impress 
upon the Hindu mind right down the ages, and as relevant today as when 
the notion was first propounded. See Fazal Ali, J.fs, summing up in 
Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, at 1954.
4. Manu V. 154, ££• cit.
Hindu way of life, i.e. child marriages. Marriage, according to the
sacred texts, is not only necessary, but it is «lso the sacramental
birth anew of the woman, and it is the father’s express and holy duty
to find a husband for his daughter. The setting in of the menses
brings with it not only the capacity for the full sexual life and the
right thereto, but first and foremost the divine call to it, the
unavoidable duty. For the woman is there for the bringing forth of
progeny, and her calling must not be barred to her or made harder.
Therefore during each rtu (those days after her period which are
proper for conception) not only has she the urge for coition, but for
her this is then also a holy right and command. Thus each time an
unwedded maiden has her courses, her parents and guardians are guilty
2of the he^Kous crime of slaying the embryo.
The conjecture has been put forward that as a matter of fact this
insistence on child marriage was based not so much on religious as on
economic grounds, "on the heavy competition in the marriage market1',^
and the father burdened with the duty of finding his daughter a good
if
husband, dared not wait long. However, it is submitted that what
1. Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 216-7.
2. See Vas. XVII. 71, op.cit.; Baudh. IV. I. XII, op.cit.; Nar. XII. 
25-7, J. Jolly, tr., The Minor Law Books, part I, F. Max Muller, ed.,
S.B.E., Vol XXXIII, (Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1889).
Disobedience of this rule incurs the wrath of the gods, and such 
punishment as is in store turns the stomach. Thus according to 
the Para^ara samhita (VII. 5, cited at Meyer, Vol. I op.cit.,) 
if a girl has reached her twelfth year and has not been given 
away, then her forefathers in the other world are forever drinking 
the blood she sheds every month.
3. Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit , at 216, f.n. 2. 
h. Ibid.
saving certain acts of household worship appropiated by custom to 
and daughters.
really emerges is the value put in the Hindu marriage on procreation 
as being of its essence; rati or sexual pleasure is subservient to 
it, and the pious rule of rightful copulation which enjoins the 
virtuous to the bringing forth of progeny, is thus the basis of the 
fear that lest otherwise, the ytu of the young woman be left unused, 
(an attitude that spills over in the Epics, as we shall presently 
see). Moreover in the rigidly patriarchal set-up of the dharmasastra 
society, it may not be too far-fetched a theory to assume that, con­
sidering the contempt of the law-givers for the moral worth of women, 
the early marriage of girls was a means by which the female honour 
was sought to be protected; weak and inclined to give in to their 
lesser instincts, their conduct in later years could not be relied 
upon, and measures could not be taken too early to prevent the 
calumny that they might otherwise heap upon their forbears!
In sum then, in the newly formed society of Manu and other like 
seers, she who had been the friend and companion of her husband in 
the period of the Veda, is debased and her fall from grace complete. 
The ceremony of marriage is recognised by legislators as taking the 
placejfor women, of the sacrament of initiation prescribed by the 
Veda. There is no sacrifice, fast, or religious observance that con­
cerns women in particular,! no pious practice beyond devotion and rever-
K
ence to her husband which alone may attain for her honours in heaven.
Instead of sanctifying her by the worship of immutable perfection, she
is debased by the exclusive adoration of a creature similar to herself
1
and subject likewise to the weaknesses of humanity.
1. C. Bader, Women in Ancient India, (Lond., Kegan Paul-Triibner, 19^ 5) 
at 17-8.
The two great Epics, the Ramayana and the Mah5bh5rata present no
less a fascinating study of the notions of womanhood, the concept of 
marriage, the ethics of sex, and their study assumes the greater sig­
nificance in that those with a familiarity of Indian conditions will 
know that the epic literature even today exerts an influence over the 
mind and life of the Hindu, for what to others might merely appear as 
the brilliant inspiration of the poet's fancy, is for the devout, 
a sacred recounting of the deeds and heroic exploits of the gods 
whose precepts they must obey, and actions strive to emulate.
While the Ramayapa is the celebration of the ideal of pativrata, 
and its heroine the high-souled lady, the devoted consort of RSma,
Slta of the spotless and unsullied character, the embodiment of every 
virtue, every grace, the Mahabharata on the other hand, is a fascinat­
ing amalgam, which in shedding the yoke of its Brahmanical past and 
the severely ascetic moral standards of the age of Buddha which 
succeeded it, introduces the cult of Krsna which symbolises a freer
more tolerant spirit, a laxer morality which agrees but little with
2the rigid code of conduct prescribed by Manu.
1. For Meyer, the essentially different character of the two Epics 
lies in that while "The Ramayapa, indeed, is seen from the very 
beginning to be essentially soft, dreamy, fantastic and deeply 
religious - to be the work of Brahmans, on the other hand, the 
poetry of the Mahabharata is often quickened in its older parts by 
a mighty flame of fire, a manly, undaunted, passionate soul: it 
was the warrior that sung this heroic song...". See Meyer, Vol. I, 
op.cit., at 2.
2. For, as Bader, op.cit., points out at l8, the Epic poetry "will 
reveal women celebrating the sacred rites within the domestic 
sanctuary, retiring even with her husband to the forests, uniting 
the piety of the ascetic with the devotion of the wife and mother, 
and attaining at last by her holy conduct to swarga the Paradise 
of Indra."
— — ‘ IThe Ramayapa and the MahaBharata together present us with the 
most graphic and detailed picture that exists of the civilisation and 
culture, the social and political life, the religious and ethical con­
cepts of the ancient Hindus. The Ramayapa, the authorship of which 
is popularly attributed to the great sage Valmiki, is seen from the
very beginning to be essentially soft, dreamy, fantastic and deeply
2religious, in a word,the work of Brahmins. The story, the broad 
strands of which are too well known to be repeated here is essentially 
the celebration of the life and noble exploits of its hero, Rama 
prince of Ayodhya, brave, accomplished, devoted to his duty, unfalter­
ing in his truth. And yet woman plays a pivotal role, and so clearly 
does she appear as causing the deeds in this great Epic that in sup­
pressing the feminine element, the spirit of the action would be des­
troyed.^  The imagination of the poet is fired by all that is 
beauteous and fine in the female character, and beauty, tact, mildness, 
chastity, such are the gracious attributes of the women of Ayodhya, 
and indeed the wives of King Dasaratha show in plenitude these exemp­
lary traits of character, for which it was designated that Visnu enter
/ 4 /the three wives of Dasaratha. Kausalya of the charming eyes, who as
5
mother of Rama shone as much as the mother of the gods the modest 
Sumitra, and even the brilliant Kaikeyl - all won by the virtues of 
Rama's character, regard his proposed coronation with pride and
1. The references to these two Epics which follow have been gleaned 
from various translations and are indicated at the appropriate 
places.
2. Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 2.
3. Bader, op.cit., at 89.
4. Ibid., at 92. 5. Ibid., at 93-
pleasure. The heart of Kaikeyl is slow to open to feelings of hatred,
and in resisting the machinations of the wicked'Manthara, she is well
aware of the worth of Rama, for not only is he the eldest son of the
king and therefore deserving of his inheritance, but he is also full
of justice, fond of the company of venerable men, his soul grateful,
1
his word always the word of truth. In short he is pure. However
"(L)ike a slow but deadly poison worked the ancient 
nurse's tears,
And a wife's undying impulse mingled with a mother's 
fears."
Thus when she does succumb, it may perhaps be regarded more as the 
awakening jealousy of a mother for the welfare of her own child, 
rather than the wicked act of an intrinsically evil woman. Her later 
remorse redeems her, and after the fourteen years of travaila.ine over, 
she is present with the other queens, to welcome back the son she had 
been instrumental in sending into exile. That Kaikeyl is not 
absolved from blame is clear, but neither is Dasaratha who might well 
have pondered the reminder in the Mahabharata; "If a bad woman is 
treated well, she turns her back on you."^
However, it is Slta who captures the imagination and as the 
animating spirit of the Epic, has come down the ages as the ideal of 
every wifely virtue. Slta, princess of Videha, "child of Janaka, 
dearer unto him than life," used to every luxury, forsakes all com­
fort to follow her husband in his banishment and to share in the 
vicissitudes of his fortune for,
1. Ibid., at 97.
2. R.C. Dutt, The Great Epics of Ancient India, 2nd ed., (New Delhi, 
Ess Ess Publications, 1976), at l86.
3. KBh. II. 64. 11, cited in Meyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at 494.
4. Ibid., at 12.
f,(M)y mother often taught me and my father often spake,
That her home the wedded woman doth .beside her husband 
make,
As the shadow to the substance, to her lord is faithful 
wife
And she parts not from her consort till she parts with 
fleeting life!"1
And resisting all Rama's endeavours to dissuade her from such a course, 
she brings the curtain down on this part of the action by her plea 
that
"(S)eparated from thee, I should not wish to dwell 
even in heaven. I swear to thee noble child of Raghu 
by thy love and by thy life! Thou art my lord, my 
guru, my way, my very divinity: with thee then shall 
I go; it is my final resolve,"^
for
"(P)aradise without thee would be an abode odious 
to me, and even hell with thee cannot be otherwise 
than a favoured heaven.
In exile, sorrow, suffering, trial and endurance, merely 
ennoble an already noble character, and Slta emerges from all her 
tribulations pure and steadfast. Not even her abduction by the 
Raksasa king Havana can cast a blemish on her spotless chastity, and 
in the face of Rama's doubts, incredulous and heartbroken she volun­
tarily undergoes the ordeal by fire to emerge pure and unscathed ;
Agni himself, the supreme Judge, assures Rama of Slta's inviolate 
chastity.
But alas for the noble Slta! She must be justified in the eyes 
of the people before she can again be readmitted to the domestic hearth, 
and at Rama's restoration, she is sent away to the forests once more
1. Duttj at *H. ©fj clt.,
2. Bader, op.cit., at 107*
3. Ibid., at 108.
to clear the dark cloud of suspicion which still hangs over her fair 
name. **
Years later at the horse sacrifice when Rama's heart yearns for 
Slta, the noble lady, broken-hearted, her life darkened by un­
founded suspicion, invokes the earth to take her back. And the earth 
which had given birth to her yawns, and the suffering child sinks into 
the bosom of her mother earth, true in death as she had been in life, 
and
"(G)ods sind men proclaim her virtue! But fair Slta
is no more, ^
Lone is Rama'a loveless bosom and his days of bliss o'er."
Such then is the heroine of the Ramayapa, the very ideal of
pativrata - an ideal that is all pervasive in the Epic, and indeed
one on which the entire story hinges. The poet encapsulates in Slta's
character the highest ideals of piety, endurance and devotion to the
2husband whom she refers to time and again as her living god. The
hand that has moulded her is undoubtedly that of a Brahmin and the
spirit that inspires him, that of Manu, for true to the tradition of
the 11 twice-born", while the spouse of Rama must be made to live up to
the most exacting standards as befitted her honoured status, he who
3
has spurned her is no common husband of a common wife, and Brahma 
himself enlightens him as to his worth. He is Narayana the August, he 
is Vi§pu the conch-shell Bearer, he is Kp§na Himself the Eternal One.
1. Dutt, op.cit., at 178.
2. A recurrent theme in the RamSyana, it is reiterated when Kausalya 
bitterly reprimands her husband for Rama's exile, but is soon 
enough struck with grief at having insulted the man who ought to 
be to her a god incarnate, and supplicates him to pardon her in 
view of what she has suffered. See Bader, op.cit., at 121.
3. Ibid., at 212.
He is much more besides, he who is ’’the author of all things and 
2has no end.”
Thus it comes as no surprise that the delineation of Slta apart,
there occur passages in the Ramayapa reviling women in general,^ for
it has truly been observed that however important woman is, her entry
into the city of life is seldom hailed on this earth with hosannas
and palm-strewn roads; nor is she met with the blare of trumpets that
b
joyfully greet the warrior hero.
The disposition of women, according to the Epic, is as whimsical 
as the leaves of a lotus flower, as sharp as the edge of a sword, and 
as unsettled as the blast of a storm.^ The great anchorite Agastya 
observes that, to remain with her husband as long as fortune favours 
him, but to forsake him in misfortune, that is often the nature and 
character of woman. Fickle as lightning, swift as wind and flame, she 
is as sharp and deadly as the point of an arrow.^ And Laksmana, pro­
voked into exasperated wrath at Slta's unseemly suspicion of his 
motive in staying with her rather than heeding to what seemed to her, 
Rama's call, indicts all womanhood as impious and inconsistent, who 
likes not the restraint of duty but is glad to sow division among
1. For a full account of these attributes see ibid., at 213-*+,
2. Ibid., at 213.
3- In fact this is made clear by the rsi Agastya, who exempts Sxta 
from the derision that he reserves for women in general for ’’she 
(Sita) only deserves praise; she is Arundhati, near to the gods, 
a model to present before women.”: Bader, op.cit., at l*fO.
*+. Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 6.
5. Indra, Prof. The Status of Women in Ancient India, 2nd ed., 
(Banaras,' Motilal Banarasidass, 1955)» 13*
6. Bader, op.cit., at 140.
brothers.
i _ _
The Mahabharata, in sharp contrast to the Ramayapa, is a rugged
epic animated by the spirit of the proud warrior whose pride lies in
the might of his strength and whose achievements of physical prowess
add lustre to his name. The collective work of centuries, the later
interpolations utterly remodelled much of it and sought to give the
2whole the tendentious coating of Brahmanism. The resulting contra­
dictory views and attitudes in it thus become more understandable, 
and in the variations on the inexhaustible theme of woman, we come 
across similar contradictory utterances often flatly at variance with 
one another, for while on the one hand she is extolled in the most 
exalted of terms as a faithful wife and loving mother,^ on the other, 
the most debasing references are made to her lack of moral worth.
The Epic abounds in utterances in derogation of woman. She is
1. Ibid. at 1^ 9.
2. Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 2.
3. The mother is covered with much glory in Indian tradition, and 
her place in the epic literature assured. "The good women, the 
so glorious ones are deemed the mothers of the world...," sings 
the Mahabharata, (MBh. XIII. 38-^3 cited at Meyer, Vol. II,
at 500)1 ancl indeed the P5$$ava brothers’ tender regard towards 
their mother KuntI which is sustained throughout the long 
narrative, is perhaps one of the most attractive and affecting 
aspects of the Epic. The story of Ram§ of the axe illustrates 
this as well. RenukS the wife of Jamadogrvt having longed for 
another, was robbed of her holy splendour, and at his father's 
behest, Rama hewed off his mother's head with his axe. When 
the old man's rage had passed, and he asked of Rama to wish for 
anything he desired, the filial heart asked for naught but that 
his mother be restored to life again without the memory of what 
had befallen her.
k. An intriguing theory attributes this to the nature of the Hindu 
in whose soul, according to it, dwells that twin pair, burning 
^sensuality and stark renunciation of the world and of the flesh 
What a delight and torment then must woman be to him who is at 
one and the same time the voluptuary and the ascetic!* See 
Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 3-*+*
guilty of every shortcoming particularly those of a sexual nature,
and a man entering into wedlock must be "fully aware with himself
1that the woman is a wavering reed." That they are the root of all
evil, the sum and essence, the very embodiment of sensuality is amply
illustrated by the legend of Narada, who desirous of a thorough
instruction on the character of woman betakes himself to Pancacu$5
the lovely but profligate Apsara, who on being persuaded by the holy
2rsi, enlightens him that "there is nought worse than woman." She
knows no moral bars, and "so soon as a woman sees a handsome man, her
vulva becomes m o i s t n a y ,  such is the lust of women that there is
no man in this world that they would not go to, be he hunchback,
blind, simpleton, dwarf or cripple, "and when they cannot come to a
man at all, then they even fall on one another." In fact, the
instruction continues,
"(T)he fire has never too many logs, the great sea 
never too many rivers, death never too many beings 
of all kinds, and lovely eyed woman has never too 
many men."5
This, the secret of all women, is the essence of her innermost being. 
Besides which
"(T)he god of death, the wind, death, the underworld, 
the ever burning entrance to hell, the knife-edge, g 
poison, snake and fire - women are all these in one."
To enumerate on this litany of disparaging attributes, we may
add here those of one who reveals her identity to the sage A^^avakr*31
7
as "the protecting goddess of the northern quarter of the heavens."
1. Ibid., at 136.
2. Ibid., Vol. II, at 9^7*
3. Ibid., at ^98.
k. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., Vol. I, at 136.
She informs the holy man of the fickleness of woman’s nature, for
"(A)mong thousands of women, nay amon^ hundreds of 
thousands, there is to be found only one that is 
faithful to her husband, if indeed, one at all.
They know not father, family, mother, brothers, 
husband or brothers-in-law; given up to their pleasure, 
they destroy families, as great rivers destroy their 
banks."1
Indeed, such is the intensity of their carnal desires that even old
2women are plagued by the feverish longing for man.
However, it is a curious comment up>on the nature of the age that 
while women in general are reviled and regarded as debased, the 
brahmanical imprint is perhaps nowhere in greater evidence than in 
the depiction of women as the ideal of the pativrata. Parvati who 
with Slta, is in the Hindu eye, the embodiment of this ideal, explains 
that ideal womanhood constituted in the fulfilment of the duties of a 
faithful wife; and reiterates that as for the woman there is no other 
god than her husband, her only means of achieving salvation lay in 
fidelity and service to him and his family. Righteous, contented, 
good-natured, charming, sweet-tongued, cheerful in disposition, dis­
ciplined in her habits and faithful to her husband, the woman must 
ever perform religious rites like agnihotra and vrata for the welfare 
of her husband, and be hei*ever so unkind or bad-tempered, she must
nevertheless obey him and not cast eyes even upon a tree bearing the
3
name of her husband.
Equally ennobling and elevating is the conduct of Savitrl, the 
third of the triumvirate of ideal womanhood in the Hindu mythology.
1. Ibid. , at 132*.
2. Ibid., at 136. These instances apart, both the Epics abound in 
numerous derogatory references to women. See Meyer, Vol. II, op. 
cit, at *+99 ff.
3- Kukherjee, or.cit., at 13.
Her selection of Satyavan for a husband is not met with favour as he 
is destined to die young, and she is told to choose another. In 
Savitrl*s answer is the consecration of the sacrament so dear to the 
hearts of Hindus then and since. Unfaltering in her resolve she 
proclaims,
!l(0)nly once can we submit to destiny; a young girl 
marries only once; only once can her father say to 
her 'I give thee'! Those are the three 'only once' 
in the life of good people. Let him have a long life 
crshort one, let him be gifted with virtues, or let 
him be devoid of them, once I have chosen a husband I 
do not choose a second time.”
When the time finally does come, and Yama, the god of death detaches
SatyavSn's soul from his body, Savitrl is undaunted and follows them
in the journey to the kingdom of darkness for,
"(W)here my husband goes, there must I also go; that 
is my eternal duty. Whither thou takest my husband, 
thither too lies my road."
And as without her husband there is no joy" for her, nor even the wish
for heaven or the desire to live,^ her supplications are heard and the
husband restored to life - the reward of her piety, constancy and
devotion.
The fiery Draupadi who has none of the gentle patience of a Sita, 
is nevertheless the embodiment of every wifely virtue, and in the dis­
course with Kysna's wife Satyabhama, she enters into a catena of
qualities which the wife must cultivate in order to attain fame in
k
this life and heaven in the next, but above all it is service to the 
husband, unquestioning loyalty and total subordination to his every
1. Bader, op.cit., at 288.
2. Ibid., at 293-
3. Ibid., at 293-
k. See Meyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at 337-9* See also Kukherjee, op.cit., 
at 29-33.
whim, besides attending .to the household duties that makes the woman
the dharmapatni, yajnapatni and mahi?l of her husband, just as she
herself is to such splendid heroes as the five Pa^ qiava brothers.
However, it must be borne in mind that the Epic is essentially
the product of an age where the rigid and austere doctrines of the
earlier Brahmanical period had given way to a livelier and more
relaxed atmosphere, and accordingly and not infrequently, the
Mah5bh5rata beau's the stamp of a moral code which violates the strict
regime set out by Manu and his ilk.
The Mamoth-Bphaspati episode is an instance which is illustrative
of a period where the rigid hold of the lawgivers had given way to a
comparatively greater freedom of sex behaviour regulated more by the
social customs of the age than by older precepts. The pregnant Mama.t<L
is approached by Bphaspati, her husband's younger brother, and this we
might notice, despite the very strict injunction against such a
1
relationship by Manu. This sexual union has none of the character- 
2 _  -istics of niyoga, yet MamhCO' A objection, as that of her unborn 
child's, is not so much on the ground of sexual morality as it is 
based on the wastage of a man's, in particular, a Brahmin's
1. Manu expressly lays down that the elder brother's wife is to the 
younger brother the wife of his teacher, while the younger 
brother's wife must be in the eyes of the elder brother, his 
daughter-in-law, and if either of them approaches the wife of the 
other, both fall from grace. See Manu, IX. 57-8, op.cit.
2. Niyoga literally "appointment", (and discussed below at greater
length), is permitted by the lawgivers in exceptional circum­
stances only, i.e. the procreation of a son for the continuity of
the line in the event of the husband's death or absence. In our
episode, Uthathaya, Mamcv££'/husband, disappears before she is
approached by B^haspati, yet even so the niyoga relationship is not
established, for years of waiting must precede it. (See Gaut. II.
9. 17i G.'Buhler, tr., The Sacred Laws of the Aryas, Part If F. Max 
Muller, ed., S.B.E., Vol. II, (Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1882), and Vas. 
X7II., 75-8» on.cit.). Besides, as is already pregnant with a male
child, there is no emergency either, to ratify the act.
1
semen. Neither are there signs of any contrition on the part of
Brhaspati. He is not called a patita (sinner) nor does he make any
2attempt at atonement. Thus these are clear indications that, for 
the narrator, and by implication for his contemporaries, cohabitation 
with the wife of an elder brother was perhaps not an uncommon 
occurrence so as to incur any degree of moral indignation or sense of 
sin.
That the ytu of a girl must not be wasted we have already noted, 
and the story of YaySti and Sarmi^ fcha is illustrative of this well- 
known code of social ethics that we come across every so often in the 
Mahabharata. In Yayati's view not to have responded to Sarmistha's 
invitation to have sexual union with her during the period of her rtu 
would have been tantamount to embryo-killing, an act of adharma on
his part, and significantly enough, SulQ'a who is well versed in the
3
prevailing social ethics of the time, is offended not at the act but
for breach of the vow undertaken by Yayati never to touch Sarmistha
in view of the bitter feud between her and DevayanI, YaySti’s wife
/ ^  i|
and the beloved daughter of Su^ Ljja.
1. B. Dtitta, Sexual Ethics in the Mahabharata in the Light of 
Dharmasastra Rulings\ (Lond., Asia Publications, 1979), at 16.
2. Ibid., at 22. The same writer indicates at ibid. that had 
Brhaspati*s guilt been established, Yajnavalkya prescribes a 
method of rehabilitation, i.e. MCne going to his brother's wife 
without being appointed (for sexual purposes) should perform a 
candrayana.” (Yaj. III. 28?).
3. The prevailing social practice whereby the girl who has not been 
given in marriage within the prescribed period, has the option
of sexual union at the period of rtu. This is within the bounds of 
dharma as propounded by Manu, IX. 90-1 and IX. 93, Yaj. 1. 6^ , 
and particularly Gaut. II. 9. 20, and Vas. XVII. 67-8. : Ibid.,
at 106.
4. Ibid., at 50-1.
However that other forces were at work is evident from the later
r>*
versions of the same legend, and the recasting of the story in the 
Ramayapa, and the Southern recension of the MahSbharata is of special 
interest, for whereas in the one, the story is narrated from a com­
pletely different orientation, the building up of an innocent legend 
of a king and his two queens, the eternal triangle where the king 
favours the younger queen more than the elder, in the other, we are 
told of Sarmistha's marriage to Yayati so as to legitimise Puru, the 
son born of the union, the eponymous ancestors of the Pauravas.
The basic core of the Yayati - S&rmi^ -tha legend is thus strictly 
within the bounds of dharma, but the modifications in the later inter­
polations reflect clearly enough the shift in moral values, and the 
imposition and ascendancy of brahmanical ideals; the emergent sexual 
ethics is marked by an unyielding stringency of conduct, possibly as 
a reaction against the laxer postures of the age.
This growing awareness of the desirability of chastity as an 
ideal is also reflected in the story of SvetaVCetM. King Pandu pro­
hibited by a curse to cohabit with his wives, pleads with his wife 
KuntI to beget for him a son through another and thereby save him 
from the terrors of hell; in his efforts to persuade her, he refers 
to alleged ancient customs and narrates the story of SvetaK^u-J.
According to legend, SVetaketu incensed by the ugly memory of 
his mother's abduction by a brahmin and the calm acceptance of this 
by his father as a practice sanctioned by antiquity, was later on to 
become the first among the sages to voice his disapproval of the 
existing practices and to establish the concept of absolute fidelity
1. Ibid., at 6 5.
in the institution of marriage. The new morality proclaimed that
Similarly
”(E)ven when (a husband) offends against his wife 
(by having sexual intercourse outside wedlock) •.. 
there will arise for him the same deadly sin (as 
for the woman who has offended against her husband) 
on the earth.’1
However what is intriguing is that, despite this insistence on
conjugal fidelity, the practice of niyoga is in express terms 
' 3endorsed by Svetaketu, an indication perhaps of the transitional
character of the period where despite the restrictions on sexual lax-
klty, the older notions tended to persist, and if the rules in the
5
practice of niyoga differed from those set out by the lawgivers,
1. M3h., (Poona), I. 113. 17» cited at ibid., at 68.
2. MBh., (Poona), I. 113- l8, cited at ibid.
3. MBh., (Poona), I. 113* 19* cited at ibid.
k. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Pandu - KuntX legend.
Kunti as the chaste wife who has place for no man other than her 
husband even in her thoughts, who chafes at the thought of having 
to submit to niyoga, is representative of the emerging sex-ethics 
of a stricter moral code, while Pandu on the other hand, voices 
the older view on sexual ethics by his insistence on the sanctity 
of niyoga by citing examples from the past including his own 
birth. Kunti finally submits to Pa^ fUi*s wishes not because his 
arguments had convinced her, but, as Datta, op.cit., points out at 
109, because as the ideal of the obedient wife it is her duty to 
please her husband.
5. A clear example of this is PSndu who while accepting and approving 
of niyoga, nevertheless violates the sutra and smrti injunctions 
in its practice in that he a) appoints an outsider who is 
neither a brother nor a close relative, b) desires for more 
sons and thus exceeds the limits set by the niyoga rules, 
c) appoints a number of persons to raise issue for him.: Datta,
op.cit., at 108.
”(F)rom today onwards, there will arioe for a woman 
transgressing against her husband a deadly sin (pata.karji
embryo, bringing
unnappiness to ner."
this was due, fairly certainly, to the influence of prevailing customs 
which invariably leave their impress upon the habits and beliefs of a 
particular age.
To this new morality a further dimension is added by the pre­
cepts of the blind sage Dlrghatamas. Driven to rage and frustration
at the action of his wife who no longer desires to support him,
Dirghatamas retaliates by proclaiming his decree of maryada or the 
limitations of behaviour for women:
”... only one husband is the resort of a woman 
throughout her life: whether he is dead or alive,
she must not get another man; having gone to another
she will fall (into deadly sin) ...”~
Thus is established an entirely new moral standard, and the code
of Svetakt.tjL which postulates strict sex ethics for both the sexes is
finally replaced by the maryada ruling of Dlrghatamas which brings
brShmanical sex ethics to a climax. Sexual relationship outside
marriage is forbidden to a woman, niyoga as a system is disavowed, and
remarriage ousted. The evolution of brahmanic ideals apparent in all
four of the legends under discussion despite their sharply conflicting
attitudes, is now complete in the story of Dlrghatamas. The rule of
the brahmin holds sway, and henceforth the demands made on women are
2
those of chastity, constancy and fidelity. In short the ideal of the
1. Datta, op.cit., at 90-1.
2. Ironically enough it is the self-same propounder of this strict
moral regime for women, “the virtuous and great-souled Dirghatamas,
the sage, well versed in the Vedas and the Ahgas”, who is himself
guilty of “the practice of cattle”, and by his promiscuity and
general shamelessness so enrages the r?is with whom he dwells in
the hermitage, that they eventually drive him away from their
midst. Another version has it that as punishment for his incestuous
crime with his son's wife, he is packed in a wooden crate and
thrown in the river Ganga, thence to be rescued by King Bali who
recognising him “chose him for the sake of sons.” See Datta, op.
cit., at 8*f-9- The double standards so apparent in this story
survive to this day in India, and while,the most exacting
(continued on next page)
pativrata is reinforced and reinstated as the only ideal for women, 
the sole means of their salvation, and there is hardly a chapter or 
religious discourse in the great Epic that does not refer to woman's 
infidelity as a breach of dharma. In other words the mores had 
been set not just for the age but for generations to come, and the 
rigid demands on women are as much in evidence in India today as they 
were those thousands of years ago in the days of Epic grandeur.
3. The Hindu Widow in Tradition
What then of the widow? In the early stages, the prehistoric 
rite of suttee, later to be revived, hardly seems to have raised its 
ugly head. The bereft wife couldsif she so desired, lead a life of 
perpetual widowhood, and in the higher castes in the noble and 
brahmanical circles, this was indeed what was demanded. Evidence as 
to the existence of widows is warranted by a few passages of the 
ggveda, and these references, however few and far between, neverthe­
less do reflect a condition of society in which widows, however small
their number, had a place. Thus the appeal "Krsa and Saya ye Asvin
2twain : ye two assist the widow and the worshipper." Yet another
passage calls out to the widow who lies beside her dead husband in a
symbolic gesture of self-immolation to
"(R)ise come unto the world of life 0 woman : Come, 
he is lifeless by whose side thou liest 
Wifehood with this thy husband was thy portion who took 
thy hand and wooed thee as a lover."5
Learned Western scholars (not without Indian inspiration) have
(continued from previous page)
standards are expected, indeed demanded of and met with, in women, 
the male members escape all strictures in the sexual ethics which 
govern them.
1. Datta, op.cit., at 117. 2. RV.X.^0.8, Griffith, Vol. IV, op.cit.
3. RV. X. 18. 6, ibid.
requisitioned these lines for the theory that they refer both to the
practice of niyoga and suttee, but an eminent modern Indian discounts
this altogether. In his view
u(T)o impute to this verse an implication that the 
widow was asked to espouse her devara or that she 
was preparing to mount the funeral pyre is absurd.”
To lend support to his argument, he then enters into a brief but
scholarly disquisition as to the correct interpretation of the
original Sanskrit text which we have no reason to disregard.
Interpretations such as these tend to reinforce the view that
widows, however small their number, did have a place in Vedic society
and that suttee as an institution was rare if not altogether absent
in it. This discouragement of suttee in the highly developed
philosophy of the Vedic times is perhaps best explained by Manu:
”(T)he Vedic action is of two sorts, such as are 
conducive to pleasure and success on the one hand 
and ultimate bliss on the other: the first is
'prolonging' - the second is 'cessation'.”
"(A)ction which is impelled by desire whether in 
this world or the next is declared to be 'prolonging'- 
But that which is accompanied by knowledge and is 
devoid of desire, that is 'cessation'.”
”(0)ne who practises the 'prolonging' ritual attains 
equality with the gods; one who practises 'cessation' 
passes beyond the five material substances."^
This means in effect that all the actions of a man are derived 
from desire, but the ultimate goal of man is absence of desire; 
religious injunctions are therefore of two sorts: those which apply
to the individual in the wheel of social life, attached to observances
1. N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, (Lond.-Cal., 
Arthur Probsthain Eastern Law House, 1953), at 106.
2. Manu XII. J.D.M.Derrett, tr,, Bharuchi's Commentary on the Kanusmrti, 
Vol. II, (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1975)» at 428.
on a social fact and not truly directed to the ultimate release of 
his personality from karma and from rebirth, and those on the other 
hand, directed to him who seeks mok$a, nivytti, i.e. the cessation of 
striving and suffering and experience altogether. This is ultimate 
merit, and is subserved by injunctions suited to attaining it. The 
ability to distinguish between injunctions directed to a better re­
birth and injunctions directed to avoiding rebirth is an ability which 
the sastra would regard as supreme. The rule permitting a woman to 
commit suttee is a rule of the first kind; she will be reborn in an 
advantageous position, for her act is done out of a desire, perhaps a 
desire for merit. But to those who seek mok§a, the duties of the 
household life as a widow, in patient self-abnegation, are appropriated
(l) Niyoga
However, apart from perpetual widowhood, the widow had other, and
more generally prevalent options open to her as well. She could, if
she chose, contract a loose alliance with her devara (husband's
younger brother). That the younger brother had some sort of sexual
intimacy with the wife of the elder brother is suggested by the
marriage hymn of the Pgveda where the gods are supplicated to make the
2
bride loving and dear to the devara, and it appears to have been a
not uncommon practice for the younger brother to live with his
brother's wife after her husband's death,^ and perhaps nowhere is this
more clearly indicated in the ffgveda than where it is sung:
"(W)here are ye Asvins in the evening, where at morn?
Where is your halting place, where rest ye for the night?
1. Derrett, RLSI, op.cit., at 69*
2. RV. X. 85. *+6, Griffith, op.cit.
3* A.X. Sur, Sex and Karriage in India, (Bom., Allied Publishers, 1973)»
at 35* Such arrangements notionally persist by custom even to this 
day in Northern Inaia.
Who brings ye .homeward, as the widow bedward draws ^
her husband's brother, as the bride attracts the groom."
i
It seems however that the right of the devara was a quite dis­
tinct right from the right as indicated by the niyoga or levirate 
usage of later times. While the privilege of the younger brother-in- 
law in the Veda was cohabitation, niyoga on the other hand served a 
distinct purpose, that of procreation. The possession of a son to 
carry on the household worship was for the Hindu a vital necessity, 
the means of his salvation, and not unnaturally therefore niyoga, the 
deputation of the husband's conjugal rights to his brother or a near 
kinsman, either after his death or even before it, and the subsequent 
birth of a son unto him, was a device adopted and assimilated by the
Jryans from various social groups where the practice was already wide- 
2spread. As to its antiquity there can be no doubt. It was prevail­
ing in Sparta;^ the Old Testament declares that if a woman becomes a 
widow "her husband's brother shall go unto her and take her to wife,
14
and perform the duties of a husband's brother unto her,"' and in the
5
Book of Ruth we find an instance of such a custom among the Hebrews.
1. RV X. ^0. 2, Griffith,op.cit.
2. Westermarck concurs. See his The History of Human Marriage, Vol. 
Ill, op.cit., at 208 where he remarks "If the rule of fraternal 
succession to a deceased brother's widow or 'levirate' custom 
proved to be a survival of polyyandry, we should certainly be com­
pelled to conclude that this form of marriage was at one time very 
common." Curiously enough, while levirate was a widespread enough 
practice in ancient India, polyyandry as an institution seems not 
to have been part of the scene. In the only instance of polyyandry 
in the Epics, the question of the acceptability of the situation 
whereby Draupadi had five husbands simultaneously is of course 
debated at great length in the Mahabharata itself.
3. Altekar, op.cit., at 1**3- 
k. Deuteronomy, 25.5«-
3. Sen-Gupta, op.cit., at 108.
Likewise in the Code of Hammurabi levirate is a recognised insti- 
tution. As an established practice of antiquity therefore, it was 
but a matter of time for the Aryans as well to incorporate it as part 
of their way of life, of its acceptance among them as a necessary 
social and religious convention.
The Epic tradition too knows of niyoga* In the Ramayana, that 
celebration of the monogamous union, there is an instance of the 
levirate practice in the episode of TarS, where after her husband 
Valin is killed by his brother Sugrlva, and despite her lamentations, 
TSra is soon thereafter seen seated on a golden throne with Sugrlva 
by her side, while in the Mahabharata, the begetter by proxy has a 
very important role to play and the practice itself is virtually 
theoretically prescribed as it is practically exemplified by the 
heroes of the poera."^
1. Ibid. For a comprehensive survey of a custom wellnigh universal 
in distribution see R.Briffaut, The Mothers, Vol. I, (Lond. -
N.Y*, Allen & Unwin-Macmillan, 1927), at 767» f•n• 2 .
2. The sum total of these lamentations being that it is far better 
for wives to be struck themselves by death than to live and see 
death striking their husbands, for "in the lonely heart of a wife, 
neither son nor father holds the same position as a husband." : 
Bader, op.cit., at 166. The Ramayapa echoes this sentiment thus: 
"Without a string there is no lute, without a wheel no chariot, 
without a husband no woman is happy, even though she have a 
hundred sons." Ram. II. 39» 29-30 cited at Meyer, Vol. II, op. 
cit, at 352.
3- Apart from the numerous instances of the levirate practice in the 
Mahabharata, as for instance the birth of the blind sage 
Dlrghatamas as a result of the union between Mam aidand Bphaspati, 
the appointment of Dlrghatamas himself by King Bali who entreats 
"For the carrying on of my line, do thou beget, with my wives, 
sons skilled in religious and worldly things," (see Meyer Vol. I, 
op.cit., at 160), it may be borne in mind that Pap4u the founding 
father of the Pandava dynasty was himself the child of such a 
union. The renowned seer Vyasa who is appointed to raise off­
spring to the dead King Vicitravlrya approaches by night, but his 
terrifying aspect and evil odour so overcome the dead king's wife 
that she turns quite pale (pandu) and the son she subsequently 
gives birth to bears the name Pandu. In like wise P5ndu himself
(continued on next page)
The smrti texts do not altogether disavow niyoga either, and in
fact Vasistha and Gautama do not join in the emerging crusade against
the practice; they permit it to the widow at her option, with the
only proviso that she should not choose a stranger if the husband's
younger brother was available. On the other hand, the custom began
to be met with considerable opposition, and led by Apastamba,
Baudhayana and Manu, there arose a school of reformers who condemned
the practice unequivocally. Apastamba declares the levirate no
longer admissible on account of the degeneration of the people of the 
2present day; in his view the son belongs to the begetter, and while 
men of antiquity could commit acts of sin with impunity on account of
the greatness of their lustre, such deeds were strictly forbidden to
3the mortals of 1 today”, and Baudhayana concurs. Brhaspati's
(continued from previous page)
prevented from the use of his manly powers, exhorts his wife Kunti 
to raise up offspring for him, and so are born three of the 
Pandava brothers the result of Kunti's union with the gods, while 
Madri her co-wife by calling up the Alvins, gives birth to the 
twins Nakula and Sahadeva. "Of the father thus blessed, the pious 
and noble Vidura then said that he was not to be pitied, but to be 
praised.*1: Meyer, Vol. I, op.cit., at 165-
1. Thus Vas XVII. 56, op.cit.: "After the completion of six months she 
shall bathe, and after a funeral oblation to her husband, (then) 
her father and brother shall assemble the Gurus who taught or sac­
rificed (for the deceased) and his relatives, and shall appoint her
(to raise issue to the deceased husband). Likewise Gaut. XVIII. k, __ 
The Sacred Laws of the Aryas^G. Buhler tr., S.B.E. Vol. II (1879) 
op.cit. : "A woman whoarjis dead and who desires offspring (may bear 
a son) to her brother-in-law," holding immediately thereafter at 
XVIII. 7, that, "Some (declare, that she shall cohabit) with nobody 
but a brother-in-law. "Narada is similarly opposed to any other 
than the brother-in-law for the purpose, declaring at XII. *f8, op. 
cit., that "When a woman, on failure of brothers-in-law, is 
delivered by her relations to a sapinda of the same caste, she is 
termed the third (Punarbhu)."
2. Xp.II. 27. 2-7, The Sacred Laws of the Aryas, Part I, op.cit.
3- Ap. II. 13. 6ff.i ibid.
k. Baudh* II. 2. 5« See also II. 2. 3**-5» op.cit.
opposition to it is equally in evidence. He notes that "The niyoga
(appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased lord) has
1
been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same1,1 and assigns
a reason for likewise forbidding it himself: in former ages (Krta
and Treta) people practised tapas and were endowed with knowledge,
while in the Dvapara and Kali age men have lost the powers possessed
by those of the past ages, and were therefore forbidden the practice 
2of the custom.
Interestingly enough however, the same writers who vehemently
condemned the practice as disreputable, lay down at the same time,
detailed rules about the niyoga procedure with all the fullness of
detail of a living law. Manu in particular , immediately after
recommending it,^ condemns it as a bestial practice (pa^u-dharma)
which was in vogue only during the reign of King Vena, and limits its
application to cases (not necessarily rare) where the girl's betrothed
kdied before the marriage could be consummated. On the other hand, 
he explains the detailed rules of the niyoga procedure and fixes the 
rights of the kgetraja (field-born) son in succession to his pater.
What therefore emerges from these texts is that the author of the 
Code of Manu was hostile to niyoga, as he was to the remarriage of 
widows, but he was confronted by customs too deeply rooted for
1. Brh. XXIV. 12, The Minor Law Books, Part I, op.cit.
2. B**h. XXIV. 13, ibid.
3. "On failure of issue (by her husband) a woman who has been author­
ised may obtain (in the) proper (manner prescribed), the desired 
offspring by (cohabitation with) a brother-in-law or (with some 
other) Sapinda (of the husband).”: Manu IX. 59, op.cit.
Manu IX. 6^-70,-ibid.
5. Manu IX. 120-1, ibid. See also IX. 191.
prohibition to be efficacious. All he could do was to try to dis-
1
credit them and to limit their practice and thervx importance.
A series of rigid conditions were now made incumbent (in theory)
for the practice of niyoga. Thus while formerly three sons were 
2allowed, a few thinkers referred to by Manu restricted the number to
two.^ A woman who already had children was prohibited from having
4recourse to niyoga, and if she was herself unwilling she was not com-
5
pelled to submit to it. A period of at least one year of waiting 
was prescribed after the husband's death before niyoga could be per­
mitted, and intercourse between the appointed (niyukta) pair was to 
be discontinued so soon as the woman conceived; they were never to 
meet thereafter, sensual and carnal pleasures having no place in it.^ 
Financial considerations or legacy-hunting were likewise frowned upon
7
as motives for niyoga; all this together with the observance of cer­
tain other rather numerous and detailed formalities were endeavours 
on the part of the lawgivers, if not to eradicate this obnoxious prac­
tice at one swoop, at least to curb its wide-spread prevalence by
1. R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India, J.D.M. Derrett, tr., 
(Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1973)* at l82.
2. Witness for instance Kunti's anger at Pa$$u's yearning for even 
more sons after she had given birth to the first three of the five 
PSijflava brothers: "More than three sons are not granted even in 
misfortune. If there were another the wife would become one that 
is unbridled (svairi&l) and with a fifth she would be a worthless 
woman (bandhaki). How canst thou, a wise man, who has learned 
this law, now go beyond it and ask for offspring?" : Meyer, Vol. I, 
op.cit., at 164.
3* Manu IX. 61, op.cit.
4. Baudh. II. 2. 4-10, op.cit.
5. Ibid.
6. Nar. XII. 80-8, op.cit.
7. "No appointment (shall be made) through a desire to obtain the 
estate." : Vas. XXIV. 12, op.cit.
-149-
rendering it almost impossible to practise practically speaking.
But if the reformers of the period failed to stamp out the
custom, they succeeded at least in restricting its scope and were
instrumental in bringing about a change in attitude which led to its
eventual d<?suetude. It has to be admitted that however objectionable
it may appear to modern sociologists, the niyoga practice did serve a
number of purposes. In the first place it was a substitute for widow
remarriage, but by far the more important function that it performed
was to allow the widow (otherwise then incapable of inheriting) to
get her husband*s share, if not directly as her husband's heir, at
least indirectly as the guardian of his minor son. Gautama evidently
contemplates that if the widow succeeded in bearing a kgetraja son,
the inheritance would go to him, but so long as she was about raising
such a son, she could keep the heritage - as a sort of hereditas
jacens. What seems to have followed was inevitable: the abuse of
the privilege in the prolongation of the niyoga practice without
fruitful result} and Vasi§tha's dictum forbidding niyoga for securing 
2the heritage is an expression of the general anxiety at the prospect 
of the sonless widow procuring for herself her husband's property for 
life.
Perhaps this, besides other causes, dealt the death-blow to the 
institution of niyoga. The recognition of the sonless widow as prefer^  
ential heir in her own right to her deceased husband's estate^ was al­
most certainly an additional reason, and once this was achieved, the
1. Gaut. XXVIII. 32, op.cit.
2. Cited above*
3- Byh. XXV. 46-8, op.cit. See also Vis. XVII. 4, op.cit., and Yaj. 
in Mit. II. 1. 2, H.T. Colebrooke tr., Hindu Law Books, W. Stokes 
ed., (Mad., Higginbotham, 1865).
incentive for the recognition of the practice, anathema to Vedic 
notions of chastity, received another blow and its popularity 
gradually waned. What might further have led to its extinction could 
well have been that, the sonless widow's desire for issue being as 
much for solace as for the fulfilment of religious purposes,
Baudhayana*s declaration that where one brother gets a son, all other 
brothers become thereby blessed with a son, attempted to dispense 
altogether with the necessity for a ksetraja son.^ The later incor­
poration of adoption in the Arya sacred law for which Baudhayana
2lays down detailed rules, further weakened the hold of niyoga, and 
with the revival of orthodoxy and the reinstating of the ancient irya 
ideals of constancy and chastity, there was a revulsion of feeling 
against the institution, and its subsequent demise inevitable.
(2) Attitudes Towards Widow Remarriage
With the expulsion of niyoga, widow remarriage too began to be
looked upon with aversion. Never a widespread occurrence, it was
nevertheless tolerated when it did occur, and in the Vedic literature
there are at least some texts capable of being interpreted as relating
3
to the remarriage of widows. Certain verses of the Rgveda and
Atharva-Veda have given rise to various explanations and opinion is
divided as to whether they refer to niyoga, or to the remarriage of
4widows or to the practice of the immolation of widows. The funeral
5
hymn of the ?gveda is one such instance and though it has been under-
1. Sen-Gupta, EAJL at 109-10, op.cit.
2. Baudh. VII. 5. Iff.
3- Kane, H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 619*
4. Ibid. . . .
5. RV. X. l8. 8, supra at 143-4.
stood as an invitation by the husband’s brother to the wife of the 
departed to marry him, Kane dismisses this as a'"far-fetched" 
interpretation.*'
However certain other passages in the Atharva-Veda indicate 
clearly enough that widow remarriage did indeed have a place in Vedic 
society. We are told that when a woman has at first even ten hus­
bands, if a brShmin eventually marries her, he alone is her real 
2husband. Similarly
”(w)hatever woman, having first married one husband, 
marries another, if they (two) offer a goat with 
five rice dishes, they would not be separated (from 
each other). The second husband secures the same 
world with his remarried wife, when he offers a 
goat accompanied with five rice dishes and with 
the light of fees.
The fact that on remarriage sacrifices are contemplated in the
passage to sanctify it indicate* in itself that the notion of sin was
not entirely absent; nevertheless it is also clear that no prohibition
of it as such was envisaged in the times of the Atharva-Veda; and if
references in the Vedic literature to the remarriage of widows are
few, one can only assume that niyoga, a popular enough alternative,
4
practically amounted to a remarriage and for the Vedic woman at 
least, the resumption of cohabitation with the devara was, presumably, 
a preferable choice to the contracting of a regular marriage with a 
stranger.
To the smrti texts too the notion of remarriage is not altogether 
unknown. Visnu recognises the marriage of a widow who is still a
1. Kane, H.D. Vol. II. Part I, op.cit. at 6l9*
2. Atharva-Veda, V. 17: 8-9*. cited at ibid., at 6l4.
3. Atharva-Veda, IX. 3- 27-8, cited at ibid., at 615-
4. Altekar, op.cit., at 151*
virgin and even Manu expressly allows the saipskara of remarriage in
2the case of a girl whose first marriage has not'been consummated.
The smrtis also indicate that where a damsel has been abducted by
force and not wedded with the recitation of the sacred texts, she
may be lawfully given to another man for ’’she is as good as a
3 i+maiden.” Gautama too prescribes remarriage for widows, and we hear
of the samskara of remarriage in Baudh5yana, Vasistha and Yajnavalkya
5
as well. Occasionally remarriage is virtually ordained. Thus NSrada:
”(W)hen the husband is lost or dead, when he has 
become a religious ascetic, when he is impotent, 
and when he has been expelled from caste: these
are the five cases of legal necessity in which a g
woman may be justified in taking another husband."
Similarly several texts prescribe a period of waiting when the
husband has gone abroad for many years. According to Narada the
brahmana wife must wait for eight years, but only four years if she
has not given birth to a child, (and lesser number of years are laid
down for the ksatriya and vaisya wife) after which period she may
7
resort to another man.
However despite such allowances, the remarriage of widows never
1. Vis. XV. 8, op.cit.
2. Manu IX. 176, op.cit.
3. Baudh. IV. 1. 15, op.cit.; Vas. XVII. 73, op.cit.
k. Gaut. XVIII. 4. 6.
5. Kane, H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit. at 612 who draws our attention
to Baudh. IV. 1. l8; Vas. XVII.T1? and Taj. 1. 167.
6. N5r. XII. 97t op.cit.
7. Kane, H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 613* Manu (IX. 76) and
Vasistha likewise prescribe periods of waiting, but as Kane
points out, unlike Narada neither of them states what the wife 
is to do after the years of waiting are over.
did become a popular practice, and the reasons for this are not far 
to seek. Even though the smrtis did permit the widow to remarry
under certain circumstances, for the lawgivers the insistence on
virginity as a pre-condition for the sacramental nature of the
marriage rites precluded their approval of widow remarriage, and we
_ 1
hear the remarried widow referred to time and again as a punarbhu.
Manu in particular is unequivocal in his declaration that "a girl
2is given in marriage only once,” and that in the sacred texts which
3
refer to marriage, the remarriage of widows is nowhere prescribed.
In the light of this, it is at once clear that where Manu is 
attributed as allowing remarriage, as with niyoga, it is more a 
grudging concession to popular usage than a definitive recommendation 
of the practice.
(3) Austerities Prescribed in the Sastra
With the reimposition of the rigid rules of chastity, the union 
of marriage came to be looked upon as a union in this life and the 
hereafter, and at least so far as women were concerned, what little 
tolerance there had hitherto been of their re-samskara now disappeared
1. See Manu IX. 175» op.cit.; Nar. XII. ^6, op.cit., Vas. XVII. 20, 
op.cit., Vis. XV. S7 op.cit. According to Nar. V. 5^, op.cit., 
there are seven sorts of wives who have been previously married to 
another man; among them the punarbhu is of three kinds, and the 
svairipl (wanton or unbridled womanT is of four kinds. The three 
punarbhus are (1) a maiden whose hand was taken in marriage but 
whose marriage was not consummated; in her case the marriage cere­
mony has to be performed once again; (2) a woman who first deserts 
the husband of her youth, betakes herself to another man and then 
returns to the house of her husband; (3) a woman who is given by 
the dead husband’s relatives to a sapi$$a of the deceased or a 
person of the same caste, on failure of the brothers-in-law. For
a more detailed learned disquisition see Kane H.D. Vol. II, Part I, 
op.cit. at 608ff.
2. Manu IX. V?, op.cit.
3. Manu IX. 65* See also V. 162, ibid.
altogether. With the remarriage of widows no longer permissible, one 
might have thought that they would have : .gained correspondingly in 
stature or status. But that was not to be, and quite on the contrary, 
wives do not seem to have reverted to the position of the honoured 
mater-familias of Vedic times. They continued to remain in subordi­
nation, as a result, possibly, of the introduction of the inferior 
forms of marriages founded upon the analogy of acquisition of owner­
ship over women. The woman who was captured or bought, or perhaps 
chose to elope, would not, unless custom sanctioned such behaviour, be 
the woman whom the husband could look upon as the one who was, as it
were, a gift of the gods, acquired by the magic of the marriage 
1
ritual, and in Baudhayana we hear it expressly stated that a woman
who has been purchased for value is not a patni; she is not eligible
 ^ 2
for pitraya or daiva purposes: she is a dasI, i.e. a female slave.
The position of the widow deteriorated correspondingly. Levirate 
and remarriage both having fallen from grace and her perpetual tute­
lage declared,^ Narada classifies women with slaves and attendants as 
kdependants, and lays down that
f,(A)fter the death of her lord the relations of her 
husband shall be the guardians of a woman who has 
no son. They shall have full authority to control 
her, to regulate the mode of life and to maintain her,”
and when the husband's family is extinct, or contains no male heir, or
when it is reduced to poverty, or when no one related to it within
the degree of sapipfla is left, "the father's relations shall be the
1. Sen-Gupta, EAIL, op.cit., at 120.
2. Baudh. I. 11.-21-2.
3. Manu IX* 3» op.cit. 
k. Nar. III. 36, op.cit.
3- Nar. XIII. 28, ibid.
guardians of the woman.”
If she chose to survive her husband, the only respectable alter­
native was to lead a life in accordance with the strict ideals of 
pativrata. The smrtis enjoined on her the harshest austerities, and 
Manu in particular prescribes that she must emaciate her body by 
living on pure flowers, roots and fruits; she must never mention the 
name of another man after her husband has died, and until her own 
death, she must remain patient of hardships, self-controlled and
chaste, performing such duties as are prescribed for wives who have 
2one husband only. VySsa likewise ordains that after her husband's 
death, a virtuous woman must observe strictly the duty of continence 
and constant abstemiousness; she must perform with devotion the 
worship of the gods, give alms and keep the various fasts, for it is 
only by the assiduous performance of such duties that she "conveys 
her husband (though abiding in another world) and herself to a region 
of bliss."5
Baudhayana similarly decrees that the widow of the departed
should give up for one year honey, meat, wine and salt, and sleep on 
if
the floor. However the restriction of these austerities for a period 
of a year, stemmed not from compassion on the lawgiver's part to
alleviate the miseries of the widow, but was a calculated move to 
grant her, after the period of mourning, permission to beget to her
1. Nar. XIII. 29, ibid.
2. Manu V. 157-8, and the reward of the virtuous wife who remains 
constantly chaste after her husband's death is, we are told at 
V. 160, that she reaches heaven "though she have no son."
3. Daya, XI. 1. *f3» H.T. Colebrooke tr., Hindu Law Books V. Stokes 
ed., (Mad., Higginbotham, 1865)i and in XI. 1. ^  it is explained 
that while by her good acts, she rescues her husband from hell, by 
her improper acts she causes him to fall to the region of terror.
4. Baudh. II. 2. 4—7 op.cit.
deceased husband offspring and thus reprieve him from the agonies of
hell. Vasistka. on the other hand, echoes Manu "in laying down that,
a widow who is engrossed in religious observances and fasts, who
abides by the vow of celibacy, who is always bent on restraining her
1
senses and making fasts, would go to heaven even though sonless.
The smrtis prescribe as well, every detail of the widow's day-to-
day demeanour and appearance. She must, according to Vrddha-Harita,
give up adorning her hair, chewing betel-nut, wearing perfumes,
flowers, ornaments and dyed clothes. She must not take food from a
vessel of brass or eat two meals a day. Nor might she apply
collyrium to her eyes but must always wear a white garment. Free
from sleep and laziness, she should be pure and of good conduct and
engrossed in the worship of Hari. She should sleep on the floor at
night on a mat of kusa grass; she should in short "be intent on con-
2centration of mind and on the company of the good." The same notions
of rigid piety are elsewhere prescribed as well. Thus
"(T)he use of tambula, dress, and feeding off 
vessels of tutenague is forbidden to the Yati, 
the Brahmachari and the widow." (Prachetes)
"(T)he widow shall never exceed one meal a day, 
nor sleep on a bed; if she do so her husband 
falls from Swarga
"She shall eat no other than simple food (if she 
has no male descendants) shall daily offer the 
tarpana of kusa, tila and water
"In Vaisakha, Karthika and Magha, she shall exceed 
the usual duties of ablutions, alms and pilgrimage, 
and often use the name of God (in prayer). u ,
(The Smrti)
And as if texts such as the foregoing had not already filled her
1. Vas. XVII. 55, op.cit.
2. See H.D* Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 58^ .
3* Quoted in H.T. Colebrooke, "On the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow" 
Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. II, (Lond., Trubner, 1873) at 133*
cup of misery to the brim, not long thereafter we hear of her as a
person to be shunned, the very embodiment of ill-luck and inaus-
piciousness. "All widows are in sorrow even if they have many sons"
says the Mahabharata, and as he surveys the scene of slaughter at the
epic battle, Duryodhana exclaims
"(I) can just as little enjoy the earth whose 
precious stones are gone, and whose kfatriya heroes 
are slain, as can a widowed woman."2
The Rgmayapa too proclaims that among all horrors, widowhood is the
3 -greatest stroke of evil. Any wonder then that the Skandapurapa
elaborates:
"(T)he widow is more inauspicious than all inauspicious
things; at the sight of a widow no success can be had
in any undertaking; excepting one’s widowed mother, all 
widows are void of auspiciousness; a wise man should ^
avoid even their blessings like the poison of a snake,"
an attitude which persists andl^ as much overtly demonstrated today in C*
the Hindu social etiquette as in the misty recesses of centuries past.
4* The Hindu Widow in Modernity
(l) The Rigours of Her Bleak Existence
The Brahmins had done their work well, and with the passage of
time so ingrained did the precepts of sacred literature become in the
pattern of social behaviour that the injunctions of the smrtis were
no doubt the reason, if not at least a testimony to the miserable and
unenviable lot of the Hindu widow, then and since. Unwanted, and for
1. Quoted at H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at
2. Keyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at 1^0.
3. Ibid., at kl2*
See H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 585*
-ii>o
most part ignored, the Hindu widow's fate was one of unmitigated
hardship and misery. Condemned to a dreary life of enforced celibacy
and having to practise the most stringent asceticisms, the simplest
pleasures were denied to her, and the most harrowing accounts have
been documented of the tragic barrenness and utter desolation of such 
1
lives - creatures of innate guilt and evil portent who must suffer
for the enormity of their sins in a former incarnation.
While the ceremonials of widowhood might vary from place to
place in their minuter aspects and in their more basic details, the
rites are uniformly of a pattern the country over. Jewellery in India
2symbolises prosperity and life, and lack of it sorrow and poverty.
Attesting to this ancient tradition is the custom of the Hindu bride
to be decorated with jewellery and receive at least a token ornament
on her wedding so that throughout the country bangles, toe-rings and
marriage necklaces worn by women signify the married state.^ The
tinkling and jangling of the ornament-laden bride or young wife
remains the happy symbol of prosperity and well-being; while bathing
at the tank or well she may not remove her jewellery: it is a sign of
ill-omen since after the death of the husband, the widow ceremoniously
if
removes them at the well or tank and bathes there. Thus the usual 
procedure for the sorrowing widow at the death of her husband is to
1. For one such graphic though vividly moving account by a German 
writer married to an Indian, an outsider to Hindu society, see
F. Hauswirth, Purdah: The Status of Indian Women, (Lond., Trubner,
1932), at 77 ff.
2. D. Jacobson, "Women and Jewelry in Rural India," G.F.Gupta, ed,, 
Family and Social Change in Modern India, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1976), 
136-77, at 136.
3. Ibid., at 139«
4. Ibid., at 15*+.
break off her bangles, strip her feet of ornaments and leave her
1
feet bare as signs of her ill-fate.
Henceforward the Hindu widow might wear no clothing other than 
a plain white sari without the adornment of even a simple border.
She must sleep on the hardest surface, frequently on a stone floor, 
eat but one meal a day of the most frugal kind, and twice a month 
keep a strict twenty-four hour fast during which not even water may 
pass her lips. To add to the pathos of her existence, as her pres­
ence is considered inauspicious or accursed, she is often enough an 
outcast on festive occasions and even debarred from attending the 
marriages of her own children. Looked upon as the virtual destroyer 
of her husband who would have lived but for her karma (action done 
out of desire seen as involving retribution in the form of transcen­
dental or occult effects) she had to drudge day and night, and was
subject to the bitterest taunts and insults by the other women of the
3
household including the servants. Thus cowed and wholly dependent, 
she was not infrequently an early sexual prey to her male relatives, 
and in this impossible situation, was faced with three alternatives 
resorted to by no means rarely - the secret murder of her infant
1. Ibid.
2. That the death of the husband was taken as proof of the widow's 
sin manifests itself in many regions in India in a curious system 
of routine persecution whereby the unfortunate woman so as to 
expiate her sins is, soon after her husband's death, forced by 
barber women who are paid to drag her to a tank or pond, there
to be given a ducking to the accompaniment of blows and violent 
language. This treatment is believed to elevate the soul of 
the widow and prepare her body and mind for the training in 
misery that was thereafter to be her lot. See P. Thomas, Indian 
Women Through the Ages, (Lond., Asia Publications, 196*0 at 297«
3. Ibid.
child, suicide or escape to the sole possible refuge, prostitution.
Still others sought sanctuary in religious pilgrimages, and sacred
cities such as Benares and Brindaban harbour a large number of such 
2pilgrim widows who prefer to make a living by begging and vice 
rather than face return to the dreaded empty house.^
1. Hauswirth, op.cit., at 77* That sexual harassment by male in-laws 
has a part to play in driving widows to prostitution has been 
brought out clearly in P. Kapur, The Life and World of Call Girls 
in India, (New Delhi, Vikas 1978), at 177-9**•
2. An article in an Indian paper The Sunday Standard (May 11, 1975)» 
describes the wretched existence of the 7,000 widows in the town 
of Brindaban, "the living spectres whose lives have been eroded 
by another's death." Shaven-headed and with a single white cloth 
draped over their bare bodies, these poverty-stricken creatures 
indulge in the now all too familiar chant of praise, "Hare Rama, 
Hare Kysna," for four hours in order to get a small bowl of rice.
In mid-afternoon they must chant for four more hours so as to 
obtain the price of a glass of tea. A not unusual case is that 
of a sixty-nine year old widow who was married at the age of nine 
and widowed at eleven, and has since been waiting for the "day of 
deliverance." Mary Daly in her work Gyn/Ecology, 2nd ed., (Lond., 
The Women's Press, 1981), which might otherwise be dismissed as so 
much biased radical-feminist ranting, nevertheless puts her finger 
on the pulse at 11^ , by drawing attention to "Surveys carried out 
by an Indian Committee on the Status of Women (which) revealed 
that a large percentage of the Indian population still approves of 
such oppression of widows.” And the present writer was herself 
nonplussed by this attitude of complacency when^in conversation 
with an American female who espouses Hinduism and has been an 
eye-witness to the practices at Brindaban, she was told that they 
(the widows) themselves seemed happy enough!
3. Bleak as the picture is, there were sometimes mitigating circum­
stances as well, for the mother of sons, widowed in later life, 
remained the honoured head of the house whose advice was sought in 
a surprising number of matters, and under whose hands the whole 
household prospered. According to Hauswirth (op.cit., at 79)? it 
is difficult to praise too highly "the Indian widow's gentle grace 
of unselfish service to all around her; she is the untiring nurse 
of the sick and of children, the willing and uncomplaining helper, 
and in innumerable homes instead of being persecuted, she was 
cherished and those around her did their best to soften her lot. 
But their belief in karma did not permit them to exonerate the 
widow from her penances, nor did the high-caste widow herself wish 
to escape these - she found her greatest solace in pious 
observances, and under the grip of inherited thought and custom 
would usually have been the one to resent most bitterly any 
suggestion of remarriage."
(2) Tonsure
As if the tribulations of the Hindu widow vere not already
enough, an added indignity was the custom of tonsure. How and
exactly when this practice - ugly and unfortunate as it was - arose
cannot be ascertained with any degree of accuracy, but that it was
generally in vogue may be inferred from the many scattered references
to her as munda, a reproachful term meaning "shorn head". Certainly
there is no express Vedic authority for it. The gphya and dharma
sutras do not refer to it, nor do important smrtis like those of Kanu
and Yajnavalkya. If one or two smyti verses of doubtful import seem
to indicate it, others like those of VrdcLha-Harxta are to an opposite 
2
effect. Those that do refer to it, if at all, refer to one shaving 
at the husband's death. The only passage prescribing continual ton- * 
sure, and on which the medieval writers relied in prescribing the 
practice which gradually evolved after the tenth or eleventh century, 
is the passage in the Skandapurapa (Kasikhanda, *+. 72), which lays 
down that
"(t)he tying up into a braid of the
hair of the widow leads to the bondage of the husband;
therefore a widow should always shave her head."^
Since the motive underlying tonsure was to harmonise the outward 
appearance of the widow with the ideals of renunciation that she was
1. Abbe J.A. Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, 3rd ed.,
H.K. Beauchamp tr., (Oxon, Clarendon Press, 1906), at 352.
2. Kane, H.D. Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 588,and in fact the same 
author by drawing attention to the various passages in the smrtis 
and Epic literature whereby the widow is specifically prohibxted 
from decking her hair gives the lie to any argument that the prac­
tice had its origins in sacred literature. Altekar op.cit., is 
similarly of the view at 160 that, epigraphic evidence indicates 
that widows were in fact permitted to keep their hair; the pro­
hibition was against the oiling or decorating of the tresses.
3- Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 592.
expected to follow, it might have been from the example of the 
Buddhist and Jaina nuns who shaved their heads as a sign of retire­
ment from worldly affairs, that this cruel custom came into existence.
In any event it gained ascendancy during the medieval ages undoubtedly
1
due to the precepts of Madhava and Anantadeva who recommended it. 
Confined at first to the brahmana caste, it was gradually extended to 
the rest of society, though its appeal in the initial stages was 
greater in Southern than in Northern India where despite the oppo­
sition of their preceptors who declared that a woman who shaved her
head would be born a Chandall (i.e. an outcast), or go to the most hor
2
rible hell, the Vaisnavas endorsed the practice, and it flourished.
Calculated to destroy her womanliness, making her more an object 
of aversion than desire, it was moreover thought that tonsure would 
incidentally afford the widow a greater degree of protection against 
the unwanted attentions of unscrupulous characters, as it would also in­
duce in her a measure of the strength and fortitude so necessary for 
the rigours of the celibate life expected of her. At any rate it was 
quite common till the end of the last century and was an additional 
affliction, for so long as the widow did not have her head tonsured, 
she was regarded as ineligible for association with religious rites 
and functions; nor would the more orthodox deign to take any food or 
water touched by her. However thanks to the efforts of Hindu reform­
ers who launched a most determined attack against the custom in the 
latter half of the last century, the realisation soon began to grow 
that, far from protecting widows, it merely exposed them to the most 
ruthless and perfidious designs, and the custom began to disappear
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 160.
2. Ibid., at l6l.
rapidly in the first half of the twentieth century. At present it 
has practically died in towns and cities, and though it still tends 
to linger in rural areas, there too its days are numbered.
(3) Child Widows
What made widowhood even more tragic was the high incidence of 
child widows who were expected to, and forced to conform with, the 
stringent deprivations that had become a way of life for widows in 
general. The monthly loss of unfertilised menstrual blood so abhor­
rent to the sastra, and Manu's declaration of the perpetual tutelage 
of women set a trend in favour of the marriage of girls the moment 
they reached puberty; and once virginity was established as the badge 
of respectability, and its extoll 1**3 a sign of the elite and an 
index to high caste, the brahmapic tendency towards pre-puberty 
marriages acquired social prestige, which with the passing of time 
became so compelling that a departure from it was a matter of social
disapproval and even of social disgrace. On the other hand, it was a
1
sign of one’s affluence, influence and status, a matter of family
prestige and honour to fulfil one’s obligation and see the daughter
safely married long before any breath of scandal could even faintly 
2
touch her. Among the peasantry and those belonging to the lower
1. Kapadia, op.cit., at 137-8.
2. That the apprehension of such scandal was never too far away once 
the girl was past infancy, and the blame for it laid squarely on 
her shoulders is evident even from the observations of Western 
scholars who lent their own considerable weight of opinion to such 
pernicious views. Thus the Abbe Dubois, op.cit., at 210: "Experi­
ence has taught that young Hindu women do not possess sufficient 
firmness, and sufficient regard for their own honour, to resist 
the ardent solicitations of a seducer”; and it is not to be 
thought that such baseless reasoning is restricted to the Christian
(continued on next page)
castes where in contrast women enjoyed a relatively greater degree of
self-expression, the practice of child marriage did not initially
*>
prevail. But their attempts towards "sanskritisation”, and the
adoption of Brahmanical conventions invariably led to the lowering of
the age of marriage for girls, and in imitation of the customs of the
"twice-born” the remarriage of widows strictly prohibited.
The result of course, can well be imagined. The ranks
of widows swelled, and there were numerous instances of girl widows
only just past infancy doomed for the rest of their dreary lives to
humiliation, and deprivation; courageously borne in the hope of
absolving their sins of past lives and of attaining a better future
after death. Census statistics bear out the rise in the incidence of
child widows, and the figures in 1891 indicated that out of a total
population of 140,196,135, as many as 22,657,429 were widows. Of
these 13,878 were under four years of age, 64,040 between five and
nine, 17,532 between ten and fourteen and 4,160,548 between fifteen
2
and thirty-four years of age. The Census Eeports of 1921 and 1931 
indicate similar figures. In 1931 in the country as a whole there 
were 83,920 widows between the ages of five and ten, 145,^9 between
•z
eleven and fifteen, 404,167 between sixteen and twenty. As the
figures included those castes which permitted their widows to remarry,
(continued from previous page)
priesthood of a bygone century, for, in more recent times David and 
Vera Mace, commenting upon the Abbe's interpretation in their work 
Marriage: East and West, (N.Y., Doubleday, i960), appear to 
accept this as a matter of course stating at 70 that, "from an 
early age, girls in the East were accustomed to the idea that they 
could not be trusted to guard their own virtue."
/
1. V. Agnew, Elite Women in Indian Politics, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1979), 
at 18.
2. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 24-5.
3. Ibid., at 6l6.
the sheer enormity of the numbers is an index to the generally pre­
vailing social aversion to the notion of widow remarriage.
The poignancy of widowhood is all the more reinforced when we 
consider that
"(t)he terrible thing - the fact that tears one’s 
very heart-strings - is that the younger and therefore 
the more unprotected and helpless the widow is, the 
more it proved how vile her sin must have been. When 
an older woman loses her husband, her sin cannot have 
been so black as that of a little clinging child of 
six or seven,
and so Anandabai, a child widow who was later to become the second 
wife of MSharsi D.K. Karve, (social reformer and pioneer of women’s 
education in Western India) was to learn to her cost. A widow at the 
age of eight years, she recounts that according to custom her head was
shaved, "and it was only when I lost my hair and had to wear a red
*
2 3
sari that I realised for the first time what it was to be a widow.”
Then follows the documentation of the usual dreary details, the
pattern of which never varied. From then onwards she was condemned
to the life of an ascetic, observing several fasts a month, keeping
various vows, eating frugally and showing special piety in the worship
of God. As the sight of the widow was supposed to bring ill-luck, she
had to be careful when she went out, and was always met with the same
reproachful refrain:
»’(Y)ou must have sinned in your last birth. And this 
is the punishment meted out to you. Now if you 
behave well and worship God devotedly in this birth,
1. S. Stevenson, The Rites of the Twice-Born, 2nd ed., (New Delhi, 
Oriental Books, 1971), at 20^ .
2. In Maharashtra the widow, as a sign of mourning, must wear a rust- 
coloured sari in contrast to the rest of India vhere die%ears white.
3. A. Karve, "Autobiography", The New Brahmans: Five Maharashtrian 
Families, D.D. Karve tr. & ed. , (Bertettuj-Lond., Univ. cf California 
Press - Camb. Univ. Press, 1963)i 52-70, at 66.
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he will reward you in the next birth.”
Thus doomed for the sins of a former incarnation, the child
widow in India, from the moment of her husband*s decease till the
last hour of her own life, was made to expiate the impieties of her
previous existence in shame, and suffering and self immolation,
2chained in every thought to the service of his soul; and the fact 
that she was merely a child of three, or five or seven who knew 
nothing of the marriage that bound her, did not exonerate her: her
sins were the blacker for it for !,if the widow has a son", the 
proverb says, "her sari has only slipped from her head to her 
shoulders, but if she be widowed while young and childless, her sari 
has slipped right to the ground, and she is left naked and defense­
less,” revealed as the creature of sin,^ herself convinced when she 
is old enough, of the justice of her fate.
1. Ibid., at 66-7. In identical detail is M. Felton's narrative, A 
Child Vidov's Story, (N.Y., Harcourt Brace & World, 1967)#
In the vast literature that intimate contact with India generated 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Occidental 
mind was often enough taken aback, and in spite of "thirty years of 
matured experience in this land, living in constant touch with the 
people and studying with eagerness their life and thought,” never­
theless "his (the writer's) pride of knowledge is chastened by the 
oft-recurring surprises which the Oriental nature and life still 
bring to him.” : J.P. Jones, India, Its Life and Thought, (N.Y.,
Macmillan, 1908), Preface, at x; and nowhere does this bewilder­
ment come out with greater emphasis than where the author notes 
at 265-^ : ”It is a strange comment upon the religious perversity
of a people of the tender domestic nature of Hindus that they 
should deal with so much cruelty and such apparent indifference to 
the bereavement and suffering of the unfortunate widow who bears 
so tender a relationship to them. Religion has not wrought 
greater cruelty and injustice to anyone than to the Hindu widow, 
specially the child widow, and notwithstanding the fact that these 
suffering ones are a great host in this land, there are few of 
their people who raise their voice in their defence or strive for 
their relief."
2. K. Kayo, Mother India, (N.Y. Blue Ribbon Books, 1927), at 8l.
3- Stevenson, op.cit., at 20k.
(4) Sati
That suttee or sati to give it its proper name (the practice of
immolating widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands), was by no
means confined to India, there can be no doubt. The evidence of its
antiquity as also of its widely reported occurrence is well
established in all parts of the world extending from Europe to the 
1
Far East, and its origins may be traced to the oldest religious
2beliefs and superstitious practices of mankind.
Whether or not the rite was indigenous to India is a moot
question. We are told on the authority of Kane that,
"(t)here is no Vedic passage which can be cited as 
' incontrovertibly referring to widow burning as then 
current, nor is there any mantra (religious chants) 
which could be said to have been repeated in very 
ancient times at such burning; nor do the ancient 
grhyasutras contain any direction prescribing the 
procedure of widow b u r n i n g . "3
But we must bear in mind that as it was a practice Kwo.wiv to the
entire world, there does not seem to be any basis for the belief that
it had found disfavour with the ancient Indians. What is more
probable is that, as a consequence of a superior civilisation, the
4
custom had been discontinued as barbarous in the Vedic times only to 
be brought in again by the early immigrants from over the North-Western
1. For an exhaustive account of the ubiquitousness of the practice in 
ancient times, see N.M. Penzer, "Widow Burning", C.H.Tavney, ed., 
Ocean of Story. 2nd ed., Vol IV, 'Appendix I, (New Delhi, Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1968), 255-72, at 255 ff*
2. For plausible theories as to its acceptability in antiquity, see 
Altekar, op.cit., at 115-6.
3. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 625.
4. Sir Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism: An Historical Sketch,
Vol. II, (Lond., E. Arnold, 1921), at 168.
Passes, from tribes in Central and Western Asia, and even Eastern
1
Europe who may be called Scythians in a general way. The date of 
its reintroduction must have been early, for by the fourth century 
B.C. Alexander the Great's soldiers found it as an established insti­
tution in "the half-foreign city of Taxila... and it also prevailed
2among the Kathaioi who dwelt on the banks of the Ravi."
However what is certain is that, while with the passage of time
it tended to fall into dCsuetude in the rest of the world, in India, 
paradoxically enough, it acquired religious sanctity and soon became 
embedded as a sacred rite despite the otherwise humane and tolerant 
character of the Hindu religion.
One view is that, sati as a rite fits quite well in the frame of
the brahmanical law of marriage as a sharpened form of the severe
demands made by the brahmanical law-givers on the matrimonial fidelity
of the widow,^ and while this is certainly true of later attitudes,
there is in the sastra a conflict of authorities for and against the
rite. Of the Hindu legislators most favourably disposed towards it,
Angiras proclaims:
"(T)he wife who commits herself to the flames with 
her husband*s corpse shall equal Arundhati and reside 
in Swarga.
"Accompanying her husband she shall reside so long in 
Swarga as are the thirty-five millions of hairs on the 
human body.
"As the snake catcher forcibly draws the serpent from 
his earth, so bearing her husband (from hell), with 
him she shall enjoy heavenly bliss.
1. V. Smith, The Oxford History of India, 2nd ed., (Oxon., Clarendon 
Press, 1928), at 665-
2. Ibid.
3- J. Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, B. Ghosh tr. (Cal., Greater India 
Society, 192&), at 1^ 7.
"Dying with her husband, she sanctifies her maternal 
and paternal ancestors, and the ancestry of him to 
whom she gave her virginity#
"Such a wife adoring her husband, in celestial felicity 
with him, greatest, most admired, wi+h him shall enjoy 
the delights of heaven while fourteen Indras reign#
"Though her husband had killed a brahmana, broken the 
ties of gratitude, or murdered his friend, she expiates 
the crime#" 1
and Harita no less:
"(S)he whose sympathy feels the pains and joys of her 
husband, who mourns and pines in his absence, and dies 
when he dies, is a good and loyal wife."^
*
Likewise the Brahma Puraqa propounds:
"(W)hile the pile is preparing, tell the faithful wife 
of the greatest duty of woman; she is loyal and pure 
who bums herself with her husband's corpse.1^
But as opposed to such injunctions, there are others which offer
her an alternative# After the death of the husband, the widow must
either preserve her chastity or ascend the pile after him.^ So too
Brhaspati:
"(A) wife is considered half the body (of her husband) 
equally sharing the result of his good or wicked deeds; 
whether she ascends the pile after him, or chooses to
1# E#T# Colebrooke "On the Duties of a Faithful Hindu Widow,"Miscellaneous 
Essays# Vol. II, (Lond#, Trubner, 1875) at 155-6#
2, Ibid,« at 157*
3o Ibid#, at 136# It is also believed that Krsna commanded the widow 
not to survive her husband, and indicated what preparations should 
precede the immolation# An English version of these fragments from 
the Puranas was published in the London Asiatic Journal (Oct. 1817) 
as follows: "I will now make known the supreme law regarding women#
It is proper that a woman should accompany her husband in death; 
such a faithful wife shall with her husband attain the regions of 
truth; for the husband with respect to the wife, is endowed with 
all the qualities of the gods and all virtues of places of holy 
visitation# The husband with regard to the wife, is as Ganga to 
rivers, as Hari to celestials, as the supreme Brahma to saints##."
See Bader, op.cit#, at 65#
4# Vis# XXV. 1. 14, op.cit.
survive him leading a virtuous life, she promotes 
the welfare of- her husband."
On the other hand, if after undertaking the duty" of sati the woman
recedes from the pile, she incurs the penalties of defilement and may
2only be purified by observing the fast called prajapatya. In certain 
other circumstances however, the smrti writers exempt her entirely
from its performance, and in Narada's view, cnewhois the mother of an
infant child, or one who is pregnant, or whose pregnancy is doubtful
3
or who is unclean may not ascend the pile. And in the event of a
brahmin dying in a distant country, his widow may not ascend a second 
if
pile, though others are not precluded from this act of fidelity and
"(T)he widow on the news of her husband*s dying in a,, 
distant country, should expeditiously burn herself.'1
a sentiment which is echoed in the Brahma PurSna:
- •
"(S)hould the husband die on a journey, holding his g 
sandals to her breast, let her pass into the flames."
1. Brh. XXIV. 11, op.cit.
2. Apastamba, quoted at Colebrooke "On the Duties of...," at 137.
3* Ibid., at 138. Colebrooke also quotes Byhaspati at 138, who like­
wise declares "The mother of an infant shall not relinquish the 
care of her child to ascend the pile, nor shall one who is unclean 
(from a periodical cause), or whose time for purification after 
child-birth is not passed, nor shall one who is pregnant, commit 
herself to the flames. But the mother of an infant may, if the 
care of the child be otherwise provided." It is noteworthy that 
even the Garudapura$a which waxes eloquent over the immolation of a
wife on her husband's funeral pyre holding that the practice of
sati is common to all women including chaggala (outcast) women, and
that a woman does not become free from the liability to be born
again and again as a woman until she becomes sati, is nevertheless 
of the view that pregnant women or those who have young children 
should not commit themselves to the flames. See Kane, H.D., Vol. 
IV, (1973), op.cit., at 237-
4. Gautama, cited at Colebrooke, "On the Duties of...", op.cit., at 138.
3. Ibid.
6. Cited at ibid.
- anumarana as opposed to sahamaraija, i.e. burning along with the 
husband.
It is certain however that it was never in the contemplation of 
.Manu, the great sage and lawgiver, to countenance satl, and the 
inferential prohibition of the rite may be garnered from the many 
detailed rules of chaste and frugal living that he lays down for the 
widow. In Bharuchi's interpretation of Manu XII. 88-90, satl is an 
instance of the Vedic action of "prolonging”, but "cessation” wherein 
lies ultimate merit and whereby one passes beyond the five material 
substances, may only be achieved by the widow in tending to the house­
hold duties and living her life in accordance with the precepts laid
2
down for brahmacharya, for has not the Vedic text declared that, ”0ne
should not leave this world before one has finished one's allotted 
3
span of life.” Thus despite Angiras* endorsement of the rite, the
action of a woman who is hasty in her anxiety to secure heaven quickly
for herself and her husband must be condemned as asastrlya (i.e. not
in accordance with the sastra). To the poet Bana however, goes the
credit of offering the most vehement and determined opposition to this
inhuman institution. To die for one's beloved, in his view, serves no
purpose, for the one who dies goes to the place determined by his own
karma, while the one who accompanies him on the funeral pyre goes to
5
the hell reserved for those who are guilty of the sin of suicide.
1. Supra, at
2. Devannabhatta, a twelfth century writer from South India similarly 
maintains that satl is only a very inferior variety of dharma. See 
Altekar, op.cit., at 12*t, and Jolly, op.cit., at l*+9»
3. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 632.
k. Medhatithi on Manu V. 137% cited at Jolly, op.cit., at 1^ 9- 
5- Altekar, op.cit., at 124.
However, despite this overwhelming evidence against the usage,
vested interests were at work, and accordingly the brahmin priesthood
who stood to gain considerably by the practice sought support for
their view in a passage from the ^gveda which was said to clearly
enjoin the rite. The text of the passage declares:
"(0)m - let these women not to be widowed good wives 
adorned with collyrium, holding clarified butter, 
consign themselves to the fire^  whose original element 
is water."**
The disputed passage in the verse is Anasravo namivah su-ratna a
rohantu janayo agne (v. 1. agre), i.e. "without tears, without sorrow,
2bedecked with jewels, let wives go up to the fire first."
Notwithstanding this supposed authority, scholars both Indian and 
European reject the view that there is any passage in the ggveda which 
can be said to countenance satl,^ and H.H. Wilson, the great Sanskrit- 
ist, is firmly of the opinion that in this particular passage, the 
word agreh was deliberately altered to agneh (fire), by .
Raghunandana in the middle of the fifteenth century, and by such 
forgery the required authority for satx established. To reinforce 
his assertion, Wilson draws attention to the Vedic passage wherein the
widow who lies beside her husband on the funeral pyre is exhorted to
5
"come into the world of life." Surely, argues the eminent scholar,
"(i)t would be inconsistent with any intention of 
burning to enjoin her (the widow) to repair to the
1. Colebrooke's translation, cited at "On the Duties of...," op.cit., 
at 135.
2. Ibid.
3* See Sen-Gupta's repudiation, supra, at 142.
k. H.H.Wilson, Works, Vol.II, (The Religion of the Hindus. Vol.11),
"On the Supposed Vaidik Authority for the Burning of Widows,"
R. Rost ed., (Lond., Triibner, 1862), at 275*
5. Supra, at 141*
world of living beings ... on the other hand it 
must be taken to imply an exhortation to the widow 
to return to her social duties, cherishing the ^
recollection, but not sharing the death of her husband.’*
Most authorities are now agreed that fraud did indeed play its part,
sind in Max Muller's view, it is "perhaps the most flagrant instance
2of what can be done by an unscrupulous priesthood."
Authoritative as these views were, they could not stem the tide 
of controversy, and in fact Raja Dev Kanta Deva, whom we remember to­
day chiefly for his determined opposition to Raja Ram Mohan Roy's 
efforts at reform, explains away the Vedic passage to which Wilson 
draws attention, by maintaining that it was merely a test of the 
widow's resolve:
"(l)f the widow thus addressed has not made up her
mind for her immolation, she obeys the call; but
should she be firm in her resolve, she consoles her
friends and relatives and enters the fire."^
On the other hand, in the Raja's view, Vedic authority for the burning
of widows is established in two verses of the Aukhya Sakha of the
Taittirlya Samhita:
(1) "(0)h Agni, of all Vratas thou art the vratapati.
I will observe the vow (vrata) of following the 
husband. Do thou enable me to accomplish it!"
(2) "(H)ere in this rite, to thee Oh Agni, I offer salu­
tations; to gain the heavenly mansion I enter into thee; 
(wherefore) oh Jatavedah, this day, satisfied with the 
clarified butter (offered by me), inspire^me with courage
(for sahagamana) and take me to my lord."
1. Wilson, Vol. II, cited above, at 276.
2. F. Max Muller, Selected Essays on Language, Mythology and Religion, 
Vol. I, (Lond., Longmans Green, 1851), at 335*
3. Cited at Wilson, Vol. II, op.cit., at 297* It may be noted that 
even on the basis of this argument, satl is not incumbent but 
merely an alternative offered to the widow.
Ibid., at 296.
However, Kane gives no credence to these verses and refers to
them as "the so-called Vedic texts” which ”to say the least are of
1
doubtful authenticity," though at the same time he is not willing to 
subscribe to the theory of fraud attributed to Raghunandana either. 
Centuries before the latter, he points out, the controversial passage 
in question was held in the same sense in the Brahma Purana and 
Apararka. Besides, had there indeed been such forgery, it would not 
have gone undiscovered for so long, "as in those days there were
2thousands of people who knew every syllable of the jggveda by heart." 
What therefore emerges from the foregoing is that, satl as an insti­
tution could not have been established by this change of text alone; 
and while there can be no doubt but that it was instrumental in en­
couraging and abetting it, the mere fact that the rite could be 
visualised to the extent that the widow lies on the funeral pile only 
to be called back to the world of the living, indicates clearly enough 
that the burning of widows was not an unfamiliar, though perhaps not 
a day-to-day occurrence.
Nor can we attribute widow burning as an institution as 
intrinsic to the Epics. Assertions that it is the duty of a good wife 
to follow her lord in death is found often enough in both poems, but 
they yield no proof since they might be referred to later revision.
The only instance of actual satl in the Ramayana is to be found in the 
seventh book, where a brShmin woman consigns herself to the flames to 
be burnt along with her dead husband. But as the seventh book does
not belong to the original poem, it is fairly certain that the legend
3
is an interpolation of especially late date.
1. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 625, f.n. I*t62.
2. Ibid., at 625.
3. Meyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at 1^2.
In the Mahabharata - which is much longer and thus offers great­
er opportunities for widow burning - it is undoubtedly ordained:
"(T)hough the husband died unhappy by the disobedience 
of his wife, if from motives of love, disgust (of the 
world), fear (of living unprotected), or sorrow, she 
committed herself to the flames, she is entitled to 
veneration."
Yet even here where so many husbands meet with death and only a very 
few widows follow them to the realms of darkness, actual instances of 
the true satl are rare. The memory of one of these remote sacrifices 
which the poem transmits to us, that of Madrl's is hardly animated by 
the precepts of those who enjoined it. Pandu is struck at the moment 
of sexual union with her, and at his death, MadrI is resolved not to 
be held back, for not only has she not yet enjoyed love to the full, 
but
"(i)n the midst of pleasure's union he (Papflu) went 
away from love in death. How might I now cut off 
his longing in the abode of Yama?"2
The only true case of satl in the poem is the mounting onto the
pyre of the four wives of Vasudeva; generally however, the widows -
so many of them - go on quietly living. Satyabhama, for example,
3
after the death of Krsna, that "Croesus in wives," goes off into the 
forest to live the life of a penitent, as does KuntI who follows her 
mother-in-law Satyavatl, into the penitential wilderness, hoping by 
humble service and asceticism to earn her entry into the world of her 
husband. **
1. Cited at Colebrooke, "On the Duties of...," op.cit., at 137*
2. Keyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at klk,
3. Ibid., at
k. Ibid., f.n. 1. As opposed to sahamarana, instances of anumarana 
are however more frequent in tne Epic. See ibid., at +^15-6.
However, that which in primitive times had been the inspiration 
of isolated devotion, soon became a duty of unbending rigidity. Con- 
fined in the first instance to the nobility, the practice of satl was 
a means among them whereby the vanquished in battle sought to protect 
their honour, and preferred their women to die rather than fall into 
the hands of the victors and the humiliations that were almost 
certainly in store for them. Gradually however, from kings and 
warriors, the practice spread among the brahmins, for the latter com­
munity, accustomed as it was to priding itself on following the most 
ascetic and self-denying code of life, could not allow itself to be
outdone by the k§atriyas; despite several texts cited by AparSrka
2which apparently forbid self-immolation to brahmin widows, the 
authors of digests explain away these passages by holding that what 
these texts really amounted to was that she should not take the step 
merely under a temporary sense of overwhelming grief,* on the contrary, 
it should be the result of full and mature deliberation; and thus a 
practice so opposed to the first law of nature, but made sacrosanct in 
India by the superaddition of religious merit, becsune engrafted on the 
custom of the Hindus.
Not a few reasons are put forward in an attempt to explain its 
wholehearted endorsement for centuries in India. Originally an 
appendage to regal and princely estate, sati was considered honourable 
in itself and reflected additional lustre on the family to which the 
hapless victim belonged. Those who actively lent support to it were
1. It is generally agreed that almost certainly the earliest instance 
of sati is that of the wife of the Hindu general Ketius, who died 
in 316 B.C. while fighting against the Greek, Antigonos.
invariably relatives of the deceased husband, and bound by none of
the ties of consanguinity and having little or no feeling for her,
made the widow the means of aggrandising the family honour, and the
higher the number of such immolations, the greater the glory
1attributed to the clan. Moreover the presence of widows, especially 
if still capable of sexual and reproductive activity, was clearly a 
problem for the husband’s surviving male kin. That such widows - 
sometimes only children - might deviate from the path of virtue and 
bring dishonour to the family name, was undoubtedly an additional 
incentive in favour of satl. Add to these the pressure of the 
brahmin priesthood who presided over the rite and for whom it had 
become a means of accumulating a not inconsiderable income, and it is 
then not difficult to understand why it became a social convention of 
such magnitude.
However, contributory as these causes might have been, they were 
certainly not the primary reasons for the hold that the rite
had on Hindu minds. To arrive at its origins, we must retrace it to 
the recesses of mythology, where we hear that on the demise of the 
mortal part of Brahma, his wives, inconsolable in their misery, deter­
mined not to survive him and burnt themselves with his corpse. There
—is also the example of Sati, who to avenge an insult to S^iva in her 
own father’s omission to ask her lord to an entertainment, consumes 
herself in the presence of the gods. With this act of fealty, the 
name of Daks'a’s daughter has been identified; and her regeneration and 
reunion with her husband as KOi<i or Parvati furnished the example for 
similar acts on the part of those for whom such stories were sacred 
truth. To add to this was the doctrine of retribution in Hindu 
theology, whereby the loss of her visible god was the just deserts of
1. Many sati-stones erected by proud relatives of the husband in medieval 
times serve to this day to witness this attitude.
a woman for the sins of -a previous life. Widowhood then must in 
rigorous justice be an experience so desolate and fraught with misery 
that a preferable alternative was to perish in the flames that con­
sumed her husband's corpse, and the early brShrains - because they 
stood to gain - gave currency to the doctrine that the spirits of 
these valiant creatures, thus purged of their guilt, ceased from their 
transmigrations to live reunited with their lords in eternal bliss.
However that the rite was never meant as a universally binding 
precept is evident from the fact that, in the extreme south of India, 
sati was more an exception than a rule down to about 1000 A.D. Among
the members of the Pallava, the Chola and the Pandya ruling families
T 1there is no evidence of sati till about 900 A.D. In Malabar, the
most primitive part of South India the rite was forbidden, probably
because of the prevalence of the matriarchal system there, and though
there are many unpublished sati stones both in the Deccan and
Maharashtra, the Epigraphia Carnatika mentions only eleven cases of
sati during the period 1000-1^00 A.D., though the figure rises to
forty-one for the period 1400-1600 A.D. Most of these satis however
relate to the Nayaka and Gauda classes which formed the main fighting
2community of southern India. When the custom did penetrate into 
southern India, it is significant that it was prevalent chiefly in the 
strictly brahmanical kingdom of Vijayanagar and "the most wholesale 
burnings on record were those perpetrated from the fourteenth to the 
sixteenth centuries on the obsequies of the Teluga Rajas of
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 128.
2. Ibid., at 131.
Vijayanagar." With the disintegration of the Vijayanagar empire, the
practice was continued on a smaller scale by its chief fragment, the
kindom of Madura, and at the deaths of two rulers in l6ll, as many as
2
four hundred and seven hundred women ascended the funeral pyres.
In Western India among the Maharashtrians it gained only modified
support, and there are remarkably few instances of sati at the deaths
of those of higher rank. Only one wife of Shivaji became sati and one
of Rajaram his son. The masterful wife of Raja Shahu was compelled
to burn for political reasons,^ while among the members of the Peshwa
family, only Ramabai, the widow of Madhavarao I, consigned herself
to the flames. Recorded cases of sati in the annals of the Maratha
ruling families of Satara, Nagpur, Gwalior, Indore and Baroda are
likewise very few. Towards the latter half of the eighteenth century,
the Maratha distaste for sati grew, and by the close of the century
two Maratha states, those of the Peshwa's personal dominions and
5
Tanjore, prohibited sati. That Tanjore later relapsed and became 
one of the few notorious centres, may have been due to the widespread 
prevalence of the rite in the surrounding"areas, the pernicious 
influence of which the kingdom could hardly escape.
1. Ibid. Nicolo Conti, an early traveller to the kingdom was informed 
that the king had 12,000 wives, and so that great honour be heaped 
upon him, two to three thousand of these were selected on condition 
that, at his death they should voluntarily burn themselves on his 
funeral pyre! See R. Sewell, A Forgotten Empire (Vijayanagar), 
(Lond., S. Sonnenschein, 1900), at
2. Altekar, op.cit., at 131*
3* E. Thompson, A Historical and Philosophical Enquiry into the Hindu 
Rite of Widow Burning" (Lond., Allen and Unwin, 192b), at 29.
Altekar, op.cit., at 132.
3. Thompson, cited above, at 59*
However, as if to make up for the comparative dearth of the
practice in the south, sati flourished unabated in Kashmir, the
Punjab, Rajasthan, or Rajputana as it then was, and the Ganges valley
including Bengal. Between 700 and 1100 A.D. Kashmir's history teems
with cases of sati in royal families. So deep-rooted became the
custom that not only wives but concubines and slaves would burn on the
pile of their lords. An acceptable explanation for its widespread
prevalence in this area would seem to be its proximity to Central
Asia which was the home of the Scythians, among whom, as we have
1
already indicated, the rite was customary.
In the Punjab the practice of satl forms no part of the insti­
tutions of the Sikhs, and in the early stages was rare among them.
In fact it is condemned in no uncertain terms in the Adhi Granth:
"(T)hey are not satis who perish in the flames 0 Nanak.
Satis are those who live of a broken heart."
And Amar Das, the third Guru declares in a similar vein:
"(T)hey are not satis who burn themselves with the 
dead. The true sati is she who dieth from the shock 
of separation from her husband. They also ought to be 
considered satis who abide in chastity and content­
ment, who serve, and when rising, ever remember their 
lord."3
Despite these injunctions against it, in course of time sati became an 
established ritual among the Sikhs, probably for the same reason that 
it took root among the Rajputs - as a safeguard of the honour of their 
women. Among the aristocracy specially, there were numerous cases of 
satl on an awesome scale. At Ranjit Singh's death, four of his queens
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 127.
2. See "Suttee," in V.F. Balfour, ed., Cyclopaedia of India, 2nd ed*, 
(Mad., Laurence and Adelphi, 1873)» 647-52, at 650.
3* Cited at Penzer, op.cit., at 263*
and seven concubines ascended the funeral pyre. During the trouble­
some period that followed his death, princes and generals fell in 
quick succession, and almost every one of them was accompanied by his 
wives and concubines. Three women died with Maharaja Kharak Singh, 
five with Basant Singh, eleven with Kishori Singh, twenty-four with 
Hira Singh and three hundred and ten with Suchet Singh.
The hold of satl among the ruling Rajput families was likewise 
formidable, and the women, members of warrior clans whose menfolk 
died so freely and readily in battle, were similarly impelled by an 
indomitable courage, and most willingly accompanied their husbands* 
remains to the funeral pile. Generally at the death of every Rajput 
raja or nobleman, those among his widows who were not with child or 
otherwise incapacitated for the rite, would ascend the funeral pyre, 
quite frequently in appallingly large numbers. At the death of Raja 
A jit Singh of Marwar in 172*f, sixty-four women ascended his funeral
pyre, while eighty-four women became satis when Raja Budh Singh of 
2Bundi drowned. To these may be added the memories of the jauhars, 
those of Chitor where the fabled Padmini and thousands of her women 
consigned themselves to the flames rather than submit to the maurader 
Alladin Khilji, that of Jaisalmer where two thousand and four hundred 
women are said to have perished,^ and those of Udaipur, where the 
females of the household of the later Ranas, by burning added to the 
numbers, and we have some idea as to the extent of the holocaust 
claimed by the rite.
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 132.
2. J. Todd, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, 3rd ed., Vol. I, 
(Lond., George Routledge, 1920), at 837-
3- Thompson, op.cit., at 37 •
Nor was this wholesale immolation of women confined to the 
palaces of Northern India only. In Bengal the rite was rampant with 
not even the excuse that the warriors of the North had - that of pro­
tecting their women from defilement at the hands of alien conquerors. 
Towards the end of the l8th century, the practice was widespread in 
the entire Bengal Presidency but particularly so in the Bengal 
Province itself. If we examine the returns of the four years between 
1815 to l8l8, the findings are that, of the total of 2,366 reported 
cases, l,*+85 satis occurred in the Calcutta Division alone, 3^3 in 
Benares, then as now the seat of Hindu orthodoxy, 135 in the densely
populated but predominantly Muslim Division of Dacca, 155 in Patna,
1105 in the Murshidabad Division and 60 in Bareilly. In the statis­
tics of 1828 the figures show that out of **63 cases of sati, **20 were
reported from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa with the Calcutta Division
2
leading in this group with a total of 287.
The question that invariably comes to mind at this stage is that
raised in l8l8 by the Magistrate of the Hoogly District:
”(T)he suttee is supposed by some to be an act 
enjoined by the religion of the Hindus; but if 
so, why does it prevail in one part more than 
another, and why in the immediate neighbourhood 
of the Presidency?
Why indeed? There does not seem to have been any one cause, and
various reasons have been assigned,. A plausible enough explanation
seems to be the general distaste of the Moghul rulers towards the
1. Ibid., at 71.
2. H.H. Wilson, The History of British India, Vol. Ill, (Lond., J. 
Madden, l8**8), at 189*
3- Parliamentary Papers, Vol. IV, 1827, at 237, cited at J. Peggs, 
Indian Cries to British Humanity Relative to the Suttee, 
Infanticide, 2nd ed., (Lond., Seely. 1850). at 11.
practice. Akbar, in particular, strongly discountenanced it, and on
one occasion personally intervened by riding a hundred miles at top
speed to prevent the Raja of Jodhpur's daughter-in-law from becoming 
_ 1
an unwilling sati. His son Jahangir was equally opposed to it, and 
seems to have forbidden on pain of death, any abetting of the per­
formance. But the most that the Moghuls could do was to insist on 
its voluntary nature, and even this restriction could not obtain in 
the territories of the great Rajput chieftains. However the Moghul 
abhorrence of the custom did lead to its suppression to a consider­
able extent, at least within the areas directly controlled by Delhi, 
but the consequence of this was its spread, with even greater ferocity
in states independent of Moghul suzerainty, and outlying semi-inde-
2pendent provinces such as Bengal.
However, this only partly explains its spread, and not at all its 
hold over Bengali minds. Kane's theory, it is submitted, is likewise 
suspect. He attributes its widespread prevalence in Bengal to the 
system of inheritance as propounded in the Dayabhaga. As he explain
"(I)n the whole of India except Bengal, the widows of 
members of joint families are only entitled to mainten­
ance and have no other right over the property of the 
family. In Bengal wherever the Dayabhaga prevails, 
the widow of a sonless member even in a joint Hindu 
family is entitled to practically the same rights over
1. In fact one can do no better than to quote the great Emperor him­
self to show his total lack of sympathy in an otherwise remarkably 
benign attitude towards the religion of his subjects: "It is a
strange commentary on the magnanimity of men that they should seek 
their deliverance through the self-sacrifice of their wives." : 
Abu'l Fazal, Ain-i-Akbari (Institutes of Akbar), Vol. Ill, H.S. 
Jarrett tr., (Cal, RASB, 189*0, at 398-
2. Thompson, op.cit., at 57-8.
joint family property which her deceased husband 
must have had. This must have frequently induced 
the surviving members to get rid of the widow by 
appealing at a most distressing hour to her devotion 
and love for her husband.11
Though admittedly there is some truth - in theory at least - in 
this contention, we must pause awhile before accepting it unreserved­
ly. The reality was quite another story, and Raja Rammohun Roy, the 
great Bengali reformer, whose disgust and horror of the rite was at 
least partly due to his having witnessed his own sister-in-law become 
an unwilling satl, exposes the non-existent nature of such inheritance 
rights in practice. While the lawgivers might have made provisions 
for the mother to have a share equal to that of the son in her 
deceased husband's property, yet, as the Raja points out, the ancient 
law has thus been explained away:
M(a) widow ... can receive nothing when her husband 
has no issue by her, and in case he dies leaving only 
one son by his wife, or having had more sons, one of 
whom happened to die leaving issue, she shall, in 
these cases, also have no claim to the property; and 
again, should anyone leave more than one surviving son, 
and they, being unwilling to allow a share to the widow, 
keep the property undivided, the mother can claim nothing 
in this instance also. But when a person dies, leaving 
two or more sons, and all of them survive, and are 
inclined to allot a share to their mother, her right is 
in this case only, valid.
The myth of inheritance thus shattered, Kane's conjecture cannot be
given credence for widows in Bengal were in reality as destitute as
elsewhere in India, and,
1. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 635*
2. Raja Rammohun Roy, ,fBrief Remarks Regarding Modern Encroachments on 
the Ancient Rights of Females," Dr. K. Nag and D. Bunnan, ed., The 
English Works of Raja Rammohun Roy,~ (Cal., Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, 
1945), 1-9, at 3-4.
M(t)he Hindu widows burn themselves on the piles of 
their deceased husbands ... from their witnessing the 
distress in which widows of the same rank in life are 
involved, and the insults and slights to which they 
are daily subjected (so much so) that they become in 
a great measure regardless of existence after the death 
of their husbands: and this indifference accompanied
by hope of future reward held out to them, leads them 
to the horrible act of suicide.”
Besides, the mind at once leaps to the memorable sacrifices at 
Chitor, Jaipur, Udaipur and Jodhpur. Property rights had no part to 
play in these regions, and though undoubtedly the form that satl took 
was a means of escape for those thousands of courageous women from the 
indignities that almost certainly lay in wait for them at the hands 
of the conquerors, nevertheless the question we must ask ourselves is 
what impelled not only the high-born ladies of the palaces, but even 
the lowly - concubines, servants and slaves - for whom the point of 
honour surely did not assume such magnitude, to endorse the rite so 
wholeheartedly.
What really seems to link the two places, Rajasthan and Bengal,
is the adherence in both these regions, to the Sakt.CL cult, and the
memory of the self-immolation of Sati to honour sT\va her husband,
must certainly have played no mean part in inculcating the rite as
an act of ultimate virtue, and while VaisnayiSin (devotion to Krsna) ,
• • • • •
tended to discourage the practice of sati, the Sakta philosophy
enormously increased it in spite of the fact that the much abused
2Tantras forbade it. Small wonder then that at Visnupur, a strongly
1. Ibid., at k. Katherine Kayo writing years later, agrees with Ram 
Mohan Roy*s view that in the 19th century as in her own time MShe 
(the widow) has seen the fate of other widows. She is about to be­
come a drudge, a slave, starved, tyrannised over, abused - and this 
is the sacred way out - "following the divine law." Committing a 
pious and meritorious act, in spite of all foreign made interdicts, 
she escapes a present hell and may hope for a happier birth in the 
next incarnation." : Mother India, op.cit., at 83.
2. Thompson, op.cit., at 73*
Vaisnava district, there are at best only vague traditions of satl, 
while Calcutta, only a hundred miles away, its suburbs and the townsI#
that cling to its outskirts - these areas have been the scenes of the 
most numerous and most horrifying instances of satl perpetrated any­
where in India. To link up this added incentive that these regions
derived for the enormous popularity of the rite, their adherence to
-
the Sakta cult and the worship of the dread goddess Kali, may not be 
far off the mark, specially if we consider that this is a feature 
that Rajasthan shares with Bengal, that in Rajasthan the great 
Vaishava devotee, Queen Mira Bai was driven from Chitor, the strong- 
hold of the Sakta tradition, to live and die in exile for her
espousal of the god Kpsna.
/
But if the SSkta cult lent lustre to the practice, what further
added numbers to the ranks of widows was the practice among the kulins,
brahmins of the highest status in Bengal, of polygamy on a formidable
scale. Indeed they made a profession of marriage, living off the
2dowries of their brides, few of whom ever lived with their husbands 
or even saw them after marriage, except when they climbed their 
funeral pyres,^ and there were not infrequent instances of the burning 
of scores of women with one quite unimportant man. We are told for 
instance, of a pyre kept alight for three days at the death of a kulin 
brahmin in the Nadia District who had more than one hundred wives.
1. Polygamy in Bengal took the form of hypergamy or "marrying up," a 
custom which forbids a woman of a particular group to marry a man 
of a group lower than her own in social standing. See Sir Herbert 
Risely, The People of India, 2nd ed., W. Crooke ed., (Cal. - Simla 
- Lond., Thacker Spink-W.Thacker, 1915), at l63»
2. Derrett, RLSI, op.cit., at 177- See also Risely, cited above, at 
166-7.
3. Thompson, op.cit., at 37-
The harrowing details of "suttee" often figured in European publications 
under the ambivalence of "newsworthiness", but there is a significant 
instance of an authentic account by an eye-witness of a case of Sept. 2,
1776, written in 1777, testifying to female loyalty to her husband and 
intrepid fortitude, reprinted at V32-4- of The Young Woman's Companion or, 
Female Instructor (new edition, improved) (Oxon., Bartlett and Hinton, N.D.
{? 1826)), manifestly as not merely a piece of information for young English 
gentlewomen's education but also for their edification and admiration (the 
caveat concerning the desirability of India's being enlightened by the Christ­
ian religion does not diminish these effects).
Relays of these widows Were fetched, and they ranged from about the 
age of forty to sixteen years. The first three had lived with the 
dead man; the others had hardly ever seen him.
The woman who resolved to become satl was the object of the 
highest veneration, and having been given a ceremonial bath, and made 
to put on her person all the insignia of SauMJagya (i.e. the married 
state), she was then taken through the town to the cremation ground in 
a grand procession to the accompaniment of music. Having arrived at 
her dread destination, she would often enough distribute her ornaments 
and belongings to friends and relatives to whom they were sacred 
mementoes. This done, she would ascend the pile, and her placing of 
her husband’s head on her lap was the signal for the funeral pyre to 
be lit.^
There is no doubt but that the great majority of such widows
ascended the pile as free agents out of a genuine sense of devotion to
the husbands they revered as gods, and a stern sense of duty, a stoical
contempt of physical pain and the hope of eternal union sustained them
through their terrible ordeal.^ But there were as well, numerous
instances of widows who much against their will, were forced to ascend 
if
the pile, and accordingly the pyres were piled in deep pits specially
Peggs, op.cit., at 8.
2. Ve have numerous documentations of such scenes, but see specially 
Altekar, op.cit., at 133-2*-
3. Ibid., at 138.
*f. Very-often such widows were rescued, sometimes for unscrupulous
purposes, and in some instances even by European onlookers who sub­
sequently married them. See ibid., at 135* The most famous 
instance of one such rescue is the saving from the flanes of a 
young widow by Job Charnock the founder of Calcutta, who then 
settled with her in the city. Whether he subsequently embraced 
Hinduism as is popularly believed, is difficult to gauge, for while 
the temple he is believed to have built and dedicated to the
(continued on next page)
Dr. Jorg Fisch in a broadcast over the West German radio demonstrated 
conclusively that Bentinck's hands were virtually forced by the fact 
that in the years immediately before 1829 the district officers were 
progressively rebellious at having to authorise suttee where, in each 
case, ii proved impossible to dissuade the heroine/victim from her 
determined course. This was the major reason why the reform took 
effect so smoothly.
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in the Deccan and Western India, so as to make escape virtually im- 
possible for them and even for those who might at the last minute 
weaken in their resolve and recoil from the agony of the flames. In 
Gujarat and Northern India, a wooden structure, twelve feet square, 
was usually built for the same purpose, and the widow tied to one of 
its pillars. In Bengal the widow's feet were tied to posts fixed in 
the ground; she was thrice asked whether she really wished to go to 
heaven, and the funeral pyre was then lit.
The demise of satl was the result of the decision of one man
alone, that of Lord William Bentinck, Governor General of Bengal.
Though the reaction against it had already set in among the enlightened
in India - and in this respect the efforts of Raja Rammohun Roy cannot
be minimised - yet to the Governor General goes the credit of firmly
resolving to take the step which was to sound its death-knell, and
this despite the almost general opposition of his subordinate English 
1 *
officers, and even the hesitation of Raja Rammohun Roy, who for all 
his utter aversion of the rite, was of the view that its abolition at 
the time was a premature step. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged 
to his credit that, when Lord Bentinck*s resolve took the shape of the 
Bengal Sati Regulation of 1829 whereby satl and its abetment was 
declared "a crime of culpable homicide punishable with fine, imprison­
ment or both", the Raja was the first to shed his reservations and to 
endorse the measure wholeheartedly.
Surprisingly, the outlawing of sati did not meet with much oppo­
sition. True it created a stir among the orthodox, and its journal, 
(continued from previous page)
goddess Kali, still stands in Bowbazar Street, an active centre of 
worship for the devout, his remains lie buried in the cemetery of 
St. John's Church, along with other European contemporaries who 
never returned home from the colony.
I
In contrast, the abolition of female infanticide, which was the extreme 
of male dominance, was never newsworthy, and stories of the abuse never 
had the ambivalence and •entertainment' value that sati had.
the Chandrika wrote vehemently against it. But there were only eight
hundred signatures to its appeal to the Privy Council to annul the 
1
Regulation. On the other hand, there was a general sense of relief 
among the more liberal, and a memorandum presented to the Governor- 
General in appreciation of his action. Raja Rammohun Roy went to 
England to plead in person before the Privy Council for the confirm­
ation of the measure, and strengthened by this advocacy, the authori­
ties in England finally rejected the appeal of the orthodox in 1832. 
Soon thereafter the jurisdiction of the measure was extended to the
other Presidencies, and thus was put the seal on satl, once and for
la*
all, in British India. It was then merely a matter of time for its 
extinction in the Princely States, though in Rajputana the practice 
lingered long, and cases were reported as late as l86l.
Though sati as a rite is a relic of bygone times, and today of 
academic interest only, this is not to suppose that once prohibited, 
it never reared its ugly head again. In fact time and again, cases of 
sati came to the notice of the law which to do it credit was always 
vigilant and took vigorous action against those responsible for aiding
and abetting it. To this day there are reports - albeit infrequent -
3
of such futile deaths. And while it is to some extent pardonable in
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 1^ 1.
2. Thomas, op.cit., at 296.
3. There was report of one such incident in Gujarat in 19311 and in
the year 1950 two cases of sati were reported from Jodhpur, and in 
1961, a case from Jaipur. See Thomas, op.cit., at 296. In 195&, 
in Tejsingh v. The State, A.I.R. 1938 Raj• 169» a case of sati came 
up before the Rajasthan High Court where the husband having died, 
the widow was instigated to become sati by the three brothers and 
two sons of the deceased. A crowd of about 1,500 people frenziedly 
shouting "Satl m5ta ki jai ho" (Long live mother sati) swelled to 
even larger numbers as the procession wore on, and once the widow
had climbed the pile and the pyre lit "the whole thing was over in
(continued on next page)
those who by a misguided sense of devotion actually become victims to
it, one is constantly amazed at the lofty tone of admiration that some
not inconsequential personages adopt in exalting the nobility of mind
which opts for such a course. Kane feels that
"(i)t is a warped mentality that rebukes modern Indians 
for expressing admiration and reverence for the cool 
and unfaltering courage of Indian women in becoming 
satis or performing the jauhar and cherishing the ideals 
of womanly conduct.
Witness too, the sense of quiet pride with which Altekar describes
the self-immolation of his own sister:
"(F)or his (Altekar*s) own sister Mrs. Indirabai Madhav 
Udgaonkar showed an indescribable fortitude in carrying 
out her long-formed and oft-announced resolution not to 
survive her husband when on 17.1.46 she committed 
herself to flames within twenty-four hours of her 
husband's death...
(continued from previous page)
half an hour and the dead body as well as Mt. Saraswati were burnt" 
(at 170). In reversing the judgment of the Sessions Judge, their 
Lordships of the High Court held that, those persons who joined the 
procession were guilty of abetting the crime and therefore punish­
able under s. 307 of the I.P.C. and the five accused "as much 
guilty if not more under ss. 147, 342 and 306 of the I.P.C. Their 
Lordships were also extremely critical of the Session Judge's 
observation that "the custom of satl is a well-known custom and 
judicial notice can be taken of it" (at 172), for in their view, as 
the law invalidating satl had been in force for over a hundred 
years, "a sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment is the mini­
mum that we can give to these accused" as against the "ridiculously 
lenient sentence" of the six months of rigorous imprisonment 
envisaged by the Sessions Judge.
1. Kane, H.D., Vol. II, Part I, op.cit., at 636.
2. Altekar, op.cit., at 137* Western writers too, tend occasionally 
to display a similar misguided admiration for such acts. Writing 
in I960, David and Vera Mace declare that, "Although custom and 
duty left many widows in the East no alternative but to suffer and 
die ... in many, many cases the widow walked into the fire proudly 
and by deliberate choice. This was her way of showing the depth of 
her affection, her devotion, her fidelity ... and looking at the 
motive, dare we say that these women of the East knew less of true
(continued on next page)
1
and this "despite the presence of a sucking child/1 and while the 
rest of the family were doubtless lost in wondrous admiration, the 
hapless infant was deprived at one stroke as it were, of both parents, 
and of the unique love and care that only parents are capable of 
lavishing on their offspring.
One's only comment is that, it is indeed a perverse mentality 
that condemns the institution as cruel but commends the act as courag­
eous. It is such unqualified praise that, one feels, is the reason 
for the formation of the satl psychology - the feelings of exaltation 
and elevation - to curb which the remedy lies in outright condem­
nation. One might also add that, what may be attractive and admirable 
in myth, could, translated into reality, seem primitive and barbarous, 
and no modern student of law and society could tolerate the enforced 
satis of the early nineteenth century.
However there is evidence enough that pious Hindu women believed
the smytis set out above, as they believed in other means of acquiring
puyya (merit) and relieving themselves of papa (sin), e.g. penance and
pilgrimage. The srnytis could not be invalidated by Moghul emperor or
British Governor-General. All the foregoing belies Kane's ingenious
theory. Satl was not due to the law of inheritance and must be dis-
regarded in our study of the "limited" estate, its rise and fall.____
(continued from previous page)
love than their Western sisters?" See Marriage; East and West, 
op.cit., at 2^ 6-7• The natural and spontaneous answer that one is 
tempted to give to this is; "You may not dare to conjecture, let 
alone say any such thing." But that apart, neither is it appro­
priate to so applaud, and thereby indirectly encourage, acts which 
in the end merely amount to the dreadful and meaningless waste of 
human lives. It is in the context of comments like these that the 
full measure and worth of Mayo's Mother India, op.cit., comes out.. 
The unvarnished truth at its least:palatable is graphically pre­
sented with none of the befuddling of issues or attempts at 
romanticisation.
1. Altekar, op.cit., at 137.
(5) The Movement Towards Reform
By the start of the nineteenth century however, and with the 
dawn of the Bengali renaissance and the movement of social reform 
that it brought in its wake, the first to receive attention was the 
widow. We have already noted the contribution of Raja Rammohun Roy; 
other great names, those of Dwarkanath Tagore, Keshub Chandra Sen and 
Pandit Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar figure prominently among those who 
crusaded just as fiercely and tirelessly to bring about a greater 
social awareness as to the indignities that it was the widow's lot to 
endure.
The Regulation of 1829 had not brought about any appreciable 
change; in itself the abolition of sati was a humanitarian act, but 
the widow herself was helpless against the forces set in motion 
against her. Traditionally brought up and inculcated with the ideal 
of pativrata, not to speak of her own unwillingness as a result of 
years of indoctrination against it, remarriage would have brought 
about social disgrace the enormity of which neither the widow nor her 
family could have endured. Moreover as each caste group with - until 
recently - the powerful sanction of excommunication at its command, 
insisted on the rigid observance of its cultural pattern, enforced 
widowhood was the norm from which the high-caste Hindu woman could 
hardly deviate. Consequently among the lower classes too, in their 
endeavour to reach the cultural plane of the higher castes, remarriage 
which had hitherto been freely practised, gradually lost its appeal, 
and thus family and caste, both combined together and operated as 
powerful reactionary forces against legislation in favour of widows.
1. Kapadia, op.cit., at 168.
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The spiritual solace that sati had afforded had not been replaced by 
corresponding legislation whereby the widow could be set free from the 
desolation of her existence, and Margaret Cormack tells us that she 
heard an Indian woman wail, "And they (the British) took that privi­
lege (sati) from us too," a sentiment which has meaning when under­
stood in the context of the theory of reincarnation and that of the
1
essential oneness of husband and wife.
Meanwhile despite opposition, the reformers were at work, and in 
the same year that sati was abolished, the pioneering efforts of 
Vidyasagar bore fruit. Saddened at the spectacle of the frustrating 
humiliations of the lives of widows in general, he first turned his 
attention to child widows and started a determined campaign towards an 
older age for the marriage of girls, and as early as 1873 the Govern­
ment had approved of a Bill fixing the minimum age of marriage. But 
this was met with strong opposition on the plausible argument that, as 
consummation of marriage took place only after the girl had reached 
puberty, the mere formalities of a ceremony of marriage earlier could 
not be objected to. The Government committed to a policy of non­
intervention in the personal laws were reluctant to interfere immedi­
ately, and though individual states such as Baroda, Mysore and Indore 
were the first to introduce legal measures against child marriages, 
the Child Marriage Restraint Act for the whole of India, popularly
known as the Sarada Act after Rai Bahadur Harbilas Sarada, its sponsor,
2
was not passed till 1929* The Act stipulated the minimum age of 
marriage as fifteen for girls and eighteen for boys, though as census
1. The Hindu Woman, (N.Y., Columbia Univ., 1953), at 173*
2. P. SenGupta, The Story of Women of India, (Kew Delhi, Indian Book 
Co., 197*0, at 155-
figures would bear out, -the practice of infant marriages still con­
tinued in violation of the statute.
In the meantime the reformers continued to press that a natural 
consequence of the abolition of sati was the recognition of the right 
of the widow to remarry. But in this too the British were reluctant 
to take the initiative. The suffering of the living was less spec­
tacular than the agony of the burning widow, and the then rulers of 
India were inclined to treat the question of widow-remarriage as a 
purely social matter to be decided by the Hindus themselves.
Nevertheless undaunted by this lack of encouragement and despite 
the rigidly hostile orthodoxy of a section of the population, the 
social reformers continued their efforts. Prominent among them were 
Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Keshub Chandra Sen and Mahapsi Karve. Of 
these, by far the most fearless and tireless in his efforts was 
Vidyasagar. In 1855, he published his major work, Remarriage of Hindu 
Widows, in which he wrote that, "a total disregard of the sastras and 
a careful observance of mere usages and external forms is the source
of the irresponsible stream of vice which overflows the country," and
2vehemently pleaded for legislation in favour of widow remarriage.
The pandits in their turn condemned the work and its author and main­
tained that the alleged permission for widow-remarriage - to which 
incidentally Vidyasagar had drawn attention - was meant for the bygone 
golden age, and not for the degenerate Kali Yuga of the present day 
with its evil men and impious women! But Vidyasagar was not to be 
intimidated and in 1855 he published his famous tract on widow re-
1. Thomas, op.cit., at 297-
2. B. Ghose, Iswar Chandra Vidyasagara, (New Delhi, Ministry of Infor­
mation and Broadcasting, 1965), at 6*f.
marriage based on the interpretation of a popular sloka from the 
Parasara Samhita :■ —■ i ■ -- *
M(0)n receiving no tidings of a husband, on his 
demise, on his turning an ascetic, on his being 
found impotent, or on his degradation - under any of 
these calamities it is canonical for women to take 
another husband.1
In Vidyasagar's interpretation of the ^loka, the widow had three 
choices, those of sati, brahmacharya and remarriage. But as the prac­
tice of sati was illegal under the existing laws, the ideal of 
brahmacharya commendable, but the social condition of Kali Yuga made
it impossible for a single woman to lead a chaste life, the only
2alternative open to her was remarriage.
On October *t, 1885! Vidyasagar sent a petition to the Government 
of India signed by nine hundred and eighty-seven people requesting 
legislation in favour of widow remarriage. The petitioners were 
"pious and orthodox" Hindus, aware that their request offended the 
prejudice of a large section of people whose orthodox obstinacy was 
opposed to any deviation from the established practice. Such hostility 
notwithstanding, they suggested that denying widows the right to re­
marry was detrimental to Hindu interests and contrary to the proper 
interpretation of the sastra.^  When at last the bill proposing such 
remarriage was presented to the Legislature, 40 petitions signed by
60.000 against the proposed legislation as against only 25 bearing
6.000 signatures in its favour were submitted to Parliament, but des­
pite this overwhelming opposition, the measure was adopted and passed
If
on July 25, 1856, as the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act.
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at 27.
Thomas, op.cit., at 298.
The Act itself merely legalised the marriage of Hindu widows, and
legitimised the issue of such union. But such advantages were more or
less nullified by the provision in s. 2 that
"(A)11 rights and interests which any widow may have 
in her deceased husband's property by way of mainten­
ance or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal 
successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary 
disposition conferring upon her, without express 
permission to remarry, only a limited interest ... 
shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if 
she had then died,...."
S. 7 further enjoined that if the widow was a minor whose marriage had
not been consummated, she could not remarry without the consent of the
father or grandfather, mother, elder brother or next male kin. On the 
other hand, if she was of full age or her marriage had been consum­
mated, her own consent was considered sufficient.
Clauses such as these severely curtailed the success of the 
legislation and the reform that it was meant to bring about. Besides, 
legal disabilities apart, as virtually no, or at best, minimal steps 
had been taken to change the traditional social structure, the statute 
was ahead of its time. Widows, either because of the deeply embedded 
ideal of pativrata, or more frequently, one would imagine, through 
social stricture - the fear of being ostracised by society and caste 
- were timid and hesitant, and till well into the twentieth century, 
the fate of the widow remained sad and tragic. History is not without 
its trenchant ironies, and it is a telling measure that the very 
steps which had been designed to protect widows and to safeguard them 
from exploitation led to practices that defeated their purpose.
Sporadic and occasional remarriages did undoubtedly take place 
with the influence and patronage of the reformers. Vidyasagar pro­
moted a few such marriages, most significant among them the marriage
of his own son to a widow, and inspired by the example and precept of
that noble son of Bengal, the Brahmo Samaj carried on the good work
there. The Arya Samaj and the Pranfriana Samaj encouraged widows to re­
marry in Northern India, while in the Maharashtra area, Maharsi Karve, 
who had lost his first wife in 1891, set the example to others by 
marrying again in 1893, a "virgin widow" when she was twenty-eight and 
he thirty-five years of age. A year later he established the Widow 
Marriage Association to carry on a public campaign in support of widow 
remarriage and to render such assistance as was necessary to those who
in defiance of convention did seek remarriage. Other institutions
also set up by the Maharsi were the Hindu Widows' Home and the Deccan
Education Society for the rehabilitation of destitute widows. Thus
the forces of change had been set in motion, and by 1900 the Eeport of
the Arya Samaj in particular indicates as having made considerable
1
progress in that direction.
2But the movement did not gain momentum or widespread acceptance. 
Thirty years after the enactment of the statute, only sixty re­
marriages were reported from all over India. The enlightened minority
1. D. Pandey, The Arya Samaj and Indian Nationalism, (New Delhi, S. 
Chand, 1972), at 93*
2. In the same year that the Arya Sa maj reported progress, that great 
expounder of Hinduism, Swami Vivekananda was on his tour of 
America, and at a lecture entitled "The People of India," 
delivered in Oaklands on March 19, 1900, lent credence to the 
orthodox view by explaining that child widows and women whose 
betrothed had died as children, might be pitied if marriage was 
the only real object in life, but according to the Hindu way of 
thinking, marriage is rather a duty than a privilege, and the 
denial of the right of child widows to remarry "no particular 
hardship." See The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. VIII, 
(Cal., Advaita Ashrama, 1971), at 2^ 3* Small wonder then that the 
impetus for reform met with such little success!
apart, widow remarriage continued to be regarded with abhorrence and 
normally gave rise to public incidents of outcasting, repression and 
direct and indirect social sanctions and even violence. Family mem­
bers would watch their widowed mothers, sisters and daughters suffer 
physically and mentally, but fear of caste rules, excommunication and 
harassment from the community forced them to silent acquiescence to 
traditional norms. Though the usages associated with widowhood were 
to some extent modified in different provinces and castes, or by the 
love and compassion of the family, nevertheless they were generally
observed, and the women themselves submitted in what was believed by
1
them to be their destiny. In brief, the Ramaya$a*s declaration
2that the greatest danger that could overcome a woman was widowhood, 
was as true over the lapse of centuries as in the stages when it was 
initially propounded.
The impotency of the Act of 1856 was not lost on those determined
to bring about a change in social attitudes, and in 188^ Behramji M.
Malabari, a Zorastrian journalist published his Notes on Infant
Marriage and Enforced Widowhood, but unlike the great pioneer of the
movement, his arguments were baaed on humanitarianism and justice
rather than on the interpretation of the smrtis.^  Sensing only too
well the overpowering influence of caste in persecuting offenders and
thereby rendering progressive legislation inadequate, Malabari wrote
cogently and poignantly:
"(S)uch are the results virtually of the abolition of 
sati by the British Government (that) had MounO»tuart
1. Felton, op.cit., at 26.
2. Meyer, Vol. II, op.cit., at kl2.
3. Kapadia, op.cit., at 139*
Elphinstone and Lord William Bentinck anticipated 
them they would have paused before enforcing the law 
(abolishing sati) without legitimate corollary, for 
whereas sati was one single act of martyrdom or heroism, 
as the victim conceived it, and an act of religious 
merit popularly believed, the life that caste imposes 
on a widow is a perpetual agony, a burning to death by 
glowing fire without any chastening or elevating effect 
on the sufferer, or any moral advantage to the community 
at large.1'1
The Note also pointed out several cases of widows who had gone
astray because of refusal on their male relatives* parts to consent
to their remarriage, of infanticide and of excommunication of widows 
2who had remarried. Under such circumstances, it was imperative, 
Malabari felt, for the Government to ensure that no Hindu girl be con­
demned to life-long widowhood against her will, that all of them had 
the right to complain to the authorities of social ill-usage, and 
priests prevented from excommunicating either the parties contracting 
a second marriage or their relatives.^
But no more encouragement was forthcoming from the Government. 
The Uprising of 1836 had effectively halted any movement for further 
reform of the personal laws, and the Government*s rejoinder reflects 
th^ s reluctance:
”... When caste or custom lays down a rule which deals 
with such matters as are usually left to the option of 
the citizens .-.. State interference is not considered 
either desirable or expedient ... hence this social 
reform should be left to the improving influence of 
time and to the gradual operation of the mental and 
moral development of the people by the spread of edu­
cation. The Government of India do not desire to 
interfere ....until sufficient proof is forthcoming ... 
that such legislation has been asked for by a section 
important in influence or in number of the Hindu 
community itself.”
1. Ibid., at l4l.
2. Thomas, op.cit., at 300. 3» Ibid.
Kapadia, op.cit. , at 1^ 2.
In tradition-bound India laws may be enacted, but if the 
customs against which they are directed sire deeply entrenched, such 
legislation is apt to be quietly ignored and the practice continued.
So it was with the HWRA. Deep-rooted social customs and the caste 
system, staunch orthodox reaction, and a lack of proper reformist 
zeal among the Hindus themselves, limited the scope of widow re­
marriage. In most cases it was only the lust for monetary gain which 
had in the first place prompted the so-called liberals to marry 
widows, and as a result primarily of these fatal weaknesses, the 
widow remarriage movement practically died out, at least in Bengal, 
long before the death, in 1891, of the illustrious reformer who first 
set it on foot.
In the Census of l88l, the number of Hindu widows stood at the
1
formidable figure of 2,100,000 and though the survey of 1901 indi­
cated a shift among the upper classes and particularly in the big
2
cities in favour, at least of the remarriage of virgin widows, this 
was a short-lived phenomenon, and as late as 1926 we find Mahatma 
Gandhi railing against the practice of child marriages and the accom­
panying corollary of child widows. Vehemently critical, he thundered 
if "thundered’1 it can be called in the context of that deceptively 
gentle man:
”(B)ut in the name of religion we force widowhood 
upon our girl widows who could not understand the 
import of the marriage ceremony. To force widowhood 
upon little girls is a brutal crime^ for which we
1. Thomas, op.cit., at 300.
2. Census of India, 1901, Vol. I, Part I, at b,
3. About the same time that the•Mahatma was making known his disgust 
and revulsion against such practices, the forces of regression were 
just as fiercely at work, and this is perhaps best exemplified by
(continued on next page)
Hindus are paying dearly.... And does not Hindu 
widowhood stink in one's nostrils when one thinks 
of old and deceased men of over fifty taking or 
rather purchasing, girl wives, sometimes one on 
top of the other? So long as we have thousands of 
widows in our midst, we are sitting on a mine which 
may explode at any moment."1
In any event it must be kept in mind that the agitation in favour
of widow remarriage was never aimed at creating general adoption by
Hindus of that practice. For the majority of the participants its
real purpose was to gain social acceptance, or at least tolerance,
for an individual deviation of an extreme and socially significant
kind from the normal pattern of behaviour, and the efforts of the most
zealous crusaders to give the Hindu widow the right to remarry, were
viewed more as releasing her from an extremely humiliating and
depressing situation rather than the granting of an ordinary human
2right to live a happy married life.
(continued from previous page)
the opinion of one Sri Ramanana Saraswati Swamiah. A disciple of 
His Holiness Sri Jagadguru Sri Sankaracharya of Sringeri, he takes 
up the cudgels against deviation from accepted practices: "Life­
long widowhood is only a mode of serious punishment inflicted on 
the widow for some grievous sin of hers committed in a previous 
life. When a man is by a judge sentenced to a long term of 
imprisonment, the lookers-on many of them feel sorry for the man, 
but they cannot prevent him from being handcuffed and taken to the 
jail. If they do attempt any such prevention, they would be them­
selves punished for the attempt. The reformers' attempt to relieve 
widows by advocating remarriage is just the same."(sic). See The 
Hindu Ideal, 2nd ed., (Mad., Ganesh, 1959)* at 218.
1. Young India, Aug. 5» 1926, quoted at V. Mazumdar, "The Social 
-Reform Movement in India-From Ranade to Nehru," B.R.Nanda, ed,.
Indian Women from Purdah to Modernity, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1976),
41-66, at 57*
2. W.J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, (N.Y.-London, 
Collier-Macmillan, 1968), at 264. That the Hindu mind at its most 
enlightened could not entirely free itself from the traditional 
connotations associated with widowhood, is evident even in Gandhi's 
attitude. He was not an advocate of widow remarriage "on a whole­
sale scale" (Young Idea, Sept. 2, 1926), for the word "widow" in 
Hinduism "has a sacred odour." (Ibid.) "My Crusade," he declared
(continued on next page)
On the other hand it cannot be gainsaid that there is probably 
no aspect of womanhood that has received greater- sympathy than widow­
hood in India, and the majority of Indian reformers, men and women - 
for diverse motivation - have laboured tirelessly on their behalf.
The emphasis has sometimes been on allowing their remarriage and for 
social acceptance of the practice, and sometimes on training them for 
positions so as to secure for them economic independence. It also has 
to be admitted that with the progressively growing education among 
women, the notion of widow remarriage is continually gaining foothold, 
and it may safely be assumed that in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century,the custom has become relatively common in certain small 
sections of the society. The measure of change in the social position 
of widows in Maharashtra for instance, may be gauged from the fact 
that during Mahay§i Karve's hundredth birth anniversary celebrations
in 1958, the Widow Marriage Association established by him in 189^ ,
1
wound up its activities as they were no longer needed. Recent Census
2figures would bear this out as well. In 1951 there were 22,000,000 
widows, and the figure went up to 23,000,000 in 1961,^ but the 1971 
figures, estimated from a sample data indicates a sharp decline 
with 231,^6 widows only. Of these, the figures of the last two 
decades sire an index to the declining incidence of child widows, and
consequently a higher age at widowhood. Thus the 1961 figures show
(continued from previous page)
"is not against real widowhood. It is against atrocious caricature 
See B.R. Dubey, "Gandhi's Views on Status of Woman of India," 
S.C.Biswas, ed., Gandhi: Theory and Practice, (Simla, I.I.A.S, 
1969), 115-9 at 118-9.
1. T.N. Madan, "The Hindu Woman at Home," Indian Women from..., op. 
cit., 67-86, at 79-80.
2. Gupta, op.cit., at 62.
3. Census of India, 1961, at 21.
b. Census of India, 1971, at 118.
that there were 29,000 Widows in the age group ten to fourteen,
90,000 in the age group fifteen to nineteen, 248,000 in the age group 
twenty-five to twenty-nine, the highest figures rising to almost 
4,000,000 in the sixty to sixty-four age group. This upward spiral­
ling is even more marked in the 1971 figures with only 200 widows in 
the ten to fourteen age group, 752 in the fifteen to nineteen age 
group, 2,000 in the twenty to twenty-four age group, 4,000 in the
twenty-five to twenty-nine age group, 7,000 in the thirty to thirty-
2
four age group, and so on. Based as these figures are on only a 1% 
sample date, their value lies in that they nevertheless indicate the 
trend, and what is particularly significant is that in both the 
Census tables, the number of widows in the age group nine and below, 
is nil.
(6) The Persistence of Traditional Attitudes in Women
However, that by and large traditional attitudes still persist, 
that the ideal of pativrata is as much alive today as when it was 
popularised, is indicated by the fact that for the average Hindu wife, 
her husband is for her, the pati-dev - an expression still current in 
India - her god on earth whom she must worship. Young or old, the 
Hindu wife's daily prayer, i.e. that she may die before her husband, 
is a peculiar death wish, and is perhaps an expression of a general 
phenomenon: the acceptance by the oppressed, of roles carved out for
them by their oppressors; and despite the spread of education and the 
emergence of India as a rapidly developing nation, what never ceases 
to amaze is that the most emancipated, the most enlightened, the most
1. Census of India, 1961, at 21.
2. Census of India, 1971, at 118.
accomplished Hindu woman is at heart the traditional Hindu wife who
has raised her husband to the pedestal of god-head.
The most dramatic example that one can think of is that of the
late Iravati Karve, distinguished anthropologist and eminent author.
Brought up in an atmosphere surcharged with ideas of social reform and
having received advanced education in India and Germany, she had
travelled widely and had earned international repute as a scholar. A
fierce champion of women*s rights she also occupied the Chair for
Anthropology at Poona University, and when at the age of fifty she
1
wrote her famous treatise Kinship Organisation in India, she dedi­
cated it to her husband, a son of Maha^§i Karve in the following 
terms:
**(T)o my husband; while dedicating to you this book 
which would never have been either thought out or 
written but for you, let me express my feelings in 
the traditional Hindu manner: I place my head on
your feet and ask for your blessing."^
3
Ved Mehta, in his work Portrait of India, brings out the same
god-like reverence that the renowned vocalist, M.S. Subbalaxmi had for
her husband. In a meeting with her in Madras, she would not be drawn
into speaking about herself and it was obvious that her husband was
master of the house in the traditional Hindu manner. And he spoke to
Mehta about her devotion to him:
"(I)n 195^ when Subbalaxmi was awarded the title of 
Padma Bhushan at a public gathering, she became tear­
ful and said 'How am I to deserve all this?' Then she 
somehow got the courage to speak up, and she said, 'My 
husband has been advising me throughout my career. He 
is my guru, so all the honour must go to him.' That
1. I. Karve, Kinship Organisation in India, (Poona, Deccan College, 
195*0 -
2. Ibid., Dedication.
3. Ved Mehta, Portrait of India, (Lond., Weidenfeld and Nicholson,1971).
1
is Subbalaxmi. She is a good Hindu wife.”
Literature, it has been aptly observed, mirrors life, and no­
where perhaps is the reality more convincingly reflected than in 
Indo-Anglian writing where the deification of the husband is a con­
stantly reiterated theme. Witness for instance the scene in He Who 
2Rides a Tiger. Slumped on the bare mud floor, her eyes swollen and 
her face marked with tears, the woman waits for the return of her hus­
band, the picture of misery itself. But in the early hours of the 
mor:ing as her drunken husband reels in
"...life flooded back into her eyes at sight of him 
...She crept over the floor and laid her face on his 
feet and wept."-^
And it is not only in the settled housewife of mature age and 
status or the simple village-bred girl that one perceives this sub­
missiveness. In the full flush of youth, the liberated city-bred girl 
is essentially no different. In Sasthi Brata's autobiography, where 
the author shocked the staid middle-class Bengali community to which 
he belongs by a frankness and directness of approach equalled perhaps 
by no other contemporary Indian writer of the 70s and 80s, Apu, the 
author's girl friend is young, educated and very modern, and bold 
enough to give herself to him just before her arranged marriage to 
another man. But even this girl Apu writes in a letter to her lover:
"(F)or a woman to live happily with a man, she need not 
stand in awe of him. But the mein must inspire her to 
look up to him as a superior when the occasion demands. 
Otherwise she is haunted by the sense of insecurity, 
for she is always subject to the limitations of being 
a woman.
1. Ibid., at 39-
2. B. Bhattacharya, He Who Rides a Tiger, (Bom., Jaico, 1955).
3. Ibid., at 188.
Sasthi Brata, My God Died Young, (Lond., Hutchinson, 1972), at 169.
Even more remarkably akin to an act of worship is the scene in
1
The Serpent and the Rope. Savitn, educated at Cambridge, is western­
ised and forward in her behaviour. She likes to smoke and dance, but 
at the decisive moment, she is like any other Indian woman, and Kama, 
the hero, recounts how she knelt before him and after removing his 
shoes and stockings, proceeded to the final gesture of self-abnegation 
by waving the flame of camphor before his face "once, twice, three 
times in arathi” (the culminating point of worship of the deity), 
after which
"(S)he touched my feet with the water, and made 
aspersions of it over her head. Kneeling again 
and placing her head on my feet, she stayed there 
long, very long . ...fl
These instances indicate clearly enough that not too far beneath 
the surface, the time-honoured notions of pativrata still persist; and 
with the husband securely perched on his pedestal of near divinity, 
small wonder then that there is so much ambivalence in the Hindu atti­
tude towards widow remarriage, no less regrettably in the mind of the 
Hindu female - however educated and "modern” - as of the male.
In an effort to assess the actual attitude towards widow re­
marriage, researchers have from time to time conducted interviews with 
groups of women and in most cases they report the response as either 
negative, or at best dubious. In one report, of the fifty-three 
widows of the middle class who were questioned as to whether they were 
desirous of remarriage, not one of them gave an affirmative answer, 
and while forty-five widows gave a definitive "no", eight would not
1. Raja Rao, The Serpent and the Rope, (New Delhi, Orient, i960).
2. Ibid., at 213.
state their views.
This was also the finding of Khanna and Varghese who report that
in most cases they were told with much pride that, "A Hindu woman
2
marries only once. It is a man who needs to marry repeatedly.” In 
some cases there was conditional acceptance of remarriage in favour 
of those widows only who were young and childless.^
Where however there is a positive response, the reasons are inde­
pendent of any consideration for the personal happiness of the 
widowed woman. In an investigation conducted by M.S. Gore among the 
Aggarwal families of Northern India, "the reasons why respondents
favoured remarriage were varied and not necessarily indicative of any
if
change of attitudes to women's status." It was not a decision that
the widow could make for her own reasons; rather her youth, economic
dependency and the moral danger that she might otherwise be exposed to
were the circumstances which figured primarily in making widow re-
5
marriage an acceptable proposition to them.
However, nowhere does the conflict between the old and the more 
progressive attitudes reveal itself with greater clarity than in the
1. C._ ^ te, Changing Status of Woman, (Bom., Allied Publishers, 1969)
2. G. Khanna and M. Varghese, Indian Women Today, (New Delhi, Vikas, 
1978)* at 162-3. Rama Mehta met with the same response in a 
survey she carried out among divorced Hindu women. In spite of 
the breakdown of their marriages, the divorcees she interviewed 
were not prepared to countenance a second marriage and dismissed 
the idea as an immoral, unethical proposition. See Divorced 
Hindu Women, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1975)* at 21-2; and we may safely 
assume that in the circumstance of widowhood, the response of 
these women would not have been dissimilar.
3. Khanna and Varghese, cited above, at I63.
4. M.S. Gore, Urbanization and Family Change, (Bom., Popular Prakashan, 
1968), at 2lSI '
3. Ibid.
1
study of Rama Mehta. Of the fifty western-educated women she inter­
viewed, all were in favour of widow remarriage And against the 
imposition of orthodox restrictions on them. But while on the one 
hand, they were of the view that the widow has every right to decide 
wherein her greatest fulfilment lies, on the otheij they believed equally
in the sanctity of marriage and admired widows who adhered to the
2traditional ideas of devotion to the husband. These women were also
aware that as widow remarriage was still not fully accepted, widows
who did remarry, took a great risk in defying the rules of family and
caste specially as these institutions still provided security for
3
those who were not economically independent, and in view of this "It
was wrong to encourage a woman to give up known forms of security
If
without providing her with an alternative."
In other traditional societies where change and progress are the 
order of the day, a corresponding ambivalence is equally perceptible.J 
China for instance is an interesting example. The basic Confucian 
philosophy of ancient China underscored the superiority of man over 
woman. Under the principle of the three dependencies (a remarkable 
echo of Manu), a woman could never act autonomously. The husband's
1. The Western Educated Hindu Woman, (Lond., Asia Publishing House, 
1970).
2. Ibid., at 125-6.
5. Ibid., at 125.
Ibid., at 126. On the other hand in the survey carried out by 
Khanna and Varghese, op.cit., a more favourable trend is noticeable 
among educated women desirous of remarriage. Fear of loneliness 
and the need for companionship apart, the more forceful argument in 
favour of it was that, "If a man can remarry and forget the past, 
why should a woman sacrifice the rest of her life for a mere 
memory?" - a view consistent with progress, but still limited, one 
fears, to a small, a very small minority, as overwhelming evidence 
is to the contrary.
5, The two examples, those of China and Japan provide interesting
parallels, where despite the political and technocratic revolutions 
in these countries, traditional behavioural patterns towards women 
persist.
authority replaced that of the father, and the son’s that of the hus- 
-1
band. Of the three unfilial acts the greatest was the failure to
produce sons. Thus girls from the day of birth were subjected to
lifelong discrimination so well described by a popular verse from The
Book of Odes written some three thousand years ago:
"(W)hen a son is born he is laid down in couches, 
and is given a piece of jade to play with. When a 
daughter is born, she is laid on the floor, and is
given a piece of tile to play with."^
Beginning with the ritual of foot binding by which women were
grotesquely crippled from early childhood, the so-called "lotus hooks"
were in reality a device by means of which the Chinese patriarchs made
3
certain that their girls and women would never "run around".
However the most difficult and degrading phase for woman was 
after marriage. The character fu "woman", is a combination of nu, 
"female" and chu, "broom", and the expressions chih chi chou, i.e. "to 
hold a broom",^ and shih chin chieh meaning "to stand by with towels 
and combs", equally suggest the humble status of the woman vis-a-vis 
her husband. A wife had no identity separate from that of her husband.
1. T.T. Ch'u, Law and Society in Traditional China, (Paris, Mouton, 
1965), at 102-3.
2. A.K. Wong, "Women in China: Past and Present", C. J.Matthias son, 
ed. Many Sisters, (N.Y.-Lond., The Free Press - Collier Macmillan,
im), 229-54, at 231.
3. A. Dworkin, Woman Hating, (N.Y., E.P.Dutton, 197*0* at 103* a view 
confirmed by Wong, op.cit., at 232-3: "Women with feet bound had 
to assume a gingerly gait (because of the pain of movement) which 
was said to be graceful, and the feet themselves were said to have 
great sexual appeal for men. However, there was no doubt that the 
bound feet had come to symbolise the subordination of the female 
sex, for the effect of the practice was to confine women ... to 
their own quarters. They could seldom venture outside except by 
being carried on sedan chairs. Thus the saying that ' the girl 
does not go beyond her boudoir' equates staying at home with 
feminine virtue."
4. Ch'u, op.cit., at 103»
She could own no property, and any activity over and above routine
1
household matters had to meet with his approval.
Remarriage for widows was as a rule frowned upon, though in some
2areas of China it was not an uncommon occurrence, and in such cases
the brother or cousin of the deceased married the widow.^ Generally
however, such remarriages were confined to the poor mainly because
the widows or their families would settle for a much lower bride 
4price.
The cult of chastity demanded not only that a woman should be a 
virgin when she married,^ or that she remain faithful to her husband, 
but also that she should remain chaste even after his death,and in fact9 * A
there were not infrequent instances of women - believing that they had
been defiled - committing suicide by dismembering themselves, while
still others engaged in the practice of marrying the spirits of their
deceased betrothed.^ Practices such as these finally led to a feeling
of revulsion and caused Confucianism to be denounced by the Chinese
thinkers of the new culture movement of 1917 as a "man-eating 
7
religion."
1. Ibid., at 104. The same author details at 105-10, the inequal­
ities in penalties for the husband and wife for similar offences, 
to demonstrate the latter's degraded status.
2. See J. Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, (N.Y., Signet, 1965)» 
at 255-41.
5. Ch'u, op.cit., at 97.
4. Wong, op.cit., at 236.
5. On the second day of the traditional wedding, a female attendant 
would present to the bridegroom's parents a piece of white silk 
stained with blood as proof of the bride's virginity, while on the 
third day the bridegroom's family would send roast pigs to the 
bride's family in token appreciation of the bride's virginity.
See Wong, op.cit., at 255* f.n. 16.
6. A somewhat similar practice, that of "ghost-marriages", i.e. of marrying 
the girl to the name of a dead relative may be quoted from Africa, See 
J.G.Gould and W.Kolb, ed., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, (Lond., 
UNESCO, 1964), at 388.
The role and status of traditional Chinese women changed under 
the impact of industrialisation and modernisation. The Marriage Law 
passed in 1950 as the first major law of the Communist regime and one 
of the fundamental laws of the People's Republic was the culmination 
of a series of earlier efforts made both by the social reformers and 
the Communist Party to bring about the socialist ideal of sex 
equality. The traditional systems of polygamy, concubinage, interfer­
ence with the remarriage of widows and the payment of bride price were
1
outlawed and the freedom of divorce guaranteed.
However tradition dies hard, and though in its external propa­
ganda, the People's Republic claims that it has already achieved the 
ideal of equality between men and women, reports of China observers 
tell us another story. In the early fifties, reports indicated that 
men continued to look down on women and more recent investigations
reveal a widespread apathy towards women's welfare, and the persistence
2of the old notions of women as ignorant and useless. Until 1952 
there were official reports of female infanticide and of the selling 
and purchasing of daughters and wives, while till right into the 
sixties the practice of arranged marriages and betrothal gifts con­
tinued, and as late as the seventies there were still parents unwillirg 
to send their daughters to school.^
Evidence also suggests that the bid for equality does not seem to 
have made a general appeal to women themselves, and the desire for
1. Wong, ibid., at 242.
2. K.P. Gupta, "Emancipation and Enslavement - The Confucian and Com­
munist Variations," U.Phadnis and I.Malani, ed., Women of the 
World(New Delhi, Vikas, 1978), 87-122, at 119-20.
3. Ibid., at 118-9.
family life and to run the household still take priority over the sac­
rificing of traditional values in an effort to leconstruct the nation.
In 1972 many educated city girls expressed a desire to get married 
1
early, while older women still think it "indecent and immoral and
shocking that young people talk freely with each other," and they
scold their daughters and daughters-in-law and granddaughters for not
2
observing decent behaviour. Significantly, with the Cultural Revo­
lution's more radical approach towards women's roles, the chief 
editor of the journal of the Women's Association, Women of China, came 
under public attack for emphasising that the nurture of children and 
the care of the family were women's "natural duties", and for reaction­
ary and feudal concepts such as respecting men but denigrating women 
and demanding obedience at the three levels, i.e. to father, husband 
and son.^
For those who are truly emancipated, their break with the past 
and with traditional values is complete. But these, a tiny minority, 
are a symbolic testimonial to the fact that for most women in modern
if
China, real change has been far less substantial.
In Japan too, the patriarchal traditions with only minor 
challenges survived till well into the twentieth century, and were 
reaffirmed by legal code and custom until the end of World War II.
The feudal social order not only drew a line of distinction bet­
ween men and women, but also laid down strict rules of female behaviour*
1. Ibid., at 119*
2. Myrdal, op.cit., at 252.
3* K.A.Johnson, "Women in China", L.A.Chipp and J.J.Green, ed., Asian Women 
in Transition., (University Park - Lond., The Pennsylvania State 
Univ. Press, 1980), 62-103« at 93•
4. Ibid., at 100.
Women showed deference to men of their own as well as of higher
classes by the use of polite language and honorific forms of address,
by bowing more deeply than they and by walking behind their husbands.
Ideally a new bride coming into the house was expected to acknowledge
1
her status of inferiority in a number of ritualised ways: getting
up first in the morning, going to bed last at night, taking her bath 
only after all other members of the family had taken theirs, eating 
after other family members and taking the least choice servings of 
food.2
Men were deemed to be the natural leaders of society because of 
certain attributes like strength, independence of mind, imperturba­
bility and stoicism. Women in contrast were believed to be weak euid 
therefore dependent,^ hence the husband's authority, not only in 
custom but in legal codes, over the wife. Upon marriage, a woman 
could act in legal matters only with the approval of her husband. In 
provisions relating to marriage, divorce, property rights and other
matters coming under family law, the Civil Code consistently favoured 
if
the husband, and the ideal of ’’good wives and wise mothers" became a 
justification for a great deal of discrimination against women in
1. As in India and China, so too in Japan, the ethical standard set 
by the great Confucianist scholar Kaibara Ekken, demanded of every 
woman the "three obediences",i.e. obedience to her father in child­
hood, to her husband in married life and to her sons in old age.
See P.A. Narasimha Murthy, "From Hakoiri Musume to a Free Individual 
- The Changing Position of Women in Japan," Women of the World, 
op.cit., 123-49, at 124.
2. J.S. Pharr, "The Japanese Woman: Evolving Views of Life and Role," 
Asian Women in Transition, op.cit., 36-59, 39-
3. This distinction was reflected in the popular saying: Otoko wa 
matsu, onna wa fuji, i.e. "Man is pine, woman is wisteria." See 
Marasimha MurFhy, op.cit., at 124.
4. Pharr, op.cit., at 40.
general.
However World War II and the surrender of Japan in 19^51 had 
drastic repercussions and set off a series of changes that have 
affected women at almost every level of Japanese life. The Consti­
tution of 19^7 explicitly forbade discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Through reform of the Civil Code, the Occupation forces attacked the 
basis of women's inferior status in the family by guaranteeing women
free choice of a spouse, equal recourse to divorce, equal property
2rights and inevitably as a consequence, a greater degree of oppor­
tunity for self-expression and fulfilment in areas other than the 
home. Japanese women are today found in numbers in fields previously 
considered beyond their intellectual attainments, and shoulder to 
shoulder with men the female influence is felt in areas such as edu­
cation, administration, lav, medicine, literature, public services, 
science, construction, engineering and the like.
However change-oriented the Japanese t>e- 3 they nevei>
thq^.ess retain a steadfast attachment to certain traditional values 
in the midst of change, and most Japanese men and women, for a very 
long time to come, will continue to feel that home-making and child­
care are primarily women's responsibilities."^  This apart, social 
values, including those bearing on woman's role and place generally, 
are in great flux today, and a great many women find themselves vacil­
lating between views, unsure of what they want, undecided as to 
whether they are willing to undergo the great personal and psycho­
logical risks that people must face when they try to cove in new
1. Narasiraha'Murthy, op.cit., at 128.
2. Pharr, op.cit., at 4l.
3. Ibid., at 36.
directions.
However, that traditional attitudes in the;end still triumph in
modern Japan is indicated by an interview carried out among young
office girls which revealed that even among those pursuing full-time
promising careers, the goal is to become housewives and mothers to
2the exclusion of most other pursuits. "I would rather stay at home 
and keep a perfect house. I'd prefer that life - waiting for my hus­
band to come home,"^ the interviewer was told, and with this end in 
mind, !II am improving myself so that I can find an ideal husband,” 
for "Men are superior to women in every field. Women have a narrower 
mind, a more limited view."^ Opinion Polls too confirm that Japanese 
women are happy enough to be designated as the "gentle sex", and 
readily accept the disadvantages that the definition connotes. That 
attitudes have not changed intrinsically, that Japan today is as much 
a male oriented society as in the past, is perhaps best summed up by 
the observation that in life a Japanese needs to know only three words 
to address his wife, i.e. food, bath and bed.^
In India time undoubtedly stands still as perhaps nowhere else in 
the world. At the tail end of the twentieth century our progressive 
instincts in a vitally crucial sphere have progressed no further than 
the crusading spirit of the nineteenth century. The trappings of 
widowhood may be on the wane but the essential notion remains. The 
Hindu widow may no longer have to submit to the rigorous indignities
1. Ibid., at 5^ .
2. Ibid., at k2.
3* Ibid., at V3.
4. Ibid., at *+2. Ibid.
6. William Horsely, B.B.C. News Reporter in Japan talking to Colin
Hamilton in the "Outlook" Programme of the B.B.C. World Service,
Nov. 15, 1983» at 15.15 hours GMT.
that her less fortunate sisters were subject to a century ago, but 
she is no less free of the traditional shackles, and should she re­
marry as not infrequently she does now, she may do so not for the 
normal reasons of personal happiness and contentment, but because she 
must. Educated and earning her livelihood she may be, property she 
might possess (for has not the HSA, 1956 made her the absolute owner 
of her deceased husband’s property along with his other heirs?) she 
is none the less a prisoner in the grip, as it were, of the ancient 
smptis.
Her own attitude no less than the male-oriented society she lives 
in, is the cause of the plight she finds herself in. No liberalising 
law, no reforming zeal on the part of others may come to her aid. It 
is therefore time for the women of India to arouse themselves from the 
stupor of centuries and heed the call of liberating forces, to defy 
primitive conventions if need be, so as to shed the chains of the past 
and to reinstate in their lives the pride and dignity that must surely 
be the birthright of every human individual, male or female. The 
Hindu widow would only then be truly liberated, free to marry or not 
to marry according to her own preferences, at par with the millions of 
widows the world over, and closer home to her more fortunate Muslim 
counterparts, ruled as they are by a far more humane set of rules, 
which permit, and even encourage the remarriage of widows in an 
attempt to reverse the misfortunes of widowhood by reinstating in such 
lives the measure of fulfilment that the married state connotes.
1. The remarriage of widows to which Islam takes no exception - indeed 
the example of the prophet encourages it, for his first wife (and 
subsequent others as well), was the widow Khadija - is deprecated 
by certain Muslim sects of Hindu origin in India. See R. Levy,
The Social Structure of Islam, 2nd ed., (Camb., Univ. Press, 1957),
(continued on next page)
(continued from previous page)
at 2M+. These are however isolated instances of the lingering 
vestiges of a pre-Islamic past, and generally the Muslims of India, 
like the rest of the Islamic world, lend overwhelming support to 
an institution ratified by both the precept and the example of 
their Lawgiver. In contrasting the attitudes towards divorce end 
the remarriage of widows among Muslims in India, M.E. Khan observes 
that though divorce is easily obtainable, it is viewed with dis­
approval, and social pressure forbids individuals to resort to it 
with any degree of frequency. Widow remarriage, on the other hand, 
"is quite prevalent and encouraged by all sections of Muslims." : 
Family Planning Among Muslims in India, (New Delhi, Manohar, 1979)» 
at 33-
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGAL " LIMITED ESTATE'
"And the gentle waves of the summer seas,
That raise their heads and wander singing,
Must murmur at last, 'Unjust, unjust;'"
VLB. Yeats 
From "The Wanderings of Oisin"
1. The Evolution of the Widow's Right of Inheritance
The HSA has become the law of the land since 17th June, 195&, anti 
is an important piece of social legislation in so far as the entire con­
cept of the Hindu woman's (for our purposes widow's) rigfrts in property 
has undergone radical transformation. From being at most a "limited" 
heir, she now becomes full owner of any property possessed by her 
whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act by virtue 
of s. 14. This was however not achieved by one gigantic stride forward, 
but was the conscious result of an awareness of the inequalities and in­
equities that women were gradually recognised to have been subject to, 
specially in regard to inheritance from time immemorial.
As in the most ancient strata of Greek, Roman and Germanic laws, so v 
too in the classical Hindu law, there was a total denial to women of all 
proprietary rights, and the bewildering profusion of conflicting smpti 
texts testify to the protracted controversy extending over centuries in 
the progression from such a state of denial to a recognition of their 
rights to individual ownership and to inheritance.
In course of time, the usefulness of permitting women to own in their 
own right impressed itself upon Sanskrit jurists, and it was admitted 
that certain classes of presents, defined according to their sources and 
the times when they might be given, should belong to the donee in such a 
way that their abstraction by her husband or sons would be a conversion,
-219-
subject always to the former's right to take them in an emergency. In 
other words the strict theory of patriarchal Aryan law broke down in the 
face of demands of practical utility, and no doubt under the influence 
of pre-Aryan customs, some of which we know allowed substantial proprie—
toral rights to women.^
However this is not to suppose that this peculiar property of women, 
or more properly stridhana to give it the name that it came to be known 
by, did not meet with some opposition, and for at least a millennium and 
a half it was a matter of acute controversy whether women might inherit
3property as opposed to their being donees of gifts inter vivos. Con­
flicting attitudes seem to emerge. In the Bgvedic times for instance, 
the Gjhya law indicates that the husband having been cremated, the 
domestic rituals terminate, and the sonless wife would then become depen­
dent on his kinsmen. On the other hand quite an early tradition records 
the case of Yajnavalkya in the Upanigads of dividing his wealth equally 
between his two wives preliminary to his retirement to the woods. Though 
in the nature of a gift ty the husband, this was a significant step for­
ward, and it is not improbable that in some Aryan societies in India at 
any rate, the sonless wife's right to inherit may have developed out of 
such practice.^
V
However an alternative source to the wife's right to inherit may 
have been the text of Gautama whereby the sage lays down that, should the 
widow resort to niyoga, the offspring would then be entitled in place of
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "A Strange Rule of Smrti, And a Suggested Solution," 
ECMHL, Vol. 1, (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1976), at 219.
2. According to Sir G. Banerjee, "The word stridhana is derived from 
stri, woman, and dhana, property, and means literally woman's property. 
While declaring the perpetual tutelage of women and their general
incapacity to hold property, the Hindu law concedes to them the pri­
vilege of holding of certain descriptions with absolute power of 
disposal." s The Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana, 5th ed., (Cal.,
S.K. Lahiri, 1923T,~at 3*K
3- Derrett, "A Strange Rule cited above, at 219.
4. N.C. Sen-Gupta, The Evolution of Law, (Cal., Univ. Press, 1925)» at 144-5*
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the sapiiyjas (agnate or cognate who shares in piiffia, defined differently
in the Mitak^ arfi, and the DSyabhaga), and the sagotras (member of the same
agnatic lineage).'*' This in effect meant that the widow had custody of the
heritage until such time as a son was bom, and there were not infrequent
cases where once having taken possession of the estate, she was loath to
give it up resulting in Vasi^tha's famous dictum that, niyoga was not per-
2
mitted for greed or a desire for inheritance. Gradually though, as was 
to be expected, it became accepted for widows to continue to be in possess­
ion of the deceased husband's property, and in their being recognised as
3
preferential heirs with or without niyoga.
In the early extant texts, a certain conflict of attitudes is at once 
apparent. There is no mention of the sonless widow as heir in the text of 
Baudhayana and Vasistha, and Apastamba similarly excludes her, stating 
generally that, in default of a son the nearest sapjpfla succeeds. Manu 
does not declare her as heir either, and there are certain passages where 
she is by implication excluded.-'*
On the other hand, side by side with these injunctions we also come
6 ^ 7across texts such as those of Visnu and Yajnavalkya which give the
1. "A legitimate son, a son begotten on the wife (by a kinsman) ... in­
herit the estate (of their fathers)." Gaut. XXVTII. 32, op. cit. So v
too Manu, IX. "He who takes care of his deceased brother's estate
and of his widow, shall, after raising up a son for his brother, give 
that property even to the son." In the same vein is ibid., IX. 190.
2. Vas. XXIV . \%t supra, pJt UfS,
3- Sen-Gupta, EAIL, op. cit., at 1^ 5.
Ap. II.6.1*f.2, The Sacred Laws of the Aryas, Part I, op. cit., and so 
complete is the widow's exclusion that, on failure of the sapipda, the 
inheritance, according to the sage, goes to the spiritual teacher, and 
on the latter's failure, to the daughter, and on failure of all rela­
tions, the estate escheats to the king.: Ibid., II.6.1^.3-5.
5* "... the father shall take the inheritance of (a son) who leaves no
male issue, and his brothers,": Manu, IV.I85, op. cit., and , "(a)
mother shall obtain the inheritance of a son (who dies without leav­
ing male issue ...).": Ibid., IX.21?.
6. "The wealth of . a man who dies without male issue goes to his wife; on
failure of her to ...,": Vif. XVII.*f-13, op. cit.
7« The wife and the daughters also, both parents, brothers likewise,
P.T.O.
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widow not only first place in order of priority to the succession of her 
deceased husband's estate, but impose no restrictions either, on her 
right of enjoyment and disposal of such property. Brhaspati in the same 
vein emphasises in that most famous of texts, the essential oneness of 
husband and wife:
"(0)f him whose wife is not dead, half his body survives.
How should any one else take the property, while half 
(his) body lives?
"Although Kinsmen (Sakulyas), although his father and mother, 
although uterine brothers be living, the wife of him who dies 
without leaving male issue shall succeed to his share.
"... if the husband dies before the wife, she takes his 
property, if she has been faithful to him. This is 
an eternal law." 1
Appealing as this new theory in support of the widow's absolute 
right to inheritance was, it is perhaps not too far off the mark to 
suggest that its long-term effect in practical terms was in fact to retard 
the very right that it so persuasively pleaded for. For this notion of 
the essential oneness of husband and wife served as a means of protecting 
the joint-stock from dissipation; the wife faithful to the living husband's 
bed continued an abstemious life of piety and austerity as a widow, and at 
her death, the husband's immediate relatives with whom she had lived, would 
then step into the ownership of the property. v
However with the passage of time these conditions changed; widows 
who had so far acquiesdM began to adopt a bolder and more independent 
stance, and there were frequent instances of substantial gifts and sales 
of the ancestral property. Such disruption of the joint-stock could 
hardly be contemplated much less permitted, and on behalf of the kinsmen
and their sons, gentiles, cognates, a pupil and a fellow student: on 
failure of the first among these, the next in order is indeed heir to 
the estate of one, who departed for heaven leaving no male issue. This 
rule extends to all persons and all classes," YeLj. 2. 13&-7 quoted in 
Mit, II. I. 2. op. cit.
1. Bri\XXV. ^7-9, on. cit.
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whose expectations were thus baulked, the restrictions on the widow's 
powers of enjoyment and disposition which had hitherto been merely moral, 
now hardened into legal restraints, the most classic example being the 
text of Katyayana:
"(A) sonless (widow) preserving the bed of her husband 
(unsullied) and residing with her elders and being self­
controlled (or forbearing) should enjoy (her husband's 
property) till her death; after her the (other) heirs 
(of the husband) would get it (succeed to it)." 1
Also ascribed to Katyayana are similar texts which appear in the 
Vyavahara Mayukha:
"(A)fter the death of the husband, the widow preserving 
(the honour of) the family, shall obtain the shares of 
her husband, so long as she lives: but she has not 
property (therein, to the extent of) gift, mortgage or 
sale." 2
And again:
" (B)ut if her husband have departed for heaven, the wife 
obtains food and raiment: Or (too) if unseparated, she
will receive a share of the wealth so long as she lives." 3
2. The Circumstances under which the Widow May Claim as Heir in the Joint
and Separate Properties of Her Husband in the Mitak^ara and the
Dayaphaga Systems
Her position as heir established, we must now turn our attention and
examine under what circumstances the widow could claim such right of ^
inheritance which depended essentially on the school of law by which the 
deceased husband was governed, whether he was a follower of one or the 
other of the two major treatises, the Mitakgara. and the Dayabhaga.
1. Katyayanasmyti, V. 921, tr. P.V. Kane, (Poona, Oriental, Date ?)«
2. VIII. *+, tr. S.S. Setlur, A Complete Collection of Hindu Law Books 
on Inheritance, (Madras, K.K. Iyer, 191l).
3. Ibid., VIII. 7.
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As is well-known under the Mita.ks9.ra which is followed with local 
variations in almost all parts of India with the exception of Bengal and 
Assam, there exists a marked distinction between property of which a 
person is exclusively possessed such as his self-acquired assets, and 
the interest which he may have in joint-family property as one who on his 
birth had become entitled to a share therein. On the death of a Hindu 
male possessing both such types of property, the law of inheritance 
operates regarding the former, while there is no such thing as succession 
in the case of the undivided share which simply lapselto the surviving 
sharers be they sons, grandsons or great grandsons, or else the 
collaterals by virtue of survivorship.^
The Dayabhaga system however recognises only one mode of devolution, 
i.e. succession, and as a result of the absence of the notion of 
’’birthright", a person acquires an interest in the joint estate only by 
and on the death of the father, and then he takes a fixed, absolute and 
invariable interest. The result is that on his own death, all his 
properties,self-acquired or joint, devolve by inheritance only on his 
heirs, and there is no such thing as survivorship. Thus while under the 
Dayabhaga, all the properties of a person pass by inheritance on his 
death, under the Mitak^ara the rules of inheritance apply only as regards,_ 
property of which the deceased was the absolute owner. In default of 
male heirs at the time that succession opened, the widow was the heir of 
both joint-family and self-acquired property in the Dayabhaga, and of the 
latter only in the Mitaksara and she took only if she had been chaste up 
to that time.
1. In an important decision, Katama Nat'chier v. Raja of Shivagunga, (1863)
9 M.I.A. 5 3^ , this principle was explained thus at 615: "According to 
the principles of Hindu law, there is coparcenaryship between the 
different members of a united family, and survivorship following upon 
it. There is community of interest and unity of possession between 
all members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the 
others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during 
the deceased’s lifetime, a common interest and a common possession."
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An important distinction to remember is that, whereas in the
Mitak^ara school female sharers are not entitled to initiate a partition,
and their rights to a share arise for the first time when the coparceners
separate the property by metes and bounds,^ in the Dayabhaga system, the
widow in her capacity as heir to her husband's coparcenary interest may
2
on her own volition call for a partition.
3- The Mother's Entitlement at a Partition between the Sons in the 
Two Schools
The position of the widow when the sons separate is again the 
subject of controversy, and there are fundamental differences between the 
two major schools as to their entitlement.
Vi jnanes^ Jara whose Mitakgara is a commentary on the text of 
Yajnavalkya is of the view that the latter*s injunction that
"(W)hen the father makes an equal partition among his sons, 
his wives must have equal shares with them, if they have 
received no share either from their lord or from his 
father," 3
means that when partition is made by the father, even the wife who has 
sons may claim a share.
1. Pratapmull v. Dhanbati, A.I.R. 1936 20. This case does not apply
to the rights acquired by females in Mitak^ara joint-family property 
under the HWRPA 1937, which gave her "the same ri§£vt of claiming 
partition as a male owner," under s. 3 (3)» while under the HSA, 1956 
it has been held that the word "possessed" in s. 1^ (l) must be given 
the widest possible connotation so as to include not only the share 
declared \*\ a preliminary decree for partition (See Munnalal v. 
Rajkumar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1^ 93» discussed at5^3ff), but also the 
share which a female acquires in undivided coparcenary property. (See 
Sukh Ram v. Gauri Shankar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365» dicussed at 560 ff.
2. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 3^ 8. This is confirmed in Kristo Bhabiney
Dossee v. Ashutosh Bosu Mullick, I.L.R. (1886) 13 Cal. 39» where the 
widow's right as heir of her husband, to bring a suit for the partition 
of her late father-in-law's estate was implicitly acknowledged.
3- H.T. Colebrooke's rendering in A Digest of Hindu law on Contracts and
Succession, (hereinafter referred to as Cole. Dig.). Vol. Ill, a
translation of Jagannatha Tarkapan&anana's Vivada-bhangamava, (Cal., 
Honourable Company's Press, 1798), at 97.
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From this it would follow that the text of Vyasa;
"(B)ut the wives of the father who have no sons, are 
declared entitled to equal share with the sons of other 
wives," 1
and that of B^haspati (LXXXV):
"(o)n the death of the father the mother (janani) has a 
claim to an equal share with her own sons; his mothers 
(matarah) take the same shares," 2
must be interpreted to mean that when partition is made by sons, a share 
must be allotted to the step-mother who has no male issue, for the par­
ticle "but" (in Vyasa) has the sense of "also."*^
Jimutavahana, the author of the Dayabhaga, refutes this contention 
for according to him the partition referred to in. Vyasa's text is not a 
partition between sons and accordingly
"(l)t should not be argued that the construction of the 
text is 'the wives of the father,' and consequently when 
partition is made by sons after his death, the wives of 
their father who have no male issue, namely their step­
mothers, shall have equal shares; and the text therefore 
relates to partition made by sons. When partition is 
made by sons, the law does not allot a share to the 
step-mother who has no male issue." ^
The text of Brhaspati is similarly dismissed on the reasoning that, 
though the words "his mother" might first suggest "son" for an answer 
because he is the most obvious agent in the sentence (leading to the 
assumption that "his mothers" then refer to his step-mothers), yet as thev 
same sense has already been obtained from the former part of the sentence 
"on the death of the father the mother has a claim...," the reference is 
to the wives of the paternal grandfather who are entitled to take equal 
shares with his grandsons.-'*
In sum then, the position of the Dayabhaga in the light of
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, at 98-
3. Ibid.
Ibid., at 97.
5- Ibid.
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Jimutavahana's interpretation of the smrtis as commented upon by
Jagannatha is that, when partition is made by a father, a share equal
to that of a son must be given to the wife who has no son, not to her
who has male issue; her son should be considered as alone entitled to
share in the partition. But when partition is made by sons, no share
need be allotted to the step-mother who has no male issue, but food and
raiment must be assigned; for the late owner of property was bound to
support her.'*' It would therefore follow that in the Dayabhaga school,
the widow is entitled to share equally with sons bom of her, but she
2cannot receive a share from the children of another wife.
1. Ibid at 98. Jagannatha sums up (at 102), the differences between the 
two schools thusj "In this and other circumstances, there is much 
difference. Consequently the variance of these two opinions consists 
herein; according to CT'kn&eswara and the rest (including Vi jnanesvara) 
whether partition be mSae by the father or by his sons, equal shares 
must be allotted, conformably with the law, to the wives who have no 
male issue, as well as to those who have sons; according to 
Jimutavahana and the rest when partition is made by a father, an 
equal share must be given to the wife who has no male issue, and when 
partition is made by sons, to the natural mother of those sons."
2. Judicial decisions are in accord with this view. Thus in Damoodur 
Misser v. Senabutty Misrain, I.L. R. (1882) 8 Cal. 537» it was held 
(at 5^2-3), that in a partition between sons by different wives, the 
respective mothers are only entitled to share equally with their own 
sons the aggregate of the shares which an equal division among the 
brothers allots to those sons, or in other words, the property must 
be first divided into as many shares as there are sons. Each widow 
then shares equally with each of her sons the portion allotted to her. 
son. Likewise in Kristo Bhabiney Dossee v. Ashutosh Bosu Hullick,
I.L.R. (1886) 13 Gal. 39, where the widow brought a suit against her 
husband's half-brother's son and her own mother-in-law for partition 
of the ancestral estate, it was held that the male defendant was 
entitled to a half share, the other half to be divided between the 
widows in equal shares. And in Srimati Hemangini Dasi v. Kedar Nath 
Choudhary, (1889) 16 I.A. 115 it was laid down at 12^ that "(W)here 
there are several groups of sons, the maintenance of their mothers 
must, so long as the estate remains joint, be a charge upon the 
whole estate; but when a partition is made the law appears to be 
that their maintenance is distributed according to relationship,
the sons of each mother being bound to maintain her. The step-sons 
are not under the same obligation."
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In the Mitakqara school on the death of an unmarried son, his 
share of the joint property passes "by survivorship at partition, but the 
question long in dispute in Calcutta as to whether or not a mother who 
inherits the undivided share of her deceased son as his sole heir under 
the Dayabhaga law is entitled to a further share at a subsequent parti­
tion of the family estate was finally resolved in Milan Kumar Das v.
Pumasashi Dassi.^  In over-ruling the decision in Indu Bhushan
2Chatterjee v. Mritun.joy Pal, to the effect that, as maintenance is the
basis of her right to a share on partition, where the mother had already
inherited the share of her deceased son which was sufficient for her
maintenance, she was not entitled to any further share on a subsequent
partition between her surviving sons, Dutt, J., delivering judgment on
behalf of the Special Bench upheld the earlier Single Bench decisions in
3
Jugomohan Haidar v. Sarodamoyee Dossee, and Poorendra Nath Sen v. 
Srimati Hemangani Dassi, and laid down that
"(e)xcept in the case of a stridhana which a mother might 
have received from her husband or father-in-law, no other 
stridhana or property received by her from any other person 
or from any other source can be taken into consideration 
for the purpose of determining whether any share can be 
allotted to her when a partition takes place between the 
father and sons, or between the sons after the death 
of the father.” 5
4. The Nature of the Estate that the Widow Inherits in the Mitak§ara 
and the Dayabhaga Schools
The question that then arises is as to the nature of the property 
that the widow so takes. There is in fact a profusion of texts as well 
as divergence of opinion as to whether such property may indeed be
1. A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 380 (S.B.).
2. I.L.R. (1946) 1 Cal. 128.
3. I. L. R. (1878) 3 Cal. 149.
4. I.L.R. (1909) 36 Cal. 75-
5- A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 38O (S.B.),at 386.
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regard ed as her stridhana over which she enjoys absolute powers of enjoy­
ment and disposition, or whether she merely takes what for want of a 
better term is known as the "limited" estate.
The Mitaksara which is a commentary on the text of Yajnavalkya 
quotes the sage thus explaining the nature of woman's property:
"... what was given to a woman by the father, the mother, 
the husband or a brother, or received by her at the 
nuptial fire, or presented to her on her husband's 
marriage to another wife, as also any other (separate 
acquisition) is denominated a woman's property," 1
and the gloss of Vijnanesvara to this is
"... and also property which she may have acquired by 
inheritance, partition, seizure or finding, are 
denominated by Manu and the rest 'woman's property'." 2
At a glance therefore, it would seem that so far as the authority of the
Mitaksara goes, the widow is the absolute owner of whatsover property
she acquires and howsover. The thought comes to mind that when
Vijnanes\/ara mentions "and also property," he is perhaps referring to
merely moveables, although this is at best conjecture in view of the
various other elaborations which we will now proceed to examine.
It is worth noting that in a further description of the separate 
property of woman the same treatise has this to say:
"(l)t is said by Katyayana, 'What has been received by a *
woman from the family of her husband at a time posterior 
to her marriage, is called a gift subsequent,... It is 
celebrated as woman's property. ... Her kinsmen take it 
if she die without issue.'" 3
And as if to substantiate this, there is the unconditional declaration
on the authority of Manu, Visnu, Katyayana and Brhaspati that the chaste
widow of a childless man takes his entire estate "notwithstanding kinsmen,
a father, a mother, or uterine bretheren be present." This view is
1. Mit., II.XI.I. op. cit.
2. Ibid., II. XI. 2.
3. Ibid, II. XI. 7-8.
k. Ibid., II. I. 6. See also II. I. 2 and II. I. 30.
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augment ed by the further provision that
"... whether partition be made in the owner's lifetime 
or after his decease, (that) the wife shall take a share 
equal to the son's... Such being the case it is a mere 
error to say that the wife takes nothing but a sub­
sistence from the wealth of her husband, who died 
leaving no male issue." 1
In view of texts such as the foregoing, it would seem that so far 
as the authority of the Mitaksara is concerned, every description of 
property belonging to a woman (be it inherited from a male or obtained 
at a partition), becomes her stridhana though it is not a necessaxy 
corollary that her power of alienation is the same over every variety of 
it. But then, it must be borne in mind, neither does a male member of a 
coparcenary have such unlimited powers of disposition over property of 
which he is undoubtedly the owner in a joint Hindu family. West J., very 
aptly pointodout that according to the Mitaksara^a woman's power of 
alienation over property inherited by her vmoa subject to restrictions 
analogous to those imposed upon the power of a male owner as regards his 
ancestral property. The learned judge observes:
"C^ ijnaneswara like all the Hindu lawyers, denounces the ap­
propriation of a woman's property by her husband except 
in cases of great pressure, and by the other kinsmen 
under any circumstances. But he lays down no rule as to 
the extent of the woman's own power over the property.
The natural conclusion would seem to be, that he con­
sidered this already sufficiently provided for as to 
his immediate subject, inheritance, by other lawyers, 
and by the analogies to be drawn from his rules as to 
the estate of a male proprietor. Now in Chap. I, section 
I, pi. 27, 28, it is laid down that a man is "subject to 
the control of his sons and the rest (of those interested) 
in regard to the immoveable estate, whether acquired by 
himself or inherited," though he may make a gift or sale 
of it for the relief of family necessities or for pious 
purposes. It is clear therefore, that a right of 
absolute disposal did not enter into Vijnaneswara's 
conception of the essentials of ownership. He admits 
(Mit. Chap. II, section I, pi. 25) the genuineness and the 
authority of the text of NcCrada, which with so many others, 
proclaims the dependence of women, which, he says, does 
not disqualify them for proprietorship." 2
1. Ibid, II. I. 31.
2. Vijiamngam v. Lakshmanan, (l8?l) Bom. H.C.R. (O.C.J.), 2^4 at 264-5.
If we now turn to the Viramitrodaya , the other commentary held in
high esteem in the Benares school, it is clear that like the Mitakgaia 
it maintains that whatever is owned By a woman is her stridhana, though 
it admits more clearly than the former that the quality of "being freely 
alienable by her without her husband's consent, which generally attaches 
to stridhana,may not attach to every kind of it. The question of 
stridhana apart, the Viramitrodaya, however, clearly takes into con­
sideration the text of Katyayana1 (of which there is no mention in the 
Mitaksara), in imposing restraints upon the widow's powers of enjoyment 
and disposition over property inherited by her from her husband.
Thus:
"(W)hen the widow after having succeeded to the property 
of her husband dies, the residue of the property after 
her enjoyment would have devolved on (her heirs as such)
... - but it is prevented by the passage, - ‘After her let 
the heirs take.' And the construction of the text (of 
Katyayana) is arrived at thus: on perusing %let the heirs 
take' the question occurs, whose heirs? and the word 'bed* 
suggests itself and is construed with 'heirsf accordingly 
the signification of the text is as follows, - "After her 
let the husband's heirs or dayadas, i.e. those that are 
entitled to take his undivided property 'take' also what 
remains of the estate of a separated brother after the 
enjoyment thereof by his wife; and not the heirs to the 
estate of the wife, such as the daughters and the like...
"(T)herefore, it is established that in making gifts for 
spiritual purpose as well as in making sale or mortgage 
for the purpose of performing what is necessary in a 
spiritual or temporal point of view, the widow's right 
does certainly extend to the entire estate of her husband; 
the restriction, however, is intended to prohibit gifts 
to players, dancers and the like, as well as sale or 
mortgage without necessity. Accordingly the term 'being 
moderate' is inserted; the meaning is, that on obtaining 
the property she shall not uselessly spend the property." 2
1. Katyayanasmyti, V. 921, op. cit. The author of the Viramitrodaya 
refers to the text of Katyayana but does not quote it. However 
the influence of this most famous of injunctions, which is in fact 
the basis of the limited estate, is as much in evidence in the 
Viramitrodaya as it is in the Dayabhaga.
2. Viramitrodaya, A Complete Collection..., op. cit., at 380*
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The Vyavahara Mayukha, .the authority that prevails with the
Mitaksara in the Bombay school, assigns to the simple term stridhana the
same unlimited signification that it has in the Mitaksara except that it
also enjoins that a woman possesses absolute power of disposal only ovhr
some kinds of stridhana. Thus where she inherits from her husband, the
treatise declares on the authority of Katyayana that she may alienate
for religious or charitable purposes though not otherwise.1
The Vivada Chintamapi which is the dominant authority in the
Mithila school declares in no uncertain terms that
"(t)he chaste wife is entitled to the property, in default 
(of heirs) down to the great-grandson of her husband." 2
The author then draws a distinction between moveables and immoveables,
and holds that the widow's powers of disposal over the latter is absolute,
but cite.a the Mahabharata to the effect: "For women, the heritage of
their husbands is declared applicable to use. But let women never make
3 _waste of their husband's wealth." The gloss of the Vivada Chintamapi
/f
that waste means "giving or selling at their pleasure," has also been 
relied on in support of the doctrine of the qualified right of the widow 
in the property inherited by her from her husband.
In the Dravida school, the paramount jurisdiction is that of the
_ ^  _ _ V
Parasara Madhaviya and the Smpti Chandrika. Kane points out that Madhava 
explains that "except immoveable wealth" in Brhaspati's dictum-'* means that 
the widow is prohibited from making a sale of immoveable property without 
the consent of the male kinsmen.^
1. Vyavahara Mayukha, VIII. b, op. cit.
2. Vivada Chintamapi, A Complete Collection..., op. cit., at 266.
3. Ibid, at 266-7- 
Ibid, at 267.
5- "The husband being separated (in interests from his former coparceners) 
his wife shall take after his death a pledge and whatever else is 
recognised as property, except the immoveable wealth." : Brhaspati,
XXV. 53» °P- cit.
6. HJ)., Vol. Ill, 2nd ed., (1973), op. cit., at 709-
-232-
The Smrti Chandrika is also explicit on the restrictions to the 
widow's power over property inherited from her husband, and makes a 
distinction between the sonless widow and an issueless widow. Thus:
"(T)he right of a widow (patni) to inherit arises only 
where the husband dies divided in estate. Accordingly 
B^haspati:- 'Whatever property a man possesses of every 
kind after division, whether mortgaged or other, the 
wife (jaya) shall take after the death of her husband, 
with the exception of immoveable property.1
For
"... immoveable property being the means of subsistence 
among the descendants of a Hindu family, is inheritable 
only by a widow that has got issue, and that, therefore 
a widow (patni) having no issue has no title to inherit 
the property although she may be virtuous and the 
family divided." 2
Having come into inheritance however, the restraints on the widow's
powers of alienation are made all too clear:
" (T)he same author (B^ haspati) further says 'After the 
death of the husband, the widow preserving (the honour 
of) the family, shall obtain the share of her husband 
so long as she lives? but she has no property (therein 
to the extent of) gifts, mortgage or sale.'" 3
It is then explained that,
"(T)he competency of a widow to make gifts for religious 
and charitable purposes, such as the maintenance of old 
and helpless persons, being sanctioned by law, the above
passage must be held as contemplating the want of
independence of a widow in making gifts etc for purposes 
not being religious or charitable, but purely temporal, 
such as gifts to dancers, and the like."
Some scholars suggest that the passage in the Smrti ChandrikA to
the effect that "whatever the mother takes, she takes for herself like
the stridhana called Adhyagni -^ and the. like, and not for the benefit
1. Smpti Chandrika, XI.I.23, A Complete Collection..., op. cit.
2. Ibid, XI.1.27.
3. Ibid, XI.1.28.
k. Ibidj XI. 1.29.
5- The Adhyagni is that stridhana which is given to the woman at the time 
of her marriage near the nuptial fire, and descends, according to the 
author of the Smrti Chandrika, to unmarried and unprovided daughters, 
and on failure of daughters, to their issue, the female issue taking 
before the male. See Smrti Chandrika, IX. 11.17, "A Complete Collec­
tion...," op. cit.
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of both herself and her husband,"^ would seem to infer that inherited
2
property is not stridhana. It is submitted that in fact it makes no 
such inference. The passage relates to the succession of the mother 
to the property of her son which, the text clearly states, is for her 
exclusive use, and reinforces the view that although the widow's 
inheritance from her husband is certainly not stridhana in the accepted 
sense of the word, nevertheless like "Adhyagni and the like," she 
exercises control over it subject to the limitations discussed above.
Let us now consider the Dayabhaga of Jimutavahana, the most 
authoritative text in Bengal. As we have already seen, the Mitaksara 
recognises the widow's right to inherit only when her husband was 
separated from his kinsmen, but it says nothing expressly as to the 
extent of her interest in the estate inherited by her or the order of 
succession to it after her death. The Dayabh5ga on the other hand, allows 
her to succeed to her husband's estate in all cases on failure of sons, 
grandsons, and great-grandsons; but as if to counter-balance this con­
cession made in her favour, it limits her interest to mere enjoyment with 
moderation, and declares that on her death the estate should devolve,
not on the heirs who inherit her stridhana but on the next heirs of her
3
husband, in accordance with the text of Katyayana, "for," says v
J imutavahana,
"(T)he right of those (persons whose succession is declared 
under that head) is relative to the property of a woman 
(other than that which is inherited by her); Katyayana 
has propounded by separate texts the heirs of a woman's 
property; and his text (declaratory of the succession to 
heritage) would be tautology: (Consequently heritage is 
not ranked with woman's peculiar property)." ^
1. Ibid, XI.III.8.
2. See for instance D.N. Mitter, The Position of Women in Hindu Law,
(Cal., Univ. of Cal., 1913), at 611-2, and R.L. Choudhary, Hindu 
Woman's Right to Property, Past and Present (Cal., L.K. Mukhopadhyay, 
1961), at 13.
3* Supra, at 222.
Daya, XI. 1.58, op. cit.
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Thus the Dayabhaga excludes in no uncertain terms inherited property 
from the denomination of stridhana; and as if to set the seal on this 
dictum we are further told that,
"(T)hat alone is her peculiar property which she has 
power to give, sell, or use independently of her 
husband's control." 1
It would seem at first glance that Jimutavahana's doctrine is 
unduly harsh in so restricting the widow's rights over inherited property, 
specially when we compare it with Vi jnanesvara's interpretation of 
stridhana in its unlimited literal sense which would also include 
inherited property. But if we consider that under the Mitaksara scheme 
of succession, it is only the widow of a separated coparcener who is heir 
to her deceased husband, it then becomes apparent that Yajnavalkya was 
probably reluctant to sanction a scheme of succession whereunder exten­
sive property would have automatically and very frequently passed out 
of the family to female stridhana heirs. On the other hand, Jimutavahana, 
who allows the widow to inherit her husband's estate whether he was 
separated from, or joint with, his coparceners, is obliged, for the 
same reason, to qualify the simple rule of inheritance that property 
vested in any person passes to the heirs of such person, by providing 
that a female heir takes the inheritance merely as a tenant for life,
and that after her the estate passes not to her heirs t but to the next
2heirs of the last male holder.
This apparent conflict of opinion between the two great authorities 
was further aggravated by the fact that the various other commentaries 
and digests, with their various interpretations - each in its own sphere 
as authoritative as the next - tended to create a great deal of confusion
1. Ibid, IV.I.18.
2. Banerjee, op. cit., at 351*
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as to whether inherited property could indeed be regarded as stridhana , 
and in fact
"(l)t became a work of art to reconcile the conflicting 
texts, which were of equal authority. Some thought 
that the widow should-jbe understood tacitly to decline 
in favour of agnates; some that only a widow of special, 
and in some areas rare, qualifications might inherit: 
thus she must be free from potential as well as actual 
blemishes of character (.'); she must be about to^bear 
a son, or be willing to submit to niyoga, ... Visvarupa 
does not allow a non-pregnant widow to inherit, but if 
a daughter is bom, she may hold the property in trust 
for the daughter. That niyoga alone qualified the non­
pregnant widow was the view of King Bhoja alias 
Dharesvara, whose opinion is immortalised in the MitSk- 
sara though since niyoga was nominally obsolete in the 
current epoch the qualification was such as to remove 
the problem totally - and finally it was suggeste&^that 
she must have been married in the "approved" form. Al­
ternatively others permitted her to inherit provided she 
accompanied her husband's corpse upon the funeral pyre.'
Others more rationally restricted her right to moveable
property,5 or to cases where the estate was very small
and her right to maintenance in jeopardy.6
For all that the Mitaksara finally reconciled the texts by allow­
ing her to inherit where her husband was "separate" that is to say, she
mi^it take his share in the joint estate if it had already been ascer-
7
tained that no more harm could be done thereby, there was still the 
authority of the Dayabhaga to contend with, which as indicated earlier, 
advocated an entirely opposite viewpoint.
1. ApaiaXko-fi? commentary on Yaj. II.135“6
2. Visvarupa on Yaj. 11.139, at 2^ 1.
3- Mit. II.1.8, op.cit.
k. An artifice of Devapna-bhatta in the Smpti Chandrika. at 290-1. As 
an Andhra or Tamilian he knew perfectly well that most marriages in 
his part of India were celebrated in the Asura, an unapproved form.
5* Saras vat i-vi la sa, ss. 512-5, (Foulkes edn. )
6. This was the view of Srikara and others, refuted in Mit. II. 1.31. For
the above passage and the references thereto, see Derrett, "A Strange 
Rule ...," jsp. cit., at 219-20.
7- Derrett, cited above.
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* ♦ _
5. The Limited Estate Established Under the Mitaksara. System
In the early British period it was supposed as a matter of principle 
that all the dharma^astra must be applied to all Hindus, unless they 
could in each case prove a caste custom to the contrary, and then only 
to the extent that custom was strictly proved.^ The major schools of 
Hindu law were recognised. But when it came to the problem of deter­
mining whether a woman could dispose of her inherited property as 
stridhana and whether, if she could not, it would be taken after her 
death or surrender, not by her own heirs but by those of her deceased 
husband, there was the patent difficulty that whereas the Mitaksara t^he 
leading authority, plainly stated that inherited property was stridhana 
there were restrictions, according to the Jastra, upon her transfer of 
immoveable property inter vivos, and it followed that she could not 
dispose of inherited lands without the consent of the nearest agnates 
of the deceased husband, and it was to the next heirs of the husband
(or the father or the son, as the case might be) that the property
2
would pass on the female's death.
The most obvious and logical solution would have been for the
Courts to have regarded inherited property as stridhana in areas governed
1
by the Mitaksara, while in provinces where the influence of Jimutavahana 
prevails, to have excluded it from the category of stridhana. So far 
as the Bengal school is concerned, judicial decisions early established 
the principle that property inherited by a woman either from a male or
1. The P.C. put it thus: "The duty therefore, of an European Judge who 
is under the obligation to administer Hindu law, is not so much to 
inquire whether a disputed doctrine is fairly deducible from the 
earliest authorities, as to acertain whether it has been received 
by the particular school which governed the District with which he 
has to deal, and has there been sanctioned by usage. For, under the 
Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written 
text of the law...," ; Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga,
(1868) 12 M.I.A. 357, at 435.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "The Rights of Inheritance of Women," ECMHL, Vol. II, 
(1977), op. cit., at 348-9.
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a female does not become her peculiar property, and this is quite in
accordance with the rule laid down in the Dayabhaga. On the other hand,
the course of decisions has been to hold, contrary to the decision of
Vijnanesvara that, according to the law of the Benares school, property
inherited by a female is not her stridhana. The Privy Council, the
highest judicial authority, drastically limited the scope of stridhana
by insisting that the Mitaksara must be read in the light of the text 
- 2of Katyayana of which in fact, as we have already pointed out, there is
no mention at all in the Mitaksara; assuming moreover the interpretation
put on it by the Dayabhaga to be its only true meaning and refusing to
take the pandits' vyavasthas seriously (of which more presently), it
was determined finally that even in Madras all the property, moveable
and immoveable, inherited by a widow, daughter or mother must be held
3
by her subject to the "women's limited estate."
The French Court at Pondicherry appears to have wavered in a 
remarkable manner in its views upon this question. In 1766 and again in 
1769 they decided in conformity with an opinion of the Vellala caste, 
that no woman could dispose of any immoveable property or of any property 
which she had inherited. This opinion was founded on what was called the 
law of the Malabar people, which no doubt means the local usage. In v
1. Sreenath v. Surbomongala, (1868) 10 W.R. *f88.
2. Supra, at 222.
3. Derrett, "The Rights of Inheritance oj>. cit., at 350*
4. That in the territory of Pondicherry the force of local usage 
clearly outweighs the written text of the law whether classical or 
statutory, has again been demonstrated in Ramalingam v. Manicka, 
(1980) 2 M. L. J. 350, where the question was as to how the law of 
intestate succession operates in that particular territory when a 
Hindu dies possessed of ancestral property and leaves both male
and female issue. In his Lordship,Balasubrahmanyan J.'s view, the - 
usual Mitaksara rule of succession by survivorship having yielded to 
a local variation wrought by custom and usage, it is to the father a- 
lone as juridical head of the family that the assets deriving from 
the ancestor belong- and over which he has absolute powers of disposi­
tion. In view of this, the learned J,udge ruled that, all properties
P.T.a
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I85I the French court, following the views which then prevailed in
the Madras court, held that property which descended to a widow was
her stridhana, and was absolutely at her disposal. In 1869 they
accepted the doctrine finally established in Madras that such property
was held on the tenure which is generally known as a widow's estate?"
The characteristics of the widow's estate in property inherited
from males as they emerge under the Dayabhaga, and applied so arbi-
tarily to those governed by the Mitaksara are indications in themselves
as to how far removed the concept of the limited estate is from woman's
property as envisaged by the Mitaksara. Thus the widow has merely the
2right of enjoyment with moderation. Should however the estate fall
short of what is necessary for her legal enjoyment, she may alienate
3
a part or even the whole of it, if necessary. Save as aforesaid, her
rights in both moveable and immoveable property are limited, and she
cannot alienate them. She is however entitled to dispose of the
property with the express consent of the reversioners.-^  She is at the
same time enjoined to maintain and to make gifts to poor relations of
the husband,^ and finally at her death, the reversioners, not her own
7
heirs, are entitled to the residue of the estate and its accretions.
held by a father in the joint-family has/eto be regarded as his 
absolute properties under the customary law of Pondicherry, and 
on his death the devolution of such estate would be governed by 
the provisions of s. 8 of the HSA, s. 6 and its Proviso having 
no application.
1. J.D. Mayne, A Treatise of Hindu Law and Usage, 7th ed., (Mad., 
Higginbotham 1906), at 827.
2. Daya., XL.I.56, 6l, op. cit.
3. Ibid., XI. 1.62.
k. Ibid., XI. 1.56.
5. Ibid., XI.1.64.
6. Ibid., XI. 1.63.
7. Ibid,, XI. I. 59.
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6. The Dissident Opinion of Eminent Authorities
This has meant, in effect, the abrogation of the simple definition 
of stridhana in the Mitakgara and considering the high authority of 
the latter, and the clear language in which it declares that property 
inherited by a woman does constitute her stridhana, scholars have not 
been slow to express their doubts as to the correctness of this 
approach. In Sir H.S. Maine's considered opinion, it was
"(a) remarkable fact that the institution (of stridhana) 
seems to have been developed among the Hindus at a 
period relatively much earlier than among Romans. But 
instead of being matured and improved, as it was in the 
Western society, there is reason to think that in the 
East, under various influences, which may partly be 
traced, it has gradually been reduced to dimensions 
and importance far inferior to those which at one time 
belonged to it; 1
and he wonders what the causes are "for the strong hostility of Hindoo
lawyers to the text of the Mitakgara of which the authority could not 
2
be wholly denied."
On the face of it, the Dayabhaga rules are rigidly restrictive 
of the widow's rights of inheritance, but eminent scholars are agreed 
that the explicitness of the Mitakgara apart, Hindu law nowhere 
prescribes any but the absolute estate for the widow.
One such authority is JagannStha, the leading Indian interpreter 
of the ancient sources in the nineteenth century whose views assume 
the greater significance as he demonstrates that, even in the 
Dayabhaga j such injunctions as do seemingly restrict the widow's 
absolute powers of disposal over her husband's property, be they
1. Early History of Institutions, 7th ed., (Lond., J. Murray, 1897). 
at 321.
2. Ibid, at 325.
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1 2 - 3those of Jimutavahana, Katyayana, Narada^  or the author of the
Mahabharata merely underscore what the widow ought not to do. To
argue that texts such as these by reinforcing her declared incapacity
and dependence render any alienation by her void, is to lose sight
of perspective. For, reasons Jagannatha,
"(t)he validity of a gift made by the owner should not 
be impugned while no special text pronounces it as 
void; the declared object of the text (that of 
Narada) is only to show sin in not subjecting 
herself to the control of kinsmen on the 
husband's side." 6
In defence of this stance he points out that, as the daughter 
may validly alienate the paternal estate
”(i)t does not seem congruous that a gift should be 
null and void made by a wife who succeeds in 
preference to a daughter, and who is declared by 
sacred ordinances to be half the body of her lord..." 7
1. "A widow shall only enjoy the estate; she ought not to give it 
away, mortgage or sell it.": Cole. Dig. Vol. IV,(1798), op. cit., 
at 166.
2. "What a woman has received as a gift from her husband, she may
dispose of at pleasure, after his death, if it be moveable; but
as long as he lives let her preserve it with frugality: or she
may commit it to his family.": Ibid, at 277-8, as also
"The childless widow preserving inviolate the bed of her lord, 
and strictly obedient to her spiritual parents, may frugally 
enjoy the estate until she die; after her the legal heirs shall 
take it.": Ibid.
3. "After the death of her lord, the relations of the husband shall 
be the guardians of a woman who has no sons. They shall have full 
authority to control her, to regulate her mode of life, and to 
maintain her." Narada, XIII. 28, The Minor Law Books, Part I,
op. cit.
*+. "Simple enjoyment is declared to be the fruit, which women gather
from the heritage of their lords; on no account should they waste 
the estate of their husbands," Cole. Dig., Vol. IV, erg. cit., at 
169, and cited at Daya, XI.1.60.^  op. ci£.
5. Emphasis mine.
6. Cole. Dig., Vol. IV, o£. cit, at 167.
7. Ibid, at 168.
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To the objection that then might be raised that, as the
daughter is permitted to make a donation, this would in itself suggest
the inferiority of the wife, JaganriStha is firm in the view that,
’’the inferiority of a wife compared with her (the daughter), is not
thereby suggested."'*' The widow herself being "the property of her
2lord as it were,for his sole service," is enjoined by sacred texts to
"(l)ive in the practice of austerities, with extinguished 
passions refraining from pleasurable food, bed and other 
gratifications, which she may desire;" 3
and in like manner therefore she may not dispose of other property of
her lord save for his benefit.
The injunctions against waste by the widow, however strongly
worded, and in particular the words "may enjoy" strongly suggest that
they are no more than explanatory precepts, and "in the case of an
explanatory precept it does not appear that a different act is void,"
so that a gift or other alienation made by the wife, is therefore
valid, though blameable,-^  and in view of all this, the irrevocable
conclusion, according to Jagannatha, is that on failure of male
descendants the widow is the first among heirs, and she being half the
body of her husband, she must take exclusively and absolutely of his
wealth.^
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Ibid, at 169.
5. Ibid, at 168.
6. The reason why the widow cannot take in the presence of male 
descendants has been ingeniously explained by SanKWa and LiV^ i-tix 
"(T)he bodies of his ancestors are born again of her; let him 
figuratively address his own soul in the person of his child." s 
Cole. Dig., Vol. IV, op. cit., at l6l. The arguments in support 
of the widow's claim is reiterated in Cole. Dig., Vol. Ill,
op. cit., at 457- 66. What is very interesting however is that 
Colebrooke himself does not subscribe to the views of Jagannatha, 
and in Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurroosoondry Dossi, (1819) 2 Mor. Dig. 
193, East C.J., totally out of sympathy as he was with such as those 
who imposed limitations on the widow's rights where there were none 
points out (at 212) that Colebrooke in letters touching on this 
subject states: "(l)t appears, on inquiry and research, not to have
P.T.O.
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The reasoning of H.H. Wilson, the great orientalist, is along 
the same lines. He examines the two ancient texts which bear positively- 
on the widow's power over the property which she inherits as her hus­
band's sole heir, the one of Katyayana,1 and the other from the
p
MaH5.bharata, and insists that, such ancient injunctions can scarcely
be interpreted to mean that if a widow gives away or sells her estate,
such gift or sale is invalid.-^  In fact, the eminent author asserts,
all that Jinutavahana ever said was that, "a widow shall only enjoy the
4
estate; she ought not to give it away, mortgage or sell it." He
been sanctioned by any previous author of note, nor as is believed, 
by any writer whomsoever. It is, on the contrary, in opposition 
to the whole current of authorities, both in and out of Bengal," 
adding in support of his contention that, according to Jimutavahana's 
doctrine, the restrictions on alienations extend equally to daughters 
and mothers as well as to wives. In refuting this argument, the 
learned Chief Justice draws attention to Daya, XI. 1.59* which 
clearly states that, "... the next heirs ... shall ... equally succeed 
to the residue of the estate remaining after use of it, upon 
the demise of the widow, in whom the succession had vested," and 
in his Lordship's opinion these words are remarkable as they clearly 
point out that "the next heir is to succeed, not to the estate 
generally, but to the residue of the estate remaining ater the 
use of it." s Ibid., at 213.
1. Supra, at 222.
2. Cited at Daya., XI.I.60, op. cit.
3. J.D.M. Derrett, in a carefully researched article, poetically entitled 
"Factum Valets The Adventures of a Maxim," ECMHL, Vol. Ill, (1977)* v 
op. cit., draws attention at 2, to the principle quod fieri non 
debuit factum valet: "What ought not to have been done is (often) 
valid when done," and it is precisely on the strength of this
maxim that, the rationalisations of both Jagannatha and Wilson in 
regard to the widow's right of alienation are based. The origins 
of the maxim stem from the canon law through which it became part 
of the law of England and thus of India. Factum Valet which gives 
expression to the two principles viz. (i) that which is abhorrent to 
the "law of God" may yet be permitted by the law of Man, and (ii) 
many prohibitions of positive law do not invalidate civil acts done 
in apparent contraventS on of them, started upon its career in India 
almost at the commencement of the British period, and in Bengal in 
particular, it took firm root; and although Sanskrit texts accepted 
as legal authorities prohibited certain transfers of property, the 
medieval commentators interpreted the prohibition as applying only 
in conscience, the breach of them leading in appropriate cases to 
censure and outcasting, while the legal transaction would remain 
valid. See Derrett, ibid., at 1 ff.
*f. Daya. , XI.1.62, cd. cit.
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allows her also, if unable to subsist otherwise, to mortgage or even 
to sell it, and to make presents to her husband's relatives and gifts 
or other alienations for the spiritual benefit of the deceased; and
"(i)t is not till we come to the third generation of 
lawyers, the commentators on the commentators, that 
the restriction is positive, and Sri Krishna 
Tarkalankara expounding Jimutavahana's text declares,
'a widow shall use her husband's heritage for the 
support of life; and make donations, and give alms 
in a moderate degree for the benefit of her husband, 
but not dispose of it at her pleasure like her own 
peculiar property. *" 1
From this,
"(t)he utmost that can be inferred... is that, originally 
the duty of the widow was only pointed out to her, and 
she was left in law as she was in reason, a free agent, 
to do what she pleased with that which was her own; 
but that in later times attempt of an indefinite nature 
have been made to limit her power." 2
Wilson is further of the opinion that until such time as "a new
- - 3race of law-givers, with Jimutavahana at their head, chose to alter it,
”(t)he spirit and the text of the original law... 
recognise(d) a widow's absolute right over property 
inherited from a husband, in default of male issue." ^
1. H.H. Wilson, Essays in Sanskrit Literature, Vol. V., (Lond.,
Trubner, 1865), at 16-7.
2. Ibid, at 17. Wilson then goes on to comment: "The eagerness with 
which the latter doctrine is urged by the Scholiasts of the 
present day is ascribable in all probability to the contempt for 
the female sex which they (Hindus) have learned from their 
Mohammedan masters." Quite clearly the learned author is not 
referring here to the popular contemporary stereotype of the 
lecherous and lasvicious "Mohammedan," (a term, anathema inci- 
dently, to sensitive Muslim ears), intent solely on carnal indul­
gences. The reference is made in the particular context of 
inheritance and, one submits, denigrating comments without 
veracity such as these, ill befit the consistent and superior 
scholarship which is otherwise the great merit of our author's 
researches. Whatever contempt he may or may not have had for the 
female sex, the "Mohammedan" was —  and still is —  bound in 
matters of inheritance and succession by a system of inheritance 
proclaimed from the desert wastes of Arabia in the 7th century A.D., 
whereby the female members were declared heirs in varying degrees, 
the widow no less than the daughter, mother or sister.
3. Ibid, at 21.
4. Ibid, at Zk.
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He argues persuasively:
"(T)he old lawyers have said, 'let a widow enjoy a 
husband's wealth, afterwards let the heirs take it.'
What obligation does this involve that she must 
leave it? But she is told she should not waste it,- 
granted: but suppose she sells it, is that waste?" 1
In fact, in his opinion, even
"(l)n Bengal the authorities that are universally 
received have altered this law and restrict a widow 
to the usufruct of her husband's property. They have 
not, however provided for its security, nor for its 
recovery if aliened, and by such neglect have virtually 
left the law as they found it, or the power if not the 
right of alienation with the widow* ..." 2
As to the injunction, 'The relations of her husband cannot dispossess
her of that property, but they may control her in the use of it," the
learned author's comment is that,
"(l)f they cannot do the one they cannot do the other: 
if they cannot take the money from her, how is it pos­
sible they can prevent spending it? By an injunction 
of the Supreme Court indeed, and the consignment of 
the funds to the care of the Master, it may be, and 
has been done: this we know; but we have yet to learn 
that it is Hindu law." 3
What in fact Wilson stresses is that the unambiguous statement of the
Mitak?ara apart, the lawgivers in Bengal too never envisaged the women's
estate as we know it today, hedged in as it is by limitations and
restrictions, and which has given rise to endless complications
leading to wasteful and tedious litigation.
1. Ibid, at 21.
2. Ibid, at 2^ . His point has not been borne out by the progress of
case law.
3. Ibid, at 22.
4. In regard to the abundance of case law it is interesting to note 
that, "(T)he assertion can be made without rashness that the cases 
relating to the extent and nature of women's estate which come 
before our courts are more numerous than the other cases on Hindu 
law put together.": Mitter, oj>. cit., at 526, and more recently 
Derrett is quick to perceive that, "(T)he 'women's estate' was a 
topic of law of such magnitude that it occupied sixty pages in the
current edition of Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage.": "A Strange Rule
..." op. cit., at 218 f,n.2.
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Consideration must also be given to the opinion of those excep­
tionally gifted jurists who, despite the generally hostile attitude 
towards women's proprietary rights, nevertheless had the courage of 
their convictions to declare in no uncertain terms in their judgments 
that, on a correct interpretation of the smrti texts, there could be no 
upholding of the denial of proprietary rights to women. If we examine the 
dicta of West J., in Vijiarangam v. Lakshmanam,^  it is clear that, 
in his view the restrictions on the widow's power of alienation qac.not
incompatible with her proprietary right, while East, C.J. 's judgment
2
in Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurroosoondry Dossi, is in effect a cogent and 
succinct plea in defence of the widow's rights of inheritance. He holds
"(T)hat the widow should have the whole property of the 
husband, that is, the right of property, and not merely 
the use of the whole, or any aliquot part of it, vested 
in her, and yet that she should be enjoined by law not to 
commit waste of it, is altogether a consistent proposition... 
so far as relates the widow's power of disposition over the 
husband's estate being under the control of his kindred, as 
her guardians, it is consistent with the prohibition 
against waste by her..." 3
His Lordship further maintains that, the directions contained in the
apparently contradictory texts
"(W)hereby her use and enjoyment of her husband's estate, 
without waste of it, are taken put of her own control, 
and transferred, with her person, under the full power i
of her husband's kindred," 4
are merely monitory, not rules of law, and
"(i)n order therefore, to avoid gross inconsistencies and 
contradictions, and yet to reconcile these doctrines with 
each other, I can find no better way than to consider her 
as having the entire right of property vested in her, both 
in the moveable and immoveable estate; for there is no 
distinction between them taken in the books in respect of 
the husband's estate devolving upon her as heir, as there 
is in the case of male succession to ancestral property..." 5
She may be legally prohibited from wasting; she may not make
1. (1871) Bom. H.C.R. (O.C.J.) 244 at 264-5.
2. (1819) 2 Mor. Dig. 199.
3. Ibid, at 214.
4. Ibid, at 215. 5. Ibid.
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away with it without the consent of her husband's kindred; she may 
even he religiously and morally enjoined to use moderation, but, the 
learned Chief Justice insists, she "is under no legal disability if 
she do not take or follow such advice."^
7. The Role of the Privy Council in Establishing the Limited Estate 
Notwithstanding such dissident opinions, and such little evidence 
as the smyti authorities indicate in support of the limited estate, 
the Privy Council, patently ignoring the authority of the Kitaksara, 
preferred the doctrine of the Dayabhaga; and the result has
been that females governed by the Benaras school have been subjected 
to the restrictions and limitations of the Bengal school, while the 
privileges enjoyed by the Bengal females of inheriting from their male 
relatives even when they were joint or reunited, were denied to the 
former, thus depriving them of their substantial rights without any 
compensation. As a result of this unfortunate interpretation, case 
law on the subject, as we have already indicated earlier, is formi­
dable, and within the scope of this brief summary one can at best 
merely draw attention to some of those decisions in the Mitaksara
territory which established the widow's estate as we know it today.
2
In Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata, the contention
was that the Hindu widow has an estate of inheritance, not a life-
estate, the original estate devolving on her in a course of succession
derived from the husband who had in him an estate of inheritance, which
3
she takes as heir. However the Privy Council considered it "clear" 
that under the Hindu law the widow, though she takes as heir, takes a 
special and qualified estate. Their Lordships took it as "admitted on 
all hands" that the widow cannot of her own will alien the property
1. Ibid, at 216.
2. (i860) 8 M.I.A. 529.
3. Ibid, at550.
4. Ibid.
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except for religious and charitable purposes, or those which are 
supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband. For such 
reasons, she has a larger power of disposition than that which she 
possesses for purely worldly purposes, and to support an alienation for 
the last, she must show necessity. The reason for the restriction on the 
widow's power is, in the opinion of their Lordships, not merely the 
protection of the material interests of her husband's relations, but the 
state of perpetual tutelage to which every woman is subject according to 
various authorities from Manu downwards.’*' This it is submitted, is in 
direct contravention of the Mitakgara authority by which the parties to 
the suit were governed where there is nothing by way of a distinction 
between the estate acquired by a male and that acquired by a female.
The Judicial Committee took the same view in Mst. Thakoor v.
2 _Raj Baluch Ram, and ignoring the explicit direction of the Mitak?ara
3
to the contrary, was of the opinion that the texts of Narada and 
4Katyayana must prevail, and ruled that
"(T)he result of the authorities seems to be that... 
she (the widow) is... restricted from alienating any 
immoveable property which she has so inherited, and 
that on her death the immoveable property and the move- 
able, if she has not otherwise disposed of it, pass 
to the next heirs of her husband." 5
Again in Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee,^  their Lordships
1. No doubt texts in derogation of female rights, and attributed to 
Manu abound, but it is noteworthy at this stage to refer, also 
to the authority of Manu to the effect that, "(T)he enumeration 
of six sorts of woman's property by Manu (...) is intended not
as a restriction of a greater number, but as a denial of a
less.": Mit., II.XI.4, op. cit. It is also pointed out in the 
Mit. that, "(T)he text of Nclrada, which declares the dependence 
of women ("A woman has no right to independence."), is not 
incompatible with their acceptance of property; even admitting 
their thraldom.": Mit., II.1.25* op. cit.
2. (1886) 11 M.I.A. 139.
3. "In the disposal of property by gifts or otherwise, she is subject
to the control of her husband's family, after his decease, and
in default of sons.": Cited at Daya, XI.I.64.
l+m Supra, at 222.
5. Mst. Thakoor v. Rai Baluch Ram, cited above, at 175-
6. (1867) 11 M.I.A. ^87.
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dismissed the argument that, according to the Mitaksara property-
inherited by a widow was her stridhana by referring to the text of
Katyclyana, and further elaborated:
"(T)he reasons for the restrictions which the Hindoo law 
imposes on the widow*s dominion over her inheritance from 
her husband, whether founded on her natural dependence on 
others, her duty to lead an ascetic life, or on the impolicy 
of allowing the wealth of one family to pass to another, are 
as applicable to personal property invested so as to yield 
an income as they are to land." 1
Decisions such as these settled the issue, and in British India
and even thereafter, the "limited" estate - the brain child of the
Privy Council - had come to stay, and this despite numerous opinions
of pandits learned in the sastrie lore to the contrary. One such
particularly illuminating opinion, the Devara-suta-sapatni-suta-dhana-
vivadah has recently come to light, and is revealing in so far as in
dealing with the very general question of the estate which a widow
takes in the property left by her divided husband and the connected
question, who shall take it on her death, the scholar makes it clear
that it was not the smyti alone to which recourse must be had, but the
smytis as a whole seen through the eyes of the superior commentators
2
or, as he prefers to call them, "digesters" or codifiers.
Of the many sources on which the author relies, the Mitakgara, the
Smyti Chandrika etc, the most interesting is the little - known Daya- 
da£a-sloki-vyakhya. Compiled in the early British period, and influenced 
by Bengali works of dharmasastra its probable date is 1796 for that year 
very closely coiv\C«.deawith the development of a real need in Madras
I*
Presidency for accurate short works on the Hindu law of inheritance.
Our researcher assigns "with great diffidence" and only 
"tentatively" this opinion to an act'll and well-known piece of
1. rbid,, at 513.
2. Derrett, "The Bights of Inheritance...," o£. cit., at 3^ 2.
3. For a transliterated version of the .Sanskrit text see Derrett,
ECMHL, Vol. II op. cit., at 353-83-
Derrett, "The Rights of Inheritance...," op. cit. , at 3^ 7-
-249-
litigation, the very long-drawn-out case of Katama Nat chi er (known 
as the Shivagunga Case)'*' which involved a dispute between the widows 
and daughters of the donee of a Zamindari on the one hand, and his 
nephews on the other. The precise form of the Opinion, relating as it 
does to a state of facts after the death of the surviving widow which 
took place in 184-9» and the fact that the Opinion was required, and 
that it was given and set out in the form in which we find it proves 
that it belongs to the British period in the first half of the 19th 
century, perhaps I83O-I85O.
A work of consummate research and reflection, it also possessed 
an undoubtedly authoritative character of some kind for the author to
have put that very late work first amongst his authorities, though
admittedly this may partly be explained by the appropriateness of the 
text for his purposes. The work starts by caricaturing the point of 
view of the opponent, who tries to make respectable the doctrine of 
the ’’limited estate” and the reversion of the estate through perhaps 
two female hands to the next heir of the propositus, going too far 
in that he asserts on this principle that even male heirs must take a 
limited estate, so that the inheritance will never come to rest, which 
is a reductio ad absurdum. It proceeds to demonstrate that only if 
inherited estates of women are taken to be stridhana, exactly as the 
Mitaksara said, could a whole series of anomalies be avoided, a series 
arising from a failure of the opponent's theory to accord with actual 
practice. Having established that the property is stridhana he 
proceeds to consider what right the co-wife's daughter would have com­
pared with that of the husband's predeceased brother's son. The texts
1. (1863) 9 M.I.A. 543.
2. Derrett, ’’The Rights of Inheritance... _op. cit., at j-43*
3. Ibid., p. 347.
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which point to the latter as a claimant, seeing that the deceased 
widow is one of his "secondary” mothers are upheld. Texts pointing to 
the nearer heirs of the husband, in particular a "Brahmin" co-wife's 
daughter are carefully put to one side, ... Thus, obviating one 
objection after another, he demonstrates the seemingly paradoxical 
hypothesis, namely that the co-wife's daughter (who may have been treated as 
a daughter and was surely the nearest surviving relative of the propositus 
to whose family the deceased widow herself belonged by her marriage) is 
to be excluded by the deceased husband's divided brother's son.*
As we know, our author's proposition was rejected*the Privy Council
view prevailed, and the Madras judiciary with the rest of India were
committed to the view that a woman inherited for a limited estate.
The Privy Council piled error on error by making the inheritance taken
even from a female proposita the subject of the limited estate. (Sheo
Shanker v. Debi Sahai).^  What was once stridhana could never pass as
2such, from one heir to the next.
That such a state of affairs was never envisaged by the ancient 
rsis did not unduly perturb the British Indian Bench, and in fact 
apologists were not slow to reconcile the palpable anomaly by facile 
and apparently convincing logic. We are told that
"(l)n assigning a motive for the ordinance that a widow should 
succeed to her husband, and at the same time that she should 
be deprived of the advantages enjoyed by a tenant for life 
even, it seems most consistent with probability that it 
originated in a desire to secure against all the contigencies, 
a provision for the helpless widow, and thereby prevent her 
from having recourse to practices by which the fame and honour 
of the family might be tarnished. By giving her nominal 
property, she acquires considerations and responsibility and 
by making her the depository of the wealth, she is guarded 
against the neglect and cruelty of her husband's relations.
At the same time, by limiting her power, a barrier is raised
against the effects of female improvidence and worldly
experience. This opinion receives corroboration from the 
distinction which prevails in the Banares school which may 
be said to be the fountain and source of all Hindu law." 3
1. I.L.R. (1903) 25 All. 468.
2. Derrett, "The Rights of Inheritance...," _op. cit. , at 35^ -2.
3. W.H. Macnagjiten, Principles and Precedents of Hindu law, Vol. I,
(Cal. Baptist Mission Press, 1829) , at 19-20.
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It is submitted with the greatest respect for the learned 
scholar's undoubted erudition that in fact the reverse is true, and 
such an opinion is in gross violation of the very spirit of the Benares 
school, which, in the author's own assertion, is "the fountain and 
source of all Hindu law.” What is more, to maintain that, by securing 
for her the limited estate, provision is thereby made for the hapless 
widow, her chastity secured, and neglect and cruelty on the part of 
her husband's relatives debarred, is to attribute to this artificial 
institution a panoply of merits it hardly deserves. It must be borne 
in mind that when the widow is not an heir, the humane spirit of 
the Hindu law allows her an inherent right of maintenance, thereby 
already protecting her from destitution and its attendant evils, so 
far as such provision may be effective in the face of temptations 
that flesh is subject to, and the shortcomings and failures of human 
nature in general.
8. The Incidents of the Limited Estate as Established by Case-Law
There is a large body of case law which determines the precise 
nature of the limited estate, and what their Lordships of the Privy 
Council had to say as early as 1880^ in regard to it, was reiterated
1. In Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany, (l88o) L.R. 7 I.A. 115» if 
was held at 15^  that "(T)he~whole estate is for the time vested in 
her absolutely for some purposes, though in some respects for 
only a qualified interest. Her estate is an anomalous one, and 
has been compared to that of a tenant-in-tail. It would perhaps 
be more correct to say that she holds an estate of inheritance to 
herself and the heirs of her husband.... The succession does not 
open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the 
widow's estate. Upon the termination of the estate, the property 
descends to those who would have been heirs of the husband if he 
had lived up to and died at the moment of her death." To the same 
effect is the observation in Janki Ammal v. ITarayanswami, (1916)
L.R. ^3 I.A. 207 at 209 ”(H)er right is of the nature of the right 
of property; her possession is that of owner: her powers in that 
character are however limited;..."
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by the Supreme Court in 1974;
"(A) Hindu widow is entitled to the full beneficial 
enjoyment of the estate. So long as she is not guilty 
of wilful waste, 1 she is answerable to no one... 
Within the limits imposed upon her the female holder 
has the most absolute power of enjoyment and is 
accountable to no one. She fully represents the 
estate, and so long as she is alive, no one has any 
vested interest in the succession... She is in no 
sense a trustee for those who may come after her. She 
is not bound to save the income nor to invest the 
principal. 2 If she accumulated it separately from 
the estate itself it passed on her death as stridhana. 3 
During her lifetime she represents the whole inheritance 
and a decision by or against the widow as representing 
the estate is binding on the reversionary heirs. It is 
the death of the female owner that opens the inheritance 
to the reversioners, and the one most nearly related at 
the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to 
possession. In her lifetime however the reversionary
1. Such waste must constitute danger to the corpus; Hurrydoss v. 
Sreemutty Uppoornah, (1856) 6 M.I.A. 433; Katama Natchiar v. 
Doraisingha {1875) L.R. 2 I.A. 169} Renuka v. Bhola Nath, l.L.R.
(1915) 37 All. 177; Janaki Ammal v. Narayanswami, cited above; 
Ramchandra v. Seeniathal, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 1011. Mere unfounded 
charges of waste would not entitle the next presumptive reversioner 
to obtain an injunction to restrain wastes Smt. Lalti v. Hira Lai, 
A.I.R. 1963 All. 392 following Janaki Ammal v. Narayanswami, cited 
above. It has also been held that mere alienation is not waste 
and no injunction can be granted against a limited owner making
an unauthorised alienation; Isri Putt v. Hansbuti, (188*+) L.R. 10 
I.A. 150; Suraj Narain v. Ram Devi, A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 78; and the 
actual reversioner may sue the alienee for possession only when the 
estate has vested in him on the death of the limited owner; Bi joy 
Gopal v. Krishna, l.L.R. (1907) 34 Cal. 329; Raghubir Singh v.
Jethu, A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 130; Anant v. Ashtabhuja, (1957) 55 All.
L.J. 55.
2. Grose v. Amritamayi, (I869) 4 Beng. L. R.1 (Q.C.J.); Biswanath v. 
Khantomani, (I87O) 6 Beng. L. R. 747; Sarat Chandra v. Charusila,
l.L.R. (1928) 55 Cal. 9l8.Kishan Lai v. Muhammad, l.L.R. (193&)
All. 761 (F.B.). *
3. Where the widow manifested no intention separately to enjoy the 
accumulation, the Privy Council held in Nabakishore v. Upendra- 
kishore, A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 39, that, it was incumbent on the 
stridhana heirs to prove that she did not intend to merge the 
accumulations or to allow them to accure to the parent estate. See 
also Ram v. Krishna, A.I.R. 1939 Pat. 3^ 4; Bhagwan v. Bitton, A.I.R. 
19^5 All. 148. However, the contrary presumption —  that the 
burden of showing that she had merged or blended it with the estate 
lay on the one who asserted it —  was laid down in Venkatadri v. 
Parthasarathi, A.I.R. 1925 P»C. 105 at 108-9; on appeal from the 
F.B. decision in Parthasarathy v. Venkatadri, A.I.R,' 1922 Mad. 457 
(F.B.); Keshav v. Maruti, A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 144; Ayiswaryanandaji v. 
Sivaji, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. Balasubramanya v. Subbayya, A.I.R.
1938 F. c. 34; Ganu v. Shriram, A.I.R. 1954 Nag. 353; Tustu v. Kali 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 122; and the dicta of the Supreme Court in SitS.ji v.
P.T.O.
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right is a mere possibility or spes successionis. It
cannot be predicted who would be the nearest reversioner 
at the time of her death..." 2
the subsisting reversioner has no transferable interest in the estate - 
for he may die before the estate falls to the reversion.
Decisions such as these establish that under the Hindu law, a 
widow takes a special and qualified estate with limited powers of dis­
position in her husband's estate. In fact it is of the very essence of 
such estate that her right of alienation over it is limited. So long 
as the estate endured the female owner could give a good and absolute 
title to a purchaser for value for a purpose coming within one of the 
following classes of justification:- (i) for necessity, i.e. her own 
needs, (ii) for the benefit of the estate, i.e. to prevent its loss,
Bijendra, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 601 at 605» points in the same direction. 
The latter view, it is submitted, is eminently more logical, for as 
Derrett pinpoints, "If the other view were to be correct, reversioners 
could question a widow's alienation of accumulations of income from 
the estate if the alienee were unable to show that she had formed an 
intention to sever them from the estate prior to the disputed aliena­
tion - which can hardly be correct."* IMHL, op. cit., at 429.
1. This was also the Privy Council's ruling in Honiram Kolita v. Kerry 
Kolitany, (1880) L.R. 7 I* A. 115» 154 where their Lordships were
explicit that,"... whatever her estate is, it is clear that until 
the termination of it, it is impossible to say who are the persons 
who will be entitled to succeed as heirs to her husband." To the 
same effect are the observations in a host of decisions, among them: 
(Mahadeay Kooer v. Haruk Narain), l.L.R. (1883) 9 Cal. 244, *
Anandibai v. Rajaram, l.L.R (I89&) 22 Bom. 984 Venkatanarayan v. 
Subbammal, (1915) L. R* 42 I.A. 125? Janaki Ammal v. Narayanswami-
(1916) L. R. 43 I.A. 207; Amrit Narayan v. Gaya Singh, (1918) L.R/ 45
I. A. 35* Rangaswami v. Nachiappa, (1919) L.R*. 46 iTa. 72? Gangabal v. 
Hari Ganesh, 1. L. R. (1921) 45 Bom. II67? Chhotey Singh v. Surat Singh,
1. L. R. (1936) 5 Luck. 691? Thakur Prasad v. Musammat Dipa Kuer, l.L. R. 
(1931) 10 Pat. 352? Ram Krishna v. Kausalya, A.I.R. 1935 C3-!- 689? 
lakshmi v. Anantharama, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 699? Subbareddi v. Govin- 
dareddi, A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 49.
2. Qurunnirthy v. Ayyappa, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1702, at 1706.
3. Thus where the income be not sufficient for her maintenance, the 
alienation of the corpus by the widow has been held to be for legal 
necessity. See Sadashiv v. Dhakubai, l.L.R. (l88l) 5 Bom. 450; 
Venkataraju v. Kotayya, (1912) 23 M.L.J. 223? Ramsumran v. Shyam 
Kumari, A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 356? Darbari Lai v. Gobind, I.L.R. (1924)
46 All. 822? Rajagopal Achariar v. Sami, A.I.R. 1926 Had. 517. Legal 
necessity would also include alienation for pious purposes. Vhere the 
recipient of the endowment was a temple, it was held in Kothandaraja v. 
Pirama&esam, (1981) 1 M.L.J. 344 that, notwithstanding the widow's 
reserving of the right to enjoy the income for her life, it was a pre­
sent disposition, and being for pious and religious purposes, it was 
unimpeachable after her death.
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destruction, diminution in value (though she was under no positive
obligation to save it from ruin);^ (iii) for the fulfilment of
obligations which lay upon the last male holder, for example the duty
2
to give his daughter and his son's daughter in marriage or to pay 
the deceased husband's untainted debts, even if these had in fact
r> _
become time-barred, or to perform the funeral and iraddha ceremonies
4of the deceased owner.
For purposes such as these she may alienate the entire property 
if need be. Whether or not a particular alienation falls within such 
category depends on the merits of each case. All that can be said is 
that if she can establish that the alienation was made in accordance 
with such necessity then the alienation would be valid, not in form, 
perhaps in substance. The only entire safeguard enjoyed by a 
purchaser against later reversionary claims is that.he had made
1. Hunoomanpersaud's caset (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393? see also Karneswar 
Pershad v. Run Bahadur, (1882) L.R. 8 I.A.8.
2. Ramcoomar v. Ichamoyi, I.L.R. (1880) 6 Cal. 36; Debi Dayal v.
Bhan Pertap, l.L.R. (1904) 31 Cal. 433? Makhan v. Gayan, l.L.R.
(1911) 33 All. 255? Ganpat v. Tulsiram, l.L.R. (1912; 36 Bom. 88; 
Bhagwati v. Ram Jatan, l.L.R. (1923) 45 All. 297; Mahadeo Prasad v. 
Musammat Dhanraj, l.L.R. (1926; 1 Luck. 477? Kamla v. Bachulal,
A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 434. However, the expenses incurred in giving a 
daughter's daughter in marriage does not come within the same 
category. Where the widow alienated property to meet the marriage v 
expenses of her daughter's daughter, the M.P. High Court, following 
Narairibatl v. Ramdhari, A.I.R. 1916 Pat. 178» upheld the contention 
of the next reversioner and laid down that, an alienation made by
a widow for the marriage of her grand-daughter (daughter's daughter), 
cannot be regarded to be for legal necessity, for there is no ob­
ligation which the Hindu law imposes on a woman to get such grand­
daughter married.: lachan v. Mst. Fulkunwar, l.L.R. (1959) M.P. 970.
3. Chimnaji v. Dinkar, l.L.R. (1887) 11 Bom. 320; Kondappa v. Subba, 
l.L.R. (1890) 13 Mad. 189; Santu Ram v. Mt. Dodam Bai, l.L.R. (1928)
9 Lah. 85? Tulshi v. Jugmohanlal, A.I.R. 1934 All. 1048; Chandrika 
v. Bhagwan, A.I.R. 1940 0udh 93 at 95? Rattan Devi v. Jagadhar,
A.I.R. 1956 Punj. 46.
4. Lakshminarayana v. Dasu, l.L.R. (1888) 11 Mad. 288; Ratanchand v. 
Javherchand, 1. L. R. (1898) 22 Bom. 818; Srimohan v. Brijbehary,
l.L.R. (I9O8) 36 Cal. 753.
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sufficient bona fide inquiry into the existence of justification of
such alienation, and the burden of proof of justification lies on the
alienee.^ One might suppose that if the purchaser did not make
sufficient bona fide inquiry that alone would disqualify him from
retaining any interest in the estate after the limited owner's interest
dropped. But the courts had to find some place in the scheme for the
ancient customary practice whereby the alienations by females were
authorised and consented to by near male relations: it was evident that
parties relied in some sense upon these authorisations or consents, and
this fact had to be harmonized with the equitable principle enunciated
2
in Hunoomanpersaud's case The result was that if the presumptive 
reversioner gave his consent, the latter was held to raise a presump­
tion ( .') that the alienation was justified,-^  and the burden of proof
1. Hunoomanpersaudfs case (1856) 6 M. I.A. 393.
2. Ibid. In this celebrated case the question was as to the extent of
the power of the mother as manager of the estate of her minor son 
to alienate the estate. The Privy Council held at Jj-23-^  that,
"(T)he power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate
not (her) own is under the Hindu law a limited and qualified power.
It can only be exercised rightly in case of need or for the benefit 
of the estate. ... Their Lordships do not think that a bona fide 
creditor should suffer when he has acted honestly and with due 
caution but is himself deceived."
3. The notion current at one time was that consent itself validated v 
an alienation and it was therefore not open to any reversioner, 
whether then in existence or not, and whether he had himself con­
sented to it or not, to question the alienation. See for instance 
Varjiwan v. Ghelji, I.L.R. (1881) 5 Bom. 5^ 3; Bajrangi v. Manokamika, 
l.L~R (1908) 30 All. 1; Rangappa v. Kamati, l.L.R. (1908) 31 Mad.
366. The view that consent does not give force per se was first ten­
tatively put forward in Collector of Mqsulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata, 
(i860) 8 M.I.A. 529* where it was explained at 551 that, "... it
may be taken as established that an alienation by her, (the widow), 
which will not otherwise be legitimate, may become so if made with 
the consent of her husband's kindred. But it surely is not the 
necessary or logical consequence of this latter proposition that,
... the fetter on the widow's power of alienation altogether drops." 
This attitude was corroborated subsequently in Raj hukhee v. Gokool 
Chunder, (I869) 13 M.I.A. 209; Sham Sunder v. Achan Kunwar, (1898)
L.R. 25 I.A. 183; Vinayak v. Govind, l.L.R. (1901) 25 Bom. 129;
Debi Pros ad v. Golap Bhagat, l.L.R. (1913) 40 Cal. 721; Bijoy Go pal v. 
Girindra Hath, 1. L.R. (191*0 4l Cal. 793;Bhup Singh v, Jhamman Singh,
l.L.R. (1921) **4 All. 95; Thakur Prasad v. Mst“Dipa Kuer, l.L.R (1930)
P.T.O.
would then he placed on the actual reversioner when he came into his
inheritance to show that the alienee had not acted bona fide,and that the
alienation had in fact been for an improper purpose.^ Collusion
between the female owner and the next reversioner was indirectly
encouraged, however.
It must be clearly emphasised at this stage that the limitations
imposed on the widow's estate are in theory not imposed upon her for
the benefit of reversioners. They are inseparable from her estate, so
that even if there be no reversioners she cannot alienate the corpus
of the property except for a legal necessity. If she does alienate
it without legal necessity, and if there be no reversioners, the
alienation may be set aside by the Government taking the property 
2
by escheat.
Within the limits imposed upon her by law, the widow has the most
3
absolute powers of enjoyment. She can sell her life interest in the 
property, or mortgage it or make a gift of it to anyone she likes. She 
is entitled to the whole income of the property. She may spend the 
income in any way she likes. She is not bound to pay her husband's 
debt out of such income, nor is she bound to maintain the members of
10 Pat. 352. However the most authoritative pronouncement is that 
of the Privy Council in Rangaswami v. Nachiappa, (1919) L.R. k6 
I.A. 72, Lord Dunedin stating at 81-2 that, (C)onsent does not 
give force per se but is of evidential value —  evidence that the 
alienation was under circumstances which rendered it lawful and 
valid."
1. Derrett, M L ,  o£. cit., at 3^2. See a Is o, Hunoo manpe rs aud' s cas e, 
£1856) 6 M.I.A. 393; Cavaly Vencata v. Collector of Kasulipatam, 
(1867) 11 M.I.A. 619; Rap Karun v. Nawab Mohamed, (1871) 1^ M.I.A. 
187; Iala Amamath v. Achan Kuar, (I892) L.R. 19 I.A. 196; Ram 
Nayak v. Mst. Rup Kali, A.I.R. 193^ All. 557-
2. Collector of Mosulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata, cited above.
3. Vasonji v. Chanda Bibi, A.I.R. 1915 18. See also Gimmirthy
v. Ayyappa, A.I.R. 197^ S.C. 1702.
4. Hurrydoss v. Uppoomah, (I856) 6 M.I.A. 3^3*
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her husband 's family or perform their marriage ceremonies out of the
income. She can throw the burden of all these charges on the corpus of
the property, and sell or mortgage the same to meet those expenses,
such expenses being regarded in law as legal necessities.^ If the
income from the estate is insufficient for her own maintenance she is
2
entitled to alienate the corpus by way of sale or mortgage.
Similarly her powers of management over the property are unlimited 
in so far as she is entitled to manage it as any prudent owner of pro­
perty, and like the manager of a family, must be allowed reasonable
3
latitude in the exercise of her powers. She fully represents the 
if
estate for the time being, and this being so, she must in the nature 
of the circumstances, enter into transactions from time to time for 
the proper management of the estate. She may for instance incur debt 
for lawful purposes, or enter into transactions giving rise to pecu­
niary liabilities in respect of which she could validly create a charge 
upon the estate, and such debt or charge would be binding on the es­
tate even in the hands of the reversioners.-^  A compromise^ entered
1. Devi Dayal v. Bhan Pertap, I.L.R. (190**) 31 Cal **33.
2. Ramsumran v. Shyam Kumari, A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 356. In Rangamma v. 
Chinnabbayi (1956)2 An. W.R 202, it was further held that when a 
widow succeeded to the separate property of her deceased husband 
who died a member of a joint-family, she could also claim main­
tenance from the income to the joint-family property in the hands 
of the husband's coparceners. She being in possession of her 
husband's separate property, she is bound to pay herself the pro 
rata maintenance exigible from the property and her claim would 
stand discharged to that extent. As a consequence, her husband's 
share in the joint estate in the hands of the surviving copar­
ceners would be liable only for the balance of the maintenance.
3. Hunoomanpersaud's case, (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393» see also Venkaji v. 
Vishnu, I. L.R. (189**) 18 Bom. 53** at 536.
**. Radharani v. Brindarani, A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 392; Viraraju v.
Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 98.
5- Bisheshwar Baksh v. Jang Bahadur. A. I. R. 1930 Oudh. 225-
6. Such compromise may be by way of a family arrangement which is an 
agreement between members of the same family intended to be
P.T.O.
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into bona fide for the benefit of the.estate is binding upon the
reve^ UoAt*, if prudent and reasonable under the circumstances of the
case.^ An alienation which is the result of a compromise, will, if it
be reasonable and prudent, fall within the power of the holder of the
Hindu woman's estate, either as being an alienation which is to be
deemed to be induced by necessity, or as being in a parallel position
2
to an alienation induced by necessity.
generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by 
compromising doubtful and disputed rights, or by preserving the 
family property, or the peace and security of the family by avoid­
ing litigation or by saving its honour. : Halsbuxy's laws of England, 
Vol. 18,5th ed. ,(Lond, Butterworths, 1979)* at 135*
1. Khunni Ial v. Gobind Krishna, I.L.R. (1911) 33 All. 356? Hiran Bibi 
v. Sohan Bibi, (1914) 18 C.W.N. 929; Mohendranath v. Shamsunissa, 
(1915) 19 C.W.N. 1280? Bahadur Singh v. Ram Bahadur, l.L.R. (1923)
45 All. 277* Ramsumram Prasad v. Shyam Kumari, A.I.R. 1922 P.O. 35&i 
Mata Prasad v. Nageshwar. A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 272; Sidh Goual v. Behari 
Lai, A.I.R. 1928 All. 65; Raoji v. Kunjalal, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 1^ 3; 
Joti Prasad v. Bahai Singh, l.L.R. (l$fe>) All. 1.
2. Ramsumram Prasad v. Shyam Kumari, cited abovej Babulal v. Maniklal, 
A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 79. However, there were not infrequent instances 
where, anxious to anticipate, the reversioner often came to terms 
with the widow. If he had not done so, the next reversioner might 
have survived him and come into the inheritance. By such an arrange­
ment the widow too stood to gain, for it meant an enlargement of
her interest from a limited to an absolute interest over that part 
of the property which fell to her as her share under such an arrange­
ment. Only overtly intended to preserve the estate from ruinous 
litigation the equitable organ of the Family Arrangement thus be­
came the means whereby Equity is called upon to endorse a fraud.: 
J.D.M. Derrett, "Family Arrangements in Developing Countries",
"Family Law in Asia and Africa, op. cit., I56-I8I, at 168-9. How­
ever judicial decisions amply testify that as early as I883 and 1884*, 
the Judiciary could gauge with precision and exactness, how Equity 
was being prayed in aid for the practice of fraud, and held in 
unambiguous language that equitable principles may not override the 
personal law. Thus in Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari, l.L.R. (1883)
6 All. 116 (F.B.), the ruling was to the effect that there is 
nothing in the Hindu law to sanction the view that a Hindu widow 
possessed of limited rights, may by uniting with one of many others 
having identical interests in expectancy on the happening of a 
certain event, anticipate that event and convert such individual 
expectancy into an immediate absolute estate of full proprietorship. 
For, if this were possible, it would virtually confer upon a Hindu 
widow the right of directing the succession to her husband's pro­
perty in her lifetime, when in law it is only upon her death. Simi­
larly the fraud inherent in such arrangements was sharply pin-pointed 
in Nobokishore v. Hari Nath, l.L. R. (1884) 10 Cal. 1102 (F.B.), where 
Garth, C.J. , in exposing the iniquitous designs associated with such
P.T.O.
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9- The Termination of the Limited Estate
As we have already noted earlier, the limited estate endures till
the death of the widow after which it passes on, not to her heir hut
to the next heir of her husband, i.e. the nearest reversioner. However
even during her lifetime contingencies may occur resulting in the
termination of such estate. Where a posthumous son is bom, or where
the widow herself, or the widow of a predeceased coparcener adopts, or
where she remarries, she is divested of such estate.
In addition to these, the widow's estate may also terminate by
reason of the device of surrender, e-* » withdrawal from
worldly affairs resulting in civil "death".^ She accelerated, inde-
2pendently of any volition of the next reversioner, the opening of the
fraudulent practices pointed out that it often happens that a 
widow who is anxious to turn her husband's estate into money may 
arrange with the next heir of her husband for the time being to 
alienate the estate to some third person for their mutual benefit, 
and thereby deprive the next male heir of the deceased husband at 
the time of the widow's death. Such clear-sightedness, it is 
submitted, is laudatory, not only in the exposition of the law, 
but also in view of the fact that if the family arrangement is an 
organ of Equity for the general benefit of all concerned, it is 
but fair that it should not be misused for fraudulent purposes, 
and equally that equitable principles should be applied so as to 
protect the rights of those who might otherwise be defrauded. For 
decisions, where the family arrangement was held not binding on 
those whose claims arose on the expiry of the widow's limited es­
tate, see Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koerry, (1882) 10 C.L.R. *•
337* Ram Sarup v. Ram Dei, l.L.R. (1907) 29 All. 239; Sashi Kanta 
v. Promode Chandra. A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 600; Angumuthu v. Sinnapennamal 
A.I.R. 193b Mad. 36*4-; Seethaiamma v. Patta Reddi, A.I.R. 1940 Mad.
739; Ekkari v. Chitrarekha, A.I.R. 195# Cal. 447•
1. Rangaswami v. Nachiappa, (1919) L.R. 46 I.A. 72; Santi Kumar v.
Mukanda Lai, (193*0 39 C.W.N. 226, Kamlabai v. Sheo, A.I.R. 1958
S.C. 914.
2. Kamlabai v. Sheo, cited above. Of course, in fact she often "did 
a deal" with him and thus cheated the remainder of the reversion, 
and the Courts recognising this have held that the surrender must 
be a bona fide surrender, and not a device to divide the estate 
with the reversioner. See Behari Ial v. Madho Lai, 1. L. R. (1891-2)
19 Cal 236; Rangappa v. Kamti, l.L. R. (1908) 31 Fad. 366; Thakur 
Prasad v. Mt. Dipa Kuer. A.I.R. 1931 Pat. 442; Ramayya v. Iakshmayya»
l.L.R. (19^ 3) Mad* 1 (P.C.); Ashalata v. Amiya Kumar. A.I.r! 1956 
Cal. 71.
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succession to that next heir. A surrender to he valid must he of the entire
a 4f i
estate for there cannot he a widow who is partly effaced and partly not so.
Likewise a conditional surrender was impossible. A surrender arranged
upon terms that parts of the estate were to pass to nominees of the
limited owner were invalid as mere devices to divide the estate between
the limited owner and the presumptive reversioner, to defraud the
2
reversion as a whole. Even when the surrender is not a device to 
divide the estate, hut is one where the widow surrenders to her own 
nominee with the express consent of the presumptive reversioner, such 
surrender would he invalid* it would he tantamount to a gift unautho­
rised by law in which the consent of the presumptive reversioner would
3
not preclude the impeaching of the transaction by the actual reversioner.
10. The Abolition of the Limited Estate
The statutory demise of the limited estate was effected on 17
June, 1956, when the Legislature in pursuance of the express aim of the
4
Constitution to accord equality of status and of opportunity to all in
1. Rangaswami v. Nachiappa, (1919) L. R. 46 I.A. 72* at 80.
2. Krishnamurthi v. Seshayya, (19*44) 1 M.L.J. 4*13. Mummareddi v.
Durairaja, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 109; Abbireddlgari v. At la, A.I.R. v 
1955 A.P. 232 (F.B.). In view of decisions such as these, the 
ruling in Challa v. Palury, l.L.R. (1908) 31 Mad. 446, that the 
validity of the widow’s renunciation is independent of the validity
of the agreement between her and the surrenderee as to the subse­
quent disposal of part of that property to a nominee of the widow, 
cannot be regarded as good law.
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 442. See Manju Ial v. Jagnandan, A.I.R. 
1953 All. 78, where a composite deed of surrender and gift of the 
entire property was executed by the widow to the nearest rever­
sioner which was then gifted to the widow's nominee. The court 
rightly held that the second joint gift clearly indicated that the 
alleged surrender was not genuinely contemplated, but was merely
a cloak considered necessary to validate the transfer of property 
to one in whom the widow was interested. It is however submitted 
that had the surrender and the gift not formed a composite deed, 
and the surrender/followed by the gift, the validity of the gift ^  
could not be impeached, for the presumptive reversioner would be 
master of the estate after a valid surrender. The S.C. confirms 
this in Mummareddi v. Durairaja, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 109*
4. Preamble.
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the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India,^ and in partial fulfilment 
of the promise of a uniform civil code in Article 44, enacted the HSA,
1956, s. 14 (l) of which proclaimed in ringing tones that "any" pro­
perty in the female Hindu's possession, and whether acquired by her 
before or after the Act, would henceforth be her absolute property, 
free from the restrictions on her right of ownership which the tradi- 
tional law —  reinforced by judicial interpretation —  had imposed 
upon her.
However, that is not to say that the problem was immediately
resolved. The words "restricted estate" in sub-s. (2) of s. 14 came
into play, and at one time there was a considerable body of opinion —
in Madras in particular which, in any case, "has a record of ingenious
2constructions to women's disadvantage", and its satellite State,
Andhra Pradesh —  where the view prevailed that a right to maintenance 
is not by itself a right to property, and as such, if any rights in 
the property of her husband, or in the joint-family property are ac­
quired by a Hindu woman in lieu of her maintenance, she obtains pro­
perty for the first time, and notwithstanding the fact that property 
is transferred to her in lieu of a pre-existing right, if the document under 
which she acquires the right restricts the estate which she would other- v 
wise get under the Hindu law, she would get a "restricted estate" within 
the meaning of s. 14 (2). On the other hand, if the transfer is only 
in lieu of a pre-existing right of maintenance, and the terms and 
conditions imposed are consistent with that, she would get an absolute 
estate under s. 14 (l) . In other words, this view, it is submitted,
1. Ibid. It is to be noted that since 1950» ar*d as a result of the
amendment of 1976, the Preamble proclaims India to be a Sovereign 
Socialist Secular Democratic Republic.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA: A Gratifying About-Face in
Madras," (1976) . S.C. (j), 51-53. at 52.
3. Gopisetti v. Subbarayudu, (1968) 2 An.W.R. 455. at 468.
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rests upon two false assumptions :(l) a right to be maintained is not 
a right to property, (2) the only estate to be up-graded to an absolute 
estate ("as full owner") by s. 14 (l) is the Hindu Woman's Estate, 
whereas if the estate sought to be enlarged is any other kind of estate 
short of full ownership capable of being called "restricted estate" in 
s. 14 (2), that estate remains subject to its restrictions and is not 
enlarged.^
It is submitted that the error in these assumptions lies in that 
the courts believed that the test, whether an estate is enlarged from 
a nominal restricted estate into an absolute estate, was not whether 
the woman acquired, contractually or consensually, the estate under 
the disposition relied upon, but whether the limitation chosen by the 
opposite parties was the old limited estate of Hindu females, or some 
other restriction incompatible with that. They implied that the limited 
estate stricto sensu was removed in favour of an absolute estate; but
that only restricted estates, being restrictions unknown to the pre-
vious law would bring the matter within s. 14 (2).
However, that such a technical construction of the expressions 
"limited owner" and "restricted estate" cannot possibly be warranted 
was not long thereafter evident in Madras itself in Muthu Bhattar v. 
Chokku Bhattar, where his Lordship, Rao, J., felt himself unable to 
agree with the view that, unless the prior estate held by the female 
is either a limited estate or widow's estate within the meaning of the 
orthodox Hindu law, there cannot be an automatic enlargement of that 
estate by reason of s. 14 (l).^
1. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA: A Gratifying... op. cit., at 52.
2. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA: "A Disturbing...,” op. cit., at 68.
3. A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8.
4. Ibid., at 13.
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This, it is submitted, is the correct view, for if we keep in
mind that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of an exception engrafted
upon sub-s. (l), b o  as not to give the edge to women over men, then the
true position must be this: where the female has a subsisting right in
the property at the time when that grant is made to her in recognition
of this right or otherwise, then the grant —  despite any restrictions
in it —  must be construed as if it conveyed an absolute estate. But
where at the time the grant is made she had no right in the estate, and
she is given a limited or other restricted estate, the grant must be
upheld and the restriction will stand.^
The Supreme Court in arriving at a similar construction of the
2two sub-sections in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, has now set the seal
3
of its approval on this view, and the death - knell of the limited 
estate finally sounded, it is to be hoped. That this happened as late
as 1977. is indicative that the "limited" estate was indeed
4unconscionably long a-dying".
11. An Overall View of the Limited Estate
At this stage in our assessement of the limited estate and the 
incidents attendant upon it, it would not be out of place to examine 
the degree of benefit that it actually conferred upon the female Hindu. 
Without digressing into undue repetition,it is clear that for all its 
apparent advantages, the limited estate is the assertion of man's 
superiority over woman, and a vindication of the obsolete notion of
1. Derrett, *S. 14 of the HSA, A Disturbing...," op. cit., at 67. Fazal
Ali, J. , confirms this in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 
1944, at 1S?8.
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944.
3. For a full discussion of decided cases taking one or the other view,
see below at Chapter Six.
4. The dying apology of England's "Merry Monarch", Charles II.
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the theory of her perpetual tutelage. What was once undoubtedly —  
at least in many communities in Central India and the Deccan — her 
stridhana to do with as she pleased, was effectively reduced to an 
obstructed heritage which, among other disqualifications, totally pre­
vented her from ever becoming a fresh stock of descent. Arguments to 
the effect that a female's lack of experience, — repeated ad nauseam 
to justify the limitations imposed on her —  specious and hackneyed to 
say the least, may be summarily dismissed.^ The same could well apply 
to an improvident and feckless male heir, and in any case, the res­
trictions on alienations inherent in the estate that a male takes,
2
could well have governed the female estate as well.
One submits that the limited estate is, in the ultimate analysis,
a contrived device to keep intact the patriarchal power and strength of
the joint-family, and the august body of the Privy Council more than
anything or anybody else, was instrumental in perpetrating an unfair
system of female inheritance out of tune with the precepts of the sages
3
of old, without any proof that such precepts had become obsolete.
To the question as to why the Judicial Committee so insistently 
denied to the female Hindu the latitude that her own law so obviously 
gave her, the tentative submission is that, their .
1. That such arguments no longer have any relevance and must be re­
jected out of hand, not only because women are no longer fit objects 
of perpetual tutelage, but more importantly, because unless they are 
given responsibility they will never grow up emotionally or otherwise, 
and will never achieve the equality which some individual women have 
shown is potentially their due, is Derrett's perceptive comment in a 
rejection of the limited estate. See his "S. 14 (2) of the HSA: A 
Disturbing ...," og. cit., at 63.
2. For those readers whose interest might perhaps have been stimulated 
for a further insight into the doctrine of the "limited estate", and 
the undesirable consequences which flow from it in areas other than 
female property rights, attention is drawn to K.B. Gajendragadkar, 
"Limited Estate", A.I.R. 1942 (j), 46-8, a brief but telling indict­
ment of an institution which Anglo—Hindu Jurisprudence had the dubious 
distinction of claiming as peculiarly its own.
3. See Rungamma v. Atchama, (1846) 4 M.I.A. 1, at 97-8, for a candid ad­
mission that their Lordships were indeed treading upon unfamiliar 
territory, and therefore bound to be out of their depth in administer­
ing the Hindu law.
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Lordships of the Privy Council, (unaware that testamentary
settlements were rare in peninsular India),^ were conceivably influenced
2
by the prevailing traditional pattern in their own country, and there­
fore insensitive to a system more liberal and just.
1. To the inquiring mind which may well wonder as to this lack of 
awareness on their Lordships' part when they " 
selves the cumbersome task of administering the law in so vast and 
diverse a country as the Indian subcontinent, this may well provide 
an area for further fascinating investigation.
2. "By the rules of common law, husband and wife were regarded as one 
person in that, during the marriage, the wife's legal existence 
was treated as incorporated or merged into that of the husband, and 
from this it followed that, in general a married woman was incapable 
of acquiring, enjoying or alienating, independently of her husband, 
any real or personal property.": Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.
22, op. cit., at 628. And as late as the nineteenth century, the 
courts in England still denied the married woman a separate legal 
entity. Thus: "The husband may forfeit or dispose of the interest 
(his wife's) during her life.": Moody v. Matthews, (1802) 7 Ves.
174, at 183. Similarly it was held in Robertson v. Norris, (1848)
11 Q.B. 916, that by virtue of the marriage, the husband acquired 
at common law a freehold interest during the joint lives of himself 
and his wife in all estates of inheritance and life estates of which 
she was seised during the time of the marriage, or of which she 
became seised during the marriage. So too in Walrond v. Goldmann, 
(I885) 16 Q.B.D. 121, it was laid down that personal chattels and 
money belonging to the wife at the time of the marriage or acquired 
by her during it, vested in the husband absolutely and could be 
disposed by him accordingly; the wife on the other hand, could not 
dispose of them except by his assent, unless, before marriage, he 
had by deed renounced his marital right. In regard to the wife's 
lack of testamentary capacity, see Dye v. Dye (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 147 
(C.A. ) at 156: "... by the Statute of Wills of Henry VIII, married 
women are declared incapable of devising lands, and no difference 
has been made in this branch of the law by the statute of the Queen 
relative to wills. A feme coverte has, properly speaking, no tes­
tamentary capacity," and again at 157* "The effect of marriage on 
a woman is or was to give certain rights to the husband over her 
property, and to suspend during coverture the testamentary capacity 
which she previously possessed." The first statutory change to 
better her lot was made in 1857. but it was only after the passing 
of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, that under s. 1 (l), a 
married woman was capable of acquiring, holding and disposing by 
will or otherwise of any real or personal property as her separate 
property as if she were feme sole without the intervention of any 
trustee.. Four other Married Women's Property Acts - those of 1884, 
1893» 1907 • and 1908 —  were passed to clear up a number of diffi­
culties and ambiguities in the Act of 1882, but affecting no change 
of the principle embodied in the latter. By extending the equitable 
principle of the separate estate, the Married Women's Property Acts 
replaced the total incapacity of a married woman to hold property 
at common law by a rigid doctrine of separate property. In the well- 
known words of Dicey, "(t)he rules of equity, framed for the daugh­
ters of the rich, have at last been extended to the daughters of the 
poor.": P.M. Bromley, Family Law^  6th ed., (Lond., Butterworths,
1981), at 418.
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CHAPTER POUR
THE WIDOW1 S RIGHT OF MAINTENANCE AT ANGLO HINDU LAW
"And that's the way I get my bread —
A trifle if you please."
Lewis Carroll 
From Through the Looking Glass
1. Introduction
The rule of maintenance in the traditional Hindu lav was a process 
of development from a situation in which women were denied all proprietary 
rights to the recognition of stridhana as an accepted institution and its 
incorporation in the smrti texts as a personal right. While the right 
of inheritance took a more convoluted turn, what is clearly noticeable 
at some stage is that, the patriarchal system having given way to the 
notion of the undivided family, it then became incumbent that strictures 
against individual enjoyment of the common property become its most 
characteristic feature.
We have already noted that the widow's right to inherit ^ in the 
absence of male issue, the separate property of her deceased husband 
in the Mitakgara school, and her claim to his separate property as well 
as to his interest in the ancestral estate under the Dayabhaga system, v 
was not inheritance in the modem sense of that term; it was, in 
effect, a means of protecting the property from dissipation, of 
securing it for the enjoyment of the male members after her death©
Likewise, though the ancient lawgivers are insistent that where she is 
not an heir, the widow, if not unchaste, has an absolute right of main­
tenance from such property,^ " it is nevertheless submitted that the duty
1. "It is a matter of special note that on the subject of maintenance there 
is singularly little difference between the Mitakgara and the Dayabhaga 
schools." : S.V.Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, 2nd ed©, (Bom., 
Tripathi, 1947)* 1056.
that both the schools imposed upon a Hindu towards his dependants was 
arguably a duty as much for the preservation of the family property as 
for the welfare of the dependant, and the grant of maintenance — - (of 
bilateral significance, for the intending alienor and his co-heirs 
mutually benefit from it) —  essentially a device to achieve just 
such a purpose.
It may well be argued that if the widow was denied such individual
enjoyment, the male members were similarly bound. However, it has to
be borne in mind that their common right to maintenance apart, the
coparceners had besides, certain inherent rights in the joint-family
property that were altogether denied to the widow, for as the Privy
Council put its
f’(l}n an ordinary joint-family ruled by the 
Mitakgara law, the junior members down to three 
generations from the head of the family have a 
coparcenary interest accruing by birth in the 
ancestral property; (that) this coparcenary carries 
with it the inchoate ri^it to raise an action of 
partition, and until partition is de facto accom­
plished, these same persons have a right to 
maintenance,..
and since
"(t)hose who are entitled to share in the bulk 
of the property are entitled to have their , 
necessary expenses paid out of its income,"
it follows that the right to maintenance, so far as founded on, and
inseparable from, the right of coparcenary, begins where coparcenary
A
begins and ceases where coparcenary ceases.
1. Female sharers were, however, not entitled to initiate a partition, 
and their rights to a share arose for the first time when the copar­
ceners separated the property by metes and bounds, s Derrett, IMHL, 
op. cit., at 324, and confirmed in Pratapmull v. Dhanbati, A.I.R. 
1936 P.C. 20, discussed below.
2. Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 81, at 82.
3. Mayne, op.cit., at 813«
4. Ibid.
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Undoubtedly not all male members are so entitled. Mention must be 
made of a special category of persons within the jo ant-family who are 
prima facie entitled, but are (statute apart)^ debarred from inheritance 
on account of personal disqualification; however, by virtue of the fact 
that they are members of the joint-family they are entitled to mainte­
nance. Numerous smrtis make this patently clear* Thus Ya.inavalkva:
"(A)n impotent person, an outcaste and his 
issue, one lame, a madman, an idiot, a blind 
person, and a person afflicted with an incurable 
disease (as well as others similarly disqualified) 
must be maintained, excluding them, however, from 
participation." 2
The widow is similarly excluded from "participation", seemingly 
b^ inferiority of sex. Equally the subject of special texts, she too 
has a right of maintenance with this difference, however, that, while 
the disqualified coparcener*s right is dependent upon the possession 
of property, and in respect of which he is still entitled to become 
sole surviving coparcener^ and to enjoy full coparcenary rights,
1. The first of these was the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) 
Act. 1928, s. 2 of which lays down in regard to the Kitakgara copar­
cener that Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the 
contrary, no person governed by the Hindu Law, other than a person 
who is or has been from birth a lunatic or an idiot, shall be 
excluded from inheritance, or from any right to a share in joint- v 
family property by reason only of any disease, deformity, or physical 
or mental defect." However, s0 28 of the HSA. 1956* extends its 
provisions to include male members of both the Mitakgara and the 
HSyabhaga systems and in laying down that, No person shall be dis­
qualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease 
defect or deformity, or save as provided in this Act, on any other 
ground whatsoever," does away altogether with the traditional notions 
of physical disqualifications.
2. Mit* II* X. 1, op.cit.; Laya. Y. 10, op.cit.
3. In Amirthammal v. Vallimayal, A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 693* ii vels laid down 
that the fact that the ancient texts recognise that the son of a dis­
qualified coparcener has the right to share in the family estate, is 
itself indicative that he is a member of the coparcenary. Likewise, 
the same High Court held in Kesava v. Govinda, A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 287> 
that if a disqualified person is a member of the coparcenary, it would 
be unjust to hold that he is disqualified from enjoying the estate 
when he happens to be the sole surviving member of the family.
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in eluding the right to alienate undivided property, Bhort of actual 
institution of partition, which rigfct itself remains in abeyance until 
cure,^ the widow’s claim is not an obviously proprietary right, and 
derives from personal relationship.
Thus in conformity with a verse quoted in Medhatithi on Manu,
III. 72 and IV. 251» and by the Mitakgara on Yaj. I. 224 and II. 175»
and occurring in some manuscripts of the MamiRmyti after XI. 10, which
provides that
u(M)anu declares that one must maintain one’s 
aged parents, a virtuous wife, and minor sons 
by doing even a hundred bad acts," 2
under the Hindu law the maintenance of a wife by her husband is a matter 
of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relation­
ship and quite independent of the possession by the husband of any 
property, ancestral or self -acquired.^
1. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 251. See Krishna v. Sami, I.L.R. (1886)
9 Mad 64, (f.B.TT which confirms this view in holding that the right of 
a disqualified member to maintenance is clearly related to his interest 
in the family property, and immediately on cessation of the disqualif­
ication, he becomes a fully-fledged member, entitled to full participa­
tion and to demand partition. More recently this position was endorsed 
by the Supreme Court in Kama lam ml v. Venkatalakshmi, A.I.R. 19&5 S.C* 
1349, at 1358.
2. Kane, H.D. Vol. Ill, op.cit., at 803. This text of Manu is the 
authority on which their Lordships of the Pull Bench relied in 
Savitribai v. Luximibaij. I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 575 (F.B.), to lay down 
the rule that, while in certain relationships, independently of the 
possession of property, maintenance is a legal and imperative obliga­
tion, in others it is merely a moral and optional duty.
3. Jayanti v. Alamelu. I.L.R. (1904) 27 Mad. 45f 48, quoted with
approval in numerous decisions. This rule applies equally to the 
obligation of the sons to maintain their widowed mother. In Satyana- 
rayanmurthy v. Ram Subbamma, A.I.R. 1964 A.P. the Court negatived
the son’s contention that, as he had separated from his father as far 
back as 1922, the obligation to maintain the mother fell solely on the 
younger brother who was bom after the partition and had lived in co­
parcenary with the father and succeeded by survivorship to his estate, 
his Lordship, Ekbote, J., holding that, as the sons’ liability to 
maintain their aged mother is a matter of personal obligation 
irrespective of the possession of ancestral property, where the income 
from the share of the husband in the hands of the surviving coparcener
(continued next page)
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Vith her change of status from wife to widow, it is not to her 
own family of birth that the female must turn for support and mainte­
nance, for the family being the cherished institution of the Hindus,^ 
a woman on her marriage leaves her own gotra (i.e. paternal agnatic 
lineage), of birth to enter that of her husband's, and as herclosest 
connection thenceforward is with his family,
»(i)t is upon that family that as a widow 
she has a claim to maintenance. It is in 
that family that in the strict contemplation 
of the law she ought to reside.
It is thus settled law according to all the authorities that the
widow's burden of maintenance falls upon those who take her husband's
estate as heirs or by operation of the principle of survivorship in the
coparcenary* So Yajnavalkya:
M(A)nd their childless wives conducting them­
selves aright must be supported, but such as 
are unchaste should be expelled,.•."5
and likewise Naradas
"(T)hey shall make provision for his women
till they die, in case they remain faithful
to the bed of their husband. Should the women not .
(remain chaste) they must cut off that allowance***
2. The Nature of the Right of Maintenance v
(i) The Notion That It is Not a Proprietary Ri^it
Despite the sacramental nature of the Hindu marriage and its concept as
(continued from previous page)
is not adequate to maintain her, the deficiency should be contributed 
by all the sons equally independently of their possession or not of 
coparcenary property. Mark, however, that this liability of the sons 
does not extend to the stepmother*
1* Bhyah Ram v* Bhyah TJgar, (1879) 3 M.I.A. 373i at 391*
2. Yirada Pratapa v. Brpzo Kishoro, I.L.R. (I876) 1 Mad* 69, at 81. See 
also Khetramani Dassi v* Kashinath Das, (I869) 2 Beng, L.R. 15 (F.B.)
A.C.J., at 20*
3. Mit* II. I. 13, op.cit.; Daya. Y. 19, op.cit.
4. Har. XIII. 26, op.cit.
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"(a) union of flesh with flesh, hone with hone 
and marrow with marrow, so as to constitute 
the husband and wife as one body, the right 
half representing the husband and the left 
half the wife,"1
a sizeable number of decisions take the view that,however imperative
the nature of the right of maintenance may be, it is a purely personal
right and not to be equated with a right to property. There are early
2
indications of this view in Bhyrub Chunder v. Nubu Cbunder, vhere \fce-.
strange contention that the property liable for the widow* s maintenance
in the hands of the son, might sold in execution of a decree against
her, the Court was at pains to underscore that the right of maintenance
being a purely personal right, the lady had no right, title or interest
in such peoperty so as to make it transferable to another in execution 
3proceedings.
It has similarly been suggested in the important Privy Council 
ruling in Pratapmull v. Dhanbati,^ that it was really the widowed 
mother's right to be maintained which served as a reason why her owner­
ship to a share accrued to her for the first time on a partition of the
1. Per Iyengar, J., Ananthanarayana v. Sharadamma, (1943) 2 My s. L.J.
237, at 241.
2. (1884) 5 W.R. 111.
3. Followed in Muthalammal v. Veeraghavalu, a .I.R. 1953 Mad. 202, where 
it was similarly held that, as the widow's right of maintenance 
against her husband's property is a personal claim, it is not capable 
of being transferred or assigned to her legal representative at her 
death during the pendency of the suit. See also Moniram Kolita v.
Kerry Kolitani, (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 151 » where Sir Barnes 
Peacock in drawing a distinction between Narada's injunction in regard 
to maintenance (supra, at 270 ), and that of Katyayana's in regard to 
inheritance, (supra, at 222 ), remarked obiter, that, "the right to
receive maintenance is very different from a vested interest in 
property,...,” —  a view that was to endure right down the years, 
and endorsed in a large body of case-law even after 195^ , to disting­
uish between the widow's entitlement to property under the EWRPA,
1937, and the estate she held in lieu of her maintenance, so as to
cut down the latter right and thus exclude the female from the enabling 
provisions of s. 14 (l) of the HSA, 1956.
4. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
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family property by metes and bounds, and not (as the law then stood)
earlier; as the mother or grandmother can never be recognised as the
owner of a share until the division has actually been made,
"(S)he has no pre-existing vested right in 
the estate except the right of maintenance•
She may acquire the property by partition ...
(B)ut partition in her case is the sole 
cause of her right to the property. It 
follows, therefore, that the effect cannot 
precede the cause."
Thus as the share allotted to the wife or mother on partition does not
become her stridhana so as to pass to her stradhana heirs at her death,
2
but must revert back to the sons or their heirs, this possession in
lieu of maintenance is not a right of property as such, but the holding
of the property for her lifetime for precisely the purpose for which it
3
was in the first instance allotted to her.
This view of maintenance as a purely personal ri$it was to have far- 
reaching repercussions after the commencement of the HSA in 1956, for in 
determining the question of crucial importance as to whether property
1. Per Mitter, J., Sheo Dayal v. Judoonath, (1868) 9 W.R. 6l, at 62.
For similar rulings see also Puddum Mookhee v. Rayee Monee, (1884)
12 W.R. 409; Sorolah v. Bhoobun. I.L.R. (1888) 15 Cal. 292; Srimati 
Hemangani DasLv. Kedamath Choudhary, (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 115 (P*C.); 
Hridoy Kant v. Behari Lai. (l907) 11 C.V.H. 239; Sashi Bhusan v. v 
Hari Narayan, A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 202; Eira Lai v. Sankar Lai, A.I.R.
1939 Cal 116. On the same basis it was held in Indu Bhusan Chatter jee 
V. Mrityun.joy Pal. I.L.R. (1946) 1 Cal. 128, that where the mother 
had already inherited the share of her deceased son which was suffi­
cient for her maintenance, she was not entitled to a further share at 
a subsequent partition of the joint-family property. However, this 
view was not to gain ascendency and was over-ruled by a Special Bench 
of the same High Court in Milan Kumar Das v. Pumasashi Dassi, A.I .R. 
1974 Cal. 380, supra, at 227.
2. Debi Mangal Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad. (1912) L.R. 39 I.A. 121.
3. However, with the coming into force of the HSA, 1956, and the recog­
nition in Munnalal v. Raj Kumar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493» (infra, at 543- 
547 )» that the share allotted to a female in even a preliminary 
decree for partition is property possessed by her within the meaning 
Of B. 14 (l), and the specific over-ruling by the Supreme Court of 
dicta to the contrary in Pratapmull1 s case. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20, this 
view must now be held to have been abrogated.
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held In lieu of maintenance is “property” within the meaning of s. 14
(l)f the crux was the nature of such ri^it in the Hindu law. A school 
of thought adhered —  despite contemporaneous decisions to the contrary
  to the notion that the right of maintenance not being a right over
property, it was incapable of attracting the provisions of the sub-s.
In Gurunadham v* Navaneethamma«^  for instance, the Court took the
view that where the female^ husband had died prior to the enactment
of the HWRPA, her right to be maintained from out of the family
properties was an indefinite right which
”(b)y itself does not confer on her any 
possessory lien or proprietary right or 
title in the property of the family.”
Die reinforcement of this latter view in Gopisetti Kondiah v.
Gunda Subbarayudu, and the assertion in it that,
“(t)he pre-existing right of (a) Hindu female 
... is in respect of property to which she 
would, under the Hindu law, obtain a limited 
estate,” 4
5
was reiterated in Basdeo v. Director of Consolidation, U.P., and the 
view of maintenance as a right capable of a being proprietary right 
in the hands of the maintenance holder, on the analogy of the limited 
estate, negatived.^ v
1. A.I.R* 1967 Mad. 429* infra, at 580.
2. Per Natesan, J., ibid. t at 430.
3. (1968) 2 An. W.R. 455, at 460. See also Narayan Patra v. Tara Patra, 
A.I.R. 1970 Or. 131, at 134.
4. Per Reddy, C.J., (GopisettiVs case, cited above) at 462.
5. (1969) 67 All. L.J. 1027.
6. For similar rulings see also Pharma Udayar v. Ramchandra, (1969) 1 
M.L.J. 181; Bindroo v. Munshi, A.I.R. 1971 J. A K. 142; Thayammal v. 
Salammal, A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 83* In Bai Parsan v. Bhagvandas, (1972) 13 
Guj. L.R. 123, it was likewise held at 128 that, “A property in pos­
session of a Hindu widow in exercise of her right of residence other­
wise continues to belong to the joint family.” In similar circumstances 
the S.C. arrived at the same decision in Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi*
A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2198. See also Subba Naidu v. Rajammal, A.I.R. 1977
(continued next page)
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In Santho^ gra iC.Gurukkal v. Subramania Gurukkal^  on the other hand,
their Lordships seemed not unsympathetic to the notion of the wife's
2
identity with her husband in proprietary right, and with the view held
by Mookerjee, J., that it is impossible to hold that a Hindu widow has
no proprietary interest when she is given a share equal to that of a
3
son at a partition at the instance of the male members. Nevertheless, 
despite this in the view of the learned Judges, as the right to claim 
partition was accorded to women in Madras only with the coming into 
effect of the EWRPA, 1937» this dicta could have no bearing La the State, 
and the notion of maintenance as a pre-existing ri§£it of property 
ruled out. However, it is submitted that the entire reasoning rests on 
a fallacy; if the ladies in the Madras State could not call for parti­
tion,^ *n«>i<could any other female except in Bengal, - and their rights to a 
share arose for the first time when partition took place at the instance 
of male members. This argument thus dismissed, one can only regard the 
decision as merely following the traditional pattern in the State.
(2) The Notion That It is in the Nature of a Proprietary Right 
However, traditional Hindu law is familiar with the concept 
that the wife is half her husband's body,^ and accordingly she 
acquired from the moment of her marriage, a co-ownership with the 
husband in his assets by reason of being his lawfully wedded 
wife. That this co-ownership was of a subordinate nature there
(continued from previous page)
Mad. 64, where Natarajan, J., held at 66 that, "At the time the lands 
were given to her, she had no pre-existing right to a share in the 
husband's properties, and the subsequent grant (for maintenance) 
could not have the effect of conferring on her a right which was 
non-existent." For a full discussion see below at 577 ff-
1. A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 279.
2. Ibid., at 281.
3o Srinath Das v. Probodh Chunder Las, (1910) 11 Cal L.J. 580» 587®
4o Br. XXV. 47» supra, at 221.
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can be no doubt ^ and as a consequence it vas not open for her to sever 
her share against the will of her husband9 or after his death, against 
that of her sons*
On the other hand, there can be no doubt either that, the wife1 s
or widow* s entitlement to be maintained out of the property in the
possession of her husband, or the share allotted to her at a partition
of the ancestral estate, must be traced to this common ownership; and
if by subsequent evolution, that ownership in the property had ceased
to exist, and in its place a maintenance right substituted, the latter
is nonetheless an interest in the nature of property* In other words,
”(t)he widow's right of maintenance is a 
truncated right which still remains out of
what was at one time a claim to a share in
the family property.”2
Thus the right of maintenance does not create any new right but
proceeds upon the footing of a pre-existing right, and whereas the
burden of maintenance is a personal obligation on the husband,
"(U)nder the Hindu law, if a coparcener takes 
the property of another deceased coparcener 
by survivorship, he takes it with the burden 
of maintaining the widow and unmarried daughters 
of the deceased coparcener* It cannot be said 
that this right of maintenance is merely per­
sonal in the sense that it has no reference to 
the property which he gets by survivorship." 5
Thus the clear divergence of opinion and the controversy as to
1. Judicial recognition has been given to this ancient notion of the 
subordinate co-ownership of the wife. See Jamaa v* Machul, I.L.R. 
(1879) 2 All. 315, at 317 ; Srinath v. Probodh, (1910) 11 C.L.J.
580, at 587; Savitri v* Savi. A.I.R. 1933 Pat* 306, at 347? Indu 
Bhusan Chatter.jee v. Mrityun.joy Pal, I.L.R. (1946) 1 Cal. 128, at 
132; Kamalabala v* Jiban Krishna, Il946) 50 C.W.H. 555, at 557; Mut---- 
halammal v, Veeraragbavalu, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 202, at 202; Chellammal 
v. Nallammal, (l971J 1 M.L.J. 439, at 46I; Milan Kumar Das v. Puraa- 
sashi Das si, A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 380, at 384; Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, 
A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, at i960,infra, 602ff, and quoted in Bai Va.-put 
v. Thakorbai, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 993, at 996-7* infra, at 602.
2. Audemma v. Varadareddy, A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 31, at- 39*
5. Secretary of State v. Ahalyabai, (1937) 40 Bom. L.R. 422, at 426.
See also Mt. Sodhan v. Khushi Ram, A.I.R. 1950 Punj. 26l, at 263®
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vhether the right of maintenance is a right to property assumed the 
greater significance after 1956, for whereas prior to the passing of 
the HSA, however adverse the retrograde stance might have been, the 
question of ownership rights per se in such property did not arise^  
under s. 14, however, the entire question was one of whether or not the 
widow could, in such property, claim absolute proprietary rights to the
detriment of the coparceners and their right of survivorship. The
1 2 period of protracted controversy over, it is now settled law that,
however indefinite the right of maintenance may be, it is traceable to
3
an antecedent right in property so as to confer on the widow absolute 
rights of ownership in the property held by her in lieu of her main- 
tenance, and in respect of which she constitutes a fresh stock of 
descent.
3. The Claim of Maintenance Arises Against Those Who Take the Estate 
of the Deceased by Succession
The natural and inevitable corollary of the ancient notion of the 
wife's co-ownership with her husband has led, in the law of maintenance, 
to the interesting proposition that the widow's claim to such right is 
not absolute either, and (leaving aside certain transfers inter vivos),
1. For cases which take the view that the right to maintenance is a 
right in the nature of property, see infra 584 , ff*
2. For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court authorities, and in 
particular, Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, settling 
the issue, see infra, 600ff.
3. The reader is in particular referred to the very appealing setting out 
of the nature of the widow's right to maintenance by their Lordships 
Hnfewala and Fazal Ali, JJ., in Sumeshwar MiBhra v. Swami Rath, A.I.R. 
1970 Pat. 348, and Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 
infra, 593, f.n.2. See also Umakanta v. Satya Charan, A.I.R.
1965 Cal. 189, where this principle of charity was conversely inter­
preted, the Court holding that the widow must first look to her 
husband's estate and alienate it as a legal necessity for her 
maintenance, rather than rely on the charity of friends and relatives.
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can only arise against those who take, either as heirs or by survivor­
ship the interest of her deceased husband. This is, in effect, the 
direction of Narada*s oft-quoted text,^ and the Courts have not been 
slow to adjudicate accordingly.
2
An early decision, that in Mst. Jaraon Koonwur v. Chandree Doosfrt 
clarifies that while a Hindu widow holds, in the absence of sons a* 9
life interest in the separate or self-acquired property of her husband,
she is entitled to maintenance where the acenstral estate is held in 
5
joint tenancy.
However, while this may merely be taken as a general statement of
the law, it was endorsed and expanded further in Subramania v. Kalian!
to the effect that where by the death of the one, the surviving brother*s
estate was enlarged, and the enlargement came to him by inheritance in
the only sense in which the term is applicable In the law of the copar-
5
cenary, the widow* s claim for maintenance was a charge on the estate 
in the hands of the survivor.
Once the property had passed by survivorship, it was authoritatively 
stated in Mst. Lalti v. Gunga^, that it was not open for the coparceners to
1. Supra, at 270* v
2. (1841) 7 S.DoA. 30.
3* There is an identical ruling by the same learned Judge, Smythe, J., in 
Mst. Lalchee Koonwur v. Sheoprasad Singh, (1841) 7 S.D.A. 26. More 
recently this view was reiterated in Jasoda v. Satyabhama, A.I.R. 1966 
Or. 240, and in holding that a widow who does not succeed to the estate 
of her deceased husband as his heir, is entitled to maintenance out of 
the property in which he held a coparcenary interest at the time of his 
death, the Court explained that there is no provision made either in 
the HSA. 1956, or the HAMA, 195&, whereby this part of the old Hindu law 
has been in any way repealed or changed. See also Gowardhan v. Gangabai, 
A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 168, at 170.
4. (1873) 7 Mad. H.C.R. 226.
5* It must be emphasised that the word "chargeM is used here in a 
non-technical sense.
6. (1875) 7 N.W.P.H.C. 261.
-278-
argue that the widow could claim no maintenance as the deceased 
husband had left no property for such purposes, for the position 
of the deceased coparcener's widow being on par with that of the dis­
qualified coparcener's widow, both were equally entitled to be main­
tained out of their husband's interest in the hands of the surviving 
coparceners.
It follows, therefore, that the widow's claim for maintenance is not
a personal obligation, but the duty that the law simultaneously imposes
upon the taking of the estate, on the existing coparceners, the Pull
Bench explaining in Gangabai v. Sit a Ram'*' that, the Hindu widow is not
entitled under the Mitak^ara system to be maintained by her husband's
relatives merely because of the relationship between them and her husband,
but that her right depended upon the existence in their hands of ancestral
property. For, as his Lordship, Westropp, C.J., held obiter in Savitribai
v. Luxinibai, ^
"(l)t is well-settled Hindu law ... that the
widow whose husband was, at his death,
undivided in estate from his father, or the 
widow of one undivided, at his death, in 
estate from his brothers or nephews, or other 
relatives, would, in the first case, if there 
be sufficient ancestral estate in the hands
of the surviving father, or in the second v
case, if there be sufficient ancestral estate 
in the hands of the surviving brothers, nephews 
or other relatives, be entitled to a reasonable 
maintenance out of such estate," 4
1. I.L.R. (1876) 1 All. 170 (F.B.).
2. I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom.. 573 (F.B.).
3. This, it is submitted, is not a complete statement of the law, for as 
we shall presently see, the father's legal obligation apart, even 
where he is only possessed of separate or self-acquired property, the 
Hindu law imposes upon him a moral obligation of subsisting force to 
maintain his deceased son's widow.
4. Savitribai v. Luximibait cited above, at 581* Thus, his Lordship ruled, 
as the husband and his father were, before their deaths, separated from 
the husband's uncle, and there was not in the possession or subject to
(continued next page)
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and where the estate is sold without justifying necessity, the considera­
tion received by the heir, of the sale of the deceased's property will, 
so far as the widow's right of recourse to it is concerned, take the 
place of the property sold.^
Nor is it open to the coparceners to take it upon themselves -to
fritter away the estate to the detriment of the claim for maintenance.',
2In Chunilal v. Bai Saraswati, where on the unproved contention that 
the proceeds realised from the sale of the deceased husband's interest 
had been utlised for the founding of a public reading room and a library 
in his name, it was rightly held that no doubt if a part of such proceeds
I
had been spent for the needs of the family, the liability for maintenance 
would have been pro tanto reduced, but as equity certainly demands that 
some limit must be set^ to the purpose for which, and the manner in which
(continued from previous page)
the disposition of the uncle, any ancestral estate, or the estate of 
the husband or his father, either one of these reasons independently 
of the other, was fatal to the widow's demand of a money allowance 
for maintenance from the uncle on whom the claim was made. Followed 
in Appaji v. Gangabai, I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 632. So too it was held in 
Adhibai v. Cursandas. I.L.R. (1887) 11 Bom. 199* that where the widowed 
sister-in-law claimed maintenance from her husband's brother, the only 
question for the Court to consider was whether the latter had ancestral 
property in his hands. Banerjee, J., ruled likewise in Devi Prasad v. 
Gun wan ti Koer. I.L.R. (1895) 22 Cal. 410 that, where at the death ofv 
the son, the father's estate is enlarged, "reason and justice" required 
that his liability to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law should not 
thereby be extinguished. See also Gowardan v. Gangabai, A.I.R. 1964 M. 
P. 168, at 170, where the surviving coparceners' liability of mainte­
nance towards the dependant widow is similarly reiterated. This 
principle would apply equally where the property had devolved by suc­
cession on widows of the joint-family, and their liability to maintain 
the non-succeeding widow persist, despite the division of the estate 
between them at a partition by metes and bounds. See Jasoda v. 
Satyabhama. A.I.R. 1966 Or. 240. See also Muniammal v. Ranganatha, . . 
A.X.R. 1955 Mad. .571. '
1. Bhagabati Das si v. Kanailal Mi t ter, (1872) 8 Beng. L.R. 225, at 229.
2. A.I.R. 1943 Bom., 393.
3.*This rule provides a valuable protection for non-coparcener members of 
the family, which will operate to save them from hostility or fraud, 
though not, of course, from incompetence. It was for this reason that 
a movement demanding absolute shares for persons previously entitled to 
maintenance culminated in the provisions of the "Hindu Code" : Derrett, 
3MHL, op.cit. at 247 •
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the assets are reduced or dissipated, the coparcener's liability to
pay maintenance remains to the extent of the property to which he had 
1
succeeded.
This leads us to the consideration of the established rule in the
Hindu law that, the widow's entitlement of maintenance against the
surviving coparcener or coparceners is "quoad the share or interest of
2
her deceased husband in the Joint-family property," and where the 
property is undivided, the amount required for her maintenance must of 
necessity be paid out of the estate as a whole,^ but in no circumstances 
may she claim an allowance greater than the income of her husband's share 
in the estate.^ This being so, it would follow that, where prior to the 
death of the husband, there had been a partition of the family property, 
there can be no right in the \Jidow to claim to be maintained out of the
5
shares that fall to the other members.
However, where once the female's right to maintenance has been 
declared, defined and reduced to a certainty by a decree of Court, and 
a charge created over the entire Joint estate, it was held in Subbarayalu
1. This decision gives new life to the dicta in Lakshman v. Satyabhamabai
I.L.R. (1877) 2 Bom. 494* at 519 that, as the Hindu widow rightfully 
belongs to her husband's family, "her right is not extinguished by any 
wilful or negligent diminution of the means of satisfying it."
2. Per Ayyanger, J., Jayanti v. Alamelu, I.L.R. (1904) 27 Had. 45, at 
48-9* Note also the stipulation of Fazal Ali, J., in Tulasajnma v.
Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944* at i960, that, "If the husband 
has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an 
equitable charge on the property, and any person who succeeds to the 
property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow."
3. This principle prevails notwithstanding that the widow may be possessed 
of other means of support. See below at 337
4. Jayanti v. Alamelu, I.L.R. (1904) 27 Mad. 45* 49* Lakshmidevannna v. 
Veera Reddy, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 781 (F.B.); at 782; Commissioner of Income 
Tax, Central and U.P. v. Bhagwati, A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 143* a-t 145*
5. Savitribai v. Luximibai, I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 573* Lakshmidevamma v. 
Yeera Reddy, cited above, and followed in Taxmibai v. Radhabai, A.I.R. 
1944 Bom. 235.
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v, Kamalavallithayaramma^ that a suit for partition subsequent would
not affect the widow's right as aforesaid, but would continue to sub-
2sist c l t h e  lifetime of the maintenance holder*
4* The Right of Maintenance Persists Despite the Disposition of the 
Property by Gift or Devise
I Where the widow is entitled to maintenance, her right cannot be r
defeated by a gift or devise of the entire property, and though the 
disposition may be entirely valid, the maintenance holder may 
nevertheless follow the property in the hands of the beneficiaries 
where her right is threatened*
3
Thus in Jamna v. Machul, where the widow had instituted a suit for 
the declaration of her right to maintenance against the beneficiary of 
her husband's will who had acquired title even during the latter's
j
lifetime, his Lordship, Pearson, J., refused to countenance the lower 
Court's ruling that the donee took the estate without exception, res­
ervation and condition, and held on appeal that, as the wife is, under 
the Hindu-law, a co-owner with her husband in a subordinate sense, the 
latter could not alienate his property or dispose of it by will in such
1. I.L.R* (1912) 35 Mad* 147» the general ruling being that the estate 
at large is liable in the hands of the members of the family making
a partition; and coparceners who desire to limit their responsibilities 
must obtain the assent of the persons interested* See R. West and 
J. G. Buhler, A Digest of the Hindu Law* 3rd ed., Yol II, (1884,
Bom. Education Society Press) at 791*
2. See also Rangaiah v. Chinnaiah* A.I.R. 1970 A.P. 33* where following 
Basappa v. Mallamma* A..I.R* 1940 Mad* 458* it was held that notwith­
standing that the step-son is under no legal obligation to maintain 
his step-mother, where the claim for maintenance had been charged 
upon the entire estate by a decree of Court, at a subsequent partition 
between father and son, it was not open for the step-son to plead that, 
unless a share of her husband is allotted to him, he is under no 
personal liability to maintain his step-mother out of the share that 
fell to him at the partition.
3. I.L.R. (1879) 2 All. 315.
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a wholesale manner as to deprive her of maintenance* As such there­
fore, the donee of the entire estate must he deemed to have taken and 
to hold it subject to the femalefs maintenance*^
Nor may a gift of strldhana by the husband cut down this per­
sisting right in the property by those who take it after his death? In 
Narbadabai v. Mahadeo, the widow had been allotted, during her husband's 
lifetime separate property for her maintenance and residence, but soon 
thereafter the deceased had conveyed by an English deed of indenture, 
the house in fee to his sons by another wife* Later, after his death 
it was contended that the gift of the house being an absolute gift and 
not made subject to any charge on account of the widow's maintenance, 
the widow's claim to maintenance was extinguished particularly as she 
had been in receipt of valuable ornaments and other property from her 
deceased husband. West, J., in an exhaustive judgement, and taking into 
account many classical and legal authorities, pointed out the cardinal 
rule of Hindu law that even as to self-acquired property, it is
1* Followed in Becha v* Mothina* I.L.R (1901) 23 All. 86. See also 
Sabitri v. Savi A.I.R. 1935 Rat. 306, where the widow's contention 
that she was entitled to avoid the will of her late husband having 
failed, it was nevertheless clarified at 395 that, "The wife's right v 
to maintenance is a different matter from a right to avoid a gift of 
the entire property made by the husband. It will not be difficult to 
reconcile the wife's right to maintenance, ... with the factum valet 
view of a gift of his entire property by the husband. The gift may 
stand and the wife * s maintenance charged on the property as in Jamna 
v. Machul* I.L.R. (1879) 2 All. 315«M Similarly the Madras High 
Court held in Periambal v. Sundarammal, A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 193 that, 
while the right of maintenance may remain suspended during the 
period of the wife's refusal to comply with a decree for the restitu­
tion of conjugal rights, it revives at her husband's death, and not­
withstanding that the entire property had been testamentarily disposed 
of, it nevertheless remains claimable against those who take the
estate. To a like effect —  i.e. that the will cannot defeat the widow's
right of maintenance —  is the obiter dicta in Audemma v. Varadareddy, 
A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 31, at 36.
2. As such, this is not a full statement of the law in view of the dicta
in Varahalu v. Sithamma, A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 272 (F.B.), infra, at 344-5-.
3. I.L.R. (1880) 5 Bom. 99.
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prescribed that the acquirer shall not part with it b o  as to leave
his family destitute. Thus as the right of a Hindu female is one
peculiarly needing protection, the gift to the sons in this case, his
Lordship concluded, was obviously intended to shut out any future claim
of the wife. It could not therefore be regarded as an exercise in good
faith of the husband’s general authority and discretion, but was dis- •
tinctly an endeavour to place the wife, should she survive her husband,
in a state of destitution. In view of this, the learned Judge held, the
general principle must be adhered to7and where a Hindu husband alienates
by gift, the whole of his immoveable self-acquired property, to his
sons by his first and second wives, without making for his third wife
  who is destitute and has not forfeited her right to maintenance --
a suitable provision to take effect after his death, she is entitled,
as a widow, to follow such property in the hands of her step-sons to
recover her maintenance,^ her right to which is not affected by any
2agreement made by her with her husband in his lifetime*
The question of maintenance was again considered in Promotha v. 
Hagendrabala, ^ and the Court made it clear that while the claim of the 
widow for maintenance from her husband’s estate could not be defeated
V
where she had been excluded from a Layabhaga will, neither was she 
entitled to question the will as a \diole. As her right to ask for a 
construction of the will was limited to the extent that it affected her 
claim, she had therefore no locus standi to question bequests for
1. See also Joytara v. Ramhari, I.L.R. (1884) 10 Cal. 638, for a similar 
judgement, though the further statement in it that such right would 
persist unless taken away by express language to that effect in the 
will, is, it is submitted, suspect.
2. Ve shall find this old rule to be of great significance in the current 
predicament of the law.
3. (1908) 12 C.W.N. 808.
religious purposes in view of the fact that the amount of maintenance 
fixed by the testator was not a nominal amount and not contrary to any 
provision of the Hindu law.^
However, where the widow* s right is threatened, not even a bequest 
for religious purposes, exempts the devisee from the liability of main-
2 jtenance. . Thus in Parwatibai v. Mariayya where the testator had
included in a bequest to a Math the house in which the widow resided,
Mudholkar, J., rightly refuted the contention that, as provision for
her maintenance had already been made in the will, the widow could not
claim the family house, his Lordship holding that, as a claim for
maintenance -- which includes the right of residence -- may not be
defeated by a gift or devise of the property, it would follow that the
right of residence in the family house -- dedicated property though
it might be   could be enforced against a volunteer or a person with
notice of the right
"(u)nless an alternative arrangement, equally 
satisfactory, is made for her residence." 3
But what where the widow —  herself the legatee along with other
beneficiaries under her husband's will -- nevertheless claims maintenance
on the grounds of insufficiency of the estate in her hands? On the well
1. On the same principle it was held in Mahant Narsidasji v. Bai Jamna 
(1939) 41 Bom. L.R. 787 that where after having made adequate provisions 
for his wife, the Hindu husband of his own free will chooses to diminish 
his estate by giving away part of it for the creating of a trust for 
religious and charitable purposes, it is not open, later on^for the 
widow to demand maintenance in proportion to what the income was before 
the charitable gifts or bequests were made.
2. A.I.R. 1951, Nag. 346.
3. Ibid., at 347* This view, expressed as early as the close of the 19th 
oentury in Rachawa v. Shivayogapa, I.L.R. (1894) 18 Bom. 679> w3-5 to be 
the basis of the ruling in favour of the widowed dau^iter-in-law in 
Rani Bai v. Yadnnandan, A.I.R. 19^9 S.C. 1118, infra, at 601.
established principle that the right of maintenance cannot be defeated 
by the execution of a will, where the testator had bequeathed all his 
properties to his mother and wife, it was held on equitable grounds in 
Kamakshi v. Kristin amraal^  that under such circumstances, if the property 
gifted to the widow was insufficient to meet her needs, she could retain 
the property, and claim in addition, further maintenance from the other 
donees.^
5* The Widow's Right As Against a Bona Fide Purchaser for Valuable
Consideration
The basic principles established, other questions come to mind#
Should the joint-family property, including the deceased husband's 
interest, be transferred to a bona fide purchaser, would the widow's 
right to maintenance be affected? This quqry is linked to another 
vital question, i.e. whether the widow's right is a mere personal 
right against the heir or heirs, or is it a lien on the estate of her 
deceased husband, and remains claimable even after the property is 
alienated?
That she is entitled into whosoever* s hands the property of her 
late husband passes for whatever reason apart for alienation for certain 
specified purposes, there can be no doubt# A few quite singular deci­
sions make this apparent enough. In Mst# Gulab Koonwur v# The Col­
lector of Benares.^  a family of brothers in possession of large
1# A.I.R# 1938 Mad. 340.
2. India has never resiled fromthis position. Likewise in Sitharatnamma 
v. Seshamma, (1939) 1 M.L.J. 436, a provision for maintenance in the 
husband's will was taken to be merely a suggestion as to what a reason­
able amount might be, the Court further adding that it was within its 
jurisdiction to substitute a more reasonable sum in the event of an 
inadequate entitlement under the will. See also Sriramulu v. Anasuyamma, 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 21, at 23# This rule is confirmed in the HAMA, 1956, 
s. 28, laying down that, "Where a dependant has a rigjht to receive main­
tenance out of an estate and such estate or any part thereof is transferred 
the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee... “ 
if the transfer is gratuitous"
3. (1847) 4 M.I.A. 246.
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ancestral estates having hecome implicated in a rebellion against the 
State, the entire property vas confiscated by the Government. At the 
widow mother* s suit for maintenance, it was held that, notwithstanding 
that the confiscation was regular, the forfeiture by the family of the 
estates, could not affect the dependant female*s claim for maintenance, 
which it was incumbent upon the Government to satisfy from out of 
that part of the property that was ancestral.'*'
This principle prevailed even where there were dissensions
2
among the family members themselves. In Ramchandra Dikshit v. Savitribai , 
where the widow had, after the death of her father-in-law, obtained a 
decree against his eldest son, the Court while acknowledging that the 
Hindu widow*s maintenance is a charge upon the entire estate, was never­
theless of the view that it was for the defendant to have this question 
resolved by suiighis brothers for contribution.
However, these instances apart, the view that a not inconsiderable 
number of decisions take is that, as the right of maintenance, until 
it is filed and charged upon the estate by a decree or agreement, is 
of an indefinite charactei^ it is not enforceable, particularly so in 
the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of such claim.
1. This principle of law is in keeping with the text of Narada, XIII. 51» 
op.cit., to the effect that the wives of the deceased proprietor are 
entitled to maintenance out of his property, where for want of better 
heirs it escheats to the King. See also Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Central and TJ.P. v. Bhagwati, A.I.R. 1947 U.P. 143» where the Privy 
Council, emphasising on the absolute nature of such right, refused to 
countenance the claim of the income Tax authorities that, where under 
a compromise the widow had agreed to a stipulated sum of money being 
charged on the ancestral estate for the purposes of her maintenance, 
it was in reality a surrender of her maintenance right, being 
merely a payment of a money allowance, it was therefore taxable.
2. (1867) 4 Bom., H.C.R. 73 (A.C.J.).
3. This view takes statutory shape in that s. 27 of the HAMA lays down;
"A dependant*s claim for maintenance ... shall not be a charge .
on the estate ... unless one has been created by the will of the de­
ceased, by a decree of court, by agreement between the dependant and 
the owner of the estate ... or otherwise.*
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The smrti literature is silent on this vital issue, and it was hut 
natural that the early ju._K.utA. had, in the last resort, to turn to their
own legal system for equitable remedies to resolve the conflicting
claims that thus arose. Equity and -- the ancestral estate being
somewhat in the nature of a trust for maintenance holders -- the law
of trusts provided the answer. In discussing the position of a bona
i ■ 1fide purchaser for value without notice, the question that invariably
comes to mind is that, if the legal estate passes from one (the trustee)
to another person, how is the conscience of the transferee affected? The
question is then of determining as a matter of policy whether this new
holder of the legal estate is bound by the trust. Any way in which an
equitable ownership of a beneficiary is destroyed is of course a serious
weakening of the position of the beneficiary, and as Equity always strives
to protect him,
"(a) trust is (thus) binding ... on a purchaser 
who bought (the property) if he knew or could by
reasonable inquiries have found out about the
existence of the trust. In short, the trust is 
binding on everyone coming to the land except the 
bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value _ 
without notice actual, constructive or imputed.”
Such were the equitable principles which provided the guidelines for 
the Indian Courts as well, and there was a further insistence, in conso- 
nance with s. 39 the Transfer of Property Act. 1882 (hereinafter
1. R.H. Maudsley, ed., Hanbury1 s Modern Equity, 10th ed., (Lond., Stevens, 
1976), at 21.
2. S. 39 of the Act of 1882 provides that, "Where a third person has a 
right to receive maintenance ... from the profits of ummoveabie property, 
and such property is transferred with the intention of defeating such 
right, the right may be enforced against the transferee if he has notice 
of such intention or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against a 
transferee for consideration and without notice of the rigfct, nor against 
such property in his hands.” It is worth noting that while under this 
original section, the intention of defeating the right on the part of the
(continued next page)
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referred to as the T.P. Act), on the existence of a charge actually 
created and binding the estate, or of proof of the transferor's 
intention to deliberately defeat the rigfrt of maintenance^ for the 
widow's claim to be viable.
2
In Sm. Bhagabati Dassi v. Kanalailal Mitter, the most noteworthy 
decision from Bengal, the widow contended that as she was entitled to 
be maintained out of the rents and profits of her deceased husband's 
estate, the latter in the hands of the purchasing defendants was subject 
to the charge for her maintenance. Phear, J., however, in ruling against
(continued from previous page)
transferor and the knowledge of such an intention on the part of the 
transferee were necessary, under the amended section, mere notice of 
the existence of the right would suffice. The amended section’ 
of the T.P. Act. 1929, lays down that, "where a third person has a 
right to receive maintenance ... from the profits of immoveable pro­
perty, and such property is transferred, the right may be enforced 
against the transferee if he had notice thereof or if the transfer 
is gratuitous; but not against a transferee for consideration and 
without notice of the right nor against such property in his hands."
1. This rule -- dispensed with in the amended section of the Act of
I929 -- is well set out in Lakshman v. Satyabhamabait I.L.R. (1877)
2 Bom., 494> where his Lordship, Vest, J., explained obiter at some 
length that, where the heir sought to defraud the maintenance holder, 
he could not, by any device by way of parting with the estate, or 
changing its form, get rid of the liability which had come to him 
along with the advantage derived from his survivorship. Similarly the 
vendee, taking from him with reason to suppose that the transaction v 
was one originating not in an honest desire to pay off debts, or 
satisfy claims for which the estate was justly liable, but one which 
was in essence a design to shuffle off a moral or legal liability, 
would, as sharing in the proposed fraud, be prevented from gaining 
from it. On the other hand, if, despite his knowledge of the widow's 
claim upon the estate, the alienee bought upon a rational and honest 
opinion that the sale could be effected without any furtherance of 
wrong, he would, against the plaintiff widow, acquire a title free from 
the claim which still subsisted as against the recipient of the purchase 
money. In short, what was honestly purchased was free from her claim 
forever; what was purchased in furtherance of a fraud upon her, or with 
knowledge of a rigjit which would thereby be prejudiced, is liable to 
her claim from the first. These principles were the basis of the 
decisions in Ramchurun v. Mst. Jasooda, (I867) 2 Agra H.C.R. 154; 
Beharilalji v. Bai Rajbai, I.L.R. (1899) 25 3om* 542; Ram Kunwar v.
Ram Dai, I.L.R. (1900; 22 All. 526; Manikyam v. Venkayamma, A.I.R.
1957 A.P. 710, at 715-4.
2. (1871) 8 Beng. L.R. 225.
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this claim, was of the view that though the lady had a right to have 
a proper sum ascertained and made a charge on the property in the hands 
of the heir, and she may also doubtless follow the property for this 
purpose into the hands of a third party who takes it as a volunteer or 
with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance, nevertheless 
in Bengal she does not have any lien over the property in respect of 
her maintenance against all the world irrespective of such notice. Lien 
for maintenance, his Lordship held, was a somewhat vague term so long 
as the amount of maintenance is undetermined, and until the proper 
amount is ascertained, maintenance as such does not acquire the charac­
ter of a proprietary rightUnder these circumstances, therefore, it 
would be most unreasonable to subject the bona fide purchaser for
valuable consideration to the possibility of a charge springing up any
2time though it had no definite existence at the time of purchase.
1. This theory was to have important consequences after 1956» where 
the Courts were unwilling to acknowledge the right to maintenance as 
a subsisting right to property capable of attracting s. 14 (l) of the 
HSA, it was used to considerable effect to cut down that right. See 
for instance Veerabhadra Rao v. Lakshmi Devi, A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 567* 
infra at 609-10,his Lordship, Ekbote, J., stating at 571 that, "It 
seems, however, to be plain that neither the texts of Hindu law nor
s. 59 (of the T.P. Act) creates any right or interest in immoveable 
property on the ground of maintenance"; Gopisetti's case, (1968) 2 An. 
W.R. 455, infra, 580ff , where it was likewise stated at 468 that,
"Under the Hindu law, a Hindu female though she has a right to be 
maintained out of ... joint-family properties, it is not a case of 
acquiring in ... joint-family properties, but she has only a right 
to be paid out of the ... properties ... over which s. 59 "the T.P.
Act imposes a charge." For further rulings to a like effect, see 
also Gurunadham v. Navaneethamma, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 429» at 451;
Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani. A.I.R. 1970 Or. 151» at 154; Velmurugayya 
Pillai v. Lakshmana Perumal, (1974) 2 M.L.J. 295> at 297; Subbalakshmi 
Ammal v. Andiappa Pillai, (l977) 1 M.L.J. (NRC) 2, at 2, —  all 
discussed below at 575^ .
2, For similar rulings see Adhiranee v. Shona Mali, I.L.R. (1876) 1 Cal. 
565; Venkatammal v. Andiappa, I.L.R. (1882) 6 Mad. 150; Ram Kumar v.
Ram Bai, I.L.R. (1900) 2 All. 526; The Bah rat pur State v. Gopal Deij
I.L.R. (1902) 24 All. l60,* Mohini Debi v. Puma Sashi, A.I.R. 1952 Cal 
451? Kaveri v. Subba Ayyer, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 574; Bayyapparaju v.
(continued next page)
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In Sham Lai v. Banna'*' the question before the Full Bench was
whether the maintenance of a Hindu widow is such a charge upon the
ancestral immoveable property as to be enforceable, wholly or
proportionately against the entirety or any part of such estate which
had passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of the liability of maintenance on it* In holding that the
bona fide purchaser without notice will have unhampered enjoyment of
the property, their Lordships decisively agreed with the Bengal
decision that, notwithstanding the imperative nature of the right of
maintenance, it is only enforceable if a charge to that effect had
been created by a decree or by an agreement*
But there the consensus ends, for whereas the view expressed in
2Calcutta in Adhiranee v. Shola Mali was that, where there was still 
sufficient of the duly charged property in the hands of the heir-at-law, 
the maintenance holder may not be allowed to recover her claim from the 
purchaser of a small portion of the family property without first 
attempting to reclaim it from the property in the hands of the heir-at- 
law,^ in Allahabad, on the other hand, the converse view prevailed, their 
Lordships holding that as the purchaser took with knowledge of the
V
charge, a portion of such property in their hands would be liable to
(continued from previous page)
Lakshammama, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 195* Ambika Raj v. Mt Tetara, A.I.R. 1956 
Pat. 295. This view was, however, not to achieve ascendancy, and *
' " the Supreme Court/in Rani Bai v. Yadunandan, A.I.R. 1969^ ^^*'’""
S.C. 1118, (infra, at 601 ) that the widow's right of maintenance is
not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of her claim or even with notice of the claim 
unless the transfer was made with the intention of defeating her claim. 
Approved of in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944j at 1950.
1. I.L.R. (1882) 4 All. 297 (F.B.).
2. I.L.R. (1876) 1 Cal. 565.
5. Followed in Goluck Chunder v. Rani Phil la, (1882) 25 W.R. 100.
-291-
such charge even if it be proved that the heirs had retained enough of 
it to meet the maintenance due on it.
Seemingly at odds, it could equally be argued that both these 
stances have in reality much ^  \xinM. from the strictly
equitable point of view, for where the portion of the alienated estate 
is small, the first liability must lie with those who retain the greater 
part of it. On the other hand, the Allahabad cannot be discounted 
either, for the mere sufficiency of property in the hands of the heirs 
cannot entirely exonerate the purchaser from the burden imposed on the 
charged estate of the widow's maintenance. Considering, however, that 
the charge existed over the totality of the estate, the quantum of 
property either way should not have been made the basis for the satis­
faction of the claim for maintenance; rather a -pro rata contribution 
towards the meeting of such obligation would, it is submitted, perhaps 
have been by far the most equitable solution in the circumstances.
But what where the alienated property is already burdened with the 
charge for the widow's maintenance? If as a consequence of obtaining 
the estate without knowledge, at the time of purchase, of a prior 
equitable rigfrt, the purchaser is entitled to priority in equity, it
V
would follow that the vendee is equally bound in equity and in law where 
he takes subject to such notice, and under the express terms of s. 59 of 
the T.P. Act, the maintenance holder may enforce her rig^ it against the
properties in the hands of the alienee with notice of her claim?
2
In Heeralal v. Mst. Konsillah, as at the alienation of the ancestral 
estate there was express mention in the sale deed of the widow's right of 
maintenance, it was rightly held that as the alienees took with notice
1. This provision is retained in the HAMA, s. 28 laying down; "Where a 
dependant has a right to receive maintenance ... the right may be 
enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the 
right,.... but not against the transferee for consideration and 
without notice of the right."
2.(1867) 2 Agra H.C.R. 42.
of such claim, they took it subject to that liability, unless the
widow herself bargained to forego it.
Likewise in Koluda v. Jageshwar,^  a part of the joint property
having been made subject to a charge for the widow's maintenance, they
were subsequently mortgaged. Later still when in execution of a decree
for arrears of maintenance, the mortgaged property was put up for sale,
the Court held that as the property in question had been specifically
charged with the widow's maintenance by a decree, the mortgagee was as
2much bound as the mortgagor. Neither, their Lordships held, could the
latter be said to be transferees without notice of the right, as it
did not appear that, before taking the mortgage they had made proper
inquiries as to the existence of any such charge upon the property.
In other words their Lordships, in invoking the equitable doctrine
of constructive notice, i.e. that a purchaser will be treated as having
constructive notice of all that a reasonably prudent purchaser would 
3
have discovered, took the view that, as the onus to make proper inquiries
1. I.L.R. (1899) 27 Cal. 194.
2. Numerous decisions testify to this right of the widow over the bona 
fide purchaser who takes with notice of her ri^ tit. For instances of 
more recent decisions see Malkar.jun v. Annarao, A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 189, 
at 190-1; Dattaraya v. Tulsabai, A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 412, at 414; Ban- 
sidhar v. Ht. Champo, A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 150, at 155; Ihrwatibai v. 
Mariayya, A.I.R. 1951 Kag. 346, at 347; Chandramma v. Yenkatareddi, 
A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 396, at 401; Smt. Sara swat i v. Smt. Rupa, A.I.R.
1962 Or. 1931 at 196; Ramaswamy v. Bagh.yammal, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 457» 
at 459.
3. R. Megarry and P.V. Baker, e.d., Snell's Principles of Equity, (Lond., 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1973)* at 39. It is further elaborated at 50-1 that, 
constructive notice may be imputed either where the purchaser has 
actual notice that the property was in some way encumbered, in which 
case he will be held to have constructive notice of all that he would 
have discovered if he had investigated the encumbrance, or where the 
purchaser has, whether deliberately or carelessly, abstained from 
making those inquiries that a prudent purchaser would have made.
lies with the alienee, and inasmuch as no such inquiry appeared to have 
heen made, they were bound and the widow's right indefeasible*
The question of the rights of the bona fide purchaser apart, where 
the widow obtains a decree for her maintenance against the ancestral 
estate, it is not open for the legal representatives to plead that such 
decree would not bind the estate in their hands, for the claim which 
arises as a consequence of the female's exclusion from inheritance must 
follow the property, and the effect of the decree persist, despite that 
the representative may not be personally liable*
Thus in Karapakambal v* Ganapathi,^  the question was whether a 
decree for maintenance against a Hindu, directing an annual payment to 
be made by him to the female decree holder for the rest of her life, 
could be executed after the death of the judgement debtor, against his 
sons. The Pull Bench was of the view that the decree could be executed 
against the heirs for arrears which had accrued since their father's death 
but only as representatives of their father, and until his assets were 
exhausted * ^
The Lucknow Higfc Court followed this line of reasoning in Mt. Munni 
3
v. Radhey Shiam, to hold the son liable where a maintenance decree had
V
been executed against his father, for though no charge had been created 
on the entire property, his Lordship Bennet, J., rightly reasoned that 
it was not open for the son to plead that it was a personal decree against
1. I.L.R. (1882) 5 Mad. 234 (F.B.).
2. An exactly similar decision was arrived at in Muttia v* Yirammal*
I.L.R. (I884) 10 Mad. 283 (F.B.). See also Minakshi v. Chinnappa,
I.L.R. 1,1901) 24 Mad. 689* In identical circumstances the reverse 
view taken in Bhagirathi v. Anantha, I.L.R. (1894) 17 Mad. 268 that 
the sons and grandsons were not bound by the decree against their male 
ascendant, may no longer be regarded as good law.
3. A.I.R. 1943 Oudh. 190.
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his father, for as the latter*s legal representative, he could not 
escape the liability to the extent of the ancestral property in his 
hands, whether such maintenance was due at the time of his father's 
death or had become due since.
Decisions such as these establish the binding nature of the
right of maintenance, and the better view that irrespective of whether
or not there is a charge,^ " even a bare right of maintenance is
capable of being enforced where the husband had left property, has
been amply vindicated after 195&, typical of such decisions being
2
Rani Bai v. Yadunandan, and from this position there is now no 
resiling.
6. The Claim of Creditors as Against the Right of Maintenance
We must now turn our attention to the question of the widow's 
maintenance as against property burdened with the debt of her late 
husband. The cardinal principle to be borne in mind here is that, 
in the Hindu law the payment of the debts of the deceased takes precedence 
over every other claim over the property. Indeed when we consider the 
theory of spiritual benefit, the Pious Obligation on the part of the son 
to settle from the joint stock, the debts of his male ancestors up to v 
three generations, provided they are not "tainted", i.e. avyavaharika, 
it then becomes clear that the widow's right of maintenance (which 
includes the right of residence in the family house),^ must of necessity
1. See in this respect Derrett's pithy comment, infra, at 576.
2. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1118 infra, at 601.
3. That the ri^it of residence is an integral part of the right of main­
tenance, is an established principle in the Hindu law and confirmed in 
numerous authoritative rulings, for as it was explained in Charandas v.
(continued next page)
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be subordinate to the claims of the creditor. The same is true of 
debts contracted by the manager of the joint family, and where these 
are incurred for the benefit of the family, or in other words for 
justifiable legal necessity, the claim for maintenance is liable to 
be defeated on the principle that, those who are entitled to the 
benefits accruing to the joint assets must likewise share in its lia- , 
bilities.
(l) The Effect of the Husband's Alienation
It is thus a well settled rule of Hindu law that the debts of 
the husband take precedence over the widow's claim for maintenance so 
long as the maintenance is not charged over the property. Where the 
husband had himself alienated the property during his lifetime in satis­
faction of a debt incurred by him, no justifying circumstances are 
necessary, and in Bhikam v. Piira^  in a suit brought against the mother 
and widow of the deceased for certain monies charged on, among other 
properties, the family dwelling house, the defence put up was that as 
the ladies had nowhere else to reside in, and in fact possessed the right
(continued from previous page)
Nagubai, A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 452, “subsistence" referred to in the texts> 
does not mean bare subsistence but also includes shelter. Tinder s. 14
(l) of the HSA, 1956, this principle was to have the effect of convert­
ing such right of residence to an absolute estate as a right held "in 
lieu of maintenance," where the female was actually prossessed of the 
dwelling house. See for instance Mst. Gaumata v. Shankar Lai, A.I.R. 
1974 Raj. 147. infra at 590 fnlsMuthu Bhattar v. Chokku Bhattar, A.I.R. 
I976 Mad. 8, infra, 598 , which render obsolete decisions such as
those in Raja Rao v. Hastimal, A.I.R. 1972 Raj. 191» infra, at 577> 
f.n.l:Bai Parsan v. Ehagwandas, (1972) 2 Guj. L.R. 123* infra, at 577 
f.n. 1; Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi, A.I.R. 197^ S.C. 2198, infra, at 5^ 9 
f .n.l, and the even more startling allegation in Janki v. Govinda,
A.I.R. 1980 Ker. 218, (infra, at 648 ) at 219 that, "The right, (of 
maintenance) if at all, is only a monetary claim and not any right i*1 
Item No. I" (the house in question).
1. I.L.R. (1879) 2 All. 141.
of residence in the ancestral home, the mortgage could not be upheld* 
Pearson, J*, however held that, in the absence of any rule specifying 
that the ancestral home could not be sold, since the house in question 
had been hypothecated prior to the accrual of the rights of the females
  arising out of the demise of the Hindu male --  the mortgage could
be enforced.'*'
2
This last principle was explained more fully in Jayanti v* Alamelu.
The deceased husband had executed a promissory note as a surety, and 
after his death, on having obtained a decree against his widow on the 
promissory note, the decree-holder attached the house in which she was 
residing, brought it to sale and purchased it* On his endeavouring to 
obtain possession, the widow resisted on the ground that she had a right 
of residence in the house for the remainder of her life and could there­
fore not be ejected. Ayyangar, J*, however, in ruling against such 
claim, was of the view that, though undoubtedly the female had during 
her husband*s lifetime a right of maintenance against him, that was 
merely a personal obligation on her husband irrespective of whether or 
not he was possessed of any property, but it formed no charge on any 
part of the property* After his death, the estate devolved upon his
V
widow by right of inheritance; she took it as heir and had to administer 
it>[such* Under these circumstances, all debts that bound the husband 
were necessarily binding upon the widow in respect of all the assets 
which had come to her as his legal representative.
In view of this authoritative exposition of the underlying principles
1. For similar rulings see also Ramzan v. Ram Daiya (1917) 42 I.C. 944» 
Gangabai v* Jankibai, A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 580; . Jamiatara v. Mt. Malian, 
A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 718; Mt* Malian v* Parmatma, A.I.R* 1936 Lah 558. 
Manohari v. Sarab Singh, A.I.R. 1937 Pesh 46; Malkarjan v. Sarubai, 
A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 187, at 189; Bhagwandas v. Chapsey (1944) 4^> Bon*
L.R. 76O, at 761-2; Satwati v. Kali Shankar, A.I.R. 1955 All. 4 (F.B*)> 
at 6.
2. I.L.R. (1904) 27 Mad. 45.
as between the widow*s right of maintenance on the one hand, and the 
claims of the husband's alienee on the other, the decision in Manilal 
v# Baitara^ may not be countenanced. The husband had, during his life­
time, mortgaged the house in question, and in execution of a decree 
enforcing such mortgage, it was sold and purchased by the mortgagee 
with knowledge that the mortagor's widow/re siding in it at the time of 
the sale. Subsequently in a suit brought by the widow to establish her 
right to continue to reside in the house, her claim was negatived on the 
grounds that in the absence of any allegation that the mortgage effected
by the deceased husband was not for the family advantage or was in any
2
way in fraud of her rights, the auction-purchaser took the house free 
from the widow's claim, notwithstanding that he had had notice of such 
claim* This view is, it is submitted, untenable, for no such consider­
ations may be entertained, and the cardinal principle adhered to, i.e* 
that in all such instances, unless the property had already been charged 
with the female's maintenance and residence, debts take priority over 
every other claim.
(2) The Debts of the Deceased Take Precedence Over the Claim of Eis 
Widow for Maintenance
%.
Unlike the wife's claim of maintenance and residence which is a 
personal liability against the husband, the right of the widow to such 
claim is based, as we have already established, upon her husband's right 
to a share in the family property, and those who take his assets by 
survivorship are under a legal obligation to maintain his widow out of
1. I.L.R. (1893) 17 Bom. 398.
2. See in this respect the dissenting comment of Ayyangar, J., in 
Jayanti v. Alemalu, I.L.R. (1904) 27 Mad. 45» at 51 •
that property in the same degree of comfort to which she was used during 
her lifetime. Where however, the property is taken burdened with the 
debts of the deceased, the principle that such debts take precedence 
over the claim of his widow to maintenance, applies perhaps with even 
greater vigour in view of the notion of the Pious Obligation.
Some of the earliest decisions bear out this fundamental rule.
In Adhiranee v. Shona Mali,'*' where the surviving coparcener had sold 
the estate for the payment of the deceased's debts, Jackson, J., stres­
sed on the principle of Hindu law that, debts contracted by the husband 
have priority over his widow's claim for maintenance, and semble that 
if a portion of his property is sold after his death to repay such debt, 
the widow cannot enforce her right against the property in the hands of 
the purchaser.^
Similarly, the absolute priority of the claim of the creditor as
against a mere maintenance holder was emphasised in Lakshman v. Satya- 
3
bhamabai. In a suit for maintenance against the sole surviving copar­
cener and the bona fide purchasers for value of the ancestral property 
sold in satisfaction of an ancestral debt, it was held that, despite the 
general rule that a charge for maintenance accompanies the property as a
V.
burden annexed to it in the hands of the vendee with notice, nevertheless 
the bona fide purchaser is not affected despite the notice to him of such
1. I.L.R. (1876) 1 Cal. 365.
2. This rule is equally binding on the daughter-in-law, where her husband's 
father alienates the unmoveable ancestral property in his hands. In 
Ganga Bai v. Sita Ram, (I876) 1 All. 170 (F.B.), it was held that as 
the father-in-law's alienation could not have been challenged by the 
son himself if alive, the satisfaction of an untainted debt took 
priority over the female's claim to be maintained out of the ancestral 
estate.
3. I.L.R. (1877) 2 Bom. 494.
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charge, If the sale was in discharge of the untainted debts of the
husband, his father or father*s father."*-
In Madras, however, this construction was rejected, and where the
creditor, who had obtained a simple money decree against the assets of
his deceased debtor, then brought the property to sale notwithstanding
that he had notice of the existence of the charge in favour of the
2
widow*s maintenance, the question in Somasundaram v* Unnamalai was 
whether the latter was ineffective as against binding debts on the 
family* In discussing the respective priorities of a charge for main­
tenance and the claims of a creditor, Ayyar, J*, took the view that, 
the moment that a Court declares that its decree is to be discharged by 
the creation of a charge on immoveable property, it is as binding as if 
there was a mortgage for a binding debt created by the debtor on the 
property* In other words, as there is no clear authority for the 
proposition that a charge bona fide created can be defeated by a 
creditor who has lent money for family purposes, the rule that debts 
take precedence over maintenance, his Lordship further clarified, is of 
limited application, and valid only so long as the two obligations — — 
the one to pay a binding debt and the other to pay maintenance —  axe
*
both of them not charged on the estate* If either of them assumes that
3
shape, the one takes precedence over the other*
1. The same view was taken in Sham Lai v* Banna, I.L.R* (1882) 4 All* 
297, (F.B.)j Gur Dayal v. Kaunsila, I.L.R* (1883) 5 All. 3°7; Kuloda 
v. Jageshwar, (1889) 27 Cal. 194.
2. I.L.R. (1920) 43 Mad. 800.
3* This equating of the two claims, those of maintenance and debts, is 
likewise evident in Lakshman v* Saraswatibai, (1875) 12 Bom. H.C.R* 
69* Where the ancestral property had been alienated for debts con­
tracted for family purposes, the widow sought to enforce her right of 
maintenance by attempting to have a charge created on such property 
in the hands of the bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. 
The learned Judges, however held that, while the sacred texts were
(continued next page)
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This interpretation is in keeping with the equitable doctrine 
that, where there are two competing equitable interests, the general 
rule of Equity is that the person whose equity attaches to the property 
first, will be entitled to priority over the other,^ or in brief, Qui
prior est tempore potior est Jure: he who is earlier in time, is stronger
• 2an law.
These same principles were the basis of the ruling in Mst. Pan Kuer 
v. Sarla Devi ,^ the Privy Council reiterating that while in the ordinary 
course of the law, the obligation to pay the binding debts of the decea­
sed will take precedence over the mere claim of a Hindu female *s main­
tenance, nevertheless the rule of the Hindu law — — in accord with the 
principles under s. 39 of the T.P. Act —  is that, if either of these 
two obligations assume the shap>e of a charge, it would take precedence 
over the other.^
It is submitted that, while from the strictly equitable point of 
view, there is much in decisions such as the foregoing to commend, the
Hindu texts nowhere lay down the condition of a charge for the one claim
to have priority over the other. On the other hand, when we consider
(continued from previous page) v
insistent on the legal claim of the widow to be maintained by those 
who took the estate of her deceased husband, they had likewise made the 
payment of debts a sacred obligation up>on the heirs for the spiritual
benefit of the deceased. In such circumstances if -- as judicial
decisions had conclusively established   proparty in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser cannot be pursued by a creditor of the deceased
proprietor, neither was it open to the widow -- whom in his lifetime
the latter was legally bound to maintain, no less than he was to pay
his debts -- to enforce her claim against proparty in the hands of
such bona fide purchaser.
1. Snell, op.cit., at 45*
2. Barclay*8 Bank Ltd v. Bird, (1954) Qu 274*
3. A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 8.
4* Ibid.,'at 14* The same view was taken in Mst. Santi v. Sudh Ram A.I.R. 
1955 Punj. 22.
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the moral force of the Pious Obligation and the duty that it imposes 
upon those who take the deceased’s estate as against the widow’s right 
to be maintained which arises only if there is any estate of the 
deceased in the hands of the survivors, one submits that on balance, 
the claim for maintenance may only be met with from the residue, if 
any, after all claims of the creditors are satisfied, v
(3) The Effect on the Claim for Maintenance of Alienations 
Coparceners Vithout Legal Necessity
It has, however, to be borne in mind that though the widow is not 
entitled to claim maintenance out of the property transferred or 
attached in execution of a decree for debts incurred by her deceased 
husband, the sale of the family house without justifying necessity by 
the surviving coparcener or coparceners, whether voluntary or in execu­
tion of a debt not arising out of family necessity, would not affect her 
right of residence. For if hell is the portion of the master of the 
family who does not carefully maintain his dependants,^ the Hindu widow 
who had resided with her husband and the members of his family in the
family dwelling house while he was alive, is entitled to reside therein 
2after his death, and it is neither open to the heir nor to the purchaser 
purchasing from him, to evict her from the ancestral dwelling*
1, See Bay a, II. 23* op.cit.
2. This is now a statutory right under s, 23 of the HSA, 1956. Where the 
Hindu intestate has left a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of 
the family, the female heirs specified in claBS I of the Schedule are 
entitled to a right of residence therein, though their right to claim 
partition of the same does not arise until the male heirs choose to 
divide their respective shares therein. Hie proviso to the section 
adds that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled 
to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried, 
or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband, or is a widow. 
See above at 54, for a discussion of the discriminatory nature of this 
provision.
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In Mangala Debi v. Dirianath Bose,^  where the adopted son^on attain­
ing majority, had asserted his right as heir and sold the house in which 
the widow had continued to reside even after her husband*s death, the 
question was whether the purchaser had such a right as to ask her to 
quit at a week*s notice# In a judgement remarkable for its adherence 
to the protection that the ancient smrti texts afforded to females in .
regard to their ri^its of maintenance and residence, Peacock, C.J.,
2
expressed "very great doubt”,
"(w)hether a son, either natural bom or 
adopted, is entitled to turn his father*s 
widow and the other females of the family who 
are entitled to maintenance out of the dwelling 
selected by the father for his own residence, 
and in which he left the females of his family 
at the time of his death," 3
His Lordship referred in particular to the text of Katyayana that
"(E)xcept his whole estate and his dwelling 
house, what remains after food and clothing of 
his family, a man may give away, whatever it be,
whether fixed or moveable, otherwise it may not
be given," 4
to hold that, this being not merely a moral precept but a restrictive 
injunction, it would be quite contrary to every principle of Hindu law 
to assume that, where the property is taken by an heir for the spiritual 
benefit of the deceased, it would not have contained some provision to 
protect the widow from being turned out, either by the heir or by the 
purchaser# Thus as such action would be against the usages and customs
of the Hindus and highly injurious to the reputation of the female, it
1. (I869) 4 Beng. L.R. 72 (O.C.J.).
2, Ibid,, at 77#
5• Ibid,,
4. Ibid,, at 77-8,
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was not within the power of the son to turn her out or even authorise
the vendor to do so,"*" without, at any rate, providing her with some
2
other suitable alternative accommodation.
Hor is it open to the coparcener, into whose hands the property
has come by survivorship, to jeopardise the right of residence by
alienating the estate for debts not binding on the widow. In Venka- ;
3tammal v« Andiappa, the son, after the death of the father, contracted 
considerable debts and on mortgage bonds executed by him suits were 
instituted and the properties brought to sale in execution of decrees 
passed in such suits. It was not shown that the debts were incurred 
for purposes which could bind his mother who, on the death of her husband, 
had a right of maintenance against her son quoad the share of her husband 
in the joint-family property. Thus, as the mortgage and subsequent sale 
were in satisfaction of a personal debt, it was held that the house must 
be sold subject to the mother^ right to continue to reside in it.^
This principle was reiterated by the Bombay Hi^i Court in Mallearjun 
v. Sarubai. In a joint-family consisting of two brothers --  one of them
1. For similar dicta, see also Gauri v. Chandramani, I.L.R. (1876) 1 All* 
262; Talemand v. Rukmina, I.L.R. (1880) 3 All. 553; Bhlsukhram v. Lal- 
lubhai, I.L.R. (1885) 7 Bom. 282; Bai Bevkore v. Sanmukhram, I.L.R. v 
(1888) 13 Bom* 101; Secretary of State v. Ahalyabai, A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 
321, at 324 Mt. Ganga Dei v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 108; Sm. Khanta 
Moni v. Shyam Chand, A.I.R. 1973 Gal* 112, where it was held that the 
destitute widowed daughter could not be evicted by the heir from the 
residence given to her by her father.
2. The same view was expressed in Yellawa v. Bhimangouda, I.L.R. (1894) 18 
Bom; 452, at 453-4; Rachavia v. ShiTOyogapa, I.L.R. (1894) 18 Bom. 679» 
at 683; Mt. Ganga Bei v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 108, at 110; Rani
. Bai v. Yadunandan, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1118, at 1121.
3. I.L.R. (1882) 6 Mad. 130.
4. An exactly similar ratio was obitn.ve/JL in Shambhu Dayal v. Mst. Munni 
A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 496.
5. A.I.R. 1943 Bom.. 187.
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still a minor ——  the elder of them executed a mortgage of the family 
property for the purpose of starting a family business, and subsequently 
after the death of the minor brother, on selling the family house to pay
off debts incurred in regard to the mortgage, it was contended that
the minor*s widow had no right to interdict either the sale or the 
earlier mortgage, for as she took her rights of maintenance and residence 
in the property as it stood at the time of her husband*s death, she could 
not set up her rights as against alienations effected during his lifetime# 
In negativing this claim, Divatia, J., however held that, as in the first 
place the manager of a joint Hindu family has no authority to impose
upon a minor member, the risk and liability of a new business set up by
him,^  the mortgage could not bind the widow# Moreover, his Lordship was 
further of the view, as part of the consideration of the mortgage deed 
represented some loans to satisfy the personal debts of the alienor, the 
minor* s interest could not be bound, for the fundamental principle is 
that,
*'(a)lthough a widow is not entitled to claim 
maintenance out of the property transferred or 
attached in execution of a decree for an alien­
ation made by the deceased husband, she is 
entitled to challenge debts incurred by a co­
parcener such as a son, or a brother of her v
husband, and to enforce her ri^ its to pay off
those debts unless it was proved that they had 
been incurred for family necessity#" ^
It would therefore follow that, where there is indefeasible evidence 
that the coparcener in exercise of his authority as manager contracts a
debt for the benefit of the family as a whole, or in the due course of
the family business, the debts thus incurred, must take priority over
1# Following Benares Bank Ltd v. Hari Narain, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 182#
2# Malkarjun v. Sarubai, cited above, at 190.
the rights of the members of the joint—family including those of the 
deceased coparcener*s widow
2I*1 Johuree Bihi v. Sreegopal, the family business under the 
management of the surviving coparcener having failed, on a petition 
being filed in the Insolvency Court, the Official Assignee sold the 
house to the defendant who then called on the widow to remove from the 
house. On her resisting on the ground of her right of residence, Ponti- 
fex, J,, was however quite clear that, debts honestly incurred in the 
course of running the family business, must over-ride the rights of 
the members of the joint-family in property acquired with funds derived 
from the joint business. In other words, those who claim to participate 
in the benefits must also be subject to the liabilities of the joint 
business.^
The Full Bench considered the question in Raman and an v. Rangamiral.^ 
After the father* s death, in execution of a decree for recovery of debts 
contracted by the sons, the family house was sold and the father*s 
widow ordered to vacate the premises. On the finding that the debt had 
been incurred not for the exclusive benefit of the coparceners, but for 
the benefit generally of the joint-family, the learned Judges were 
unanimous in holding that the widow was not entitled to set aside the v 
sale unless she could prove that the debt that had led to it was not
1. The widow* s claim to maintenance and residence is likewise subservient 
to the personal untainted debts of the male ancestor up to three 
generations. See Ganga Bai v. Sit a Ram. I.L.R. (1876) 1 All. 170 (F.B. 
supra.at 298, f.n. 2.
2. I.L.R. (1876) 1 Cal 470. -
5. Followed in Mst. Champa v. Official Receiver, Karachi. I.L.R. (1954)
15 Lah. 9.
4. I.L.R. (1888) 12 Mad. 260.
"binding on her.^ "
Thus while on the one hand, the widow's right of maintenance and
residence, for all its imperative nature, is liable to be defeated where
2
the estate is burdened by the debts of the deceased on the principle of 
the Pious Obligation, equitable principles on the other hand, equally 
stipulate that debts incurred bona fide for family purpose must bind , 
the widow like any other member of the joint-family, provided that 
imprudence or fecklessness do not otherwise play their part to vitiate 
such sale.^
7* The Widow's Rigfrt to Claim Maintenance While Living Away from the 
Family House.
The same reasons which require a wife to remain under her husband's 
roof,^ do not apply where she has become a widow. However, despite the 
fact that it is nowhere prescribed that the right of maintenance is 
dependent upon residence, some early decisions indicate that where after 
the death of her husband, the widow leaves the ancestral home, the true 
principle of the Hindu law is that, while she does not lose her right
1. For similar rulings see also Bayyapparaju v. Lakshmamma, A.I.R. 1957 
Mad. 1935 Lakshmi v. S.Y. Co-operative Bank, I.L.R. (1945) 50 Mys.
39 (F.B.); Kalipada v. Pumabala. A.I.R. 1948 Cal 269* v
2. This position has not been materially altered by the "Hindu Code", 
s. 26 of the HAMA. 1956» providing that unless under s. 27 a charge 
for maintenance has been created, "debts of every description con­
tracted or payable by the deceased shall have priority over the claim 
of his dependants for maintenance under this Act."
3. See Chunilal v. Bai Saraswati, A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 393» supra, at 279-80*
4. See A.jaib Kaur v. TJttam Singh, A.I.R. i960 Punj. 117f where it was
held that, as under the Hindu law it is the duty of the wife to 
remain under her husband1 s roof and protection, she commits a breach 
of this duty by living separately from him unless she can by reliable 
evidence establish that, by reason of her husband's misconduct, or 
refusal to maintain her in his own house, or for some other justifying
cause, she is compelled to live separately.
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of maintenance lay visiting her own relatives, nevertheless as the 
widow is not entirely her own mistress, being subject to the control 
of her husband's family, she is not entitled to separate maintenance in 
the absence of special circumstances necessitating her withdrawal from 
the family dwelling.*
2In endorsing this view, Pinhey, J#, in Kasturbai v. Shivajiram V 
after having elaborated on the general dependence of Hindu women, 
further ruled that it was a fallacy to declare that a Hindu widow is a 
perfectly independent person, and that however young (provided she were 
of full years) and however incapable of taking care of herself, she is 
entitled to throw off all the restraints which every society in some 
form or the other imposes on its female members, to take a house in the 
bazaar, and to do exactly as she pleases at the expense of her husband's 
relatives, subject to the one condition that she was not found out in 
unchastity and proved to be guilty in a Court of Law* With respect 
however, it is submitted that such extravagant flights of fancy merit 
rebuke. It is supreme irony that his Lordship should have, in the 
same breath, talked of restraints that every society imposes upon its 
female members (and indeed more so by Indian society than most others), ^  
and of widows who leave their homes for patently immoral purposes. Given 
the general view that womoi must always be the citadels of virtue, the 
preservers of the family honour, one is forced to the conclusion that his
1. Ran go v. Yamunabai. I.L.R. (1379) 3 Bom* 44* See also Seshamma v. Sub- 
barayudu, IL.R. (l895) 18 Mad. 403» where in a suit by the Hindu widow 
against her husband's brother to establish her right to maintenance and 
to recover arrears for six years, the Court incidently observed that, 
though it had the discretion to award arrears, the same could be refused 
where the widow had chosen to live apart from her husband's family 
without sufficient cause.
2. I.L.R. (1879) 3 Bom. 372.
-308-
Lordship was out of touch with the realities of Indian social conditions# 
In a Hindu family of moderate means, concern for which the learned Judge 
had so much at heart, the widow, in leaving her husband's home in the 
instant case, left it to seek refuge among her own relatives; imputation 
of unchastity in such cases is, it is submitted, gross generalisation 
the few such instances that may have occurred.
Unsupported as this stance is by any authority, textual or otherwise, 
it may safely be discarded, for it has been settled by decisions of the 
highest tribunals that though undoubtedly the husband's family home is 
the proper place for his widow to reside in, it is not necessarily the 
most proper place for her continued residence,and provided that she is 
not guilty of unchastity or other disreputable practices after she leaves 
such residence, her right to claim maintenance remains intact# This 
minority view —  significant only inasmuch as it illustrates how such
facile arguments may mislead --- was thus rightly rejected, and their
Lordships, Westropp, C.J#, and Melvill, J., in taking a contrary view, 
referred in particular to the ruling of Sir Barnes Peacock in Raja 
Pirthee Singh- v# Rani Ra.jkoer* to hold that unchastity apart, non­
residence as such could not nullify the claim for maintenance.
2 vIn the Privy Council decision, where the widow having voluntarily
left the family home to reside with her own relatives, sued seven years 
later for arrears and future maintenance, the question for decision was 
whether, under such circumstances, where her departure from the family 
home had not been motivated by unchaste or other improper purposes, the 
widow's claim could be negatived. His Lordship reviewed some of the
1. (1873) 12 Beng. L.R. 238 (P.C.)
2. Ibid.
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earliest authorities to establish precedent, and taking in particular 
the dicta in Cassinaut Bysack v. Hurroosoondry Dossi.^  where the Privy 
Council had expressed in general terms that, where the widow from a Just 
cause chose to reside in a place other than the roof of her husband*s 
family home, she did not thereby forfeit her right of succession to his 
estate, held that this principle was equally applicable to a case of 
maintenance* This freedom of choice, the learned Chief Justice explained, 
had respect to causes as applicable to a widow not an heiress as to one 
who inherited, that is to say that, unless the widow left the residence 
of her deceased husband for unchaste purposes, she could not be deprived 
either of the property which she had inherited from him, or of the main­
tenance which the Hindu law requires of her husband’s heirs to provide 
for her.^
It is thus now settled law that mere non-residence in the ancestral 
home does not thereby defeat the widow’s right to claim maintenance, for 
as Maclean C.J., explained in Sjddessury v* Janardan, the term ’dependant*
1. (1819) 2 Mor. Dig. 198.
2. An earlier decision in Visalatchi v. Anaswm.y, (1870) 5 Mad. H.C.R. 150, 
arrives at a similar view, the Court, however, further adding that where 
the widow does leave the family residence for unchaste purposes, it 
would seem to be unsettled whether her unchastity affects her rights v 
to an allowance for the bare necessaries of life. This remark made 
obiter needs clarification. Vhile it is no doubt true, as we shall 
presently see, that a widow guilty of unchastity but who subsequently 
reforms, is allowed a bare or ’starving* maintenance, nonetheless once 
she decides to leave the protection of her husband's home, she is only 
entitled if she leads a chaste life. TJnchastity under such circumstances 
would, it is submitted, disentitle her, as by a voluntary act she frees 
herself from the responsibilities that she would have otherwise have 
been burdened with, and what is more, adopt a course so frowned upon
by the jjastra. On the other hand, what is really the moot question is, 
(it is submitted) whether or not she loses her claim to maintenance, if, 
as a consequence of ill-treatment and duress, she is forced to quit the 
family residence, and having nowhere else to take shelter, then takes 
to unchastity as a last resort.
5. I.L.R. (1902) 29 Cal. 557.
does not necessarily mean 'resident*, and while so long as the non­
resident widow does not pu.t forward her claim, the right may remain 
dormant or in abeyance, nevertheless it subsists continuously as a legal 
obligation upon those who take the estate
However, this general rule apart, where the husband chooses by his
will to make it a condition that his widow should reside in' the family
house after his death, such a direction would be binding, and it would
be futile to plead that the imposition of this condition is at variance
with the enlarged and liberal Bpirit which has actuated the Hi$i Courts
in dealing with the question as to the separate maintenance of widows#
2
In Gokibai v# Lakhmidas, where the husband*s will clearly stipulated 
that, should his widow leave the family house after his death, her main­
tenance allowance be reduced, the Court nevertheless allowed her claim 
for separate maintenance, and in purporting to follow the ruling in Raja 
Pirthee Singh* s Case.^  left open the question whether that rule applies 
where in defiance of her husband*s instructions the widow chooses to live 
elsewhere# It is however submitted that in fact had the learned Judge, 
Farran, J#, actually followed the ruling of the Privy Council, the
1. Mokhada Das si v# Nand Lai, I.L.R# (1901) 28 Cal# 278. A host of decisions 
vindicate this view, among them, Surampalli v. Surampalli. I.L.R. (1908) 
31 Mad 388? Ekradeshwari v. Homeshwar, A.I.R. I929 B.C. 128, at 132; 
Srinavasa.v. Lakshmi, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 216; Har Pratab v. Thakurain 
Raghuraj, A.I.R. 1933 Oudh 550; Krishna.1i v. Anusaya, A.I.R. 1939 Nag* 
130; Dattatrya v. Laxman, I.L.R. (l942) Bom. 584; Hari v. Narmadabai, 
A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 133; Rajamma v. Varadarajulu, A.I.R. 1957 Mad* 198f 
where as a consequence of a pre-puberty marriage, the widow had never 
lived with her husband, the Court nevertheless decreed that she was 
entitled to arrears; Gowardhan v. Sint. Gangabai, A.I.R. 19&4 M.P. 168, 
at 171; Sidramappa v. Mahadevi, A.I.R. 1971 Mys. 145* at 147* Guru- 
swami.v. Angaiyarkannit A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 194* at 198.
2. I.L.R. (1890) 14 Bom. 490.
3* (1873) 12 Beng. L.R. 238 (P.C.).
question would have posed no problem, for in the course of the earlier 
judgement,*^  Peacock, C.J.'s qualification obiter of the general rule 
was precisely to the effect that, the widow's right of maintenance 
cannot be defeated by reason of mere non-residence for purposes other 
than unchastity except where she deliberately flouts the direction in 
her husband's will by residing elsewhere without a Just cause. In this 
particular instance, therefore, rather than bringing the widow's case 
under the purview of the general rule, a more equitable solution for 
the learned Judge to adopt would have been to bind her to the terms 
of the will and grant her the reduced maintenance that the testator had 
envisaged in such circumstances.
2
The same Higfc Court's later decision in Girianna v. Honama, is, 
it iB submitted, more to the point. Where the minor widow had left the 
protection of her husband's undivided nephew a year after his death, his 
Lordship held that despite the general rule that maintenance is not con­
ditional upon residence, where the husband had specified in his will 
that his widow should remain in the family house until she attained 
majority, she would be bound by this condition uni ess she could prove 
that the nephew's conduct towards her was such as to justify her action.^
V
In effect > therefore, where circumstances justify her leaving the 
family house, the coparceners cannot escape their liability to maintain
I* Raja Pirthee Sink's Case, cited above.
2. I.L.R. (1891) 15 Bom. 236.
3. In Jamna v. Arjun, A.I.R. 1941 All. 43, for instance, where the widow 
in disobedience of the instruction in her husband's will, had left 
the family residence as a consequence of dissension and strained 
feelings between her and her husband's adopted son, the Court held 
that such non-residence being for a just cause, the widow did not 
thereby forfeit her right to claim maintenance.
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the widow notwithstanding that the testator rni^ it have stipulated 
residence as a pre-condition to maintenance. In Mul ji v. Bai Ujam\  
where the bequest to the wife was conditional upon her returning to 
the family home, it was alleged that as the condition remained unful­
filled, it was not open to the widow to claim arrears of maintenance on 
the ground that those in possession of her husband's estate were liable 
for her maintenance. It was however held that,as ill-feeling between 
the two parties had predominated to the extent that the widow's charac­
ter was sought to be blackened by the raking up without justification 
of an old scandalous story against her, it was inconceivable to visualise 
a joint living of amity and harmony, and this being just enough cause 
for the widow to live separately, she would be entitled to the arrears 
she was claiming.
2
Similarly in Tin Couri v. Krishna Bhabini. where contrary to the 
condition as expressed in the testator's will, the infant widow was 
removed from the deceased husband's home with the assistance of the 
police, their Lordships held that though it would appear that what was 
contemplated was a wilful, deliberate and intentional leaving, nevertheless 
considering that the girl could not be treated as a free agent at the
V
time or even subsequently during her period of non-residence, it had 
therefore to be construed as a plain case of duress which could not be 
treated as working a forfeiture of her rights as contemplated in the will. 
However, what adds interest to the ratio is that, while holding in favour 
of the widow, the learned Judges added at the same time, the note of 
warning that, while in these exceptional circumstances her right 
remained intact, their ruling was not to be misconstrued as laying down
1. I.L.R. (1888) 13 Bom. 218.
2. I.L.R. (1893) 20 Cal. 15.
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as a matter of law that mere legal infancy as such could effectively 
he a plea to keep the widow away from the residence where she was 
hound to live under the terms of her hushandfs will*
On the other hand, where there is no such condition of residence 
in the will, such an intention on the testator’s part cannot he imputed*
In Narayanrao v# Hamahai,^  in a suit brought hy a Hindu widow for main­
tenance more than sixteen years after the death of the testator who had 
bequeathed the entire of his estate to his eldest son, directing him at 
the same time to provide for his widows and other members and dependants 
of the family, the plea of the son was that it was a condition precedent 
to the widow’s right to maintenance that she should live under the same 
roof as the rest of the joint-family* It was however held that, as 
there was no condition in the will making the plaintiff’s right to main­
tenance dependent upon her residing in the family house, she was therefore 
left in the ordinary position of a Hindu widow in whose case separation
from the ancestral home would not generally disentitle her to maintenance
2suitable to her rank and position.
8. The Widowed Daughter-in-Law’s Claim to Maintenance from the Separate
Assets of Her Father-in-Law *   v
(i) The Moral Liability of the Father-in-Law
Intimately connected with the question of the widow's claim to
maintenance from her deceased husband’s family is the nature of the
right that the widowed daughter-in-law may assert in her demand for
1. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 114.
2. However, as the suit was instituted more than sixteen years after the 
husband’s death, an alert counsel could well have taken advantage of 
the law of limitation to plead on behalf of the defendant that the 
claim was barred by time.
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maintenance from the self-acquisitions of her father-in-law. Where the 
deceased husband had left no property, there is, as we have already 
indicated,no liability on his male collaterals to maintain his widow. 
Neither, in such circumstances, is the husband*s father legally compelled, 
except that it has been uniformly held, and is settled law that, though 
the adult son who is not permanently disabled from supporting himself, 
has no right, moral or legal, to be maintained by the father from his
self-acquired assets, nevertheless upon the son*s death, the Hindu law
imposes upon the father, the moral obligation to provide maintenance for 
his widowed daughter-in-law.'*'
Thus Manu
"(T)he father, the mother, the Guru, a wife, an 
offspring, poor dependants, a guest and a reli­
gious mendicant are declared to be the group of
persons who are to be maintained." 2
Likewise Narad a maintains in even more explicit language:
"(A)fter the death of her lord, the relations of 
her husband shall be the guardians of a woman who 
has no son. They shall have full authority to 
control her, to regulate her mode of life, and 
to maintain her."3
and guided by injunctions such as these, and on the principles of
1. Appavu v. Kallammal, A .I.E. 1949 Mad* 24, at 25. Note though, that 
there is no authority for the proposition that, where the daughter- 
in-law is widowed after the death of her father-in-law, she is entitled 
to maintenance out of the estate left by the father-in-law to his 
heirs. The condition precedent attaching to the moral liability of 
the_ father-in-law is the pre-decease of his married son. See Mst.
. Saran Bai v. Abdul Rashid, A.I.R. 1948 Sind 127, at 129.
2. Cited with approval in Lakshmi v. Sundaramma, AIR 1981 AP 88 (F.B.),at 98* 
See also Raya II. 23, op.cit: "For the maintenance of the family is an 
indispensible obligation; as Manu positively declares: *The support of 
persons who should be maintained is the approved means of attaining 
heaven. But hell is a man*s portion if they suffer. Therefore, let the 
master of a family carefully maintain them.*"
3. Nar. XIII. 28, op.cit.
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justice and equity, it has long been established by custom and usage 
that, in a society where child marriages were not uncommon and fathers 
exercised their not inconsiderable authority in arranging them, the 
daughter-in-law who was placed in a peculiarly helpless situation as 
a widow, should at least be provided with food, shelter and raiment by 
her husband*s father, irrespective of whether or not the latter had 
succeeded to any property of the former.
This right was early recognised but merely as a moral liability 
on the father-in-law* s part that could not ever assume the force of 
law. In Khetramani Pasi v. Kashinath Ras,^  Lock and Kemp, J.J., were 
of the view that, not only is the maintenance of a son*s widow as a 
dependant member of the family, a charge on the inheritance, but that, 
as for all practical purposes she is a member of the family into which 
she had been married, the obligation to support his family which the 
law imposes on every Hindu makes it incumbent upon the father-in-law 
to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law even where his means are self- 
acquired, as if he were in possession of ancestral property. The rest 
of the Bench were, however, vigorous in their dissent, and, it is sub­
mitted, ri^itly so. As Peacock, C.J., explained, (with Macphearson, J., 
concurring), the right of a wife or widow and that of a son*s widow to v 
maintenance appear to be governed by very different principles. While 
the wife may legally enforce her claim against her husband, or the 
widow against those who take his estate by inheritance, the maintenance 
of a son* s widow is a mere moral obligation upon the father-in-law which 
cannot be converted into a legal liability; she has no greater right 
to enforce such a claim after her husband’s death, than she would have
1. (1868) 2 Beng. L.R. 15 (A.C.J.).
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had in his lifetime were he unable to maintain her#
The learned Judges being equally divided in opinion, the matter 
was taken in Letters Patent Appeal to be heard by a fuller Bench, which 
unanimously concurred with the view taken by Peacock, C#J. Their Lord­
ships in emphasising the merely moral nature of the injunction, elabo­
rated that, the penalties for the non-performance of the duty being < 
the displeasure of heaven, the pains of hell and the reprehension of 
mankind, it is at best a sin against divine mandate rather than a penal 
offence against human law; accordingly the Hindu law does not prescribe 
a civil remedy in such instances, for if the widow*s suit be well founded 
for an annuity to be paid to her out of her father-in-law* s property in 
which her husband, had he been alive, would have had no interest, it would 
follow that, a son*s widow has a legal right to a share in the father*s
property during his lifetime where the son himself had none  a
position patently absurd and therefore not to be countenanced.
The Pull Bench took the same view in Ganga Bai v# Sita Bai,^  where 
the daughter-in-law*s suit to set aside the alienation of the family 
house for untainted debts apart, she also claimed maintenance from her 
father-in-law out of a certain charitable allowance paid to him by the
V
Government. Their Lordships, in negativing the contention, ruled that 
the father-in-law being possessed neither of ancestral property nor 
of funds with the disposal of vdiich his son, if alive, could have 
interfered^  his liability to provide his daughter-in-law with
maintenance was merely a moral obligation as hers was to minister 
to his needs. Neglect on both counts is discreditable in this 
world leading to punishment in the hereafter, but no more than that.
A Hindu widow is not, therefore entitled under the Mitakgara to be
1. I.L.R. (1876) 1 All. 170 (F.B.).
f
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maintained by her husband's relative merely as a consequence of the 
relationship between them and her deceased huBband* Her right depends 
upon the existence in their hands of ancestral property, and where none 
exists, all she can hope for from the father only, is a moral claim 
arising from religious precepts but unenforceable in a Court of Law.^
(2) The Legal Liability of the Heir
But if it is well settled under the Hindu law as interpreted and 
administered by the Courts that, the father-in-law is under no legal 
obligation to maintain the widow of his predeceased son out of his 
separate property, although he is as a matter of moral obligation 
expected to do so, it is equally well-settled that at his death an 
essential element of the son's right of inheritance is the spiritual 
benefit which in the contemplation of the Hindu law, he must confer 
upon the soul of his deceased father* Thus the son, inheriting the self- 
acquired property of his father, takes it subject to such obligations 
as are conducive to the spiritual welfare of the latter, and what was 
a moral obligation in respect of the father, ripens into a legal 
obligation when the estate passes into the hands of his heirs*
1* Among the early decisions establishing this rule, the Bombay High Court 
held likewise in Kalu v* Kashibai, I.L.R. (1882} 7 Bom* 127, and in 
Madras in Meenakshi v* Rama Aiyar, I.L.R. (1912) 57 Mad. 596, the Court 
held that as the right of maintenance in such circumstances has no 
obligatory force, the principles of justice, equity and good conscience 
defeated the widowed daughter-in-law1 s claim, where she had not been a
minor at the time of her marriage, and on widowhood had left  and
indeed relinquished her right in the ancestral estate  her father-
in-law's house to live els^ykere* Mark, however, that Equity has a 
role to play in such cases as well, and in Ratan Chand v* Smt* Huree 
(I884) 5 W.R* 225, it was held that though the daughter-in-law could 
claim maintenance wherever she might elect to live so long as she 
remained chaste and virtuous, where the father-in-law was a poor old 
man with no means of supporting his daughter-in-law, or even of main­
taining himself, her claim must in justice and equity be defeated*
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Kahmood, J.*s learned and illuminating Judgement in Janki v. Hand
Ham,'1' perhaps best illustrates these principles* Where the pre-deceased
son*s widow sued for maintenance out of the self-acquired assets of her
deceased father-in-law in the hands of the surviving son, his Lordship
held that, as in the Hindu law, the devolution of property depends upon
the competence to perform the obsequial rites of the deceased, similarly,
"(0)f the successor to the estate the guardian 
of the widow and of the son, he who takes the 
assets becomes liable for the debts*" ^
This injunction of Harada, while not directly relevant, nevertheless
where the statute law is silent, and the original texts of an ancient
system of jurisprudence furnish no express authority in specific terms,
Judges could not, his Lordship ruled, ignore in disputes arising out of
the law of marriage, the conditions, sentiments or prejudices, religious
or social, which are held sacred by the population to which the law is
administered. Thus the word "debt" in the foregoing text, was to be
understood in a broad sense so as to include all classes of obligations
including the moral obligation on the father-in-law* s part to maintain his
widowed daughter-in-law, and under the Hindu law these purely moral
obligations imposed by religious precepts upon the father, ripen into
V
legally enforceable obligations as against the son who inherits his
father* s property, for not to do so would be to expose the widow to
risks and a course of action repugnant to the very essentials of Hindu
thought and action* To put it in the words of the learned Judge:
"(W)ould he (the son in denying maintenance) 
propose that the girl widow • • • should marry a 
second husband, thus incapacitating herself for 
(sic) conferring any of those spiritual benefits
1. I.L.R. (1889) 11 All. 194.
2. Ibid, at 221.
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upon his brother and her deceased husband, 
which the ecclesiastical ceremonials of the 
Hindu law and religion inculcate and ordain?
Would he propose that thiB widowed girl should 
claim maintenance from her parental family of 
which she, by reason of her marriage • • • has 
ceased to be a member, and as such entitled to 
no such legal right? Would he propose that this 
widowed girl should enter into some profession 
to earn a livelihood? Would he propose that if she 
is unfit by reason of her sex and the condition of 
Hindu society, to adopt any respectable profession, 
that she should go begging in the streets for her 
bare necessaries of life, thus exposing herself ••• 
to all those temptations of immorality which the 
authorities prescribed by the Hindu law for the 
widow, are intended to obviate and preclude?" ^
In the event, despite the opposite party’s plea that, all considera­
tions of compassion be ignored, and the case be disposed of entirely upon 
the technicalities of the law, in what has become a classic judgement
his Lordship upheld what was declared obiter in Khetramani Dasi v.
2Kashinath Has, and there can be no question but that the heir is legally
liable where the father-in-law*s obligation in his self-acquired assets
3
was merely moral, as numerous reasoned decisions testify*
1. Janki v. Hand Ram, cited above, at 221.
2. (1868) 2 Beng. L.R. 15 (A.C.J.).
3. This view was upheld in YiBalatchi v. Annasamy, (1870) 5 Mad* H.C.R*
150$ Adhibai v. Cursandas, I.L.R. (1887) 11 Bom. 199; Kamini Dasee y.
Chandrapode. I.L.R. (1888-90) 17 Cal. 373; Devi Persad v. Gun want i Koer,
I.L.R. (1895) 22 Cal. 410; Rangammal v. Echammal, I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 
305; Siddessury v. Janardan, I.L.R. (1902) 29 Cal. 557; Indubala v. 
Panchuinani, A.I.E. 1915 Cal* 417; Jai Hand v. Met. Parandei, A.I.R. 1929 
Oudh 251 (F.B.); Rajani Kanta v. Sajani Sundari, (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 29; 
Mt. Munni Bibi v. Radhey Shiam, A.I.R. 1943 Oudh 190, at 191; Gangadei 
v. Jagannath. A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 108; Audemma v. Verarareddy, A.I.R. 1949 
Mad. 31* at 37* la view of decisions such as these, the stance adopted 
in Ammakarmu v. Appu, I.L.R. (1888) 11 Mad. 91» that as a Hindu is 
under no obligation to maintain his adult son or his widow out of his 
self-acquired property, it therefore followed that the daughter-in-law 
could enforce no claim for maintenance against such property in the 
hands of the grandson unless the original owner had shown by conduct
or otherwise, an unequivocal intention that it should be taken subject 
to the obligation of providing for her support, may be dismissed out of 
hand as militating against the spirit of the Hindu law. For to put 
it in the words of Mahmood, J., "The Mitaksara and the Bengal school do
(continued next page)
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The rule applies with equal vigour in the case of widowed daughters.
At her marriage the daughter leaves the family of her father and becomes 
incorporated in the family of her husband. The father iB under no legal 
liability to maintain her any further, but if she becomes destitute by 
reason of her inability to obtain maintenance from her husband*s family, 
the Courts are agreed that, in such circumstances the father is under a 
moral obligation to maintain her. However, the conflict of judicial 
opinion arises as to whether, like the daughter-in-law, the indigent 
daughter* s claim is legally enforceable against the property in the hands 
of the heirs.
While in Bai Man gal v. Bai Rukmini,^  Ranade, J., expressed the view
that there is no legally enforceable right by which a widowed daughter* s
maintenance may be claimed as a charge on her father* s estate in the
2
hands of his heirs, in Mokhada v. Hundoolall. Maclean, C.J., left open 
this fundamental question in negativing the daughter* s claim to separate
(continued from previous page)
not differ with each other in the principle that the right of inheri­
tance itself is. based on and arises from the contemplation of the 
Hindu law that the inheritor by taking the inheritance renders spiritual 
benefits to the soul of the deceased proprietor." : Janki v. Hand Ram,
I.L.R. (1889) 11 All. 194, at 212. In view of this clear enunciation 
of the law, doubts persist as to the correctness of the dicta in Shiva 
Pu.jan v. Jamuna Mi a sir, I.L.R. (1968) 47 Pat. 1118, and Kunji Thomman 
v. Meenakshi, A.I.R. 1970» Ker* 284, infra, at 571-3*
1. I.L.R. (1898) 23 Bom. 291.
2. I.L.R. (l90l) 28 Cal. 278. It is to be noted, however, that when the
matter came up in the Court of first instance in Mokhada v. Hundo Lall,
I.L.R. (19OO) 27 Cal. 555> Ameer Ali, J., while holding that the 
widowed daughter is not entitled to maintenance out of the estate of 
the father in the hands of the heirs, observed inter alia that, in 
cases where the father had married his daughter to a personnel posses­
sed of means to support her, and had consequently, and as a matter of 
moral obligation, maintained the daughter and her husband in his own 
house up to the end of his life, such moral obligation would, after his 
death, become a legal obligation on the part of those taking his 
property.
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maintenance -where not only was there an offer by the heir to maintain
her in the family, hut more importantly, neither was there any evidence
in support of her contention that she was unable to receive maintenance
from her husband's family.
However, such questions were put to rest by the decision of the
Pull Bench in Ambu Bai v. Soni Bai,^  where in considering whether the
step-mother in possession of her husband's property as his heir was
bound to provide maintenance to the indigent widowed daughter of her
late husband, their Lordships had no hesitation in extending the princi-
2
pie of the decision in J«.nki v. Nand Ram to hold that those principles
applied with equal force to the case of a destitute daughter.
But the story was not to end there, and in Provash v. Prokash,^
a further step was taken, Has, J., holding that the duty of the heir
who takes the estate not for his own benefit but for the spiritual
well-being of the owner must be the same in respect of all such moral
obligations as are recognised by the law. In the event, as it would be
illogical to differentiate between such moral obligation to maintain
on mere difference in the degree of relationship, consequently
"(i) do not see why this principle should be 
limited to the case of a widowed dau^iter-in-law 
or destitute married daughter," 4
and the unmarried daughter of a predeceased son, the object of tender
affection whom every Hindu considers himself morally bound to support,
must likewise have a right of maintenance legally enforceable against
the property in the hands of the heir.
1. A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 804.
2. I.L.R. (1889) 11 All. 194.
3. (1946) 50 C.VJJ. 559.
4* fbid.» at 5^ 8.
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In Sm. Khanta Moni v. Shyam C h a n d these principles were extended
even further. Where the widowed daughter with her two minor children
had been given shelter by her father in a part of his assets, at his
death, his only son sought to evict her on the ground that, as heir to
his father he alone was entitled to the property. Sinha, J., however,
ruled to the contrary, and in upholding the claim of the daughter on
the basis of her actual destitution, adopted a more equitable approach
to hold that,
"(a) widowed daughter to sustain, her claim for 
maintenance out of the estate of the father in 
the hands of the heirs need not be a destitute
nor need be actually maintained by the father
during his life. All that she is required to 
prove to get such maintenance is that at the 
material time she is a destitute and she could 
not get any maintenance from her husband's 
family." 2
Connected with issue of the legal right of the daughter-in-law to
be maintained by the heirs of the deceased father-in-law, the next
question for consideration is as to the nature of the right where the
3
family is disrupted by partition. In Yasmnabai v. Manubai, the daughter- 
in-law, whose husband had died during the lifetime of his father, claimed 
maintenance after the latter*s death against the assets in the mother-in-
V-
law's hands, some of which had come to her under the terms of her 
husband's will and the rest by succession. In ruling in favour of the 
daughter-in-law, the learned Judge, Banade, J., observed that the dis­
tinction of union and separation was very material, and though the son's 
widow had no legally enforceable claim for maintenance against the
1. A.I.R. 1973 Cal 112.
2. Ibid.. at 114.
3. I.L.R. (1889) 23 Bom. 608.
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self-acquired properties in her father-in-lav*s hands, as her 
husband had lived in union with his father, it was legally binding; 
on the heirs to provide her with maintenance.
However, this cannot be regarded as good law in view of the con­
trary, and, it is submitted, much more reasoned approach taken by 
Division Bench in Ap-pavu v. Nallammal.^  Where after the disruption of 
the Joint-family, the father had continued to maintain the widow of his 
predeceased sen, his Lordship Gentle, C.J., held in clear terms that,
”(V)hether the family is joint or whether it is 
divided in status, the members of it have no right 
with respect to the father’s self-acquired property 
during his lifetime and, again, whether united or 
separated, the father’s self acquisitions descend 
to hiB heirs ... upon his death intestate. ” ^
In the event that there had been no partition of the family, the moral 
liability of the father-in-law to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law 
out of such assets would undoubtedly have ripened into a legal liability 
enforceable against those who took the estate by inheritance. Thus since 
the liability relates solely to the father-in-law* s self-acquisitions, 
its application cannot be said to depend upon the existence or non­
existence of the joint status, and so far as the heirs are concerned, as 
they take the property for the spiritual benefit of the late proprietor, v
”(t)heir liability arises out of their personal 
position as heirs, and not by virtue of member­
ship of a joint Hindu family.” 5
Decisions such as these establish that at Anglo-Hindu tradition, 
the legal claim of the daughter-in-law from the joint-family property 
apart, she had an equally indefeasible legal claim to maintenance in the 
separate assets of her father-in-law in the hands of his heirs. However,
1. A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 24.
2. Ibid., at 26.
3. Ibid.
since 21 December, 1956, such right has been statutorily regulated, and 
while under s. 21 (VII) of the HAMA., the widowed daughter-in-law is 
classified as a dependant, s. 19 (l) does away with the traditional 
notion of the father-in-law* s noral liability to maintain his widowed 
daughter-in-law by providing that, a widowed daughter-in-law, whether 
married before or after the commencement of the Act, may now claim 
maintenance from the father-in-law only where she is indigent and unable 
to claim maintenance from the estate of her husband, or from her father 
or mother, or from her son or daughter, or from his or her estate. This 
right is further conditional under s. 19 (2) upon the father-in-law 
having in his possession, coparcenary property out of which the widowed 
daughter-in-law has not obtained any share. The sub-s. continues 
tradition, however, in further envisaging that the claim to maintenance 
ceases on the widowed daughter-in-law*s remarriage.
(3) The Legal Liability of the Donee or Devisee
The next question to consider is whether, like the heir the legatee
too takes the property subject to the legal liability of maintaining the
widowed daughter-in-law where this had merely been a moral obligation
upon the deceased proprietor. The Bombay Hi^ fr* Court has consistently
exonerated the devisee from any such responsibility on the basis that,
"(p)roperty acquired by valid testamentary dis­
position is not governed by the rules of the 
Hindu law of inheritance, and when the power of 
making such disposition is unrestricted, it is 
difficult to conceive any consistent ground on 
which the devisee could be held bound by an obligation 
from which the testator had power to relieve him, and 
by the bequest bad actually relieved him.” 1
- 2 
The same view was suggested obiter in Yamunabai v. Manubai, and
1. Per Batty, J., Bai Parwati v. Tarwadi, I.L.R. (l90l) 25 Bom. 263, &t 268.
2. I.L.R. (1899) 23 Bom. 608.
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vhile upholding the daughter-in-law1 b claim to maintenance against the 
heir, the learned Judge passingly observed that, had the latter been a 
testamentary devisee, the incidents of self-acquisition would have pro­
tected the property in the handB of Buch legatee on the principle that 
self-acquired property disposed of by will or gift cannot be made 
subject to the incidents of inheritance *^
2
The Lahore Higji Court followed suit in Bhagwanti v. Thakur Malt 
the Court adopting the rationale that as her right had been merely in 
embryo during her father-in-law’s lifetime and over which the widowed 
daughter-in-law had no right or control, she could not possibly be 
allowed to realise her maintenance from the property which he had seen 
fit to sell or gift* This view the learned Judge held as "inevitable",^
"(a)ny other decision would be irreconcilable 
with the all important proposition that a man 
may do what he wills with his own self-acquired 
property*" 4
There were, however, early indications of dissent with this view, 
and in Rangammal v. Echammal, the Madras High Court in upholding the 
widowed daughter-in-law1 s right held that,
1. Followed in Bhagirathi Bai v* Dwarkabai, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 155 vhere 
in holding that no such right inheres in gifted property, it was 
observed that it is immaterial if the donee under the gift is the 
next heir*
2. A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 198.
5. Ibid.
4. Ibid. See also Sankaramurthy v. Subbamma, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 914» where 
in maintaining a similar stance, it was held that, as the essence of 
the idea of a gift or will is that the testator or donor is disposing 
personally and at his own will and pleasure of the property he possesses, 
when the transfer of property is achieved by such means, it is not 
necessary for the legatee or donee to take it subject to the spiritual 
welfare of the deceased.
5. I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 505.
r
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M(T)he tetter conclusion is, perhaps, that the 
party whose moral claim he comes a legal right 
would not he affected by testamentary disposi­
tions in favour of volunteers made hy the ^
person morally hound to provide the maintenance,"
for, his Lordship explained, as the claim to maintenance originated from 
the status acquired hy marriage, it becomes a legal right independently 
of the testator's volition, and comes into existence at the same time as 
the disposition in favour of the volunteer become operative. Thus "it 
is consequently difficult to see how the latter could affect the former,"^ 
and in such circumstances, the learned Judge held that, even that 
property bequeathed to the widow could not he exempted from a charge 
being created for the widowed dau^iter-in-law's maintenance.^
This view was endorsed with a commendable degree of force in the 
judgement of Ameer Ali, J., in Foolcomari v. Debendra Nath. The argu­
ment addressed before his Lordship was that, as the liability to main­
tain the widowed daughter-in-law depended upon a certain ingredient in
1. The word "perhaps" here was seized upon by their Lordships, King and 
Stodart, J.J., in Sankaramurthy v. Subbamma, A.I.E. 1938 Mad. 914» to 
reinforce their own view to the contrary in holding that, as the 
observation was made expressly obiter, it could therefore not be regard­
ed as a definitive statement of the law.
2. Per Aiyar, J., Ran gamma 1 v. Echammal, cited above, at 307*
3. Ibid.
4. Followed in In the Goods of Gobinda Chundra, (1913) 23 I.C. 559? Indu- 
bala Dasee v. Panchumani, A.I.E. 1915 Cal. 417; Jeot Ram v. Mst. Lauji 
A.I.R. 1929 All. 751* See also the decision of Mookerjee, J., in 
Gopal Chandrapal v. Kadimbini Las, A.I.R. 1924 Cal 364> where the 
property having been transferred by gift inter vivos, the learned 
Judge held that transfers by will and gift were essentially the same, 
for while in the one, it was effected during the lifetime of the donor, 
in the other it took place after his death, but in neither case could 
the donor so alienate the property as to evade his moral obligation and 
protect his estate after his death from the claim of the daughter-in- 
law which according to well-established rules ripens, at that stage, 
into a legal claim.
5. A.I.R. 1 9 4 2  Cal. 474.
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intestate succession, that of spiritual benefit, it is a liability 
peculiar to heirs alone, for where there exists absolute freedom to 
dispose of property, this element is eliminated by gift or will* The 
learned Judge, in ruling to the contrary, held that, as long as the 
father is alive, there is the expectation that he would perform the 
moral duty that the Hindu law imposed upon him, that of maintaining his 
pre-deceased son's widow. If he dieB without performing it he commits 
a sin, but there is no legal remedy. On the other hand, there can be no 
question but that the right is legally enforceable against the property 
in the hands of his heirs, and as the liability is dependent upon the 
possession of property, it is legally incumbent upon the Hindu heir, 
bound as he is by the theory of the Pious Obligation, to provide main­
tenance to the daughter-in-law whether he takes the property on intestacy
or by a gift or will, as the judgement of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee^ had
2made abundantly clear.
(4) The Legal Liability of the Stranger Donee or Devisee
Prom the above position there is no resiling, and it may now be 
regarded as settled by the highest judicial authorities that the donee 
or devisee heirs are as much bound by the duty of maintaining the 
widowed daughter-in-law as the intestate heir. But what where a 
stranger succeeds to the property under a gift or will? In Sankaramurthy
1. See Go pal Chandra pal v, Kadimbini. A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 364.
2. Followed in Lakshmi v. Sundaramma, A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 88 (F.B.), at 
IO5-6, where Rao J., in disagreeing with the Bombay viewpoint, fol­
lowed the reasoning adopted by Ameer Ali, J., in Foolcomari's case, 
A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 474» to hold at 105 that, "when there is property 
in the hands of the heirs belonging to the deceased who had a moral 
duty to provide maintenance, it becomes a legal duty on the heirs.
In our view it makes no difference whether the property is received 
either by way of succession or by way of gift or will, the principle 
being common in either case.*
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v. Subbamma,^  their Lordships^  in absolving the devisee heir of the res­
ponsibility of maintaining the son*s widow had observed!
"(l)t is impossible to argue that there is
anything in the nature of the transference of
property by will or by gift which requires that
the legatee or donee should take any thought
for the spiritual welfare of the testator or
donor* The legatee or donee may be a stranger,
may be a Mahomedan, (sic) may be a Christian,
may be anybody. • •1 2 v
and while there is no substance in the argument in regard to the donee
or devisee who is also the heir, the latter part of the reasoning makes
one ponder. Why indeed should the stranger donee or legatee be saddled
with the liability of maintaining the dependant widow when the question
of spiritual benefit on his part doeB not eirise at all?
In considering the question obiter in Foolcomari^ case,^  Ameer 
Ali J., while conceding that the matter was not free from doubt, also 
acknowledged that if strangers are to be affected, the liability must 
be visualised as something which attaches to the property rather than
to the person or the capacity of thq devisee or donee --  something in
the nature of a charge or implied trust affecting the transferee. But 
if, his Lordship reasoned, the obligation for maintenance is a liability 
dependent upon the possession of property, it seemed to him neither v 
startling nor preposterous to conceive of a state of law whereby volun­
teers or persons taking with notice should be affected by the claim to 
maintenance of a Hindu daughter-in-law in keeping with the principle if 
not the actual provisions of s. 39 the T.P. Act. However, as the 
learned Judge was not called upon to express any final view, he contented
1. A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 914.
2. Ibid., at 915.
3. A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 474.
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himself with ohserving that it was a matter which would no doubt receive
the attention of those who were then in the process of codifying this
branch of the Hindu law.'*'
Almost forty years later the Andhra Pradesh Pull Bench was faced
2
with precisely this question in Lakshmi v. Sundaramma.
/
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S2 having been given in adoption to B2, there was a subsequent partition 
of the joint family, though Bl and Si continued to live in a state of 
jointness. In 1924$ Si executed a registered relinquishment deed in 
favour of hi8 father, and after giving up all his rights in the moveable 
and immoveable properties to which he was entitled, died in 1933# Bl 
in turn bequeathed son® of what was now his separate property to his 
widow B1V, and the remainder to S2, his natural son who had gone in 
adoption. In 19&1, B1W executed yet another registered deed whereby she 
relinquished her right, title and interest in the property in favour of 
S2, and on the latter alienating the property by way of sale or gift
1. A prophetic enough statement, as codification did take shape in the 
form of the "Hindu Code" with its four components of Marriage and 
Divorce, Succession, Minority and Guardianship and Adoption and Main­
tenance, the last of which was to take into account this controversial 
aspect of the law. See below.
2. A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 88 (F.B.).
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short ly thereafter, S1W filed the present suit for possession and alter­
nately for maintenance and residence.
SI having died prior to 1937» the question of possession did not 
arise, but after an exhaustive analysis of the ancient smrti texts and 
judicial authorities, their Lordships having established that, the moral 
obligation of a father-in-law possessed of separate or self-acquired 
property to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal 
obligation in the hands of persons to whom he had either bequeathed the 
property or made a gift of it, even as it does in the hands of the 
intestate successor, the point for decision was whether, where the 
donee or devisee is a stranger, he is similarly bound.
The learned Judge, Rao, J., speaking on behalf of the Bench, while
fully aware of the difficulties that the problem presented in that
despite an examination of
”(t)he development of law for the last 
hundred years, we have not come across even 
a single case where the property was bequeathed 
or made over by gift to strangers,” 1
nevertheless held that as every custom and usage which has been recog­
nised as law in the Hindu jurisprudence indicates that,there is essen­
tially no difference as between a moral obligation and a legal 
obligation in so far as the head of the family is concerned, the only 
inference that could be drawn is that the property, even if self- 
acquired , is treated by the father as trust property for the mainte­
nance of the family members including dependants, in which category 
the widowed daughter-in-law is placed. Under theBe circumstances, 
therefore, it could not be said that a man is entitled to dispose of 
his property in favour of strangers in such a manner as to deprive the
1. Ibid., at 107
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daughter-in-law of her maintenance. Or to put it in other words, where 
the head of the family visualised that there is a charge attached to 
the property to maintain the family members, the transferees, in keep­
ing with the principles of s. 39 of the T.P. Act
M(a)re affected by such charge, and they 
would also constitute as trustees to maintain 
the dependants when the property is in their 
hands," 1
and as there is basically no difference between a widow and a widowed 
daughter-in-law in so far as maintenance is concerned, the principle 
has to be logically pursued, and where the entire property is bequeathed 
or made over by gift to a stranger, the donee or devisee stranger takes 
the estate subject to the liability of maintaining the widowed daughter- 
in-law.2
This rule, i.e. that dependant members of the family are entitled 
to maintenance from those who take the estate has been incorporated in 
the HAMA., 1956, and while s.22 (l) lays down that the heirs^ of a 
deceased Hindu are bound to maintain the dependants of the deceased out 
of the estate inherited by them from the deceased, the sub-s. is made
1. Ibid.. at 100.
2. However, having established the principle as would govern the right of 
maintenance in property in the hands of the stranger donee or devisee, 
his Lordship was of the view at 107 that, in the present case "by no 
stretch of imagination could it be said that the transferee is a total 
stranger to the family," and as a natural son of the deceased, though 
given in adoption, he, like the grandson in whose favour the property 
is bequeathed, "would be equally interested, according to the ancient 
concept, in relieving his ancestors from bodily and mental discomfort 
and in protecting their souls from the consequences of sin, by 
providing maintenance to the dependants such as the daughter-in-law."
3. The word "heirs" in the sub-s. has rightly been construed to include 
all persons on whom the estate has devolved upon intestacy as well as 
under a testamentary instrument (see Gulzara Singh v. TeJ Katir, A.I.E. 
1961 PunJ. 228), and, it is submitted, by gift inter vivos.
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sub Ject to the provisions of s* 22 (2) which statess
"(v)here a dependant has not obtained hy testa­
mentary or intestate succession, any share in the 
estate of^a Hindu dying after the commencement of 
this Act, the dependant shall be entitled subject 
to the provisions of this Act, to maintenance from 
those who take the estate."
9* The Bate or Proportion of Maintenance That Kay be Claimed!
(l) Where the Widow is Possessed of Joint Family Assets
Inasmuch as the right to maintenance is a legal right, its accrual
and enjoyment by the widow is claimable against those who take the
.tssests of her deceased husband by survivorship to the extent of such
assets in their hands. In other words, as the liability for maintenance
arises only upon the taking of the property of the deceased, where, as
a consequence of partition or any other reason, the widow is herself
possessed of such estate, the burden of her maintenance may no longer
be imposed upon the remainder of the ancestral property*
This eminently sensible construction did not, however, commend:
itself to their Lordships Newton and Warden, J.J., and in Bai Lakshmi 
2
v. Lakhmidas, the learned Judges ruled that notwithstanding that the 
widow had obtained the share of her deceased husband and had lived by
3
money-lending for thirty years, the obligation of maintaining her would
1. These words clearly indicate the prospective nature of the sub-s* So
it was affirmed by the Pull Bench in Lakshmi v* Sundaramma, A.I.R. 1981» 
A.P. 88 (F.B.), at 93* following Kamamoorthy v* Sitharamamma, A.I.R.
1961 A.P. 131 (F.B.), which was confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court 
in. Gopala Rao v. Sitharamamma, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1970, over-ruling the 
opposite construction put to the words in Kameshwaramma v. Subramanyam, 
A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 269.
2. (1863) 1 Bom. H.C.R. 13.
3. However reprehensible money-lending as a profession may be, to the 
extent that such earnings are the result of the widow’s own exertions, 
they cannot be taken into account in determining the quantum of mainte­
nance due from the joint assets as we shall presently see, and while
the judgement as a whole certainly militates against the rules governing 
the incidents of the Joint family, there can be no question but that
(continued next page)
nevertheless attach to her husband^ relatives should she then be 
destitute.
How little this theory bears up to the more acceptable view in
consonance with the correct interpretation of the Hindu law is at once
evident if we consider the dismissive comment made obiter in Savitribai
v. Luximibai^, his Lordship observing that it seems against reason and
a premium upon extravagance to hold that,
"(a)fter she (the widow) has received and 
spent her full share given to her as maintenance, 
she is entitled again to charge the estate, or 
her stepson or step-grandson for another share 
or further maintenance." 2
This, it is submitted, is by far the more reasoned approach and in
3
Dattaraya v. Rukhmabai where the widow in possession of a fund belong­
ing to the family estate, sought to have a charge declared on the joint 
assets for her maintenance, Batchelor, J., was unequivocal in invalidating 
such claim. His Lordship held that as the sum of money in her hands was 
sufficient to provide for the widow1 s maintenance for five years at the 
rate fixed by a decree of Court, it was quite clear that five years 
earlier, when the suit for maintenance was instituted, she had no cause 
of action by virtue of being possessed of the joint-family fund, and
V
under the then existing circumstances, no liability to provide
(continued from previous page)
their Lordships were quite within rights in disregarding it as a 
factor to be taken into consideration in the circumstances of the case.
1. I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 573 (F.B.).
2. Per Westropp, C.J. ibid., at 583* See also Mst. Thakur Dei v. Dharam 
Kaj. A.I.R. 1953 All. 134> 135-6, where it was held that a Hindu
widow who inherits her husbandfs property is not entitled to mainte­
nance if she makes a transfer of that property or relinquishes it, and 
it would then depend on the contract whether or not she gets mainte­
nance from the transferee or reversioner in whose favour it was made.
3. I.L.R. (1909) 33 Boni. 50
maintenance could attach, to the survivorship.
The ratio in Srinivasa v, Ammani^ ~ confirms this position, and in 
negativing the widow’s contention that, irrespective of whether she 
had or ought to have had joint-family property in her hands she was 
entitled to maintenance, it was held that the correct decree in such a 
case would be not to dismiss the suit, but to direct that the maintenance 
primarily be, quantum valeat a charge upon the family property in the 
widow’s hands. If that were to prove insufficient and she must live on 
the capital, she would be entitled to come again to the family for 
maintenance when that had been exhausted provided she had spent it with 
reasonable care and caution.
The Court’s further observation that whether the property was held 
ex consensu in lieu of maintenance or not, would make no difference to 
this general statement of the principle, strikes, it is submitted, the 
right note, for what must always be kept in mind is that one of the 
fundamental rules underlying the law of maintenance is that, as the
2
obligation is a corollaiy to the taking of the deceased husband’s assets,
1, A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 668.
2. A harmonious note is struck in Saro.iini Devi v. Sri Kristna. A.I.R.
1944 Mad0 401, where at a time when the HVRPA, 1937» v3-5 passed by v
the Central Legislature but there was no parallel legislation in 
Madras, in view of the Federal Court’s ruling in In re Hindu Women * s 
Rigfrt to Property Act. A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72, to the effect that the
Act is ultra vires as regards agricultural lands in Governors’ Provinces, 
(infra, 387)« but operates only in respect of other kind of properties, it 
was held that though the widow was possessed of family assests in that she 
had inherited her deceased husband’s share in the non-agricultural 
property of the family, she could nevertheless sue for maintenance, 
the income from the non-agricultural part of the estate in the widow’s
possession would have to be taken into consideration  an equitable
enough proposition and cited with approval in Ran gamma v. Chinnabbayi, 
A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 598, at 599, his Lordship, Sastri, J., reiterating 
further at 600 that, "If, (however), by reason of the inapplicability 
of the Central Act (of 1937) to regulate succession to agricultural 
lands, the widow is not entitled to her deceased husband’s share in
(continued next page)
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the widow may under no circumstances claim a right to be maintained 
out of the shares that fall to the other members of the coparcenary.
(2) Where the Vidow is Possessed of the Deceased Husband's Separate 
Assets
We next come to the interesting question as to whether the widow 
who inherits her husband’s separate property is entitled to claim 
maintenance from his assets in the hands of the surviving coparceners.
It is no doubt true that the liability is common to both sets of 
properties, and even as the sons and stepsons would have been bound to 
pay her maintenance out of the separate estate in their hands, similarly 
her maintenance is exigible ther^Jfrom where she is herself the heir. 
Indeed in Shib Payee v. Doorga Pershad,^  Turner and Spankie, J.J., 
expressed the opinion that though there is nothing to debar the widow 
from having recourse to the joint estate to meet the deficiency in 
maintenance where the separate assets are insufficient, nevertheless the 
primary liability must be borne from out of the profits of the separate 
estate.
But this, it is submitted, is discriminatory, for the one benefi­
ciary should not be preferred to the detriment of the other, and if the
1
entire burden may not be shifted to the coparceners, neither, on the same
principle,may the heir, be it the son or the widow herself, be held
primarily liable for the responsibility.
This, much the mire equitable approach, was endorsed and elaborated
2
by the Andhra Bench in Ban gamma v. Chinnabbayi. Where the limited heir
(continued from previous page)
the agricultural lands of the joint-family and they pass by survivor­
ship to the other coparceners, her right to maintenance from those 
properties within the limits of her husband’s share does not stand 
ext inguished•"
1. (1872) 4 N.W.P.H.C.R. 63, at 72.
2. A.I.R. 1957 A .P. 598.
in possession of her husband^ separate property claimed past and
future maintenance from out of the Joint assets, his Lordship, while
upholding her right to make such a claim on the family property, further
considered the question whether the income from the separate property
should be taken into account in determining the amount of maintenance
awardable to her. In a remarkably considered Judgement, the learned
Judge held that as the liability is common to both sets of properties,
the separate estate could not be regarded as the primary fund for the
payment of the widow*s maintenance, and the deceased husband’s share of
the Joint-family assets as only secondarily liable. There is thus
"(n)o reason in Justice and equity for compelling 
the widow to pay herself her maintenance out of 
the separate property of her deceased husband 
exonerating his share of the Joint-family lands 
from the liability," ^
On the other hand, as both the estates are equally liable, his Lordship
laid down the eminently equitable principle that, the widow as heir is
bound to pay herself the pro rata maintenance exigible from the property
2
in her hands and while she is still entitled to claim maintenance out 
of the Joint-family property, it is subject to diminution to the extent 
that her claim is met by the separate property which is inherited by her.^
V
1. Per Sa£>fc>d J., ibid., at 600.
2. A number of decisions vindicate the view that, where the widow suc­
ceeds to her husband’s separate property, she is bound to defray the 
charges which are legally payable out of that estate, as for instance, 
her own maintenance and that of other menbers of the family whom her
husband was bound to maintain, or the legal liability on her part to
maintain those whom her husband was morally obliged to support. See, 
for instance, Ramaswami v, Mangaikarasu, (1895) 18 Mad, 115, at 119- 
20; Darbari Lai v, Govind, -A.I.R, 1924 All. 902; Kuthalinga ▼. 
Shanmuga, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 4^4; Rajani Kanta v. Sajani Sundari, (1934) 
L.R. 6l I .A. 29; Viraraju v. Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1939 Mad, 98,
5. This applies equally where the widow inherits the separate assets of 
her deceased husband under the HWBPA, 1937 > said in Tirathabasi v. 
Bhuyani. I.L.R. (1949) 1 Cut. 536, it was held that even if those 
liable for maintenance are unable to completely extinguish the decree 
granted for the widow’s maintenance, they are entitled to get the
(continued next page)
This may now be regarded as settled law, and the rule of cantribution9 
based as it is on justice, equity and good conscience, not resiled from.
(3) Where the Widow is Possessed of Stridhana
An altogether different set of considerations must be taken into 
account in assessing to \diat extent if any, the possession of 
stridhana by the widow may affect her claim for maintenance. If the 1 
right to be maintained is a liability arising out of the jural 
relationship between husband and wife, and, in the widow's case, the 
vestigial relic of what was at one time a claim to a share of the family 
property, it would logically follow that the obligation of maintenance 
must fall on no other estate except that of the deceased husband®'*'
However, there are instances ldiere it was held, more on equitable 
principles one would suppose, than on the injunctions of the Hindu law, 
that in fact the stridhana of a Hindu female is a factor to be taken 
into consideration in determining whether and to what extent she should 
have maintenance assigned to her. Such was the remark made obiter in
(continued from previous page)
allowance reduced after taking into consideration the exact value of 
the separate estate of the deceased husband® Followed in RameSh­
etland er v. Bibi Ved, A.I.E. 1951 Punj* 129, at 131®
V
1. In view of this eminently sensible reasoning because in keeping
with the spirit of the Hindu law --  the fallacy in the opinion
expressed by Das, J., in Indu Bhusan Chatterji v. Mrityunjoy Pal,
I.L.R. (1946) 1 Cal. 128, is all too apparent. His Lordship held at 
135 that, "If her separate property is to be taken into consideration, 
there can be no logical reason to confine the consideration to 
stridhana received from the husband or the father-in-law or for the 
matter of that (sic) to stridhana in general only, and to exclude 
from consideration properties possessed by her which are productive 
but which do not technically fall within the description of stridhana®" 
It is submitted, however, that such a view is a misconstruction of 
the very nature of the claim, and contrary to every principle 
governing stridhana as laid down in the sastra.
Savitribai v. Luximibait^  but as his Lordship did not clarify or dwell 
on any length on this statement, he appears^  on the face of it, to have 
meant "both productive and unproductive stridhana.
The same view was elaborated at length in Bamawati v. Manjhftri 
where the Calcutta Hig$i Court took into account the affluent circum­
stances of the widow to rule that, so long as an applicant for main­
tenance has sufficient private means for her own support, she cannot 
claim maintenance from her husband*s family. For, their Lordships 
reasoned, citing the eminent Hindu law scholar G.C. Sarkar Sastri
”(l)f the right to maintenance depends an 
necessity for the same, then surely a 
person viiose maintenance is otherwise 
satisfied, is not in need of it, and 
therefore cannot lay a claim for what is 
non est. The right, however, seems to 
remain but the amount must be nil or 
nominal as that must be fixed having .
regard to the need which does not exist."
But to raise an objection which the learned author himself proceeds to
raiser as the right of maintenance is conferred by law and annexed
to an estate, it should not be --  indeed it must not be   affected by
1. I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 573» &t 584* For obiter dicta to the same effect, 
see also Rangubai v. Subaji, I.L.R. (1912) 36 Bom. 583, at 386; Appibai 
v. Khim.ji, A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 138, at 151* Similarly as the share 
allotted to a female at a partition is in recognition of her ri^it of 
maintenance, Prinsip, J*s observation obiter in Siddessury v. Janardan, 
I.L.R. (1902) 29 Cal 557, at 570, 576,' is pertinent: "In a partition of 
joint-family property, if a widowed mother who is entitled to a
share is possessed of stridhana, i.e. of private property, it is to 
be taken into account in determining what she should receive at 
partition." Likewise in enumerating the factors on which the rate of 
maintenance would depend, it was held in Har Pratab v. Thakurain 
Rajhuraj, A.I.R. 1933 Oudh 550, at 553 that regard must be had to the 
stridhana in her possession.
2. (1906) 4 C.L.J. 74.
3. G.C. Sarkar, Sastri, 7th ed., (Cal., The Book Stall, 1936), at 703* 
Fundamentally wrong as this principle is, it was upheld in Lingayya
v. Kanakamma, I.L.R. (1915) 38 Ma-d 153* Where the widow was in posses­
sion of both, a small portion of the joint assets and private property 
of her own, the Court in holding that she was entitled to an amount 
sufficient to maintain her in comfort according to the means of the 
family, ruled at the same time that her private means is a factor to 
be taken into account in determining the quantum of maintenance.
extraneous considerations, and in view of this, any such contention 
that seeks to absolve the joint-family possessed of the deceased*s 
assets from the liability to maintain his widow, is clearly untenable*
This controversy was further exacerbated by the question whether,
in determining the quantum of maintenance, the widow*s income-producing
stridhana should be taken into account* In not a few instances there
is evidence, despite the recognition of maintenance as an absolute
right due to the female *s membership in the family, that the burden on
the joint-family --  to the extent of the income-producing stridhana
  is shifted to the private means of the widow*
2
In Shib Payee v. Doorga Pershad, it was held that as the widow
who has a son has as much a claim to maintenance as the childless widow,
the former's right to sue her father-in-law arises to her from the
circumstance that until such time as a partition is effected and the
right to a share accrues to the son, the joint undivided estate is
retained by the elder coparcener. However, in emphasising this right
their Lordships decreed obiter at the same times
"(N)or will the fact that a widow has in her
possession jewels and other property unproductive
of income, deprive her of or diminish her rigfct
to maintenance if they constitute her stridhana* »
If, on the other hand, she has property in her
possession productive of income, the amount
should be taken into consideration in determining
the measure of her allowance for maintenance." 3
- 4
This view finds fuller expression in Guru9hiddappa v. Parwatewwa, 
and while it seemed "illogical" to Vassoodew, J*, that in the considera-
1. Sastri, op* cit., at 703.
2. (1872) 4 N.V.P.H.C.R. 63.
3. Ibid, at 73*
4. A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 135.
tion of the circumstances of her position as well as the estimated 
income of the properties sought to he made liable for her maintenance 
the potentiality of the widow1 s income from her stridhana ornaments 
should not he taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance, 
Broomfield, J., in concurring held that the general principle that 
stridhana ornaments must he excluded in assessing the rate of 
maintenance, need not he laid down as an invariable rule. Where the 
ornaments are of great value, his Lordship ruled, which the widow 
would not ordinarily wear or use, and which she would he likely to 
dispose of, "that might he another matter".^
That, in fact, it is this approach that is essentially illogical, 
is apparent from the number of reasoned and authoritative decisions 
taking the contrary view, i.e. that, as the right of maintenance is, 
under the Hindu law, conferred on the widow in lieu of her husband^ 
share in the joint-family property, it cannot he taken away merely 
because 6he is in possession of Bome property of her own either 
productive or non-productive of income#
In the enumeration of the six sorts of woman*s property, Manu 
specifies that "what has been received hy her from her brother, her
2 T  vmother, or her father," would he categorised as stridhana, and would 
include
"... that which was presented (to the bride)
1. Ibid., at 137* For similar rulings see also ■So^mbhai v. Furshothamdas. 
A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 645, at 659; Krishnaji v. Anusuya, A.I.R. 1939 Hag. 
130, at 131; Bai Jaya v. Gan pat ram t A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 305» at 307;
Indu Bhusan Chatterji v. Mrityunjoy Pal, I.L.R. (194&) 1 Cal. 128, at 
155.
2. Mit. II. XI.4 op.cit. See also Yaj. 2. 144, explained at ibid., II.
XI. 1-2. The texts of Yisnu, KatySyana and Narada expressing a similar 
view is expounded in Baya. IV. I. 1. 3-4*
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by the maternal -uncles and the rest (as  ^
paternal uncles, maternal aunts etc.) ..."
Stridhana derived from these sources, therefore, could not con­
ceivably be regarded as wholly or partly mitigating what is legally 
the widow's due from her deceased husband's assets, and while objection 
could rationally be raised to that part of the ruling in her favour where 
she had dissipated the portion of the joint property held by her for ' 
her maintenance, their Lordships rightly held in Bai Lakshmi v. Lakhmidas,< 
and subsequently in Chandrabhagabai v. Kashinath,^  that where the widow 
is possessed of property from sources other than the estate of her 
husband, the liability of the coparceners to maintain her is not thereby 
extinguished, if she happens to be in needy circumstances.
Strenuously as this view is challenged in Savitribai v. Luximibai,^  
it is submitted that, but for the stipulation in it, it is a harmonious 
construction of the law of maintenance as envisaged by the ancient seers. 
As the widow's claim to maintenance is an inalienable right, the charge 
that it creates in the joint assets, is independent of whether or not 
she is in straitened circumstances, or indeed of the need to enquire 
whether the stridhana in her hands is of a productive or non-productive 
nature. v
This was the considered opinion of his Lordship, Row, J., in
5
Annapoornamma v. Veeraragfrava, and in holding that, so far as the widow's 
right to maintenance is concerned, it is immaterial if she has any 
private means of her own, or can have them by selling some of the
1. The gloss of Vijnanesvara at Mit. II. XI. 2., op.cit., in explaining 
Yij. 2. 144.
2. (1863) 1 Bom. H.C.R. 13.
3. (1866) 2 Bom. H.C.R. 323.
4. I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 573 (F.B.), at 583-4.
5. A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 547.
jewellery that is not required hy her after her husband's death, his 
Lordship elaborated in unequivocal terms that, as it would have been 
the duty of the husband, had he remained alive, to maintain his wife 
out of his own assets irrespective of her possession of stridhana or 
private means, there is no reason why the latter should be regarded as 
a factor to be taken into consideration in fixing the widow's mainte­
nance after his death.'*' To recognise any such contention, would, in
1. For similar decisions see also Kodandarami v. Chenchamma, A.I.R. 1930 
Mad. 479, at 482; Ran gamma v. Chinnabbayi, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 598, at 
599; A.S. No. 264 of 1969» reported in Dugginal lak ah am ana v. Duggina 
Lakshmi, A.I.R. 1973 A.P. 302 at 305. By the same token, where the 
widow is possessed of means through the generosity of others or by 
dint of her own labours, it would be inequitable to take these into 
account in assessing the quantum of maintenance due to her from the 
family property. In Saraswati v. Sheoratan, A.I.R. 1934 Pat 99, Wort,
J., while holding  erroneously, it is submitted --  that in fixing
the amount of maintenance, among a number of other factors regard must 
also be had to the widow's means, was however clear that, a sum of 
money paid by the brother, could not be described as her "means" to 
which she is legally entitled. On the other hand, where the payment 
is voluntarily made, no liability could attach to it, and could be 
stopped at any time. In Madras the same view prevailed in Sundari 
Ammal v. Venkatarama, A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 384, Pandalai, J., holding that 
where the widow is in receipt of a certain rate of maintenance from the 
family but subsequently improves her financial condition, either by her 
own efforts or by the generosity of others, she is not liable to have 
that allowance reduced. See also Mavji v. Sushila. A.I.R. 1955 Sau.
45, at 49* Nor. it was held on the same principle, in Bai Lakshmi
v, Lakhmidas, (1863/ 1 Bom. H.C.R. 13* could the widow's income by 
money-lending be taken into account, for as the Bombay High Court v 
point out in Bai Jaya v. Ganpatram, A.I.R. 1941 Bom 305* it is a sound 
principle that once the amount of• maintenance is fixed, it is only the 
permanent reduction in the income of the family property, which could 
afford a valid reason for reducing the quantum of maintenance. Thus, 
as income by personal service is always contingent and irregular on 
account of various causes such as illness, leave without pay, change of 
salary or even the discretion of the employer, the widow's private means 
as a consequence of her own exertions is independent of her right to 
claim maintenance from her husband's family. For, as Aiyer, J., 
reasoned in Kodandarami v. Chenchamma, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 479> at 482:
"If the result of their honourable activity and laudable attempts to 
earn a portion of their maintenance should work against them in claiming 
maintenance from their husband's estate ... it will be a disadvantage 
both to them and the family ... and such people would have no inducement 
to work or to save." See also Maheshwari v. Mst. Sahdei, A.I.R. 1937 
Oudh 16; Jai Ram v. Mst. Shiv Devi, A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 344; Mavji v. 
Sushila, A.I.R. 1955 sau. 45* at 47; Manilal v. Bai Sushila, A.I.R. 1956 
Bom. 402, at 404; Ran gamma v. Chinnabbayi, A.I.R. 1957 A. P. 598» at 599* 
Yarahalu v. Sithamma, A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 2]2 (F.B.), at 278.
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the learned Judge*s view, introduce greater uncertainty into a field
where there was already too much uncertainty, leading at the same time
to increased litigation as a consequence of the vagueness attendant upon
the taking into consideration the extent and mode of such property in
determining the rate of maintenance. In other words,
"(t)he co-existence of an absolute right to 
get maintenance with conditions of this kind is 
really difficult to postulate, (for) what is 
absolute must be unconditional and if there are 
conditions, there cannot be any absolute right ."I
But what where the stridhana in possession of the widow is derived
2
from her husband or father-in-law? In Joyatara v. Ramhari, where 
notwithstanding that the husband in his will had left gold and silver 
ornaments, money and sundry other items to his widow, Field, J., was of 
the view that, the right to maintenance being one which the widow has 
under the Hindu law, a gift of stridhana is not equivalent to a provision 
for maintenance; the rif£it persists unless taken away by express language 
to that effect.
In Ra.jamma v. Yaradara.julu.^  in considering whether the gift of 
precious jewellery to the widow by her husband*s father would affect the 
question of her maintenance, Ramaswami, J., held that as those items fell 
within the category of stridhana called saudayika i.e. a gift (including 
bequests) made throu^i affection by relatives as opposed to strangers,
1. Annapoomamma v. Yeeraraghava. cited above at 551* To this excellent rule
one qualification  dealt with in greater detail below may be
mentioned here: where a female member of the joint-family is possessed
of separate property, earnings, or (under the former system) stridhana, 
the rate of maintenance may be affected, to the extent that the needs 
of the less fortunate will reduce the entitlement of the more fortunate: 
Derrett, 3MHL, op.cit., at 245•
2. I.L.R. (1884) 10 Cal. 638.
3. A.I.E. 1957 Mad. 198.
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they became her absolute property to spend, sell, divide or give it
away at her own pleasure* As such therefore,
*\w)hen the absolute property of the plaintiff 
was allowed to be retained by her, it cannot 
be considered to be joint-family property given 
in full quit of her future maintenance*H 1
It is, however, submitted that, considering that the right of
maintenance emanates from the legal duty that the Hindu law imposes '
upon the husband, and the moral liability thereafter upon his father,
gifts by them of a valuable nature and productive of income, are in
effect the donation to the widow of those very assets from which her
maintenance is derivable. though gifts of jewellery cannot be
said to diminish the rat'j.vof maintenance, whether or not income producing
stridhana may be regarded to be in "full quit" of her maintenance would
depend upon the value of such gifts; at any rate, upon equitable
principles, they must affect the rate at which the maintenance is to be
fixed, and the ruling which perhaps mcivt comprehensively encapsulates,
from the Hindu law perspective, the role of such stridhana and its
effect upon the quantum of maintenance, is the judgement of the Full
2
Bench in Yarahalu v. Sithamma.
In considering the position of a widow who had sufficient means of
her own, but claimed past and future maintenance from the coparceners,
Chandra Reddy, C.J., reiterated that as the right to maintenance is not
3
related to any want of means, but to the membership of the deceased
1. Ibid., at 200.
2. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 272 (F.B.)
3. In assessing the view expressed at Sir Thomas Strange, Hindu Law,
Yol I, 3rd ed., (Mad. Higginbotham, 1859)> 172, that "An opinion
that her maintenance should be independent of her (the widow* s) 
peculiar property"is unsupported, his Lordship refers at 274» ibid., 
to the opinion of the Pandit of Nellore, cited at Strange, Yol II, 
cited above, at 307-8, where in answer to the proposition that, "On 
the death of a Brahmin, leaving a widow and two sons, she and they 
take possession of his estate, subject to her possession of stridhana,
(continued next page)
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husband* s family, and is historically the relic of a share, the only 
deductions that could be made from the allowance (not exceeding the 
income of the late husband's share) which could keep her in the same 
degree of comfort, if possible, as she had enjoyed during his liftime, 
would be on account of properties yielding an income given to her by 
her husband or his father
(4) The General Principles upon which the Rate of Maintenance Depends
However, as absolute as the widow's right to maintenance is to the
extent of the deceased husband's share in the coparcenary assets, and
the duty of persons who are in possession of it, unqualified and 
2
unconditional, equity must of necessity play its part, and other 
factors taken into consideration in finally determining the quantum.
Each case must undoubtedly be judged upon its merits, and as the Madras 
High Court pointed out in Srinivasa v. Lakshmi Animalwhere the husband's
(continued from previous page)
in which case she is entitled only to a half share, the Pandit 
unequivocally states, "This opinion is generally correct, but I do 
not understand either the authority or the reason for restricting 
the maintenance to the amount of a half share, in the case of the 
existence of Stridhana ... and the correct opinion seems to be that, 
it shall be the amount of a full share as received by the coparceners, 
or perhaps this may be considered as its maxi mum.*
1. Derrett's analysis of the ratio in Yarahala v. Sithamma, A.I.E. 1961 
A.P. 272 (F.B.), 3MHL, op.cit., at 246. The author submits at ibid., 
that the principle is as applicable to testamentary dispositions as 
to gifts inter vivos.
2. The absoluteness of this right was emphasised in Gowardhan v. Smt. 
Gangabai, A.I.E. 1964 M.P. 168, in the unusual circumstances that, 
the surviving coparcener having obtained the entire estate by 
survivorship, it was held that, the mere fact that he had given his 
sons shares at a separate partition would be of no consequence, for 
where the husband leaves a share in the joint-family property, his 
widow is entitled to maintenance out of it from those coparceners 
who take by survivorship.
3. A.I.E. 1928 Mad. 216.
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assetB which are taken over are small, it may even be that the entire
income of his share may be awarded as maintenance to his widow. ^ On the
other hand, in other instances there is no fixed ratio. All that is
required is that the allowance ought to be such as to enable her to
live in comfort having regard to the means of the family. Such being
the rule, it is not open to the coparceners to prescribe any arbitrary
standard as regards the comforts the widow is entitled to have, or the
style in which she should live. For, as the degradation in which a
Hindu widow is expected to live is a matter of ceremonial observance
2
rather than of law,
"(p)rivation -per se is no virtue, and while a 
Hindu widow is certainly expected to live a 
chaste life, which is further not extravagant 
or disproportionate to the means of her late 
husband, we are quite unable to concede that 
austerity or asceticism should be rightly 
expected of hereby the coparceners of her 
late husband."
However, despite the general principle that in no case could the 
rate of maintenance exceed the income from the deceased husband's share 
of the property, it is not a fixed principle of law either, that the 
entire income of that share should be given to the widow, for what she
1. See also Thayammal v. Muthuswami, A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 282, at 285*
2. Per Glover and Ainslie, J.J., Hurry Mohan v. Sreemutty Nayantara, 
(1882) 25 W.R. 474» at 476. See also Mahmood, J. *s dicta to the same 
effect in Baisni v. Rup Singh, I.L.R. (1890) 12 All. 558» at 564* an^
Banerjee, J.'s concurrence with it in Devi Prasad v. Gun wan ti Koer,
I.L.R. (1895) 22 Cal 410, at 4I8.
5. Per Anantanarayanan, J., Sankaranarayana v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. 
i960 Mad. 294, at 296. See also Thayammal v. Muthuswami, cited 
above, where in answer to the contention that as the widow's needs 
were few and her life style sparse, her claim for enhanced maintenance 
could not be justified, Kailasam, J., held at 285 that, "Ve are not 
able to accept the contention ... that as the widow was living in an 
extremely frugal manner a small sum of maintenance would suffice ...
To accept such a contention would result in victimising widows lead­
ing frugal lives and rewarding those spending extravagantly. • • "
-347-
ie entitled to is maintenance and not the extra income of the deceased
husband.^ - Thus while the widow is entitled to a reasonable maintenance
out of the joint property, with reference to the family and their
2
circumstances in life, the position and status of the deceased and 
3
the widow, the expenses involved in the religious and other duties that
she is expected to discharge,^ their Lordships held in Smt. Nittokisso-
5
ree v. Jogendra Nauth that, over and above these factors, "the main 
subject of inquiry would be the value of the estate."^
These decisions are early indications that, however persistent the 
right of maintenance may be, no single component may be regarded as 
conclusive in determining the rate, and while it should generally be 
sufficient to allow the widow to live^  as far as may be, consistently with 
the position of a widow, in something like the same degree of comfort 
and with the same reasonable luxury as she had in her husband* s life-
7
time no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what particular
1. Gowardhan v. Smt. Gangabai, A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 168, at 170; Thayammal 
v. Muthuswami. A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 282, at 285«
2. Mst. Bheeloo v. Fhul Chand, (1824) 3 S.D.A. 298, at 301. See also 
Eursoondri v. Nubogobind» (l850) S.D.A. 422, at 423; Devi Persad v. 
Gunwanti Koer, I.L.R. (1895) 22 Cal 410, at 418.
3. Baisni v. Run Singji. I.L.R. (I89O) 12 All. 558, at 563*
4* Ibid. See also Mst. Santi v. Sudh Ram, A.I.R. 1955 Punj. 22 at 24.
5. (1878J L.R.5 I .A. 55i followed in Dalel Kunwar v. Ambika Pratap, I.L.R. 
(1903) 25 All. 266, where a Hindu widow having been ousted of posses­
sion of the immoveable properties of her deceased husband by the 
adopted sen, was awarded maintenance on the basis of the principles in 
the above case.
6. Smt. Kittokissoree*s case, cited above, at 57*
7. To this generally accepted principle, an important qualification was 
added in Ekradeshwari v. Homeshwar, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 128, at 130 that, 
"there may be circumstances in which the past mode of life of the 
widow has been demonstrably on a penurious a miserly scale, or on the
other hand, on a quite extravagant scale, having regard to the total
income of the husband." In other words, the Hindu law not having pro- , 
vided for such contingencies, equity must step in in either of such 
extremes and scale the rate of maintenance so as to make it both 
consistent and reasonable.
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fraction of income derivable from her husband’s share in the family
should be awarded as maintenance to the widow;^ and while each of the
principles enumerated in the earlier decisions must certainly play its
part, the remarkably exhaustive list of the variety of factors that
determine the quantum, is the now classic formulation of the principles
2
by the Dr Lordships of the Privy Council in Ekradeshwari v. Homeshwar 
that, as it is out of a great category of circumstances, small in them­
selves, that a safe and reasonable induction is to be made by a Court of 
Law in arriving at a fixed sum,
"(m)aintenance depends upon a gathering together 
of all the facts of the situation, the amount of 
free estate, the past life of the married parties 
and the families, a survey of the condition and 
necessities and rights of the members, on a
reasonable view of change of circumstances possibly
required in the future, regard being, of course, 
had to the scale and mode of living, and to the 
age, habits, wants and class of life of the 
parties.” 5
In other words, depending on the circumstances, there is nothing in 
law to prevent an increase or a decrease in maintenance should 
sufficient cause be shown for either,^ and to the extent that the 
incidents of joint living and the needs of the less fortunate reduce the
1. Panchakshara v* Pattammal, A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 865, at 866.
2. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 128.
3o Ibid., at 130, and quoted with approval in numerous subsequent decisions.
4. Sreeram v. Puddomookhee. (1868) 9 W.R. 152.
5. The Bombay High Court took note of this factor in Sidlingapa v. Sidava,
I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom. 624, and in asserting the necessity of varying 
the maintenance from time to time and of inquiring into the circums­
tances of the claimant, or of the family estate, or of the family 
itself, observed at 630: "Additional burdens may from time to time be 
cast upon the family estate. Other widows besides previous claimants, 
may be thrown upon it for support by the death of their husbands, or 
the number of sons and daughters of the male coparceners may have 
increased. "
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entitlement of the more fortunate,^ - "it is not necessary that a Hindu
vidow should he maintained in the same state that her husband would 
2
maintain her," In short,
"(h)er fortunes are bound up with the 
fortunes of the family. If the income of 
the family increases she will be entitled 
to the benefit of it. Likewise if the 
income of the family decreases she must , 
submit to a reduction of her maintenance,"
Thus in Ra.jendranath v. Rani Putto,^  where under a solehanamah or
compromise the widow was assigned a certain amount as maintenance, the
sum to be recoverable from the produce of certain agricultural lands
which subsequently became unfit for cultivation by reason of inundation
of salt water causing impoverishment, it was held that, inasmuch as the
amount of maintenance must be taken to have been fixed with reference to
value and extent of the property, the Court had power to reconsider the
1. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit,, at 245* In Ramchandra v, Sagunabai, I.L.R, 
(1879) 4 Bom. 26l, where the family ol' the husband was large and the 
ancestral estate small, Vestropp, C.J., refused to countenance the 
widow*s demand for enhanced maintenance, but gave her the right to 
elect between taking the original sum and living separately, or 
accepting the offer to be maintained in the family house in the same 
manner as the other members of the family. Ayyar, J. * s remark obiter 
in Kodandarami v, Chenchamma, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 479» 480, is also
worth noting: 'TCo doubt in cases where the income from the joint-family 
is not sufficient to maintain properly all the members who are entitled 
to maintenance out of the same, it would be proper that the private 
properties of any particular member and the income thereof, should be 
taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance due to such 
member having private means."
2. Kallee Persaud v. Kupoor Koowaree, (I865) 4 W.R. 65, at 65. See also 
Gowardhan v. Smt. Gangabai, A.I.R. 1964 MT.P. 168, at 170.
3. Yeera.ju v. Narayanamma, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 159 (F*B.), at 161. In 
explaining, Nair and Spencer, J.J., pointed out in Manikka v. Sowbagia, 
A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 26 that, as the husband*s interest by survivorship 
formed the nucleus of the subsequent acquisition, it stood to reason 
that, the widow would get a reduced rate of maintenance if the family 
income diminished, and on the same principle, she would be entitled
to an enhanced rate if the family income expanded.
4. (1880) 5 C.L.R. 18.
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allowance and. to readjust it to the altered circumstances.^-
2
Similarly in Kallee Persaud v. Kupoor Koomaree, where there were
debts outstanding on. the estate, the High Court*s refusal to ratify the
v Subordinate Judge's decision to enhance the widow's maintenance, was in
3
later years endorsed in Savitri v, Savi where it was likewise held that 
where the estate is indebted, even one-fifth or one-sixth of the income 
would not be an insufficient sum for the widow's maintenance.
More recently in A.S, No, 264 of 1969,^  where the enhanced 
maintenance awarded to f!v~ adoptive mother was challenged, Eao, J,f 
while affirming the decide, nodified the quantum having regard to the
1. However, this is not to as sum* that, where the family income is reduc­
ed as a consequence of wilful negligence, the widow must be made to 
share in the burden of zuck negligence. In Gopika v, Pat tar ay a, I.L.R. 
(1900) 24 Bom, 386, where the family income was much diminished, 
chiefly through lack of repairs and the resultant deterioration of
the property, Parsons and Eaziade, J.J,, were agreed that, though main­
tenance decrees are by their very nature subject to modification 
according to change of circumstances, nevertheless as in this instance 
there was no evidence to_xhru that the state of decay had been brought 
about by natural curses, the rate of maintenance would remain 
unaffected. Followed in 1':, . Savitribai v. Eadhakisan, A.I.R, 1948 Nag. 
44 where the sale of some of the properties in execution of the decree 
for maintenance was he"!! not a relevant consideration for reducing 
the quantum, the diminution being due to default in not paying the 
maintenance charges in the first place. Nor is it consistent with 
equity to assume that the position of a Hindu mother of a child, 
deceased subsequent to her husband's death, so far as concerns the v 
principle upon which the allowance of maintenance has to be computed, 
is inferior to that of a childless widow. On the other hand, in 
Narhar Singh v. Dimath Kuar. I.L.R, (1879) 2 All 407* Straight, J., 
was of the view that the case of a widowed mother, deprived of her
only son and consequently of the advantages that might have accrued
to her had he survived, seemed the more desaving of sympathy and con­
sideration rather than to make her loss a ground for reducing the 
allowance she would have been reasonably entitled to had she been a 
childless widow,
2. (1883) 4 W.R. 65.
3. A.I.R. 1933 Pat, 306, at 341.
4. Reported in Dugginal lakshmana v. Duggina Lakshinl, A.I.R. 1973 A .P.
302, at 305.
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age of the lady, her reasonable, needs and standard of life. It is, 
however, submitted that in these inflationary times the reduction in the 
rate from Rs. 125*00 to Rs. 100.00 could not possibly be regarded as 
making any significant difference in either the needs or the standard of 
life, and unless the estate was small enough to have warranted it (of 
which there was apparently no finding), the cutting down of the quantum 
was more a gesture than any meaningful adjustment of claims as between 
the parties.
However, if the change of circumstances in the family may justify a 
suit for reduction of maintenance, they may equally justify a suit for 
its increase,^ - and the Court must look not only into the needs of the 
widow, but also any change in those other circumstances to which the
2Court had regard in fixing the rate of the original maintenance claim.
3
The only limitation to this rule, it was held in Sreeram v. Puddomookhee, is 
that subject to the limitation that, in any case,the maximum amount of 
maintenance which the widow can claim cannot exceed the share which her 
husband would have had, had he lived, there seemed no reason why she also 
should not be benefit ted from the increase in the net income of the 
family^  due to the reduction in the number of its members.
1. Ban gam Ammal v. Vi.jayamachi. I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 175, at 177*
2. One of such relevant circumstances where the need for enhanced varia­
tion of the rate would meet with the approval of the Court is the 
increased value of assets and income, and the contrasting sharp increase 
in costs of living, so that what might have been sufficient when the
rate was originally fixed, could hardly be regarded as enough years
later when the suit for an increase in maintenance is instituted. See 
Bansidhar v. Champoo Bibi, A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 150, at 156-7; Kirpal Sjnffr 
v. Chandrawati Devi, A.I.R. 1951 All. 507, at 510; Sankaranarayana v. 
Lakshmi Animal, A.I.R. i960 Mad. 294, at 296; Smt. Sara swat i v. Smt. Rupa, 
A.I.R. 1962 Or. 193, at I96.
3. (1868) 9 W.R. 152.
4. The same view was expressed in Veerayya v. Chellamma, A.I.R. 1939 Mad
37, at 39.
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This position has been consistently maintained, and in Smt. Saras- 
wati v. Smt. Rupa} in a suit for enhanced maintenance, after the death 
of the father-in-law viho had executed a deed of maintenance in favour of his 
deceased son's widow, it was held that, quite apart from the rise in prices 
and the consequent increase in the family income, as the reasonable 
anticipation of the senior coparcener of an increase in the family 
members as a consequence of his second marriage had not only failed to 
materialise, but, on the contrary, the decuhivi. of the members of the 
joint-family leaving only one widow as the sole heir had lessened the 
burden on the estate, it was a material change in the circumstances 
which would justify the demand of an increase in the quantum.
The principles under which the rate of maintenance is fixed under the
new law are substantially the same as those by which they were determined 
2
before 1956, with this important distinction, however, that, whereas 
the better view in regard to the old law was that,as the widow's right to 
maintenance was unquestionable both from out of the separate assets of 
her deceased husband, and to the extent of his share of the joint-family 
property, the possession by her of private means would not affect the 
quantum, the latter is now a factor to be taken into consideration under
V *
s. 25 (5)5 (f) of the HAMA., 1956.
1. A.I.R. 1962 Or. 197.
2. That in fact the quantum of maintenance is still dependent upon a 
gathering together of the facts of the situation is evident from the 
wide discretion given to the court in determining it. S. 23 (1) of the 
HAMA, 1956, lays down: "It shall be in the discretion of the Court to
determine whether any, and if so what, maintenance shall be awarded 
under the provisions of this Act, and in doing so the Court shall have
due regard to the considerations set out in ... sub-section (3)> •••* 0>®low 
so far as they are applicable.
3. The sub-s. provides that, "In determining the amount of maintenance, 
if any, to be awarded to a dependant under this Act, regard shall be 
had to: --
(a) the net value of the estate of the deceased after providing for 
the payment of his debts;
(continued next page)
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It is thus clear that, though the test/is the taking of the property 
by the person to be charged with the maintenance of the female, as it is 
the totality of circumstances in relation to which each factor has to be
weighed and given greater or lesser prominence, the obligation which rests
1 2 upon the survivors is in its very nature variable. What these factors
(continued from previous page) ~
o>> the provision, if any, made under a will of the deceased in 
respect of the dependant;
(c) the degree of relationship between the two;s
(f) the value of the property of the dependant and any income der­
ived from such property; or from his or her earnings, or from any 
other source;
(g) the number of dependants entitled to maintenance under this Act,"
1. We have already noted the alienee *s liability under s. 59 of the T.P. 
Act. On the same basis it was held in Kaveri v. F&rameswari, A.I.R. 
1971 Ker. 216, at 220-1 that, as the right of maintenance is a recur­
ring right, where the property is charged with the widow1s maintenance 
she is entitled to claim an enhancement of the rate if altered cir­
cumstances justify the increase, even where the estate has passed into 
the hands of an alienee purchasing for consideration with notice of 
such charge.
2. The opposite view prevailed in Jhunna v. Ramsarup, I.L.R. (1880) 2 All. 
777» ie., that, for reasons of convenience, and in order to prevent 
the recurrence of litigation between the parties, it is far better that 
' a reasonable sum, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
should be ascertained and fixed. But this stance, it is submitted, 
cannot be countenanced, for while fluctuations in produce and profitB 
in thriving circumstances would militate against the widow, in leaner 
times it would violate all equitable considerations in that, the lady 
would continue to get her fixed maintenance, pressures and hardships 
on the rest of the family notwithstanding. See also Krishnamurthy v. 
Suryakanthamma, A.I.R. 1955 A.P.5, where a similar suggestion was made 
at 8, on the analogy of the rule in Peramanayakam v. Sivaramant A.I.R. 
1952 Mad. 419 (F.B.) at 437» 441* that if in partition proceedings the 
alienee seeks possession of property corresponding to the alienor*s 
share, the maximum he may obtain is the fraction of the assets to which 
the alienor would have been entitled at the date of the transaction 
itself, as applied to the net distributable assets at the date of the 
suit, (see Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 507) • However, this view was 
effectively scouted in Subbarayudu v. Papayamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 865, 
Reddy, C.J., pointing out at 866 that, whereas the alienee’s interest 
cannot fluctuate on the principle that a man gets what he bargained
(continued next page)
the reasonable wants of the dependant;
the past relations between the dependant and the deceased;
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are, and to what extent they might affect the quantum would, of course, 
depend upon the finding of the Court, ^ hut the irore substantial question, 
that has come up time and again is, whether or not the income at the time 
of the taking of the property constitutes the measure of the rate of
maintenance at all subsequent periods.
2
In Rangathai v. Munuswami , while acknowledging that no hard and 
fast rule could be laid down that the widow is entitled to a particular 
fraction of the income, the Court held at the same time that, she could 
in no event claim more than the income of the share of the estate which 
her husband would have been entitled to if a division had taken place 
during his lifetime.^
This was also the guiding principle as laid down in Audemma v. Vara- 
dareddy.^  in regard to the self-acquired assets of the deceased husband, 
Govindarajachari, J., ruling that, as the widow* s maintenance cannot be 
reduced as a consequence of extravagance or imprudence on the part of the 
heir or devisee, neither could either of them be directed to pay enhanced 
maintenance when by his own efforts he had made considerable additions to
(continued from previous page)
for, this rule is inapplicable where the claim for maintenance is to 
the extent of the assets of the deceased coparcener for the letter’s v 
share is not defined as on his death.
1. The principle of the variation of the maintenance rate now finds sta­
tutory recognition in the HAMA, s. 25 of which specifies: "The amount 
of maintenance, whether fixed by a decree of Court or by agreement, 
either before or after the commencement of this Act, may be altered 
subsequently if there is a material change in the circumstances justi­
fying such alteration."
2. (1911) 21 M.L.J. 706.
3. The same view was expressed in Subbarayalu v. Kamalavallithayaramma,
I.L.R. (1912) 35 Mad. 147, at 148; Srinavasa v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. 
1928 Mad. 2l6at 219; Ramxah v. Ram Daiya, (1917) 42 LC. 944» 945> 
Gurushiddappa v. Parwatewwa. A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 135 > a"t 138*
4. A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 31.
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the property. The extent of the obligation must therefore he defined 
in terms of the estate existing at the time of the death of the last 
male holder.
It has however, to he stated that, so far as the widow*s right of
maintenance is concerned, the one estate is as liable for it as the
other, and the distinction that the learned Judge makes between the two^
2hardly justifiable. What is more pertinent to the discussion here is
whether this principle may at all be given credence when we consider that
the subsequent accretions are as much due to the investment of the
surviving coparceners* own (shares as that of the deceased husband*s
assets in the joint family property.
This view  consistent with equity has been attractively set
3
out in Manikka v. Soubagia. As the major portion of the income was derived 
from the family trade which had since the husband *s death increased con­
siderably, it was held that, as the deceased's interest formed in part 
the nucleus of the subsequent acquisitions, the amount of property in 
existence at the time of his death would not limit the widow's claim.^
1* Ibid.. at 56, where in regard to joint-family property, his Lordship 
reiterated the principle that, "as a necessary and logical consequence 
of the nature of the right possessed by the widow, her maintenance would 
- be dependent upon the vaiying fortunes of the family. Her comforts witl 
dwindle if the family property is reduced; but if the family becomes 
more affluent, she- will be entitled to participate in that affluence."
2. The correct position, it is submitted, is stated in Raghunath v. Dwar- 
kabai, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 3579 360s "There is no distinction between
an heir and a surviving coparcener with regard to the claim of a widow 
for maintenance which is founded not upon the nature of the succession 
but upon possession of the property belonging to the husband. The 
principle is that who ever has got the property is liable for the widow's 
maintenance."
3. A.I.R. 1915 Kad. 26.
4. Followed in Chunilal v. Bai Saraswati. A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 393, where to 
the argument that a certain property subsequently acquired was not in 
existence at the date of the suit, nor had it been purchased at the 
date of the husband's death, Sen, J., ruled at 396: "But as there is a
(continued next page)
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In other words,
"(t)he share the husband would get if he had 
been alive at the time of the suit should be 
taken into consideration (in fixing the rate 
of maintenance) and not the share, if any, he 
was entitled to on death,"
for as a member of the joint-family, the widow* s fortunes are bound up 
with the fortunes of the family, and her maintenance invariably subject
to variation --  a feature inconsistent with the assertion that
maintenance should be fixed taking into consideration the husband*s share 
in the income of the joint-family at the time of his death and at no 
subsequent time.^
This may now be regarded as settled law in view of the numerous 
decisions* which testify to the eminently equitable nature of this cons­
truction, and in Kir pal Singh v. Chandrawati Devi,^  Sapru, J., while 
holding that the husband's share of the income, had he been living, would 
have been substantial enou^i to justify the claim for enhanced maintenance, 
extended the principle further to hold that the positive change in social 
outlook, as represented by the enactment of the HWRPA, 1957» must
(continued from previous page)
finding that it had become joint-family property by virtue of the 
family nucleus, ••• this property must be taken into account in 
arriving at the quantum of maintenance." See also Gowardhan v.
Smt. Gangabai. A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 168, at 170.
1. Manikka v. Soubagia, cited above, at 26-7#
2. Yeera.ju v. Narayanamma, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 159 (F.B.), at l6l.
3. For such decisions see Madhavrav v. Gangabai, I.L.R. (1878) 2 Bom.
639, at 64O; Sreeram v. Puddomokhee (1883) 9 W.R. 152, at 155; Bar 
Pratab v. Thakurain Rajhuraj A.I.R. 1935 Oudh 550, at 553? Yeerayya 
v. Chellamma, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 37, at 38; Bansihar v. Mt. Champoo, 
A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 150, at 156; Eari- v. Narmadabai. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 
133, at 137; Subbarayadu v. Papayamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 865, at 866; 
Smt. Saraswati v. Smt. Rupa, A.I.R. 1962 Or. 195, at 197; Basavayya 
v. Venkayamma, (1967) 2 An* W.R. 23, at 24•
4. A.I.R. 1951 All. 507.
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of necessity affect the rate of maintenance.^- Consequently, even in 
cases where the Act itself might have no application because of the 
death of the husband before it came into force, it would be proper to 
take into consideration the income from the share of the property which 
the widow could have demanded in partition under the Act and to fix a 
reasonable rate of maintenance in relation to it. i
10. The Principles Upon Which Arrears of Maintenance are Determined
It is well known that, at one stage the entire question of a claim.
2
for arrears of maintenance was in doubt as a legal claim. But, as
3
this liability stejvi i-txthe personal law governing the parties 
rather than from any contractual obligation, the implication that these 
are dues based upon some mere contract which is invariable as between 
the parties, is misleading.^ Though as a general rule the widow cannot
1. See also Thayammal v. Mutfaiswami, A.I.R. 1971 Mad. 282, at 285 where 
Kailasam, J., agreed with this view, adding at the same time that
"the several enactments providing her with a right to property" --
an obvious reference not only to the EVRPA. 1937* but to the ESA.
1956, as well  had enhanced the status of the widow, a factor to
be recognised in fixing the quantum of maintenance.
2. See Mst. Jamwati v. Maharani. A.I.R. 1931 All. 227, where it was held 
that as the demand for arrears could not be equated with the right of 
maintenance, the Court*s discretion in awarding it would depend upon v 
whether or not the widow claiming it was in want.
3* Or, in other words, as the Privy Council put it in Ekradeshwari v. 
Homeshwar, A.I.R. I929 P.C. 128, at 131: 1 In the Board*s opinion
such arrears if they truly exist, fall within the range of the widow*s 
right to maintenance." A similar equating'of the arrears with the 
right itself is equally in evidence in Mst. Savitribai v. Radhakisan, 
A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 44, at 46: "Once the maintenance is fixed and a
charge declared ... a floating charge over the property is created 
which crystallises month by month as each arrear falls due ... and 
the principles which enable a creditor to proceed against a family 
estate, despite partition, in the case of crystallised charges apply 
with equal force in the case of a floating .(charge-of this character."
4. Sankaranarayana v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. i960 Mad. 294> at 297*
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claim arrears of maintenance for the period she was living in her
husband’s family unless she was kept there under extreme penury and
oppression, she is, however, entitled to arrears from the time she
changes her residence,* and it has now been settled in a long series
of decisions that a demand and refusal need not precede the claim for 
2
arrears, that in fact non-payment of maintenance would prima facie 
constitute proof of wrongful withholding.^ In other words, the right 
to arrears is an absolute right defeasible only on proof of waiver,
4
abandonment, estoppel or limitation.
In fixing the arrears of maintenance to be awarded to the widow,
it may be regarded as settled principle that, like the claim for
maintenance itself, it is the duty of the Court to consider the whole
5
circumstances of the situation in pronouncing a decree for arrears*
Thus while the Court may, in exercise of its undoubted discretion,^  fix
1. Ekradeshwari v. Homeshwar, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 128, at 131.
2. Jivi v. Ramji* I.L.R. (1879) 3 Bom* 207, at 208-9; Baja v. Raja, I.L.R* 
(l90l) 24 Mad. 147, at 155* Panchakshara v* Pattaxnmal, A.I.R. 1927 
Mad. 865, at 867; Srinavasa v. Lakshmi Animal* A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 216, at 
222; Sobhanadramma v. Harasimhaswami, A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 401, at 405; 
Ramarayudu v. Sitalakshmamma. A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 915> at 916; Eari v. 
Narmadabai, A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 133» at 137; Nagendramma v. Ramakottayya, 
A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 713* at 72^ ; Krishnamurthy v. Suryakanthamma, A.I.R. 
1955 A.P. 5> at 9; Rajamma v. Varadarajulu, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 198, at 
200; Sankamarayana v. Lakshmi Ammal. A.I.R. i960 Mad. 294» at 297*
3. Jivi v. Ramji, I.L.R. (1879) 3 Bom. 207» at 210; Raja v. Raja, I.L.R. 
(l90l) 24 Mad. 147* at 155; Panchakshara v. pattammal. A.I.R. 1927 
Mad. 865, at 867; Sobhanadrarmna v. Karasimhaswami. A.I.R. 1934 Mad.
401, at 405.
4. Apart from the cases dn f.n. 1, see also Guruswami v. Angaiyarkanni, 
A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 194, at 198.
3* Ekrade shwari v. Homeshwar. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 128, at 131.
6. The view taken by Umamaheswaram, J., in Krishnamurthy v« Suryakanthamma, 
A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 5, at 9, that there is no discretion in the Court 
either to cut down or to reduce the amount of past maintenance, appears 
unduly arbitary, for while certainly the period may not be cut down 
given the abiding nature of the right, circumstances may justify the 
award of arrears at a lower rate, as our examination of relevant 
decisions will presently indicate. That pexhaps the learned Judge
(continued next page)
the arrears at a rate not necessarily the same as future maintenance,
that discretion may only he exercised if the evidence shows that the
conditions of the family, i.e. to say, that the income and the expenses
were substantially different from the conditions obtaining at the time
of the suit and likely to obtain in the near future.^ "
In other words, the question of fixing the rate of maintenance for
arrears should be looked at from the standpoint of the person
the claim and the person who has to meet the claim, and it is to these
well-defined principles (rather than the resorting to arbitary or
capricious rules)that the Court must look to in determining the rate of 
2arrears.
5
Thus in Venkataratnamma v. Seetaratnam, in holding that it was 
fully open to the Court to award arrears of maintenance at some rate less 
than that fixed for current maintenance, Curgeneven, J. ruled that, as 
during the period for which arrears were being claimed, the widow had 
been merely a child from about twelve to seventeen years of age, and 
consequently her needs being extremely moderate, it was a factor to be
(continued from previous page)
was himself not quite convinced by his own stance, is indicated a 
little later at 10, where in modifying the earlier statement he 
observes: "If the income of the family during the period for which - 
arrears are claimed is less than the income at the time of the insti­
tution of the suit, arrears may certainly be allowed at a lesser rate." 
The general principle obtaining in Kirpal Singh v. Chandrawati Devi, 
A.I.R. 1951 All. 507, at 511 may in fact be regarded as being nore in 
tune with the correct position: "There is no sufficient justification 
for making any distinction between the rate allowable for past arrears 
of maintenance and future maintenance unless there are special circum­
stances." (Emphasis mine.)
1. Hari v. Narmadabai, A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 135* at 13.6.
2. Venkanna v. Satyanarayanamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 652, at 654*
3. A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 408.
taken into consideration, and the cutting down of the rate justifiable.^
The more problematic issue, however, is whether, where the arrears
have been allowed to accumulate, it is open to the Court to award it
2
at a reduced rate. In Dattatraya v. Laxman, the Bombay High Court in
laying down the basic principles held that, where silence on the part of
the widow for a long time and her omission to demand maintenance might
justify an inference that the claim had been waived or abandoned, and
her conduct generally such as to lead the person in charge of the
estate to believe that he would not suddenly be called upon to meet a
claim for a large sum of money from out of his current income, it was in
the discretion of the Court to decide whether a claim for arrears of
3
maintenance ought to be allowed in whole or in part.
Judicial opinion, though^  has consistently opted for the award of
4
arrears at a lower rate where it had been allowed to accumulate. In an
1. For a similar decision see also Ramarayadu v. Sitalakshmamma, A.I.R.
1937 Mad. 915. On the other hand, to award arrears at a lesser rate 
merely because she is in receipt of an independent income, is, it is 
submitted, violative of the widow's absolute and unconditional right 
to maintenance from her deceased husband's assets, and in this regard, 
the dicta in Panchakshara v. Pattammal. A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 865, and other 
like decisions, merit careful reconsideration.
2. A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 260.
V
3. Ramaswami, J., in underscoring this principle, in Ra.jamma v. Varadajulu, 
A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 198, at 200, followed Sobhanadramma v. Narasimhaswami. 
A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 401, to hold that, "it is equally well settled that 
arrears may be fixed on a lower scale than future maintenance ... on 
the principle that by reason of the arrears not being claimed promptly, 
the opposite party would have been induced not to make any provision 
for meeting it out of his annual income and therefore it would not be 
proper to saddle him with such heavy unexpected liability as would 
result in the liquidation of the joint-family assets. For similar 
reasoning see also Venkanna v. Satyanarayanamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 652, 
at 654.
4. In rare instances, the demand for arrears have been altogether negatived. 
See, for instance, Seshamma v. Subbarayadu, I.L.R. (1895) 18 Mad. 403> 
where a demand for past maintenance for six years was denied on the 
ground that, as the widow had chosen not to reside in the family house, 
it was a matter in the discretion of the Court not to award any arrears 
at all --  a stance not to be countenanced in the light of the imperative
(continued next page)
early decision, that of Raghubans v. Bhagwant,^  it was held that, where 
the widow had advanced no claim for arrears for nearly eleven years, and 
considering that the amount spent on her upkeep by her brother was far 
less than the amount claimed, the Court in the exercise of its discre­
tionary power, was entitled to fix the arrears at a rate lower than what 
had been awarded for future maintenance*
Equitable as this rationale may appear, the further reasoning of 
their Lordships that, where the demand for arrears is not made for a long 
time, those upon whom the liability lies, may well infer waiver of the 
right, is difficult to comprehend, Die question that such a proposition 
begs is: what may a "long time" be taken to be ? If as a general rule
waiver or abandonment cannot be inferred either from the fact that no 
formal demand was made, or that the widow was living in her parental
home, the correct principle must in the circumstances be that, provided
2
that her claim is not barred by time, no waiver may be inferred, and
(continued from previous page)
nature of the claim to arrears of maintenance, and the equally non­
binding rule for the widow, of residence in the family home. See 
also Audemma v. Vara dare ddy. A.I.R, 1949 Mad. 51, at 59 where a like 
view was expressed, and the widow* s right to arrears denied on the 
ground that, as for twenty-seven years she had made no demand, she had 
implicitly abandoned her claim prior to the institution of the suit. On 
the other hand the ruling to the contrary in Guruswami v. Angaiyarkanni 
A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 194> at 198 is, it is submitted, by far the more 
attractive and equitable of the two viewpoints: "A plea of abandonment 
or waiver is not always one of law, and that is a matter which has to 
be expressly pleaded and proved, because abandonment or waiver involves 
a conscious and deliberate act on the part of the person who has got a
right to, or interest in, certain property, which he or she deliberately
and with full knowledge of the existence of the right or interest gives 
up the same."
1. I.L.R. (1889) 21 All 185.
2. That this may not be an unreasonable proposition, is indicated by a
like opinion expressed by Umamaheswaran J., in Krishnamurthy v. Surya- 
kanthamma, A.I.R. 1955 A.P. 5* 9 that, "If the right of a widow is a
legal one, and if under the law of Limitation she is entitled to claim 
arrears of maintenance for a period of twelve years, I am unable to 
understand how the Courts are entitled to exercise a wide discretion in 
cutting down the period or the rate of arrears."
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she is as imich entitled to arrears at the same rate as to her present
1 2 maintenance, other conditions remaining the same.
Keeping in view the foregoing principles, the decision in Lakshamma 
Vo Venkatasubbiah, ^ is worth noting. Where the widow sued for arrears 
twenty-seven years after the death of her hushand, it was held that, 
though no waiver or abandonment of the right could he inferred, neverthe­
less a period of three years was thought sufficient for the award of 
arrears. On the face of it, a most inequitable judgement in that the 
award of arrears for only three out of the twenty-seven years might 
appear as almost tantamount to the denial of the right itself, it is 
submitted that, on reflection, no injustice was done. The period of 
limitation runs for twelve years at a stretch, and the widow* s claim 
being barred twice by the consecutive running of time against her, the 
award of arrears for three years was what her entitlement amounted to.
Where however, the action to enforce the claim to arrears is 
instituted within twelve years, it is submitted that the Court must
1. See the decisions in Kirpal Singh v. Chandrawati Devi, A.I.R. 1951 
All. 507, at 511> Venkanna v. Satyanarayanamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 652, 
at 654; Hari v. Narmadabai. A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 155* a-t 156, all of which 
lay down that, while the Court has the discretion to decree arrears at 
a rate different from the rate allowed for future maintenance such v 
discretion may only be exercised when the conditions in the family in 
the past were different fromthe present conditions. In other words, 
where the conditions prevailing in the past were the same as those in 
the present, arrears must be awarded at the same rate as present 
maintenance.
2. Where the conditions are in fact not the same, if arrears may be fixed 
at a reduced rate under adverse circumstances, it is equally certain 
that it may be awarded at an enhanced rate under more favourable con­
ditions. This is brought out clearly in Kanilal v. Bai Sushila, A.I.R. 
1956 Bom. 402, where -on the widow’s demand of a certain sum for arrears 
as a consequence of her having incurred debts, Chainani, J., held at
404 that, "We think the plaintiff should be awarded a much larger amount, 
having regard to the extensive properties possessed by the defendants.”
5- (1925) 48 M.L.Jo 266.
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exercise its discretion to cut down the rate only on "the gathering
together of all the facts of the situation” as envisaged hy the Privy
Council in Ekrade shwari v. Homeshwar,^  and not merely because no demand
had been made, for where there is a right; it cannot be said to have
evaporated simply on the basis of its non-assertion©
It has been held that, as the Courts do have a wide discretion in
awarding arrears, they may take into consideration that a sudden demand
for a large sum by way of arrears, may be inequitable and embarassing to
2
those upon whom the liability rests0 It is upon this principle that
3
it was held in Gowardhan v« Smt© Gangabai , that, as the widow had taken 
no action to enforce the claim for arrears for twelve years, and the 
amount accumulating in that period was a large sum to pay which the 
defendant would encounter difficulties, the Court had of necessity to 
exercise its discretion in fixing a lower rate of arrears.^ It is cer­
tainly true that, if the demand for accumulated arrears is to be met with 
from the current income alone, hardships must inevitably result, but to 
cut down what is legitimately the due of the female, is, it is submitted,
5
quite as unreasonable, quite as inequitable. The dicta in Guruswami v.
1. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 128, at 130© v
2. See Sobhanadramma v« Rarasimhaswami, A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 401, at 405; 
Dattatraya v© Layman, A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 260, at 262.
5. A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 168.
4. Ibid., at 171.
5© See also Sidramappa v© Mahadevi, A.I.R. 1971 Mys© 145» at 148, where the 
ruling is the more reprehensible in that, while recognising the widow* s 
right to arrears for the past twelve years, as well as taking cognisance 
of the fact that the sum awarded by the trial Court could not be said 
to be excessive in any manner taking into consideration the status of 
the parties, nevertheless, "as the defendants have to pay in one lump 
sum of money, by way of past maintenance for a period of twelve years 
which they may have to find from out of current income, it would be 
equitable to reduce the past maintenance..." It is submitted that, 
however else one may regard this dicta, equitable it certainly is not. 
In holding the contrary view in Guruswami v. Angaiyarkanni, A.I.R. 1974 
Mad 194, Ismail, J., puts in proper perspective the entire question of
(continued next page)
Angaiyarkanni, may here be called in aid to resolve the dilemma, and 
once that formula is resorted to, the person upon whom the liability 
lies would, one feels certain, recognise the recurring nature of the 
right and make proper provisions accordingly as the liability arises,
11, The Effect of Hnchastity on the Right of Maintenance
The protection from destitution by way of the right of maintenance
that the Hindu law provides to the female after her husband's death is,
however, conditional upon her living a life of chastity. As the estate
from which her maintenance is deriveable is that of her late husband's
she must, for the remainder of her life, remain constant to his memory,
and incontinence must of necessity result in forfeiture? so the smrti texts
2state unambiguously.
The Courts have consistently upheld this view, and as early as
3
1843 9 it was held in Buss ant v, Kummul, that, having voluntarily quitted 
her husband's house in the night with a stranger male, the claim of the 
widow for an allowance from her husband's family was untenable, as 
according to the "shasters" her own conduct had deprived her of all claim 
to maintenance from them.
In Muttammal v, Kamakshy,^  the Madras High Court arrived at a v
(continued from previous page)
arrears in quite rationally holding at 199 that, while the demand for 
an exaggerated amount by way of arrears was rightly regarded as 
inquitable and embarrassing to the estate in Dattatraya v0 Laxman, A.I.R, 
1942 Bom. 260, nonetheless there is no "unalterable and fixed principle 
of law that whenever a widow comes to the Court with a demand for lump 
sum payment by way of arrears of maintenance, the Court should treat 
such a demand as inequitable and embarrassing to the estate."
1. A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 194» above, 0J1 3to ^
2. Mit. II.I. 13; Daya. V. 19; Nar. XIII. 26, supra, 270.
3. (1843) 7 S.D.A. 168.
4. (1865) 2 Mad. H.C.R. 337*
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similar decision to hold that, where the wife had been divorced for
adultery and continued to live in unchastity after her husband's death,
she was disentitled to claim maintenance from the property in the
hands of the survivors.
Similarly in Raja Pirthee Singh's case.^  which was essentially
concerned with the question of the legal implications and the effect
thereto of the widow's non-residence in the family house on her right of
maintenance, it was made clear during the course of the judgement that,
unless she is guilty of unchastity or other disreputable practices which
disentitle her altogether, the widow's right to maintenance is unimpeachable.
2Likewise in Moniram v, Kerry Kolitany, in considering the effect
of unchastity upon the estate inherited by a sonless widow, Sir Barnes
Peacock drew a distinction between Narada's injunction^ in regard to
maintenance and that of Katyayana1 s  ^in regard to maintenance to hold
that, as the right to receive maintenance is very different from a vested
estate in property, what is said as to maintenance could not be extended
to the case of a widow's estate by succession --- a point of view that
5
may well be open to challenge, but important for our purposes i£ its 
clear endorsement of the generally accepted principle that, maintenance
V
is indeed conditional upon chastity,
_ _
What is however interesting is that, while Narada and Yajnavalkya 
envisage the grant of maintenance only to such widows who maintained the
1. (1873) 12 Bengo L.R. 238, at 247.
2. (1880) L.R, 79 I.A. 115.
3. Supra, at 270,
4. Supra, at 222.
5. See Br, XXV-. 49* Kat.yayanasmrti, Y, 921, supra, 222, See also Mit, II.
Io 6,*op.cit., Daya. XI.1.7, op.cit., for the declaration of Vrddha 
Manu that "The widow of a childless man, keeping unsullied her
husband's bed, and persevering in religious observances, shall present
his funeral oblation and obtain (his) entire share,"
code of conduct that the sastra had entailed upon them, the text of 
Harlta that,
"(l)f a woman he coming a widow in her youth, he
headstrong, a maintenance must in that case he
given to her for the support of life,” ^
2
was fastened upon in some instances for the interpretation that, prov­
ision  however frugal  must he made for even the erring female,
Vestropp, C.J. taking the view that, the observations of the Privy Council
3
in Raja Pirthee Sin^i*s case as to loss of maintenance in consequence
of unchastity, referred to maintenance as a full right, and not to a
"starving" maintenance, as a hare maintenance has sometimes heen denomi­
nated.
To contemplate that the abhorrence that is unchastity in the sight 
of the lawgivers should to this extent he mitigated, is to militate
against the very spirit of the ancient texts. As was to he expected
this construction did not gain ascendency, and in Valu v. Ganga,^  Sargent, 
C.J., in dissenting with the earlier view, was clear that the texts which 
hear directly on the question of maintenance make the widow*s right to 
it conditional upon her leading a chaste life.^
1. Mito II* I* 37, opocit. Kane draws our attention to the full import ^
' of this texto See H.D. Vol. I, Part I, op.cit., at 545* See also H.D., 
vol. IV, op.cit., at 105, where in explaining Taj. III. 296, and Manu
XI. 176, the learned author expounds: "A woman, however, was not to he
altogether abandoned on the street and left to fare for herself, though 
she he patita, hut she was to he lodged in a cottage thatched with grass 
near the house, and was to he guarded against further lapses and given 
hare maintenance (enough to keep body and soul together) and (dirty) 
clothes."
2. See Honomma v. Timannabhatt I.L.R. (1877) 1 Bom. 559.
3. (1873) 12 Beng. L.R. 238.
4. I.L.R. (1883) 7 Bom. 84.
5. His Lordship referred in particular to the text of Harada, (supra 270 ), 
and to the Smrti Chandrika, X.l. 34» op.cit., : "Whichever wife becomes 
a widow and continues virtuous, she is entitled to he provided with 
food and raiment."
6. See also Vishnu v. Hanjamma, I.L.R. ( I 8 8 5 )  9 Bom. 108, where in over­
ruling the subordinate Judge*s dicta that, the right of maintenance 
having once commenced, it could not he extinguished, their Lordships
(continued next page)
The Calcutta High Court followed suit in Roma v. Rajonimoni.^  The 
widow having resorted to unchastity subsequent to her husband* s death, 
it was held that as maintenance was not a vested right of which she 
could not be divested, the widow*s chastity at the date of her husband*s 
demise was of no consequence in determining the loss of that right as a 
consequence of her subsequent unchastity* So far as the question of 
starving maintenance was concerned, it was rightly held that only those 
widows were entitled who, having taken a false step, had subsequently 
reformed.
That unchastity disqualifies absolutely the right to maintenance even
though it might have been secured by a decree or agreement, is the
inevitable corollary of the right and the contingency that it is based
on --- such is the view expressed in some decisions • In Daulta v,
2
Meghu. the allegation of unchastity having been proved, the widow 
contended that so long as the declaratory decree entitling her to main­
tenance stood unreversed her right to the amount decreed to her by it 
would remain unaffected, and that, in any case, her unchastity notwith­
standing, she was entitled to what is known as starving maintenance* In 
negativing these claims, it was held on the authority of the Bombay
V
3
decision in Vishnu v, Man gamma that, a decree obtained by a Hindu widow 
declaring her right to maintenance, is liable to be set aside or suspended
in its operation on proof of subsequent unchastity* As regards the
(continued from previous page)
were explidit that by virtue of the text of Narada, such a right is 
liable to resumption or forfeiture depending on the conduct of the widow.
1* I.L.R* (1890) 17 Cal* 674*
2. I.L.R. (1895) 15 All. 582.
5. I.L.R. (1885) 9 Bom. 108.
Becond proposition, i.e. that she is entitled at least to a starving 
maintenance, the High Court reiterated the earlier decisions that, in the 
face of continuing unchastity, the right to maintenance is destroyed in 
its entirety.
It might well he argued that such rulings .vare in direct contravention 
to Harita*s insistence that even the incontinent widow he given the 
barest minimum by way of food, raiment and shelter. What has, however, 
to he home in mind is that, as under the Hindu law chastity is 
absolute^incumbent, the text of Harlta must be construed in the context 
of this fundamental principle; as aware as the widow might he of her 
rights under her personal law, she must he equallyawaiye. that disreputa­
ble conduct on her part would neither he overlooked nor condoned by the
. 2 same law.
This general rule might, however, he waived in exceptional circum­
stances, and in Nagamma v. Yirahhadra,^  where the widow denied unchastity, 
and averring that her pregnancy had been the result of a forciahle 
connection, sued to recover arrears of maintenance due to her under an 
agreement. While upholding the established principle that the unchaste 
widow was indeed deprived of the right otherwise due to her, their
V
Lordships were willing to consider, on equitable grounds, the grant of a 
starving allowance on the basis that no text had been cited in the 
pleading, in favour of the theory that a bare maintenance could not be 
allowed, assuming that the pregnancy and subsequent out-casting was 
indeed the consequence of a forcible alliance. Thus though the claim for 
maintenance under the deed of agreement was nullified, as no proof of 
her continuing unchastity was forthcoming, the widow* s ri^it to a bare 
minimum was upheld.
1. I.L.E. (1894) 17 Mad. 392.
2. However, where maintenance is secured under an agreement or decree of 
Court, the better view is that the personal law ceases to operate. See 
below.
On the other hand, where maintenance demands had resolved them­
selves in compromises the Courts have taken the view that the personal 
law is no longer operative, and such suits must he judged on their own 
merits. In Kisanji v, Lakshmi,^  the claim of the widow for maintenance 
against her deceased husband*s collaterals was compromised on the under­
standing that a lump sum was to be paid in cash to her, and the remainder 
in monthly instalments. On the stoppage of the installments on the 
allegation of unchastity, Madgavkar, J,, ruled that, while undoubtedly 
the premium placed by the Hindu legislators upon the chastity of a 
widow was so high as not to deter a Court from depriving her of the 
right, nevertheless where the widow*s claim rests upon an independent
consideration, as in this instance, a compromise- of her claim to property,
2
she would not stand to lose out by reason of subsequent unchastity.
By parity of reasoning the same principle is held to apply where
the grant to a widow for her maintenance is secured under a testamentary
3
disposition. In Parami v. Mahadeyi, the deceased husband had devised 
all his property to his relatives with this provision, that they should 
maintain his widow in case she lived with them, but that if owing to 
dissension she lived apart, they should give her a certain sum of money 
per annum by way of maintenance. The provisions of the will were resisted
1. (1951) 55 Bom. L.R. 510.
2. That the widow*s subsequent unchastity does not affect the agreement 
as her claim rests upon a compromise and not on any principle of Hindu 
law, was also the ruling in Bhup Singh v. Lachman Kunwar, I.L.R. (1904) 
26 All. 321. On the same principle, it was held in Shivlal v. Bai 
Sankli, (l93l) 55 Bom. L.R. 490, that a specific agreement of annuity 
arrived at by a Family Arrangement as between the parties, could not 
be negatived on ground of the widow's subsequent unchastity. In view
of these rulings it is clear that the ratio in Haulta v. Meghu .I.L.R. 
(I893) 15 All® 582, (supra at 367) likewise in Sathyabhama v.
Keshavachar.ya I.L.R. (1915) 59 Mad. 658 (infra, at 371) may not be 
countenanced.
3. I.L.R. (1909) 54 Bom. 278
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on the ground that, subsequently the widow, having resorted to unchastity, 
had given birth to an illegitimate child. In ruling in her favour, 
Chandravarkar, J., held that, quite apart from her entitlement under the 
Hindu law itself in circumstances where she had since refoimed,^ as the 
widow*s right had been secured by a testamentary disposition, it could 
not be questioned. For, his Lordship explained, as a Hindu*s power to 
make a will is co-extensive with his power to make a gift inter vivos, 
the mere fact that the word "maintenance*1 was used, could not affect 
the unconditional terms of the bequest* In other words, where mainte­
nance is awarded by will, unchastity does not work a forfeiture, unless 
it is expressly provided that it should be so forfeited.
What therefore emerges from the foregoing is that (those instances
apart where the personal law may not apply at all), while continuing
unchastity on the part of the widow would certainly disentitle her to
the maintenance which she could otherwise effectively claim, on her
return to a life of continence, she must at least be entitled to a
starving maintenance, for as Mitter, J., so aptly observed in Moniram 
2
Kolita*s case, to maintain that a widow once unchaste must forever
remain unchaste, appears fundamentally opposed to some of the texts of
3 v
the Hindu law, and to the essentially protective nature of the same,
1. Dealt with below.
2. (1880) L.R. 79 I.A. 115.
3. Iyengar, J., dwells on this protectiveness of the law during the 
course of his judgement in Ananthanara.yana v. Sharadanna, (1943) 22 
Mys. L.J. 237 242: "The idea of starving*maintenance* is
not to be found in any other system of law, because among communities 
where divorce is permissible it is open to a woman after divorce to 
marry another husband and thus have the means of receiving maintenance, 
while among Hindus, a woman who is abandoned by her husband on account 
of unchastity, has not that advantage. That is the reason why the 
smritkaras, while showing the utmost abhorrence against unchastity, 
did not condemn the unchaste woman to die of starvation or to be forced 
by absolute necessity to lead a life of shame and miseiy, and directed 
that she should be given a starving maintenance ... "
!
-371-
1 it is submitted.
To revert to Pa rami v. Mahadevi,1 the learned Judge, after an
2elaborate review of the various smrti texts, reiterated the general 
rule that, as a Hindu wife cannot be altogether abandoned by her husband, 
even in the event of her unchastity, he is bound to keep her in or near
i
the house under restraint and provide her with food and raiment just 
sufficient to support life. If, however, she repents, returns to purity
f and performs such expiatory rights as are ordained, she must be reinstated
I
| so as to entitle her to all conjugal and social rights. In decreeing a
i
bare maintenance in favour of the widow, his Lordship rightly reasoned 
that what applies to the erring wife must a fortiori apply to the widow.^
In Sathyabhama v. Keshavacharya, on the other hand, where the widow* s 
maintenance had been settled under an agreement, it was held that on her 
repudiation of the unchastity to which she had resorted, the widow was 
entitled to the bare minimum for her upkeep and not the rate fixed under
| the agreement. Whether this construction can at all be countenanced is
1. I.L.R. (1909) 34 Bom. 278.
2. Reliance was particularly placed on verses 70-2, and 297 of the 
"Marriage and Ritual" chapter in the Mitakgara.
3* Die reason for this is obvious and has been stated elsewhere, but to 
recapitulate: As the claim to maintenance is a recurring right, it
may be in abeyance during the unchastity of the wife or the widow as 
the case may be, only to revive on the cessation of the disqualification. 
On analogy with this principle it was held in Mst. Shibbi v. Jodh Singh, 
A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 747, that where the husband had denied maintenance to 
his wife on her alleged unchastity, it was not a bar to her claim to 
maintenance on his death if in fact there had been no unchastity.
4. As unimpeachable as the ratio is, it is submitted that the obiter dicta 
in the judgement requires further thought, and is dealt with in the 
appropriate place below.
5. I.L.R. (1915) 39 Mad. 658.
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debatable, for as we have already established, the personal law in
such instances ceases to operate and the parties are bound by their own
undertakings* However, while this aspect of the ruling might well be
dismissed, what does merit approbation is the enunciation that though
the texts of Manu, lajnavalkya and Narada make no provision for a woman
who had repented and was subsequently leading an honest life,
"(l)t is not to be presumed from the omission 
to provide for such a contingency that, the 
resumption once made is to be irrevocable and 
that the fallen woman who had reformed is to be 
denied even starving allowance.” 1
The same rule applies with all the greater force where it is
established from the evidence that the woman was guilty of only a single
2
moral lapse. In Ananthanarayana v. Sharadarqnina, where barring the one
deviation into adultery, the wife had subsequently maintained an
unsullied existence, the learned Judge followed the now established rule
to hold that, thou^i her misconduct could not entitle her to be
maintained by her husband on the same scale as a virtuous wife, neither
3
by that single act of infidelity could she be entirely deprived, and 
must of right be provided with starving maintenance just enough to keep
1. Per Aiyer, J., ibid., at 660 • The grant of a starving allowance to
the reformed widow was also upheld in Bhikubai v. Hariba, I.L.R. (1925) 49 
Bom. 459> Ram Kumar ▼. Bhagwanta, I.L.R. (l934) 5& All. 592.
2. (1943) 22 Mys. L.J. 257.
3. It is submitted that from a purely subjective angle what most attracts
is the reasoning of the learned Judge that, where the wife is guilty
of marital disloyalty, the husband cannot be exonerated from blame, 
for as among Hindus a woman is under perpetual tutelage, ”When, during 
coverture, the husband has control over his wife and is her guardian, 
he should take proper precautions and necessary measures to safeguard 
her against all evil temptations. The ancient Hindu lawgivers therefore 
regarded the husband as being partly responsible, on account of his 
negligence, for his wife yielding to temptation and becoming unfaithful 
to him.” : Ananthanarayana v. Sharadamma, cited above, at 242.
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her tody and soul together.^
In the learned Judge*s view, however, he the wife’s sin ever so 
heinous as to justify her abandonment by the husband, she is to be 
abandoned only for the purposes of conjugal relations and religious 
ceremonies. For the rest, the texts of Yajnavalkya and the Mitakgara »s 
commentary thereon, clearly indicate that whether or not she performs the 
praya^chitta (penance) her right to a bare or starving maintenance cannot 
be denied.^
3
Qhus the obiter dicta in Pa rami v. Mahadevi that,
"(l)f, however, she repents, returns to purity 
and performs expiatory rites, she becomes entitled 
to all conjugal and social rights, unless her 
adultery was with a man of a lower caste, in 
which case, after expiation, she can claim no 
more than bare maintenance and residence,"4
5
must be rejected as being not only inconsistent with a modem outlook, 
but also contrary to sastric injunctions, for as his Lordship was 
perceptive enough to note, while in the caste hierarchy a Kg^tri.ya
s <-Vaisya or Sudra are all of a "lower caste" than the Brahmin woman, the 
abandonment contemplated in the smrti is in regard to misconduct wiih 
a jungitaha.k i.e. the chandala or the charmakara (the outcast). Thus
1. What applies to the wife is equally applicable to the widow, and in 
Jai Kissen v. Mst. Ram Rakhi. A.I.E. 1930 H.P. 12, where it was the 
widow who was guilty of a single moral lapse, a similar decision was 
arrived at.
2. In defence of his reasoning, his Lordship draws attention to the 
comments of the Mitaksara on verse 297 in the PrayaAddttadhya.ya of 
Yajnavalkya Smrti that, it is only in the case of women who have com­
mitted the four kinds of heinous sins, who will not be entitled to even 
starving maintenance, i.e. one who yields herself to her husband’s 
disciple, and one who yields herself to her husband’s guru, and parti­
cularly one who attempts the life of her lord or one who commits 
adultery with a .jungitha (a chuckler or the like).
3. I.L.R. (1909) 34 Bom. 278.
4. Ibid., at 283.
5. Lerrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 171.
6. More properly jungita. See Vas. 21.10, o£. cit.
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in the present case, though the liaison of the Brahmin woman was undoubt­
edly with a man of a lower caste, as he was not a jungitaha, her repentance 
was sufficient to dispense with purification ceremonies, and her right 
to a starving maintenance undisputed.
Decisions such as these leave no doubt in mind/that however stringent {onii 
the view the sacred texts may take of moral lapses, it is only in\
very rare circumstances that the woman is left totally unprovided for, 
and while compassion might have had a part to play, it is equally certain 
that, in making provision for a bare minimum to the erring female, the 
lawgivers were propelled by the driving fear of the shame and dishonour 
that the destitute widow’s conduct might otherwise heap on the patriarchs 
of the family.
Once this is clear, it is then quite in order that, in the contem­
plation of the "Hindu Code" the stipulation of unchastity in regard to
both maintenance and inheritance is dispensed with, in keeping with the 
broader, and theoretically at least, more tolerant perspective of modem 
times.
12. The Effect of Remarriage on the Right of Maintenance
That the remarriage of the Hindu widow was never in the contemplation
of the Hindu sages, and was unlawful except where it was sanctioned by
caste custom, is evident when we consider the various detailed injunctions
prescribed in the ^astra in regard to her demeanour and mode of existence
upon her husband’s death.'*' However, all that was changed, and the
departure from tradition marked by the passing of the HWRA, I856, legalising
2.
the remarriage of widows. But such relief as this much needed piece of
1. Supra, lJ>3fY* See also Daya., XI. I. 43*
2. The HWRA, 1856, was repealed in 1983.
Since the remarried widow would depend on her second husband for mainte­
nance, the law requiring her to forfeit maintenance from her previous 
family was admittedly reasonable. ^
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legislative enactment might have been brought to bear upon the stark 
conditions of deprivation attendant upon widowhood, was effectively 
nullified by the provisions of s, 2 in the stipulation of which the 
widow on her remarriage forfeited all rights by way of maintenance and 
inheritance in her deceased husband*s property.^
It is thus clear that, where the widow remarried under the enab­
ling provisions of Act, there can be no doubt but that she was equally
bound by the restrictive clause in it, and stood divested of the estate
2
that had inhered in her as her deceased husband*s heir, and by parity 
of reasoning, of her right to claim maintenance from the same. But the 
real problem that arose in the wake of the new legislation was whether 
the widow who was permitted to remarry by the custom of her caste was as 
liable to forfeit such interest --  be it that of inheritance or main­
tenance --  as her counterpart who-remarried in reliance on the statute
of 18 £6.
The conflict of judicial opinion is an indication of the complexity
of the problem, the Allahabad High Court consistently holding to the
view that the widow is divested on remarriage except where by the custom
of the caste and apart from the Act, she is entitled to remarry, and
decisions to the contrary could not be said to lay down the correct law.
3
In Ga.jadhar v. Kaunsilla. where the widow had remarried in 
accordance with the custom in her caste, the transferees from her husband 
refused to pay her further maintenance under s. 2 of the Act of I856, the
1. Supra, 196.
2. See Thangavelu v. Lakshmi, A.I.R. 1957 Kad. 534* After the coming into 
effect of the HSA. 1956# the view that rightly prevailed was that, where 
the widow had remarried prior to 17th June, 195^ » s*16 could not claim 
the benefit of s. 14 (1), as under s. 2 of the HWRA, 1856* she was 
divested of the estate which had inhered in her as her husband’s heir. 
Infra, 495*
5. I.L.R. (1909) 31 All. 161.
contention being that, as the right of maintenance was founded upon
relationship, the effect of the remarriage was to dissolve all ties
"between the widow and the family of her first husband. Banerjee, J.,
however, took as precedents the Allahabad rulings in Har Saran v. Nandi,^
2and Ran .jit v. Radha Rani, to hold that as the Act of 18^6 was inapplica­
ble to the case of the widow who was permitted by the custom of the caste 
to remarry, there could be no forfeiture of the property inherited by 
her from her late husband. While unchastity may work a forfeiture of 
her right of maintenance, his Lordship opined, as remarriage could 
not be equated with unchastity, she was entitled to retain the estate 
of her first husband, and a fortiori, to receive the maintenance fixed
by the decree against her husband and against the transferees of his 
3
estate.
This early stance was reinforced yet again in Allahabad in Bhola 
v. Mst. Kausilla,^  where in holding that the Act must be read as being
5
controlled by the Preamble, Mukherjee, J., was of the view that, as 
the statute was meant to apply to only those Hindus among whom widow 
remarriage was not permitted by caste custom, its enabling provisions were
1. I.L.R. (1889) 11 All. 330.
2. I.L.R. (1898) 20 All. 476.
3. Followed in Mula v. Pratab, I.L.R. (1910) 32 All. 489; Mangat v. Bharto,
I.L.R. (1927) 49 All. 203; Ram Lai v. Mst. Jwala, I.L.R. (1928) 3 Luck.
610; Ga.jadhar v. Sukhdei, I.L.R. (1930) 5 Luck. 689, though it is to
be noted that, in the Allahabad rulings in the main, the learned 
Judges hesitated not a little in accepting this point of view, but 
eventually capitulated, in that they felt bound by the course of 
decisions, and were reluctant to overturn the tradition established in 
the Allahabad Higfr Court.
4. I.L.R. (1933) 55 All. 24.
5. The Preamble lays down the purpose of the Act as, "An Act to remove
all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows."
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never meant to create disabilities where none existed. As such,therefore, 
the strict and orthodox Hindu law could not logically be invoked^ " in 
order to furnish a rule of forfeiture on remarriage, applicable in the 
case of those castes which, in derogation of that strict and orthodox 
law, had recognised and permitted the remarriage of widows. Under these 
circumstances, therefore, it would be necessary for the party claiming 
that there had been forfeiture by reason of remarriage to prove 
affirmatively that such forfeiture is an incident of the custom under 
which the remarriage took place^^Jln Murugayi v. Viramakali,^  where 
the widow had remarried, it was held that notwithstanding that such 
remarriage was sactioned by the caste to which she belonged, the law 
would not permit such widow to retain the inheritance, for by her 
remarriage she had violated the fundamental principle upon which the
1. An irrational and illogical statement, as earlier, his Lordship had 
maintained that, while certain castes might not permit remarriage,
the sastra certainly permitted it. This being so, so far as the Hindu 
law was concerned, there could be no forfeiture as there is no express 
text vdiich lays down that a forfeiture of the widow's estate will 
follow upon her remarriage. Nor, it is submitted, is it possible to
endorse the further stance of the learned Judge that, if  upon an
interpretation of the texts relating to the conditions attaching to 
female inheritance, and in reliance upon the dicta in Moniram Kolita1 s
case, (1880) L.R, 79 I*A. 115» --  open unchastity does not entail
forfeiture, it would prlma facie follow that, a remarriage would notv 
either. To put matters in proper perspective, what has to be borne 
in mind is that the Hindu lawgivers' motivation in allowing a starving 
maintenance to the unchaste widow was as much to save her from further 
incontinence as to make allowances for human frailty. On the other 
hand, remarriage, uni ike unchastity, was as it were, a snapping of the 
matrimonial tie, the negation of the very concept of the oneness of 
husband^hich is a constantly reiterated theme in the sastra, A cx^ A
2. The Allahabad High Court has persisted in this view in Narain v. Mohan, 
A.I.R. 1937 All. 543; Jileba v. Pannesa, A.I.R. 1950 All. 700; Mohan 
Lai v. Mst. Bhudevi, A.I.R, 1954 All. 558; Smt. Ram v. Board of Revenue, 
U»P. A.I.R. 1972 All. 492, and Madhya Bharat followed suit in Ram v. 
Occha, A.I.R. 1951 M.B. 97.
5. The same view is evident in Jileba v. Panne sa, cited above,* and Smt. Ram 
v. Board of Revenue, U.P., cited above j Rampiyari v. Board of Revenue,
4. I.L.R. (1877) 1 Mad. 226. A.I.R. 1972 All. 492.
Derrett takes the contrary view. See "Hindu Law", J.D.M. Derrett ed., 
An Introduction to Legal Systems, (Lond., Sweet and Maxwell, 1968), 
81-103 » stating categorically at 97* "Custom was ... at the root of 
the smrfcis themselves."
WtZ\>.. The significance of the words "any widow" in s. 2 of the Act of 18^ 6
(supra, at 196) cannot be minimised. It is submitted that they clearly 
postulate the application of the provisions to all Hindu widows, for 
were the intention otherwise, the specific words of the Preamble, i.e. 
"Hindu widows with certain exceptions", could well have been incorporated 
in their place.
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widow* s right is "based, i.e. that she is the surviving half of her 
husband.
This was further elaborated in Matungini v. Ram Rutton,^  the Full 
Bench explaining that the widow takes her husband's interest not 
becapse of past relationship, not because she was the wife of the 
deceased, but on the basis of a continuing relationship, that notwith­
standing the death of her husband, she is still his patnl, capable of 
conferring by her pious acts, spiritual benefit on the deceased. Accord­
ingly, where she remarries, whether by the custom of the caste, or
under the enabling provisions of the Statute of 1856, she forfeits all
2
rights in the deceased husband's property.
This, it is submitted, is the correct interpretation, for as the
Hindu texts nowhere prescribe remarriage for the widow, the custom of
the castes permitting it is deviation from the strict contemplation of
2. a*
the sacred texts. On the other hand, the HWRA, 1856, cannot be construed
to extend to the widow permitted to remarry under caste rules, the
latitude it denies to the rest, for the clearly indicates that,
both its enabling as well as restrictive clauses were intended to be
Vfrapplied equally to all Hindu widows. ^
V
It has to be borne in mind, however, that where the widow married 
after 1956, s. 2 of the HWRA cannot be called in aid to divest her, for 
s. 14(l) having vested her with full authority over the property, she 
cannot subsequently be divested.^
1. I.L.R. (1892) 19 Cal. 289 (F.B.).
2. For similar decisions see also Vithu v. Govdnda, (1898) 22 Bom. 521 
(F.B.); Suraj v. Attar, A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 578; Santala v. Badaswari,
A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 98; Rana Appa v. Sakhu Dattu, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 515;
Manabai v. Chandanbai, A.I.R. 1954 Nag 284; Hira v. Bodhi, A.I.R. 1954 
Or 172; Kish an v. Ar.jun, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 429*
5. K^ra, 501 ff.
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In cases of compromises, agreement and the like, the Courts have 
rightly taken the view that the disenabling clause of the statute could 
not operate to the detriment of the widow's right under the compromise 
etc. In Arunchalam v. Kon.jiti,1 the widow in consideration of the 
execution of a promissory note of A fixed amount in lieu of maintenance, 
renounced all claims in the ancestral estate. On her subsequent remar­
riage, it was contended that, as she had by her remarriage forfeited her 
right to maintenance from her husband*s estate, the balance due on the 
promissory note being in fact money due for her maintenance, she was 
incapable of claiming it. It was held, however, that if the promissory 
note was evidence of the surrender of the widow*s right to maintenance, 
the coparceners were equally bound by the terms of the agreement 
irrespective of any consideration of the right to maintenance under the 
Hindu law. Thus the widow's claim under the document was a debt due to 
her by the coparceners which could not be treated as an interest in the 
property of the deceased husband, and as such, neither in the strict
letter of the Act of I856, nor indeed in Equity could the coparceners
2
repudiate the debt.
12. An Assessment of the Right of Maintenance
The incidents of the right of maintenance thus established, it is 
perhaps in order thatj in concluding, we look upon the right as a whole, 
and assess exactly what its basic characteristics are. Despite the
1. A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 994.
2. It was likewise held in Bangaru v. Mangammal, (194&) 2 M.L.J. 377* 
that, where under a deed, the widow had obtained property absolutely 
in lieu of her maintenance, with power to alienate by way of gift, 
sale, exchange, etc., the estate which is conferred on her is absolute 
and not liable to forfeiture on her remarriage. See also Sm. Sankari- 
bala v. Sm. Asita, A.I.R. 1977 Cal 289, infra 403* f.n, 1. and 646-?.
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divergence of view in the Mitakgara and Dayabhaga schools in regard to
the incidents of female inheritance and succession, there are none of those
sharply defined distinctions in the view that the two systems take of
the maintenance rigfrt of the female. Both the schools are agreed that,
the sacred texts enjoin maintenance as a moral obligation upon the Hindu, for
"(M)aintenance by a man of his dependant is, 
with the Hindus a primary duty. They held 
that he must be just before he is generous, 
his charity beginning at home; and that even 
sacrifice is mockery if to the injury of those 
he is bound to maintain." ^
After him, it assumes the character of a legal duty, on those who 
take his estate, to maintain his dependants, particularly his widow.
Be- as she was from taking property, it was inconceivable that
after her husband*s death., want and poverty should drive her to the 
indignities attendant upon destitution, and,worst of all, perhaps even to 
vagrancy.
pMuch has therefore been made of the humane spirit of the Hindu law, 
and, as we have seen, with reason too. But while there can be no 
gainsaying its essentially compassionate nature, it would seem to the 
discerning eye that there was more than mere benevolence behind this 
provision for maintenance for widows. Any blot on the family honour was^  
(and still is) an abhorrence not to be countenanced, and if the widow 
chose not to consign herself to the flames on the funeral pyre of her 
husband, the only other option open to her was a lack-lustre life of 
dreary penance and piety. Chastity was made the prerequisite for main­
tenance, and for all that sympathy may have played its part, by far the 
more pressing motivation was surely the time-hallowed notions of family
1. Strange, Vol 1., op.cit.. at 67.
2. See, for instance, Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, op.cit.t at 
1056.
honour and prestige.
This appears all the more convincing when we see the contrast in
attitude towards the widow, disqualified from inheriting by reason of
her sex, and other male members equally disqualified by reason of other
disabling factors,^ " though not by unchastity, male unchastity of course
not being a matter of any moment. Both woe*e entitled to maintenance by
virtue of their being members of the joint family. But there their
equality of status ended f for while
*'(T)he sons of these persons (disinherited 
coparceners), whether they be legitimate 
offspring or issue of the wife, are entitled 
to allotments, or are rightful partakers of 
shares; provided they be faultless or free from 
defects which should bar their participation, such 
as impotency and the like,”
for the widow the provisions unyieldingly stringent. Her only
entitlement t^ esto maintenance, and she mVjktneither make extravagant use
of, nor make a gift, mortgage or sale of any property she migklhave in
possession for maintenance purposes; after her death the corpps must
revert to her husband*s heirs.
In the light of our investigation, and assessed from the point of 
view of the female who at one and the same time is able to identify her­
self and sympathise with her own sex, and yet retain that objectivity 
which is the perquisite of the spectator, one is forced to an awareness 
that the concept of the right of maintenance in the Hindu law, like most 
other discriminations generally applied to women, was an ingenious 
device to which the ancient rsis were parties, a means of securing the 
joint stock from fragmentation, the insistence on chastity and penance 
further circumscribing any tendency towards extravagance and waste. In
1. Supra, at 268-9.
2. Mjt. II. X. 10, op.cit.
-382-
many cultures the "bearing of population upon natural resources is
\
reflected in civil law, notahly family law, and not least in those 
whose laws are coloured "by religion. By the times of our rgis, it seems, 
the Hindus had reached a frontier and land was not an indefinite com­
modity. *
Once its true nature is ascertained, it then becomes clear that 
the grant of maintenance to widows was an important means of securing 
at one and the same time the family honour and the family property.
That the institution took root must be attributed to the fact that the
law makers and law expounders were all males, and female protests --
if at all heard  were themselves evidence of unfitness for the
compassionate treatment upon which the culture prides itself.
On the other hand one must admit that an artful and deserving female could 
always turn the right to be maintained into a very valuable asset, more 
valuable than a lump sum would be to her - but that must depend to some 
extent on, not only her own adroitness, but on the good will, good luck 
and competence of those who manage the property.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The HWRPA, 1937
"See, they return; ah, see the tentative 
Movements, and the slow feet,
The trouble in the pace and the uncertain 
Wavering'"
Ezra Pound 
From "The Return"
1. Introduction
Whatever might be the merits of the Hindu joint—family as a legal 
and social institution — and it has to be admitted that there are not 
a few1 - certainly so far as the female was concerned, there can be no 
doubt but that the institution was instrumental in keeping her in a posi­
tion of subordination. Her right of maintenance apart, the denial that 
a woman could own property was somewhat modified by the admission of the 
institution of stridhana. But as if to counteract the effect of this 
concession, her right to a share in the joint stock was effectively 
curbed, though once that was admitted, the question was not whether a wo­
man could own property, but whether she had svStantrya, i.e. an unres-
2
tricted power of disposition.
The emergence of the "limited estate" in British India finally 
resolved this question. As we have already indicated, all that the widow 
stood to gain from it was what might best be described as relatively 
a*pittance," presumably because of the notion current at one time 
that the widow's duty was to spend the rest of her life in penury,
1. As for example, the spiritual and material benefit of joint-living mak­
ing it economical, efficient and practical, the fact that handicapped 
members are taken care of, widows and other persons whose contribution 
to the whole may once have been great but is now minimal, are maintained 
and the common mutual share of fortune and misfortune. : J.D.K. Derrett, 
"Birth Control and the Intended Abolition of the Hindu Joint-Family," 
law Asia, Vol. 4, No. 2, Dec. 1973, (Univ. of N.S.W. ), 155-68, at 161.
See also G-D. Sontheimer, The Joint Hindu Family, (New Delhi, Munshi- 
ram Manoharlal, 1977), Intro., at XVII.
2. Sontheimer, ibid., at *+5-
3. Derrett, HLPP, op. cit., at 20*+.
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obscurity and prayer. Impermanent as this thesis was to prove, the 
consolidation of the Empire and with it the misguided zeal of the 
Privy Council further entrenched it deep within the Hindu system of 
inheritance, and the Hindu female continued to suffer from the 
deprivations that were inevitably resultant upon this artificially 
created institution. .
However the British conquest of India was of no small moment, 
and consequent upon it, there were certain significant and momentous 
changes in the social and legal aspects of the lives of the indigenous 
population. Notwithstanding the general policy of non-intervention in 
the personal laws of the subject people, there were certain glaring 
evils, the perpetration of which could not be tolerated, and huma­
nitarian considerations, as also active agitation on the part of 
enlightened Indian opinion, compelled the British legislators to 
modify certain areas of Hindu law through Imperial Regulations and Acts.
These were, in the main, and in effect, pieces of permissive 
legislation which did not affect the majority of Hindus, but were 
modifications of existing practices so as to better the lot of women.
The prohibition of infanticide in 1795t the abolition of sati in 1829, 
the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, the Hindu Widows 1 Remarriage 
Act of 1856 - these were all ameliorative steps that had far-reaching 
consequences in restoring to the Hindu woman a measure of her dignity 
as an individual. But the Mutiny of 1851 had the effect of bringing 
to an abrupt halt all such compassionate legislation, and though there 
were still many inequities to be remedied, from then onwards, the 
Hindu female continued to linger in the limbo of stagnation and 
indifference to her plight for well over eight decades.
At the same time however, with the British advent in India, a 
transformation of the cultural pattern had become inevitable by virtue
1. Ibid.
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of the new economic organization, ideology and administrative system 
that they brought with them. In particular, liberalism in the 
ideological domain, and the principle of equality in the social and 
political systems became the order of the day. Liberalism attacked 
all privileges and disabilities based on birth; it challenged authority 
and insisted that institutions and traditions not being sacrosanct, 
they may be repudiated and discarded when they fail to stand the test 
of Reason.'1' More picturesquely put:
" (T)hat contented acquiescence that has come down from 
the past is selfish and anti-social, because amid the 
ceaseless change that is inevitable in a growing 
organism, the institutions of the past demand progressive 
readaptation." 2
The essence of this new philosophy was thus in a real sense, the
emancipation of the individual.
Respect for the individual which this philosophy inculcated,
and the concept of rights, personal, social, economic and political,
were given a further impetus by a new system of education transferred
in all its principles and almost all its details from the British
Isles. Along with the new education went the dissemination of the
English language bonding together Indians who had formerly been
separated by language barriers, and this common language, and through
it, the exposure to ideas newly current in the West, were probably -
and ironically - the main channels through which a feeling of national
Identity came to India. What is more, the building of the railways
and the construction of new roads provided her with a communications
system which ensured the spread of these ideas throughout the country.
Little wonder then at the tide of political and social awareness
that swept over the country in the first half of the twentieth century,
1. A.D. Ross, Hindu Family in its Urban Setting, fiUniv. of Toronto jt “ 
Press, 1967), at 233-^ . K
2. J.V. Morley, quoted at ibid, at 23^ .
3. Ross, op. cit„at 18, 2k.
'v
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The struggle for freedom was on, and as the national movement gained 
momentum, the clarion call of the Mahatma went forth for women to 
hear the yoke of independence along with men. Unusual circumstances 
demand unusual behavioural patterns, and this participation in the 
freedom struggle brought for certain women not only a sense of prestige, 
but also a new awareness of themselves as individuals; some breach of the 
mores had been accomplished, and there was a growing feeling among 
the more advanced of the Indians that the first reforms with which the 
country should be overhauled was the emancipation of women, the raising 
of their status, and the elimination of the inequalities which they 
hadl hitherto suffered from.
The demand went forward for the bringing about of major changes 
in law, and for removing the legal disabilities and ending the 
discrimination against them in matters like marriage, divorce, guardian­
ship and inheritance. Crucially important as each of these areas is, 
the social conditions emphasised the need for the recognition of the 
rights of inheritance of women. In particular there was a definite 
shift in preference from the agnatic kindred to the members of the 
nuclear family group, and it was felt that both from the point of view 
of need as also the closer affinity of relationship, the widow and . 
children, whether sons or daughters, deserved priority over claims 
of brothers and nephews.'1'
Reform became the need of the day, and the Legislature took 
the first step towards this end in 1937 when the Hindu Women *s Rights 
to Property Act was passed. The Act came into force in British India 
on the l^th April 1937 and in certain Princely States of India and 
other states from shortly after Independence until it was repealed 
for India by the Hindu Succession Act 195^ * By an unfortunate over­
sight the statute was passed in the Indian Central Legislature only, 
which was not entirely competent to legislate, under the provisions
1. B. Sivaramayya, Womenfs Rights of Inheritance in India (Mad. 
M.L.J. Office, 1973), at 36.
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of the 1935 Constitution, concerning the devolution of interests in 
agricultural land, and the Federal Court held that the Central 
Legislature's Act operated to regulate succession only to non- 
agricultural land and was ultra vires as regards succession to 
agricultural land in Governor's Province as it fell within the 
exclusively Provincial list of subjects.’1' Thereafter on the recom­
mendation of the Rao Committee appointed by the Central Government 
to consider the situation created by the Federal Court's judgment, 
some provincial statutes enacted provisions corresponding to the 
original Act, and this, with subsequent retrospective amendments, 
apply thenceforward to all property. A few provinces, now States, 
for example Bengal and, until very shortly before the repeal of the 
main Act, the Central Provinces and Berar, neglected to extend the 
original Act, with the result that leases, mortgages and all interests 
in agricultural land fell outside the operation of the statute, and 
the Anglo-Hindu law and the law as amended by the HWRPA operated 
simultaneously on the various categories of a deceased intestate
Hindu's estate. The statute produced effects which will long be felt,
2
and its provisions must be regarded as in a sense current law.
However for all that the Act effects important changes both in v 
the law governing the devolution of a person's separate property as well 
as the interest which he might have in joint-family properties, it is 
nonetheless an example of piecemeal legislation which sacrifices 
clarity for brevity. Ill-drafted, in language that is loose and not 
strictly legal, it has given rise to unintelligibleness, ambiguities 
and anomalies, creating confusion and complexities in an already 
complicated state of law. What the Legislature left unsaid or
1. In re Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, A.I.R. 19^1 F. C. 72.
2. Berrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 253*
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undefined has resulted in a spate of litigation, and it was left to 
the Judiciary to define its ambit, import and limitations - no easy 
task as we shall presently see.
2. The Widow's Entitlement in Separate Property under S. 3 (l)
Let us now examine the relevant provisions of the Act as regards 
the separate estate of a Hindu male dying intestate. S. 3 (l) provides;
" (W)hen a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school of 
Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and 
when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu 
law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate 
property, his widow, or if there are more than one 
widow all his widows together, shall, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (3)» Be entitled in respect 
of property of which he dies intestate to the same 
share as a son; provided that the widow of a 
predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son 
if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, 
and shall inherit in like manner as a son's son if there 
is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son; 
provided further that the same provision shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of 
a predeceased son."
Relevant to this subsection (as also to s. 3 (2) which we will discuss
later belowis s. 3 (3) which lays down:
"(A)ny interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the 
provisions of this section shall be the limited interest 
known as the Hindu woman's estate, provided however that 1
she shall have the same right of claiming partition as 
a male owner."
It is apparent that as a result of this enactment, important 
changes were effected in the law governing the devolution of the 
separate property of the deceased. In place of the provision that a wi­
dow could take only in default of a son, grandson and great-grandson, 
the Act provides that the widow shall be entitled to a share in the 
inheritance along with such persons. It also provides for the first 
time, and under all schools of law, a heritable capacity on the widow 
of a predeceased son, and the widow of a predeceased son's predeceased
son.
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As regards the quantum of interest which the widow takes, the 
sub-s makes it clear that she is to have the same share as a son. The 
widow of a predeceased son will take the share of a son of the 
deceased if no son of her own husband survived the deceased; in the 
event that such a son survived, she will take the share of a son's son. 
A similar provision is made as regards the share of the widow of the 
predeceased son's predeceased son.
The diagram below illustrates this:
At the time of P's death, SI is his only surviving son, S2, S3,
and S5 having predeceased him. S2S was dezad at the time that succession
opened, and S^S and S5S were the predeceased sons of Sk and S5
respectively.
According to the provisions of s. 3 (l)* w is entitled to the 
same share as SI. So too is S2w, S2S not having survived. S3w*s 
share is equal to that of S3S's in the evemt of his being alive, but 
were he to have died earlier, she would talce a share equal to that of 
S3SS. S^ S having predeceased S^ , S^ fSw's entitlement is equal to that 
of SI, whereas S5Sw*s share would be the same as that of S5SS or, 
should he have died prior to P, to that of’ S5SSS.
The widow inheriting will take "the same share as a son, "from 
which it follows that the tenancy will eitlher be a joint tenancy or 
tenancy-in-common with the co-heirs according as the latter were 
undivided or divided at the moment that succession opened, and according 
as the parties were governed by the Kitaksa-ra or the Dayabhaga. Thus 
in all provinces subject to the Mitaksara iaw, if after inheriting
jr* v/
SI
S5SSS
the property as joint tenants and before amy partition is effected
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among the co-heirs, any of them dies, whether it he the widow or the 
sons of the deceased, the interest of such co-heirs would survive to 
the rest. Where however the co-heirs had taken the inheritance as 
tenants-in-common, then on the death of the widow subsequently, she 
having only had "the limited interest known as the Hindu woman's estate" 
under s. 3 (3) of the Act, succession will once again open to her 
husband, and his heirs at that time would succeed to such interest.
So far as the Dayabhaga school is concerned, the provisions of 
s. 3 (l) do not create any problems, in as much as the expression ”any 
property" is comprehensive albeit of a limited nature under s. 3 (3)» 
and includes, unless something to the contrary can be spelt out from 
the other provisions of the Act, all forms and types of interest 
answering to the description of property in law. The property must be 
heritable property in respect of which alone the question of succession 
may legitimately arise.^
(l). Shebaitship is Property Within the Meaning of S. 3 (l)
According to the construction of the Supreme Court in Angurbala 
2
v. Debabrata, even shebaitship is property within the meaning of the
One N. a Hindu widow and her son M. who was the real owner of the 
properties in question, executed an indenture by which certain properties
Act
V
p
D
1. Angurbala v. -Debabrata, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293 at 297*
2. Ibid.
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were dedicated to a deity. The indenture provided that N, and after 
her death M, were to be the shebaits, (managers). Should M be survived 
by his wife K, she was then to take up the office, and after her death 
the heirs of M were to act as shebaits. K died during the lifetime of 
M, leaving a minor son D, the defendant in the suit. Soon after M 
married the plaintiff as his second wife, and died shortly after the 
marriage. The plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that she was 
the sole shebait of the deity under the terms of the indenture, or in 
the alternative, was entitled to shebaitship jointly with D, she being 
the co-heir with her stepson under the HWHPA.
It was contended on her behalf that, as K had died during the 
lifetime of M, the grant of the shebaiti right in her favour had lapsed 
and the heirs of M were therefore entitled to come in as next shebaits 
after M's death. Who these heirs were had to be determined according 
to the law in force at the time when the succession opened on the death 
of M, and under the HWHPA 1937» the widow of a propositus, who dies 
intestate, would rank as an heir along with the son, and would be 
entitled to the same share as a son gets in the property of the deceased, 
and, as shebaitship is property, it would devolve under s. 3 (l) of the 
HWHPA upon both the plaintiff and the defendant jointly. The further 
contention was that, if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the 
expression "property" as used in the HWRPA does not include shebaiti 
right, it is nonetheless a well established proposition of law that 
succession to shebaitship is governed by the ordinary rules of inheri­
tance in respect to secular property under the Hindu law, and as the 
HWRPA had amended the general rule of inheritance in certain matters, 
the same alterations must be recognised in regard to succession to 
shebaitship as well.
As against this, the defence was that the HWRPA is a piece of 
special legislation enacted for a special purpose, and does not use
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the expression "property” in a wide and unlimited sense; it would 
therefore appear from the provisions of the different sections of the 
Act that it could not have had in contemplation, and does not purport 
to effect, the rules of succession relating to the special and somewhat 
anomalous type of property which shebaitship admittedly is.
In delivering the judgment Mukherjea^ J., held otherwise, and 
stressed that as no testamentary disposition of shebaiti (other than 
shebaiti executed by testament) property is possible or could take 
effect in law, the testator must in such circumstances be deemed to have 
died intestate in respect of such property, and this would be in 
accordance with s. 5 of the Act which lays downs
"(F)or the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed 
to die intestate in respect of all property of which he 
has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable 
of taking effect."
There is thus nothing in any of the provisions of the Act from which an 
inference can be drawn that the expression "property” as used in s. 3 (l) 
has a limited or restricted interpretation, and is not applicable to 
shebaitship, which is recognized as property in Hindu law.
In his Lordship's opinion, this view is all the more reinforced 
when the dicta in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi  ^is considered, where the 
widowed daughter-in-law's insistence was that certain religious and 
charitable trusts left by the deceased came within the purview of the 
HWRPA. It was held however that the HWRPA was intended to apply only 
to properties beneficially owned by the propositus, and it was not 
applicable to rights in the nature of trusteeship.
Shebaitship,on the other hand, involves precisely this element of
beneficial or personal interest, and in the learned judge's view, the
2dicta in Suryanarayanacharulu v. Seshamma would be more to the point.
1. A.I.R. 194-5 F.G. 25.
2. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 103.
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There the question arose in connection with the rights associated 
with the office of archakatvam (priesthood), which is a hereditary 
religious office and the holder or holders of it for the time being 
are beneficially entitled to enjoy certain income arising out of the 
endowed property. The Madras High Court was of the opinion that the 
principle laid down in Umayal Achi's case'Siad no application to the 
case relating to the office of archaka,and that, that decision 
proceeded only on the main ground that the Act governs succession to 
property beneficially owned by the propositus. So too, the learned 
judge held, with shebaitship where, for all that there is an ingredient 
of office in it, succession to it follows succession to ordinary or 
secular property, and therefore there is nothing in any of the 
provisions of the HWRPA which excludes from the scope and operation of 
the Act, succession to shebaitship which is a recognised form of 
property in Hindu law.
(2). Judicial Construction of the Words "Separate Property" in s. 3 (l)
The construction of the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l) 
however ran into difficulty where the Mitakgara school was concerned.
The question as to what constitutes "separate property", whether or not ^ 
it would include, for the purposes of the Act, property in the hands of 
the sole surviving coparcener, and property obtained at partition 
became a matter of prolonged controversy, and is an instance of the 
kind of legislative ambiguity inherent in the Act which it was left for 
the Judiciary to resolve.
2
Nandakumari v. Bulkan Devi was one of the first cases to come up 
for decision before the Patna Hif£i Court. A sole surviving coparcener 
in a joint Hindu family died, leaving a widow, three daughters and the 
widow of his predeceased son. The main .point for decision was whether
1. A.I.R. 194-5 F.C. 25 2. A.I.R. 19^5 Pat. 87.
the daughter-in-law's claim to a half share in the properties on the 
death of the sole surviving coparcener was justified under the 
provisions of s. 3 (l) of the Act. On appeal Beevor J., acknowledged 
that although there may he, at a particular time, only one surviving 
coparcener of a Hindu joint-family, there may still be "joint-family 
property" or "coparcenary property" in which any new male member 
introduced into the joint-family will take an interest by birth or 
adoption.
His Lordship however refused to countenance the defence raised 
that such property could not be regarded as "separate property" so 
long as there was no such birth or adoption, as, according to the learned 
judge "separate property" in s. 3 (l) is a description of property 
bearing a particular character, which character is determined by the 
manner in which the intestate or his predeceased coparceners acquired 
title to the property.
The alternative interpretation, his Lordship held, is that they 
(the words "separate property")* refer not to the character of the 
property itself, but to the mode in which the intestate possessed or 
enjoyed it, and it is "well-settled that so long as there is only one 
surviving male member of the Hindu joint-family, his power of alienating v 
the family property is unrestricted."^ As the words "an interest in a 
Hindu joint-family property" in s. 3 (2) not merely refer to property 
bearing a particular character, but also has reference to the mode of 
possession or enjoyment of that property, so also, the learned judge 
emphasised, the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l) have reference to 
the mode of possession or enjoyment. The sole surviving coparcener of 
a MitSksara joint Hindu family has not merely an interest in the property, 
but holds the property exclusively or separately whatever its character.
1. Ibid, at 89-90.
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The words "separate property" in s. 3 (l) would therefore mean property 
which the intestate had separately, in the sense that he held it without 
the participation of other coparceners, and therefore the widow and the 
predeceased son's widow would each take half the property, the one 
taking "the same share as a son" under s. 3 (l)» and the other "in like 
manner as a son" under Proviso 1 of the section.
However at about the same time, the Federal Court in Umayal Achi 1 
v. Lakshmi Achi~*~ differed vigorously from the interpretation of the 
Patna High Court. In a lengthy and learned disquisition, Varadachariar, Jv 
bracketed property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener with 
property obtained at partition to hold that such property is not 
"separate property” within the meaning of the Act. Indeed so far- 
reaching have been the repercussions of this startling judgment, as we 
shall presently see, that it is important to examine at some length 
the novel, though strictly correct interpretation of the words "separate 
property" by the learned Jidge.
The relevant facts are that a wealthy Hindu governed by the 
Mitakqara school died, leaving among others, two widows and a widowed 
daughter-in-law, who thereupon brought an administration action in 
which she claimed a half share in the entire property on the ground ^ 
that the deceased had acquired it as the sole surviving coparcener.
The contention that property left by the sole surviving coparcener 
is "separate property" within the meaning of s. 3 (l) was negatived, 
and in fact a very strict construction of the expression was propounded. 
According to the ordinary and commonly accepted interpretation, the 
words "separate" and "self-acquired" are often used in the same sense, 
and joint—family property held by the sole surviving coparcener passes 
on his death by succession to his heirs.
Varadachariar^ J. f however, called this a "loose" interpretation,
1. A.I.R. 194-5 F.G. 25.
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and while acknowledging that the expression "separate property" has 
sometimes been used in a limited sense to denote what is known as self­
acquired property, and while in fact both property obtained by a person 
at a partition, and property held by him as the sole surviving 
coparcener may, in some measure resemble self-acquired property, there 
is nonetheless a difference.
For al3 that the owner may have, at the moment a full dispensing 
power over such property, while in the case of self-acquired property, 
the owner's power of disposition will continue to remain undiminished 
throughout his lifetime, in the case of the other two kinds of property, 
his power of disposition will become qualified and his interest reduced 
the moment a son is bom to him, or the widow of a predeceased copar­
cener takes a boy in adoption. In such contingencies such "separate" 
property would become joint-family property again, and therefore the 
property held by the sole surviving coparcener cannot be regarded as 
"separate property" within the meaning of s. 3 (l)-
It will be seen therefore that while the Patna High Court held 
that property which is potentially joint-family property remains 
separate property within the meaning of s. 3 (l)# the obiter dicta of 
the Federal Court accentuates the view that such property not being
li
separate property, it must be deemed to be joint-family property within 
the meaning of s. 3 (2).
The authoritative pronouncement of the Federal Court, and Its impact 
on the various High Courts, cannot be minimized for all that it is not 
free of anamolies, and in fact certain rather curious pronouncements 
may be clearly traced to the influence of the dicta laid down in it.
In Bhaoorao v. Chandrabhagabai  ^where the joint—family having 
broken down by a partition, on the death of first the father and then 
the son, the dispute was between the widows of the former and the sons
1. A.I.R. 19^9 Nag. 108.
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of the latter who claimed to he entitled to the property of their 
grandfather.
Hidayatulla^ J., held on the authority of Umayal's case'*' that 
property obtained on partition is indeed "separate property" under 
s. 3 (l) tut what is more astonishing, his Lordship was further of the 
view that, considering the facts of the case, the property in question 
was "separate property" under the ordinary Hindu law, for the copar­
cenary having broken down, and the widow's powers of adoption having 
come to an end, the traditional Hindu law would prevail, and in the 
absence of undivided sons, the divided sons would be the preferential 
heirs to the exclusion of the widows. Such property would therefore 
come neither under sub-s. (l) nor sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act.
This, it is submitted, cannot be the correct interpretation when 
we consider that the Act was specifically passed to give 'better rights' 
to women. Ss. 3 (l) and (2) were intended to exhaust between them all 
categories of property, and it is difficult to envisage the rather 
anamolous situation that, while providing for better rights in respect 
of undivided joint-family property, or even self-acquired property 
under all the laws, whether Mitaksara, Dayabhaga or even customary, 
the Legislature could overlook altogether, the claims of the widow of
V
a person who had separated from his sons, and had left her in the same 
unsatisfactory position in which she was prior to the passing of the 
Act and to allow the unamended law to prevail, thereby excluding her 
in favour of the divided son.
An interesting situation developed when in Subramanian v.
2 3Kalyanarama , and a few years later, in the case of the same name
whichj[up on appeal against the judgment in the earlier decision, the
1. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 22.
3 Subramanian v. Kalyanarama, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. -^^6.
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same High Court came to totally opposite conclusions as to the 
interpretation of the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l)*
The contention was that the property obtained by a coparcener 
in a partition with his sons would not be separate property within 
the meaning of s. 3 (!)• Nayudu J., however insisted that in Umayal's 
case'*' the Federal Court had merely considered the nature of property 
in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener; and while the decision of 
the Federal Court must bind the High Courts, it can bind them only to 
the extent it purports to decide and nothing more. It would therefore 
follow that property obtained on partition must be deemed to be 
"separate property", as the coparcener dividing from his sons would be 
entitled to deal with it absolutely since there is no other to 
question his actions.
In rejecting the viewpoint expressed in the above case, when the 
2
matter came up again, it was left for Rajamannar^ C. J. , to point out 
that in fact the Federal Court had categorically distinguished between 
self-acquired property, and property in the hands of the sole surviving 
coparcener, and property obtained at partition. As Varadachariar J., 
had clarified, the latter two types of property not being "separate 
property", by the very same token they must be deemed to be an interest 
in Hindu joint-family property within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of s. 3*
These varying interpretations, the one holding that property 
obtained at partition would neither be "separate property" within s. 3(1)» 
nor joint-family property under s. 3 (2), but outside the scope of the 
Act altogether, the other holding that such property is indeed "separate 
property" within the meaning of s. 3 (l)» and the third viewpoint 
insisting that such property could only be regarded as joint-family 
property under s. 3 (2), caused not a little confusion in an already
1. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. In Subramanian v. Kalyanarama, A.I.R. 1957 Mad-* *+56•
3* In Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achit A.I.R. 19*+5 F.C. 25.
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perplexed state of law, and we are faced with the situation where
1 2 Andhra Pradesh preferred to follow Nagpur in Seshamma v. Ramakoteswara
to hold that where, the sole surviving coparcener died after a partition
with his sons, the claim of his widow that such property was joint-
family property under s. 3 (2) of the Act, so as to exclude the widow
of the predeceased son, could not be upheld. But, the Court held,
neither could it be said to be his "separate property” under s. 3 (l)»
for neither of the sub-ss. deal with the two categories of separate
property represented by what a Hindu holds as the sole surviving
coparcener, and what he has obtained at a partition as and for his
share.
3
On the other hand the Patna High Court in Asrafa v. Bhureshwari, 
chose to follow the precedent set in Nandakumari*s case, and ruled 
that the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l) must be taken to mean 
property which the intestate held separately in the sense that he held 
it without the participation of other coparceners. As such, property 
obtained on partition in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener 
would be property within the meaning of s. 3 (l)f and, the widowed 
daughter-in-law would be entitled to her share under Proviso (l) to 
s. 3 (l).
That the ambiguous wording of the Act has raised many conundrums 
is evident from a most curious ruling in The Commissioner of Income 
Tax v. Thiagarajan. The father having divided from his son, the ques­
tion subsequent to his death was whether such property could be held to
be joint-family property for tax purposes as both the widow and the
son claimed. In Jagadisan J's view, it was irrational for the sharers
1. Bhaoorao v. Chandrabhagabai, A.I.R. 19^9 Nag. 108.
2. A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 280.
3. A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 210.
*f. A.I.R. 19^5 Pat. 87.
5. A.I.R. 196^ Mad. 58.
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to hold such property to be joint-family property once the assets are 
divided, and even the ameliorative nature of the Act could not be made 
to strain the statutory language almost to the point of distortion.
Yet for all his emphatic pronouncement, his Lordship felt that his 
own judgment must be subservient to the authority of the Federal 
Court and to the precedent set by Madras in the decisions (discussed 
below) which followed it.
The function of the Bench is to analyse and interpret the law, 
and when a decision such as this is presented where the judgment is 
contrary to the interpretation, it is, one submits, a disservice to 
the integrity of the Bench - a lack of courage perhaps, to be 
condemned in resounding terms.
However^  the majority view is in acceptance of the Federal Court 
ruling, and time and time again we are faced in the various decisions, 
with lengthy passages from Umayal's case ~^ to lend weight to the view 
that property in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener, and 
property obtained at partition do not constitute "separate property" 
within the meaning of s. 3 (!)• The effect of this is that the 
widow's share be enhanced.
2In Visalamma v. Jagannadha, the plaintiff, the divided son, 
claimed a half share in his father's property under s. 3 (i) of the 
HWRPA, while the widow's contention was that she was entitled to all 
of it under s. 3 (2) of the same Act. In delivering judgment their 
Lordships were in complete agreement with the decision in Umayal's case 
that property held by the deceased on partition was potentially joint- 
family property in the contingency of either birth or adoption, and 
could not therefore come under the purview of s. 3 (l)« The authority
1. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. A.I.R. 1955 Or. 160.
3. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
-401-
of the obiter dicta in the Federal Court decision to the effect that
"(T)he Act of course is intended to redress the widow's 
disabilities even in such a case; but that redress is 
provided in sub-s, (2) and not by sub-s. (l) of s. 3»” 1
was in fact the basis for their Lordships' decision, for in their
opinion
"(E)ven the obiter of a Federal Court is binding on 
this Court unless they make it clear by appropriate 
expression that the view is a tentative one." 2
In Bombay where the question was once again as to the right of 
the divided son in competition with the widow, the learned judge in 
holding that the widow took under sub-s. (2), explained that the 
words "any interest in a Hindu joint-family property" in sub-s. (2) 
must be given a comprehensive meaning as a logical corollary to the 
narrow meaning of the expression "separate property" in sub-s. (l). 
furthermore his Lordship clarified, since it was not in the contem­
plation of the Act to create a lacuna, the argument that such property 
is governed by the ordinary Hindu law3 would be to negate the very 
purpose of the Act, i.e. to give better rights to widows in com- 
petition with sons.
Similarly in Jhangalu v. Pancho Bai3 where the widow filed a. 
suit for declaration of her title to the entire property alloted
1. Ibid, at 32.
2. Visalanma v. Jagannadha, A.I.R. 1955 Or. l60jat 162.
3. As in Bhaoorao v. Chandrabhagabai, A.I.R. 19^ +9 Nag. 108.
Jana v. Parwati, (1957) 60 Bom. L. R. 553 (A.C. J.). As against this, 
the original defendant preferred an appeal some years later in the 
Bom. High Court in Parwati v. Jana, A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 77, where one 
of the two questions that was referred by the Single Bench Judge 
to the Division Bench was whether the share obtained at partition 
by a member of a joint Hindu family is, and continues to be an 
interest in joint-family property. In affirming the decree of the 
Single Bench, it was unequivocally held that in view of the 
decision in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25, 
such property could not be held to be "separate property" as it 
was not "self-acquired" property, and therefore it could not properly 
attract the provisionsof s. 3 (!)•
5- A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 172.
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to her deceased husband at a partition with his son, Tare J., was
quite clear that in view of the pronouncement of their Lordships of
the Federal Court,^ it is settled law that s. 3 (l) of the HWRPA
1937 cannot at all be attracted in respect of the divided share of a
coparcener, as "separate property” as used in s. 3 (l) of the Act has
a limited sense analogous to self-acquired property. It is however
not clear from the judgment whether in his Lordship's view, such
property would then pass on to the widow under s. 3 (2), or whether
2 3he was in agreement with the Nagpur and Andhra^ decisions to hold 
that it would be neither "separate property" under s. 3 (i) nor 
joint-family property under s. 3 (2), and as such, the ordinary Hindu 
law would prevail so that the divided son would take to the total 
exclusion of the widow; and to the extent that this is not clarified, 
it is submitted that the decision is vague and hence unsatisfactory.
From the decisions examined above, it is therefore clear that 
though the widow could not take the same share as a son as a result 
of the interpretation of the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l)» 
in regard to property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener, 
or in property obtained at a partition, she is nonetheless entitled 
to the "same interest" as her deceased husband in such property under 
s. 3 (2). On the other hand, this same interpretation worked 
adversely as against the claim of the widowed daughter-in-law under 
Proviso 1 of s. 3 (l)f for such property having been held to be 
joint-family property, no provision is made in the Act in regard to 
this particular category of property.
Where however the separated coparcener forms a new coparcenary, 
the widowed daughter-in-law is still entitled. This eminently
1. In Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. Bhaoorap v. Chandrabhagabai, A.I.R. 19^9 Hag. 108.
3. Seshamma v. Ramakoteswara, A.I.R. 195& A.P. 280..QvtA.JU^ Aj£.<i,
£-quq v 1 ilao . 2* l\y\. W.Lf.ft.)*
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equitable ratio was arrived at in Trisul v. Doman  ^where the widowed
daughter-in-law of the separated coparcener claimed a share on his
death in the property held by him on the basis that such property on
partition assumes the character of "separate property" within the
meaning of s. 3 (!)• The Court held however that although she could
not claim under s. 3 (l)» 33 the expression "separate property" is
the antithesis of other expressions viz. "ancestral property",
2
"coparcenary property", and "joint-family property”, there was 
certainly no question but that she was entitled to the share of her 
deceased husband under s. 3 (2).
3
The same question came up again in Mst. Manbhari v. Bishun,
where the divided coparceners claimed the property in the hands of
the sole surviving coparcener to the exclusion of the widowed daughter-
in— law. In decreeing that such property could not be held to be
separate property reference was made to the observation in Subramanian 
4v. Kalyanarama to the effect that property obtained by a coparcener 
at a family partition where there were no undivided sons, would result 
in the property falling under s. 3 (l). It would therefore follow that, 
the property owned and possessed by the sole surviving coparcener who 
died leaving the widow of a predeceased coparcener, would not come 
within the scope of s. 3 (l) "by reason of the decision of the Federal 
Court in Umayal's case,"* but would in fact revert to his heirs under 
the ordinary Hindu law.
The daughter-in-law's claim came up again in Lakshamma v. Kondayya,
1. A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 44l.
2. Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25, at 32.
3. A.I.R. 1958 All. 769.
4. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 22.
5. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
6. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 505.
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where the owner having been allotted a one-third share of property 
obtained at partition in a settlement deed, his widowed daughter-in- 
law, at his death, claimed to be entitled as his heir by virtue of 
Proviso 1 of s. 3 (!)• The Andhra Hi§£i Court which traditionally
follows Madras negatived her claim on the basis of the ruling of the
1 2 Federal Court and that of Subramanian v. Kalyanarama to hold that
such property would not come under s. 3 (!)•
3
So too in Mst. Khatrani v. Smt. Tapeshwari , it was reiterated
l\
on the authority of Umayal and other decided cases that property
obtained at partition, and property in the hands of the sole surviving
coparcener are not "separate property", and while the widow of the
predeceased son is entitled to her husband's share, she can lay no
claim to the share of the sole surviving coparcener at whose death his
widow would take under s. 3 (2).
Where the widowed daughter-in-law in competition with the divided
sons, claimed to be further entitled in the one-fifth share obtained
by her father-in-law at a partition with his sons, her claim was
similarly negatived on the basis that such property could not be held
to be separate property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener.^
It is therefore clear that the Federal Court's interpretation
of "separate property”^  in s. 3 (l)» narrow and restrictive as it is,
has had far-reaching consequences. A few isolated instances apart,
7
most of the judges had felt "dutifully bound" by the ratio decidendi
1. Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 1945 F.C. 25*
2. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 456.
3. A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 261. (F.B.).
4. A.I.R. 1945 F.C. 25.
5- Manoharlal v. Bhuri Bai, A.I.R. 1 972 S.C. 1369-
6. In Umayal Achi v. lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 1945 F.C. 25.
7. Jana v. Parwati, (1957) 60 Bom. L. R. 553» at 55$.
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in Umayal  ^to the total eclipse of the viewpoint adopted in Nandakumari 's 
2case.
It has to be admitted that startling as the interpretation is, 
the reasoning cannot be faulted in so far as property in the hands of 
the sole surviving coparcener, as well as property obtained at partition 
may indeed change character and take on the garb of joint-family 
property in the event of either birth or adoption. Any other
interpretation would lead to further confusion and anomalies, and in
3
fact Varadachariar J*, was impressed with the difficulty that if 
property obtained at partition was to be regarded as "separate property", 
in the subsequent coparcenary, the widowed daughter-in-law would claim 
her husband's half share, and should she then choose to exercise her 
right of partition under s. 3 (3), there would be a further division 
of property between her and her father-in-law whereby, at his death 
she could claim an additional one-fourth share in such "separate 
property" under Proviso 1 of s. 3 (l) to the detriment of the widow.
This would be both inequitable and undesirable, a result hardly likely 
to have been contemplated by the Legislature,
It must also be kept in mind that the entire scheme of the Act 
envisages better rights for widows at the expense of sons. However, *
where a partition is effected between the father and his son or sons, 
were the divided estate in the hands of the father to be regarded as 
separate property, at his death his widow entitlement would amount 
to merely the same share as a son. In other words, where she would 
have got the same interest as the deceased himself* had, i.e. the entire 
estate under s. 3 (2), if such property is construed to be joint-
1. A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. A.I.R. 19^5 Pat.87.
3- In Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, cited above.
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family property, the former interpretation drastically reduces her 
entitlement accordingly as there are the number of sons.
On the other hand, however, the restricted meaning given to the 
words "separate property", and its acceptance by the various High 
Courts, has resulted in the denial of any benefit of the Act to the 
widow of a predeceased son, and the widow of the predeceased son of 
a predeceased son in cases where the husband of these two died before 
the passing of the Act (the Act not being retrospective), thus 
excluding them from the purview of the "better ri^its” that was in 
the intention of the statute to confer on women.
Self-defeating in certain respects, it is true that the inter­
pretation of the sub-s. resulted in unhappy situations, giving rise 
to difficulties and uncertainties and anomalous situations, but that 
by far the most acceptable solution is that provided by the Federal 
Court pronouncement,^  is evident in that in decisions contrary to 
the latter interpretation, there is no abatement of the ambiguity 
inherent in the wording, and years later the Supreme Court could do 
no less than to hold that property in the hands of the sole surviving
coparcener, and property obtained at partition are indeed joint-family
2
property for the purposes of the old Act.
3. The Widow's Entitlement in Joint-Family Property under S. 3 (2)
We now come to the provisions of the Act in regard to the Mitak§ara 
joint-family where the changes effected were most material. S. 3 (2) 
lays down:
"(w)hen a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other 
than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having 
at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint- 
family property, his widow shall subject to the provisions 
of sub-s. (3) have in the property the same interest as he 
himself had."
1. Umayal Achi v. lakshmi Achi, A.I.R. 19^5 F.C. 25.
2. Hanoharlal v. Bhuri Bai, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 13&9-
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In effect therefore, we are told that upon the death of her 
husband, the widow of a Mitak^ara coparcener, or a coparcener under 
customary law (such as that of the Punjab), has in the property, i.e. 
the joint-family property, the same interest that her husband himself 
had subject to this qualification, that she has not an absolute 
interest in it, but only the interest known as the Hindu "woman's 
estate,"^ - by virtue of sub-s. (3) of s. 3» which further confers on ' 
her the same right of claiming partition of the joint-family property 
in the same way as any coparcener entitled to do so under the general 
law.
But beyond this we are told nothing. We are not told what the 
effect of this is upon the other members of the joint-family, nor 
upon the powers of the manager; we are not told whether she takes this 
interest as a fixed or as a fluctuating interest, nor whether she is 
a coparcener along with her deceased'husband*s coparceners.
These are questions that inevitably come to mind, and it is
imperative that in order to arrive at the correct answer, the Act
must be strictly construed, so that no more disturbance is created by
it than is needed in order to convey the rigfits specifically given,
and if the result of the combination of the rule set up by the statute
(as construed in the above manner) with the rest of the chapter of
the law as unamended, is to create anomalies, that inconvenient and
2
undesirable result must nevertheless be tolerated.
The effect of s. 3 (2) is that instead of persons owa/ng interests 
being all males having absolute interests, subject to varying dis­
abilities regarding alienation which depend on the law administered in 
the respective state, the existing male coparceners are to be joined by 
widows who shall have in the property "the same interest" as the
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Three Questions Arising Out of the HWRPA 1937»" 
(195^ ) 56 Bom. L.R. (J)., 137-1^6. at 138.
2. Ibid, at 138.
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deceased husband.
(l). The Widow Does Not Become a Coparcener
The question that then comes to mind is whether the widow 
becomes, by virtue of the sub-s. , a coparcener in the joint-family 
to which she belongs. Linked to this is the question as to whether 
she has the right to take by survivorship which is an essential element 
of the coparcenary interest or, in other words, is the right that she 
takes capable of being enlarged by deaths, whether of a coparcener 
(including the sole surviving coparcener), or of widows who likewise 
had taken under the Act.
If we turn to judicial decisions, the Madras Higfr Court un­
equivocally held in Manorama Bai v. Rama Bai  ^ that the widow did 
indeed become a coparcener. The facts are difficult to dis^ka^.e in 
the lengthy and learned judgment, but they amount to this:
i----- — :— i
BIDS*5
Two brothers B1 and B2 had two sons SI and S2 and five daughters; Bl 
gave S2 in adoption to B2 so that the picture was that the two brothers 
each had a son, whom we can rename BIS and B2S. After their marriages 
the family was joined by BISw and B2Sw. In an accident Bl, BIS and 
B2S and BISw were killed, and it was held as a fact that the last 
to die was B2S on the presumption that death occurred in order of
1. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 269.
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seniority.^ The sisters of BIS objected to claims by B2Sw, who was 
not involved in the accident, to take the family property subject to the 
claims of the widow of B2 who had died earlier. The question was 
whether as the widow of the last coparcener to die, B2Sw, the plaintiff 
was entitled to the entire properties of the family. The relative 
times of the deaths of BIS and BISw were not inquired into and were
\
not established, and it was assumed in passing that if momentarily
BISw acquired any rights under the Act of 1937* these passed on her
death to the sole surviving coparcener B2S who himself died last 
2in the tragedy.
1. Presumption first gained statutory recognition in India by virtue 
of s. 21 of the HSA which lays down that "(W)here two persons have 
died in circumstances reridering it uncertain whether either of 
them, and if so which, survived the other, then, for all purposes 
affecting succession to property, it shall be presumed until the 
contrary is proved, that the younger survived the elder." In 
sharp contrast to the Roman civil law with its complicated 
presumptions of survivorship among commorientes, at common law 
there was no presumption to aid the devolution of property by 
testament or intestate succession. Accordingly the dicta in 
Wing v. Angrave, (i860) 8 H.L. C. 183 was to the effect that where 
the deaths of several persons were caused by one and the same 
cause, the question is entirely one of fact and there is no 
presumption from age or sex as to survivorship; neither is there 
any presumption that all died at the same time. However, in 1925 
when presumption was finally statutorily introduced under s. 18^ 
of the Law of Property Act, the Indian Court had the jurisdiction 
to apply an English statutory rule under the residuary source ’
of law known as Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, but no 
advantage was taken of this. Consequently, in decision after 
decision, as for example, Neksi v. Jwala, A.I.R. 193^ Oudh 101; 
Gopibai v. Chuhermal, A.I.R. 1939 Sind 23^ ; Agha Mir v. Mir 
Mudassir, A.I.R. 19^+ P.C. 100, and even very recently in Manni v. 
Paru, A.I.R. i960 Ker. 195* their Lordships simply relied upon 
Wing v. Angrave, (i860) 8 H.L.C. 183 and the common law was applied 
to the exclusion of English statutory law, i.e. to say, that 
survivorship must be proved like any other fact, and there is no 
presumption. Manorama Bai v. Rama Bai, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 269* 
thus provides a welcome break from this monotonous precedent and is 
in harmony with s. 21 of the HSA. See J.D.M. Derrett, "Commorientes", 
Univ. of Ceylon Review, Vol. XX, No. 1. Apr. 19&2, 55-83.
2. Summarised at Derrett, "The HWRPA 1937: A Sting in the Tail,"
(1965) 67 Bom. L. R. (J), 35-^1 at 37-
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In a lengthy investigation of what is meant by "coparcener", 
the conclusion that Ramaswami J., arrived at was that by virtue of 
the Act, the widow being possessed of all those incidents of the 
coparcenary that any ordinary coparcener is associated with, it 
would be less than just to regard her not as a pucca (true) coparcener, 
but at best a kucha (notional) one, merely because she had no right 
by birth. It was therefore held that B2Sw was as good as if she 
were a coparcener, and was thus entitled to take by survivorship.
This, it is submitted, is not the correct interpretation, for 
though her position in the joint-family may, in many respects, be 
analogous to any undivided male coparcener, and though undoubtedly 
she takes a coparcenary interest, as the learned judge was at pains 
to point out, she does not thereby become a coparcener.
An investigation of the rights of a person who claims under a 
statute must first look to the statute, and not add to the statute 
any qualifications or conditions which might be suggested by any 
individual interpretation or application of that statute, whether by 
the Courts or by the jurists.^ In the light of this principle, it is 
clear that what the Act gives the widow is a statutory right, i.e. 
the same interest as her husband. What it does not, and cannot 
convey to her is the Mitakgara male birtfQp.ght which is of the 
essence of the coparcener's right in the joint-family property, and 
as such, the widow, on whom certain special rights have been conferred 
by the provisions of this special enactment, cannot aspire to the 
status of a coparcener in the absence of express provision to that 
effect in the Act.
However^  numerous other decisions vindicate the view that the 
interest that the widow takes under s. 3 (2) of the Act, does not
1. Ibid, at 38.
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thereby have the effect of making her a coparcener. This has been
insisted upon since at least as far back as In re HWRPA 1937»^
2 3Jadaobai v. Puranmal, Seethabai v. Narasimha, and in recent times
the Supreme Court has been in agreement with this view.
(2). The Widow takes a Statutory Interest
The widow not being a coparcener, the question then is as to 
the nature of her right, and while in a minority of cases it has been 
held that the interest that she acquires under s. 3 (2) devolves on 
her by inheritance, the majority —  and it is submitted, the correct —  
view is that she acquires such interest neither by inheritance nor 
by survivorship, but what she takes is a special kind of statutory 
interest which cannot be brought under known categories of interest, 
but is sui generis, created by statute to ameliorate the conditions 
of Hindu widows.
The minority view prevailed in Saradambal v. Subbarama^ as also
in Siveshwar Pars ad v. Hamarain  ^where it was pleaded that the widow
would not be liable for her husband's debt, and in Jadoabai v.
7
Puranmal, where the widow's effort to recover a debt due to her
V
1. A.I.R. 19*4-1 F.C. 72.
2. A.I.R. 19*44 Nag. 243.
3. A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 306.
4. Commr. I.T.M.P. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills, (1965)
2 S.C.J. 289, Lakshmi Perumallu v. Krishnavenamma, A.I.R. 1965 S.C.825* 
Satrughan v. Sabujpari, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272.
5. I.L.R. (1942) Mad. 630.
6. A.I.R. 19*45 Pat. 116.
7. A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 243. On the same principle, it was held in
Mt. Rajendrabati v. Mungalal, A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 129, that because 
the widow acquires by inheritance and not by survivorship, she 
could not sue for recovery of money due upon a handnote executed 
in favour of her deceased husband, unless she obtained a 
succession certificate.
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deceased husband was resisted on the ground that she did not take
by succession. The Madras, Patna and Nagpur High Courts were all
agreed that survivorship having been ruled out, the only other way
that she could be said to have taken under s. 3 (2) would be by
succession or inheritance.
On the other hand, the consensus of opinion in decisions too
numerous to enumerate, is to hold that the interest which s. 3 (2)
conveys to her is a statutory interest, the result of which has been
to introduce "changes which are alien to the structure of a 
„2coparcenary.
By the Act, sis his Lordship Shah^ J., explained in Satrughan v.
3
Sabu.jpari, certain antithetical concepts are sought to be reconciled. 
Because she is invested with the same interest as her husband had, 
she is thereby introduced into the coparcenary, and between the 
surviving coparceners and her, there arises community of interest and 
unity of possession. But she does not on that account become a 
coparcener; all that this statutory substitution does is to suspend 
the rule of survivorship as between coparceners so long as the 
estate enures.**
From this it follows that where the widow of the payee of a
1. The same opinion was expressed in Kedar Nath v. Radha Shyam, A.I.R. 
1953 Pat. 81 at 8^ s "The better opinion... is that the widow takes 
the property, the share of her deceased husband, by inheritance...". 
Madhya Pradesh came to the same conclusion in Bhagobai v. Bhaiyalal, 
A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 29, where it was reiterated at 30 that she (the 
widow) takes as heir of her husband. In Jugalkishore v. Wardhasa, 
A.I.R. 1955 Nag. 166, in deciding whether the non-joinder of the 
deceased coparcener's widows would result in an abatement of the 
suit against the present coparceners, it was held that the widows 
represented the deceased husbands, and unless the suit was 
specifically as against the karta in his managerial capacity, the 
widows would have to be necessary parties to the suit. Implicit
in this ruling, it is submitted^  is the view that the widow takes 
by inheritance.
2. Satrughan v. Sabujpari, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272,at 27*K
3. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272.
4. Ibid., at 27^ . See also Ramji Sharma v. Smt Deoshakhi, A.I.R. 1933 
Pat. 16^ (NOC) which summarises the entire incidents -of the estate 
that a widow acquires under s. 3 (2) of the HWRPA, 1937-
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promissory note endorses the note in favour of another, the endorsee 
needj^ procure a succession certificate in favour of the widow before Kofc. 
instituting a suit on the note, for it does not follow that because 
she does not obtain her right by survivorship, she must of necessity 
have obtained it by inheritance. What the Act gives her is a 
statutory right, and the cumulative effect of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of 
s. 3 may "be regarded as recognising a survival of the husband's 
persona in the wife, giving her the same right as the husband had, 
except that she may alienate such property only under certain special 
circumstances. ^
(3) Can the Widow be a Karta?
Since the powers of the manager (karta) are founded upon his 
being an "owner" of coparcenary property for he binds himself by all 
proper acts which bind his coparceners - it is questionable whether 
a female, who cannot be a coparcener, is entitled to act as a true 
manager when she had acquired an interest in coparcenary property by 
virtue of the statute of 1937* The stricter view that prevails in 
Madras, Bombay and Patna i.e. that she cannot be a manager rests on
V
the basis that statute must be taken to have disturbed the Hindu law
3
only so far as is necessary for their purposes, but no further.
Technically sound as this argument is, it is necessary to evaluate,,
1. Quoted with approval in lakshmi Perumallu v. Krishnavenamma, A.I.R.
1965 S.C. 825, at 830, the learned judge Mudholkar^  J., authori­
tatively concluding at 831 that, "(t)he interest devolving upon 
the widow need not necessarily be either by survivorship or by 
inheritance but could also be in a third way i.e. by statute..."
2. Natrajan v. Perumal, (19^2) 2 M.L.J. 668 followed in I. L.T.
Development Ltd. v. Koltayya, A.I.R. 1955 A-P- 135- See also
Controller of Estate Duty Madras v. Alladi Kuppusvamy, A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 2069.
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 260.
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at this stage, the Hindu law, and to put in proper perspective the 
dharmasastra position in regard to this question.
The sastra is clear that in the absence of the senior member,the ju­
nior member, or even a female may incur debts for the needs of the family. An 
alienation of interest for such debt would therefore be binding upon 
the family, and must be paid out whether from the minor's own 
interest or from his interest in the coparcenary.
The authority for this may be derived from the text of Narada 
which is numbered Ch. Ill- 13 in Jolly's edition in translation of the 
shorter Narada-smyti (London, 1876).
It says:
"(T)he manager of householder, (actual or eventual) 
is liable to accept (or admit) all alienations made 
for the purposes of the family, by a pupil, 
apprentice, slave, wife, agent or bailiff." 1
Appearing as it does in the Smyti Chandrika, the Vivadaratnakara, the
Parasara-Madhaviya, the Vyavahara-praka^a of the Viramitrodaya, and
the Vivada-tafldava, its significance and binding authority cannot be
denied in Benares, Madras, Andhra, Maharashtra and Gujarat.
The inference is clear: i.e. alienations for maintenance or even
for less necessary purposes (provided they are for the family's
benefit) will be binding upon the manager (when he returns or appears v
on the scene by simply coming of age, as the case may be), because in
his absence the implied authority rests with his formally authorised
representative or, failing one such, with his fellow members of the
family who, though not major coparceners, are able to transact
2business in such emergencies.
If then in certain special circumstances, the ancient sages 
could conceive of the female in a managerial capacity, the Act of
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Kay a Hindu woman be the Manager of a Joint- 
Family at MitSkgara law?" ECMHL, Vol. IV, 1978, _op. cit., at 128.
2. Ibid, at 129.
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1937, - the professed aim of which was to give her "better rights - 
should hardly be construed to have in effect restricted what in 
traditional law was her right. And yet certain High Courts, as we 
have already noted earlier, have not hesitated to rule adversely as 
against this special privilege accorded to the female.
In Madras for instance, in Seethabai v. Narasimha,^  the widows 
objected to the appointment of a guardian for the property of the 
minor sons as they claimed that, they were themselves members of the 
undivided coparcenary. This the learned judge refused to countenance 
and held that, in a coparcenary consisting of only minors, the widow(s) 
could not claim to be the karta, as under the Act the widowed mother 
is not a coparcener although she may be a member of the undivided 
family.
Two years later however Nagpur struck (it is submitted), the
2right note in Pandurang Dalake v. Pandurang Gorle , and considered
the question from the purely Hindu law point of view. The widowed
mother had passed a promissory note as guardian of her two minor
sons, and it was held that, the widow being the de facto manager of
the family, she was within her legal rights to incur debts for
necessity, and which the sons could not repudiate on attaining
majority. Not only was this an eminently equitable decision in so
far as the honest creditor is thereby not defrauded as a result of
collusion, but to add weight to its pronouncement, the Court relied
3
upon the authority of the F.B. decision m  Kasheo v. Jaganatha, 
and dwelt in particular upon the dicta in Hunoomanpersaud *s case 
that, given the necessity the realities must be observed and the
1. A.I.R. 19^5 Mad. 306.
2. A.I.R. 19^ 7 Nag. I78.
3. A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 81.
*+. (I856) 6 M. I. A. 393-
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female alienor must be understood to have acted as manager of the 
estate"*- - a point of view which fits in well with the decisively 
positive attitude of the ^ astra.
This same progressive attitude is evinced in I.T. Commr. v.
2 -Iaxmi Narayan, where the mother in her capacity as karta of the
undivided family consisting of herself and her two minor sons, entered
into a partnership, renewing thereby the partnership which her late
husband had had with his brothers. Their Lordships insisted that the
right to take by survivorship, or the status of a coparcener is not a
sine qua non of competency to become the manager of the joint Hindu
family, that in view of the fact that at Dayabhaga law women could be
coparceners and so even managers, and the recognised fact that a
female may even be manager of a religious endowment, and considering
the changing times and the Act of 1937 which had improved the widow's
status, it would be quite in order for the female to become the
manager, particularly if she is the only member left sui .juris in
the joint-family.
That the question was by no means settled soon became evident
from the rulings taking the opposite viewpoint. Thus in Radha Ammal
3
v. I. - T. Commr. Madras where the mother, guardian of minor sons, 
purported to execute a deed of partnership admitting a stranger as a 
partner in the ancestral business, the Madras Hi^i Court, true to its 
conservative trend, held that for all its ameliorative effects, the 
HWRPA did not make her a coparcener, nor was she clothed with the 
right to represent the family as their karta, gaardianship powers
1. Derrett, "May a Hindu Woman..." op. cit., at 131-2.
2. A.I.R. 1S&9 Nag. 128.
3. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 538.
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being distinctly less broad than those of a manager at Hindu law.
Bombay followed suit in Rakhmabai v. Sitabai\ and as the facts
2were broadly similar to the Madras ruling in Seethabai v. Narasimha,
the learned judge chose to rely on the latter to the total exclusion
of the Nagpur decision.
But then, as if to make up for the unseemly haste with which
Bombay seemed to have dispensed with any notion of the expansion of
the widow's rights beyond the literal letter of the law as embodied
in the statute of 1937» the Pull Bench of Travancore-Cochin recon-
sidered the question in Balakrishna v. Ganesa, and reverted to the
ifauthority of Hunoomanpersaud *s case to hold that the mother in the 
absence of adult male members, is competent to act as the manager of 
the family, and the test of binding alienations by her would be legal 
necessity.
K
In Orissa the conservative view prevailed earlier, but in 
Budhi Jena v. Dhobai Naik,^  where the issue really was whether a 
minor could act as manager through his guardian, the obiter dicta in 
regard to the mother's powers as manager, is indicative of a change 
of heart. It was held that since there is no text in Hindu law which 
makes it imperative that no one else at any time or under any
1. A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 160.
2. A.I.R. 19^5 Mad. 306.
3- A.I.R. 195^  Tr-Co 209 (F.B.). The F.B. was undoubtedly—  and quite
naturally —  influenced by the fact that Kerala has had a tradition 
of matrilineal families of which females could be managers.
if. (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393-
5- Manguni v. Lokananidhi, A.I.R. 1956 Or. 1, where the legal compe­
tency of the mother to alienate for legal necessity in her capacity
as tie facto manager, in the prolonged absence of her son the karta, 
was decisively rejected. A passing reference may also be made to 
the Patna attitude in Sheogulam v. Kishun, A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 212^  
where it was the wife who in the absence of her husband incurred a 
loan for family necessity. The conservative stand was reiterated 
in holding that coparcenership is a necessary requisite for the 
managership of a joint Hindu family:
6. A.I.R. 1958 Or. 7.
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circumstances except the coparcener is competent to be the manager, 
there is therefore no inherent incompetency. The Supreme Court in 
C.I.T. M.P. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills  ^ was not directly concerned 
with this issue, and it was in fact a situation where the kartas of 
two families having formed a partnership, one of them died in 19^3» 
and it was not till 19^9 that a minor coparcener attained majority in 
his family. In order to resolve the question that then arose, i.e. 
whether in the intervening period the partnership existed, the Supreme 
Court discussed incidently the Nagpur view that widows could be 
managers, and - for all that no such contention had been made in the 
present case - remarked obiter that the widow not being a coparcener, 
cannot be a manager, and therefore the partnership stood dissolved.
It is however submitted that this, and all other like decisions 
adopt the retrogressive attitude. The argument that because she is 
not a coparcener she cannot be a manager is fallacious and misleading. 
Independently of the statute, the sastra says that females, given an 
emergency, are entitled to act. Tne test therefore is not who did it, 
but whether it was justified. The Act of 1937 must be held not to 
have disturbed the law more than was strictly necessary. It must also be 
held to have enhanced the rights of females, not to have subtracted 
from them. It would therefore follow that the Supreme Court's obiter 
is per incuriom, Madras, Bombay, Orissa (earlier on) and Patna are 
wrong, and Nagpur right.
(^ ). The Widow's Position Vis-a-Vis Alienations of the Joint-
Family Property *
(a). The Manager's Power to Alienate for Valid Purposes Binds the
Widow
The manager of a coparcenary is authorised to alienate the
1. (1965) 2 S.C.J. 289.
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joint-family property under an elaborate head generally referred to 
for convenience'as "legal necessity" or "benefit of the family."
This authorisation is a matter of law, and is independent of any 
explicit authorisation made by the coparceners themselves which will 
of course bind their interests if the manager acts upon it. When 
the Act gave the widow the same interest as the deceased husband 
himself had, there was a dramatic change in the coparcenary in that, 
instead of persons owning interests being all males having absolute 
interests, subject to varying disabilities regarding alienation, the 
existing male coparceners were to be joined by widows who would have 
in the property the aforesaid "same interest".^
That interest invariably conferred certain well-known rights, 
and indeed includes the right to question alienations made by the 
manager or another coparcener without authorisation. By the same 
token, it must be borne in mind that the Act having impliedly given 
the widow that right, also imposes on her,by implication, the 
authority of the manager in regard to the alienation of the joint- 
family property, including the share that she gets, for legitimate
2
purposes, i.e. for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.
3
In Seethama v. Veerana where a Hindu widow demanded an 
account of the joint-family business for the period of time prior
1. Derrett, "Three Questions Arising...," jop. cit., at 138.
2. See for instance Saradambal v. Subbarama, l.L.R. (19^ 2) Mad. 6j0,  
and Siveshwar Prasad v. Lala Har Narain, A.I.R. 19^5 Pat. 116 
where it was held that the widow takes her husband’s interest with 
all its rights and liabilities, not least of such liabilities 
being the manager's right of alienation for legal necessity. 
Similarly a suit cannot be dismissed simply because the widow was 
not impleaded. For, in spite of the statutory interest of the 
widow, the joint-family is not disrupted; the proper person to 
bring a suit on behalf of such joint-family is the manager, and 
the non-joinder of the widow would not make any difference to the 
efficacy of the suit. See Kalianbai v. Kashinath, A.I.R. 19^ 3 
All. 188; Murikupdi v. Madanam, A.I.R. 19^ 3 Mad. 2*+6; Satyanara- 
yancharlu v. Narasanma, A.I.R. 19^ 3.MacL* 708; Kamal Kishore v.
Hari Har, A.I.R. 1951 Pa-t. 6^ 5* Fateh Chand v. Brij Bhushan, 
A.I.R. 1957 All. 801.
3. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 785.
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to partition, RajmannarjC. J. , was quite clear that the effect of 
the Act is not to confer larger rights on the widow than the rights 
that the coparcener would have "been entitled to if he were alive, 
and as the coparcener cannot demand from the karta an account of the 
management of the joint-family except in special circumstances e.g. 
fraud, misappropriation, it would follow that the karta is not liable 
to render an account of his management to the widow for any period 
prior to the issue of the notice for partition.
In Bombay the same principles were relied upon to hold that, 
where the sole surviving coparcener alienated the family property 
including the widow*s interest for his medical expenses, this would 
be regarded as legal necessity, and the widow had no ri§£vt to 
interdict such alienation.-^"
(b). The Widow*s Power to Question Invalid Alienations
However, coparcener though she certainly is not, the widow's 
statutory right in the joint estate, so far as the karta's powers 
are concerned, are somewhat analogous to the right of an undivided 
coparcener, and if her widow's interest is sought to be defeated by 
an unjustified alienation, she is entitled to challenge it in just 
the same manner as a coparcener would.
1. Mahadu v. Gajarabai, A.I.R. 195^ Bom. 4^-2. See also
Parvathamma v. Subhadramma, A.I.R. 19&3 A.P. 236, where the 
mortagee sued for recovery of a mortgage debt, and the A.P. High 
Court held that the mortgage debt being for business purposes, 
this would fall under the category of legal necessity, and the 
widow's claim to free her half share from such encum’tQance 
must fail. Decisions such as these, it is submitted, are right 
for they clearly do not infringe the fundamental principle.
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In Shivappa v. Yellawa,^  the Bombay High Court considered 
the question as to whether it was within the legal competence of the 
sole surviving coparcener to execute a deed of gift of the major 
portion of the joint-family property to his daughter. Decreeing in 
favour of the predeceased son's widow who had sued to recover so 
much of the gifted property as fell to her share under s. 3 (2) of 
the HWRPA, the court explained that the sole surviving coparcener 
could not now claim "unfettered" powers of disposal, as there was 
also the statutory entitlement of the widow to consider in the 
undivided family. This, it is submitted, is an eminently equitable 
view, for it would follow as a necessary corollary that, if like her 
deceased husband, the widow is subject to the kartais powers of 
management, she has also the right to challenge alienations which 
might unjustifiably impinge upon her interest under the Act.
In view of this the dicta in Rathinasabapathy v. Saraswati Ammal' 
requires careful reconsideration. His Lordship Nayadu, J., held that
" (T)hough a gift of coparcenary property is not as 
such recognised even if it is by the entire body of 
coparceners, a transaction evidencing the gift of 
ancestral property to which all the coparceners were 
parties cannot, however, be attacked as void... and 
the gift does not become invalid as the interest of 
any other person is not affected by such transaction." 3
1. A.I.R. 195^ Bom. 7^. Madras in similar circumstances was guided 
along the same lines in Lakshmi Ammal v. Ramchandra, A.I.R. i960 
Mad. 568, Jagadisan, J., referring with approval to the observation 
in Ramalingam v. Ramalakshmi, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 228, that the widow 
in such circumstances is quite competent to question the alienation 
as otherwise her rights under the Act would be gravely imperilled. 
She cannot therefore be a mere "passive spectator." The same 
view was taken in Udai Narain v. Dharamraj, l.L.R. (195^ ) AH* 2C& 
and the widow's right to challenge a mortgage deed executed by
the karta on the ground of lack of legal necessity, was decreed.
See also Pappayamma v. Gopalkrishnamurty, A.I.R. 1969 A.P. Jkl 
where the Court stressed that the widow's interest could be best 
protected by her being conceded the right of preservation of the 
property with the concomitant right of challenging a non-binding 
alienation, fojv cl. -fUJcc du^ ca-LOr*- A«.e p. P. fou. v, fccoyie^Vvwcut.
2. A.I.R. 195^ Mad. 307. -A.-I, &, .
3. Ibid, at 309-10.
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This contention, it is submitted, cannot have any validity after 
the passing of the HWRPA. The widow's interest, it must be remembered 
is affected, and, considering that she was not a party to the 
alienation, her right to impeach it must be regarded as being just as 
strong as that of any disaffected coparcener despite the learned 
judge's ruling that, "interest" in s. 3 (2) of the Act does not 
include a right to interdict an alienation, or any other right which 
her husband possessed, and which could only be exercised by a copar­
cener and not by any member of the joint-family.
The reasoning in Ramsaran Sap v. Bhagwat Shukul  ^likewise
requires reappraisal. Notwithstanding that the widowed daughter-in-
2law had obtained a decree against a gift inter vivos of the ancestral
property made by the sole surviving coparcener, it was later held
that the interest of the widow in the share of the property of the 
sole surviving coparcener being merely a spes successionis during 
his lifetime, the donee was entitled to half of the property after 
the donor's death. The dicta apart, while admitting that the sole 
surviving coparcener's absolute right of disposal of the family pro­
perty "is necessarily limited by the interest to which the widow of
3
the deceased coparcener succeeds under the Act," his Lordship,
Reuben C.J., nonetheless dismissed the suit on the basis that since 
hers was not a coparcenary interest, the Act of 1937 had not given
1. A. I. R. 195*+ ^ t. 318.
2. Bhagwat Shukul v. Mst. Kapumi, A.I.R. 19*^ + Pat. 298 (F.B.).
3. Ramsaran Sao v. Bhagwat Shukul, A.I.R. 195^ + Pat. 318 at 319* It
is submitted that such powers of the sole surviving coparcener 
are additionally limited in that, a coparcener may well come 
into existence at any given time by reason of the widow's 
capacity to adopt, or in the event of the birth of a son to the 
sole surviving coparcener.
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to the widow the same right that a coparcener had to interdict 
alienations.
In view of the ameliorative intent of the Act, this attitude, 
one submits, is not justified, for to envisage the enlargement of 
the karta1 s powers beyond even the traditional law would mean the 
effective nullification of the widow's statutory right of partition - 
a state of affairs apparent in the specious reasoning of both the 
Madras and the Patna High Courts in the decisions discussed above.
(5). The Widow's Right to Maintenance
There are no express words in the Act to the effect that the 
widow's general right to be maintained out of the joint-family estate 
had been taken away, and yet there is a school of thought which 
maintains that, since maintenance under the Hindu law is allowed 
only by reason of exclusion from inheritance and from a share on 
partition, it can reasonably be urged that once that share is con­
ceded under legislation, the right to maintenance is no longer 
operative.^
It is however submitted that there is nothing in the Act that
can be construed to yield such a result, for this principle must be
subject to the qualification that the widow exercises her right of 
partition and takes her separate share which would then be deemed to 
be in lieu of maintenance. For to hold otherwise would be to negate 
the very purpose of the Act, i.e. to give her "better rights", and
she would not be in any better position than what she was before the
Act.
The position was further complicated by the decision of the 
2Federal Court that the Act was ultra vires agricultural land, the
1. Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage, 11th ed., op. cit., at 7H»
2. In Re HWRPA 1937, A.I.R. 19^1 F.C. 72.
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result of which was that the widow stood excluded from succession 
to agricultural property in the absence of provincial legislation on 
parallel lines in respect of such land, and the question then was as 
to the position of the widow in regard to her right to maintenance.
In Venkata Subbaratamma v. Krishniah'*' and Sarojini Devi v. 
Kristna, the widows claimed their husbands* share under s. 3 (2) 
from the entire property, but on the Federal Court's decision being 
known, they amended their plaints, and the question for decision was 
whether, notwithstanding the right to share in the non-agri cultural 
properties of the family, they were still entitled to any rights of 
maintenance as under the ordinary Hindu law. Prima facie they were 
in principle entitled and both the learned judges were agreed that 
in so far as the widow stood excluded from succession to agricultural 
land, it could not be said that the reason for the right to main­
tenance had ceased to exist, and while she could exercise her right 
of partition over property that was non-agri cultural, she was at the 
same time entitled to claim maintenance from the agricultural part 
of the estate, the only proviso being that in assessing the amount 
of maintenance, due allowance had to be made for the share that she 
took under the Act.
3
This was also the view expressed in Parappa v. Nagamma which
was an appeal to the Full Bench from a suit filed in 1949. Their
4Lordships held that by reason of the Federal Court decision, the 
scope of the Act became confined to properties other than agricultural, 
and as such it left untouched the widow's pre-existing right under
1. A.I.R. 19^3 Mad. 417.
2. A.I.R. 19^4 Mad. 401.
3. A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 576 (F.B. ), taeXutJ at 4X1, ^ X ^ .
4. In Re.HWRP, A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72.
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the general Hindu law to claim maintenance in respect of agricultural
property. In regard to the widow's demand for enhanced maintenance,
the learned judges further held that the plaintiff not being entitled
to a share in properties acquired from and out of the income from the
agricultural lands subsequent to the death of her husband, the said
properties should be added to the other agricultural assets of the
family for the purpose of fixing the rate of maintenance.
However, once the scope of the Act was extended so as to include
within its purview agricultural land as well, Nayudu J., in
Rathinasabapathy v. Saraswati Ammal,^  made it clear that the widow's
right to claim maintenance apart from partition was by reason of the
fact that the Act as originally passed before the amendment of 19^7
in Madras, did not give a right to the widow to claim a share in
agricultural lands. By reason of the amendment it could not however
be said that such right of maintenance had been extinguished. Dis-
2
counting 'Mayne's' view, his Lordship explained that there was 
nothing in the Act to suggest that the right to partition was in 
substitution for the rigjit of maintenance. There being no provision 
in the Act expressly taking away her right to maintenance, such 
maintenance, the learned judge ruled, would still be available, and 
the option would rest with the widow, i.e. to claim maintenance or 
a share, but not both.
3
In an Andhra case-' where the question for determination was 
whether by reason of the right to a share conferred on the widow 
under the Act, she would not be entitled to claim maintenance, his
1. A.I.R. 195*+ Mad. 307.
2. Hindu law and Usage, 11th ed., op. cit., at 71-2.
3- Varahalamma v. Ammathalli, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 590.
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Lordship was quite clear that if for some reason she was not in a
position reasonably to ask for a share, (as this widow was not,
since it would mean supervision of cultivation in a far-off village),
her right to maintenance could not be said to have been lost. The
learned judge discounted the view expressed by some scholars and
given credence to in Misralal v. Mst. Simarta'*' that, maintenance was
a right in substitution for partition, and agreed with the decision
2
in Tirthabasi v. Trinayani that the right to maintenance out of
certain properties which passed out of the family could not be held
to have vanished, and decreed in favour of the widow.
3
In Gajavalli v. Narayanswami , the plea of the respondent 
rested on the strength of a settlement deed, which he alleged, was in 
full settlement of all the widow*s claims in the joint-family. It 
was held that the nature of the estate conferred upon the widow under 
the settlement deed could not determine the nature of the claim made
by her. Since the Act of 1937 did not deprive the widow of her
general right of maintenance, she was free to choose either this 
general right or the specific right conferred upon her by the Act of 
19371 whichever was more favourable.
To sum up, the maintenance rights of the widows (of three 
generations) mentioned in the HWRPA 1937» were not abolished in 
express terms, but the effect of recognition of their rights by the 
Act was that there was little occasion for them to claim maintenance 
since they were not excluded from inheritance and were entitled to 
a share on partition.
1. I.L.R. (19^ 8) 23 Luck. 227.
2. A.I.R. 1951 Or. 306.
3- A.I.R. 1962 Mad. I87, followed in Basanta v. Iaxmi, l.L.R.
(1966) Cut. 926.
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(6). The Widow’s Power to Alienate Her Interest under the Act
Since it is established by judicial decisions that a coparcener
may not alienate his undivided interest at his pleasure, "but subject
to elaborate provisions of law and which differ according to region,^
it would follow that if the widow took the "same" interest as her
husband had, she was entitled to alienate it subject to exactly the
same terms. But this could not be, as the interest that was given
to her was by statute and subject to the limitations of the "women's
estate"; it was therefore an interest distinct from, and thus could
not be alienated similarly with, the coparcenary interest. She had
first to demand partition (one would suppose), and then hold the
property as if she were an heir of her husband under the ordinary 
2Hindu law.
3
In Saradambal v. Subbarama it was said obiter and in Parappa v. 
^ .Nagamma it was repeated by the Pull Bench obiter that the interest 
taken by the widow was not only liable to separation at the widow's 
option, but thereafter alienable inter vivos for valuable con­
sideration. In Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Nahanty^ the Orissa High Court 
went even further and took the view that the widow is entitled to 
alienate her undivided interest upon the ground that a right of 
property was conveyed to her by the statute - and this in a state 
where not even male coparceners enjoy such a privilege.' The reasoning 
was that by merely allowing her the right of partition, the Act 
conveyed thereby a special kind of proprietory right to the widow,
1. See Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 284--99*
2. Derrett "Three Questions Arising...," o£. cit., at 1^ 0.
3- I.L.R. (19^ 2) Mad. 630.
k. A.I.R. 19j& Mad. 576, (F.B.).
5. A.I.R. 1951 Or. 35-
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and, the estate "being expressly a "woman's estate", she could not 
be forbidden to alienate by considerations specially appropriate to 
coparceners. These would remain subject to their traditional legal 
fetters, the Act of course having done nothing to "improve" their 
position'.
The matter was considered again, and the strange view of the 
Orissa High Court generally approved of by the Bombay High Court in 
Dagdu v. Namdeo. ^ Where the widow had sold her interest in the joint- 
family property, and the alienee then filed a suit for partition, 
their Lordships held that she was entitled to alienate her undivided 
interest absolutely for legal necessity, or to alienate for her life 
(or until surrender), without such justification, and as in this 
case she must be held to have assigned her life interest, by that 
very fact the alienee became entitled to pairtition and to disrupt 
the family tenure.
The difficulty that one faces in a construction of the Act 
which gives to the widow the "same" interest, provided that it is 
subject to the limited interest which is known as the Hindu "women's 
estate", and the resultant anomaly, i.e. the widow is thus given 
greater powers of alienation than a coparcener, was in fact the very 
basis of the understandably adverse ruling in Hemant Kumar v. Somenath. 
The widow having alienated her share in the joint-family property 
without any legal necessity, the learned judge held that the obiter
1. A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 152. To the same effect had been the obser­
vation in Mahadu v. Gajarabai, A.I.R. 195^ Bom. 4^2, i.e. that 
under the provisions of s. 3 (3) the widow takes the limited 
interest known as the Hindu woman's estate, and the result is 
that the widow could without any legal necessity alienate her 
own 'life' estate in the property but if she wanted to convey her 
undivided interest absolutely it would be necessary that there 
should be legal necessity for the alienation.* A similar decision 
was arrived at in Pern Man at on v. Bandhu Mahto, A.I.R. 195^ Bat. 20.
2. A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 557-
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dicta in Parappa v. Nagamma  ^(a case from Madras where the copar­
cener has the unconditional right to alienate his interest), could 
not apply to areas where the coparcener himself had no right to 
alienate without legal necessity. Sub-s. (3) of s. 3 therefore 
operates as a limitation of the right conferred on the widow by sub-s. 
(2), and so long as she did not resort to a partition, she could not 
claim the right of alienating even for legal necessity the interest 
which had devolved on her, or for her life without such legal
necessity, where and when her husband had no such right.
2
The Patna decision is thus in complete contradiction to the 
3 4rule laid down in Orissa and Bombay, and one is again faced with
the problems of ambiguity and obscurity inherent in the Act. To hold
as the Patna High Court held that, the widow was disentitled to
alienate altogether would be to contravene the notion of the "limited
estate” and the incidents accruing to it. Besides which that does
not solve the dilemma of the patent contradiction, i.e. that the
c
interest devolving on her would be the Hindu "woman's estate”, but
that she would also take the "same interest”^  as her deceased husband.
Perhaps the more acceptable solution would be to hold, as was
7
held in Kunja Sahu's case, that "same interest" is not qualitative 
but quantitative, and means the share the husband would have taken.
It is not absolutely necessary that this share should be assessed at
1. A.I.R. 195^ Mad. 576, (F.B.).
2. Hemant Kumar v. Somenath, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 557*
3* Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Mahanty, A.I.R. 1951 Or. 35*
Dagdu v. Namdeo, A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 152.
5. Sub-s. (3) of s. 3 HWRPA 1937.
6. Sub-s. (2) of s. 3, ibid.
7. Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban Mahanty, A.I.R. 1951 Or. 35.
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the husband's death, nor that it should be exempt from fluctuation.
But once it is admitted - as all the High Courts except Orissa have 
admitted - that the interest fluctuates like a coparcener*s interest 
we are more than half way to admitting that the "same interest" is 
same qualitatively and not quantitatively.*
Once this is clear, sub-s. (3) falls into proper perspective, 
and can then be understood as a limitation upon the coparcenary 
interest and as no more than that. In other words the interest 
known as the Hindu "woman's interest" must be held to have a special 
definition in that it merely means a series of limitations as follows: 
the property is not stridhana and would devolve accordingly; it is 
not freely alienable upon the terms known in each respective state to 
attach to the ordinary coparcenary interest, but those who take the 
interest after the widow (whether by her death or surrender), would 
not be bound by those alienations which were outside a widow’s normal 
power’s, and also outside the powers of a coparcener. In other words 
the sub-s. in question adds limitations and does not indirectly 
grant special facilities above those possessed by coparceners and the 
special grant of the right of partition suggests as much.^ Automatic
solution to this problem eluded us at the time the Act was repealed v
by the ISA, 19#.%
(7). The Widow's Right to Claim Partition and the Fluctuation of
Her Share
Sub-s. (3) of s. 3 conferred on the widow the "same right of 
claiming partition as a male owner." However, so long as partition 
did not take place, her possession and enjoyment extended to the 
entire property conjointly with the other members of the coparcenary, 
and because she took the "same interest" as her deceased husband,
1. Derrett, "Three Questions Arising...," on. cit. , at lA-2-3.
2. But see Sukh Ram v. Gauri Shankar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 3^5 (a-t 560 below), 
which took the Orissa view.
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the share that devolved on her was not a fixed and determinate share, 
and until there was a partition either at her own volition or by 
virtue of a partition among the coparceners, her interest was subject 
to fluctuation, i.e. to increase or decrease by births or deaths as 
the case may be in the coparcenary.
Once partition takes place, it effects a severance in the joint 
status, and the widow must be considered to hold her interest separately 
her interest is defined. It would then be worked out having regard 
to the circumstances obtaining in the family on the date of partition.
A few discordant rulings apart, judicial decisions confirm 
this interpretation. In Chinniah Chettier v. Sivagami,^  one of the 
earlier cases in regard to fluctuation, the sole surviving coparcener 
having adopted a son, the question was whether the widow was entitled
to a half or a one-third share in the coparcenary property. The 
Court was quite categorical that, as what she got under the Act was 
her husband's share which was subject to alteration by fluctuation, 
she could not be said to be in a better position than a coparcener, 
and her share at partition would therefore decrease to one-third by 
reason of the adoption.
2An interesting situation came up in Madras in Subba v. Nallammal. 
Where the coparcener had died in 19^2 leaving agricultural lands, and 
the widow then claimed a half share, the question arose whether she 
would be entitled to share the produce derived from the land after
1. A.I.R. 19^5 Mad. 21, followed in Gangabai v. Parmesharibai,
A.I.R. 19^9 Sind. 5, wbere on the same principle the widow's 
share was held to have been augmented on the death of a coparcener. 
See also Nagappa v. Mukambe, A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 309, Kedarnath v.
Radha Shyam, A.I.R. 1953 Bat. 81, Mahadu v. Gajarabai, A.I.R.
195^ Bom. 442, Shivappa v. Yellawa, A.I.R. 195^ Bom. 47,
Gangadhar v. Subhashini, A.I.R. 1955 Or. 135, Bamchandra v.
Ramgopal, A. I. R. 1956 Nag. 228, Harekrishna Das v. Jujesthi Panda, 
A.I.R. 1956 Or. 73.
2. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 192.
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her husband's death. The learned judges held that she was not 
entitled to share either in the agricultural lands or the produce 
from such land derived subsequent to her husband's death. According 
to their Lordships, on a plain reading of the language of s. 3, it is 
clear that the rights of the widow had to be determined as on the 
date of the death of the husband and not on the date of the 
particular suit.
The rationale behind this seemingly adverse ruling was explained
by the Full Bench of the same High Court in Parappa v. Nagamma~*~ where
the widow filed a suit for partition and possession of a half share
in the non-agri cultural properties of the family. While holding
that the widow could ask for such partition and separate possession
of her husband's share, which share was to be worked out having regard
to the circumstances obtaining in the family on the date of the
partition, their Lordships were however clear incidently that this
could apply to non-agri cultural property only, in view of the dicta
2
in In re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act 1937» The position 
would therefore be that on the death of the husband, the agricultural 
properties would go by survivorship to other members of the joint 
Hindu family, (as it did in Subba's case^), while the husband's 
interest in non-agri cultural property would devolve upon the widow.
In Onssa however, the Court held in Kunja Sahu v. Bhagaban- 
that in the same way that a coparcener's interest becomes a specified 
interest the moment it is attached by a creditor after his death, 
which then stands out of fluctuation by preventing its lapse into
the joint-family estate, so too would the interest which devolved
1. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 576, (F.B.).
2. A.I.R. 19^1 F.C. 72.
3- A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 192. 
k. A.I.R. 1951 Or. 35*
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upon the widow. After devolution such interest could "be predicated 
with certainty, and as property, it carried with it the incidents of 
transferability. Subsequent partition could not affect the fraction 
or the nature of the property subject to it.
On the other hand in Radhi Bewa v. Bhagwan Sahu1 the Bench was 
divided, Jagannadhadas J. , holding that the widow not being a copar­
cener, her interest must be held to be the same as it stood at the 
time when her husband died, and therefore not subject to fluctuations, 
Panigrahi J., insisting on the other hand that until such time as a 
partition is effected, her interest is a coparcenary interest and
liable to fluctuation. In fact the learned judge further emphasised
2
this point in Nandakishore v. Sukti where in criticising the
3
observation of Ray C.J., in Radhi Bewa*s case  ^that reduction by 
fluctuation is permissible but not enhancement, he felt that there 
was no authority for such a proposition, for either a member is a 
coparcener or he is not.
Fortunately, however, the authoritative pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court have now put to rest all such controversy as might 
have raged as a result of the strange interpretation in the Orissa 
High Court. We have for instance, the clear dicta in Lakshmi 
Perumallu v. Krishnavenamma that the widow will be entitled to be 
allotted the same share as her husband would have been entitled to 
had he lived on the date on which she claimed partition."*
On deeper reflection it thus becomes clear that fluctuation has 
been recognised by the Courts in cases where the size of the share
1. A.I.R. 1951 Or. 378.
2. A.I.R. 1953 Or. 2*+0.
3. A.I.R. 1951 Or. 378.
k. A.I.R. I965S.C. 825.
5. Reiterated in Satrughan v. Sabujpari, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272.
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obtained by the widow at partition differed from what she would have 
obtained had the suit been instituted earlier. What has really 
happened is that the interest given to the woman by the statute is 
by the same statute declared capable of being realised by partition. 
Not merely by partition, but by partition as if she were a male owner.
This tells us that where a male owner in her situation could demand
partition she could demand it, and where a right to institute a 
partition at Mitaksara law had ceased for any reason, the incidents 
of partition formerly open to her had ceased as well.'*' It therefore 
followed that there could be no survivorship as between the sole
surviving coparcener and the widow, for the right of partition having
come to an end, the incidents of fluctuation were extinguished once 
and for all*
If we now turn our attention to the Madras decision in Manorama 
2Bai v. Rama Bai we will recall that the learned judges held that 
the widow took by survivorship from the sole surviving coparcener of 
her husband, that is to say, that she took because she was a 
coparcener. With respect it is submitted that the true view is that, 
at the death of the sole surviving coparcener, the Mitakgara joint- 
family came to an end, and with it the widow's right to demand 
partition and any fluctuation resultant upon it; her right being 
statutory and not a birthright, her interest was confined to the 
interest which her husband had, and therefore she took the property 
vested in him as sole surviving coparcener under s. 3 (2), and not 
by survivorship, as there was no statutory gift to her of survivorship 
as such.
1. Derrett, "The HWRPA 1937s A Sting..." op. cit., at 39»
2. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 269.
l«?bn the other hand, where the sole surviving coparcener did not indicate 
either in his lifetime or in his will, his intention to effect severance 
of status, he is not entitled to dispose of joint-family property by testa­
mentary disposition, and in such cases as the bequest becomes inoperative, 
the widow is entitled to survive to it. See Tukaram v. Mathurabai, A.I.R.
: 1973 Bom. 37.
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This reasoning was lost sight of in Bhondu v. Ramdayal^ where in
a. -tuA ujrt.wvvuued
a coparcenary consisting ofAfather andAson, on. o^tcur cL l£e
lit en-Tute- eifcdie, <oy\ i^-t IcUXtx^  } contention was that the
coparcenary having ceased, the widows' rights came to an end as well.
In negativing the claim, their Lordships of the Full Bench decreed,
(mistakenly it is submitted), that the widow's interest being in the
nature of a fluctuating interest which she derived from her husband
in that it was capable of being enlarged by deaths and liable to be
diminished by births, she must be held to have taken the entire estate
by survivorship. That she was not entitled to take by survivorship
is clear; what she did take is the half share of her husband under
s. 3 (2), the share of her son reverting to his heirs by succession. *
2Manicka Gounder v. Arunachala Gounder was an appeal from the
3
judgement of Jagadisan J., in the case of the same name. In a 
coparcenary consisting of two brothers, one married and the other 
unmarried, the former dying first followed in quick succession by the 
latter, the widow claimed to be entitled to the entire property by 
survivorship. In a remarkably erudite judgment, Iyer J., explained 
that the statute of 1937 could prima facie be construed as changing 
the law to no greater extent than its words or necessary intendment 
require. The benefits conferred on the widow did not thereby make 
her a coparcener; the sole surviving coparcener's rights, and after 
him those of his heirs, remain intact, and with the extinction of 
the coparcenary, the fluctuation of interest in the family property 
ceases; and the logical result of all this would be that the sister 
as the reversionary heir would be entitled to the share of the sole
1. A.I.R. i960 M.P. 51 (F.B.).
2. (1964) 2 M.L.J. 519 (F.B.).
3. (1961) 2 M.L.J. 483.
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surviving coparcener. As there could "be no survivorship from the 
sole surviving coparcener, for the very same reason there would he 
no survivorship as between widows who took under the Act.
In an Orissa decision'*' two brothers having died, their widows 
became entitled under s. 3 (2). Subsequent to the death of one of 
them, it was held that the surviving widow was not entitled to the 
entire property by survivorship. The coparcenary having been 
extinguished, the widows held as tenants-in-common, and on the 
death of one of them, her life-estate ceased and the reversionary 
right, in abeyance during her lifetime, reasserted itself.
2
This was exactly the decision in Mst. Khatrani v. Tapeshwari , 
where at the death of a mother-in-law the widow of the predeceased 
son claimed to take by survivorship on the basis that her husband 
must be held to be alive in her person. In a learned judgment 
replete with reference to the authority of decided cases, Sahai J., 
reiterated that since the two widows never attained the status of 
coparceners, the disputed property would pass to the husband's heirs 
under the ordinary Hindu law.
(8). Devolution of Interest on the Death of the Widow
V
The Act is silent as to the devolution of the widow's interest 
upon her death. The separate property inherited by her would, it is 
clear, devolve upon her husband's heirs as reversioners. The 
complexities arose where the widow took^in the joint-family property 1^ ®^ - 
under s. 3 (2) and we have then to consider the devolution of her 
interest where she died unseparated, where she died pending a suit 
for partition and finally, where she died separated.
1. Keluni v. Jagabhandhu, A.I.R. 195^ Or. 47-
2. A.I.R. 196^ Pat. 261 (F.B).
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(a). Where She Died Unseparated
Where the widow died without a partition having been effected,
the question was whether her interest would pass to the reversioners,
i.e. the heirs of the husband, or to the surviving coparceners. The
specific statement in sub-s. (3) of s. 3 that the interest would be
the limited interest known as the Hindu woman's estate suggests at
once that the devolution of the Interest would follow the course
taken by property normally held subject to that estate, viz to the
next surviving heir of the last male holder.'*'
That in fact was the premise on which the learned judge
2
remarked obiter in Radha Ammal's case that, the Interest devolving
on the widow is a Hindu woman's estate with the limitations and
qualifications imposed by Hindu law on such an estate, that is to
say, that on her death it would devolve on her husbands heirs who
3
take it as ancestral property.
However that the Courts were not entirely free from doubt as 
to the correctness of this approach is evident from the ruling in
*4-
Kedamath v. Radha Shyam, where the moiety share of the joint- 
family property given to the widow under a compromise, was the bone 
of contention between the sole surviving coparcener and the next 
reversioner of the last male holder. In Sinha^J. 's, "better opinion,"
1. Derrett, "Three Questions Arising...," op. cit., at 1^.
2. A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 538.
3. See also the observation of Jagannadhadas J., in Radhi Bewa v. 
Rhagwan Sahu, A.I.R. 195^ Or. 37^ to the effect that on her 
death the widow's interest in the joint-family property, or even 
the share therein that she may take on separation does not 
prima facie revert back to the coparcenary as such, but goes
to the heirs of the husband as the fresh stock of descent.
4. A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 81.
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the widow took the property, the share of her deceased husband, 
by inheritance, with the result that, on her death the property 
would devolve not by survivorship but by inheritance to her 
husband's heirs.
It must however be kept in mind that the learned judge pro­
ceeded along the assumption that, in fact,, severance of the joint 
status had already taken place by virtue of the compromise, and 
while such assumption itself may be open to question, there can 
be no doubt but that the principle that,
”(l)f there had been no cessor of jointness by virtue 
of the compromise aforesaid, it could have been 
seriously argued that the properties would go by 
survivorship," 1
is in essence accurate, for we have to keep in mind that while she
did indeed take the woman's estate, the widow continued at the same
time the persona of her deceased husband, and the property must be
held to have devolved as it would have devolved if he had died on
the date that she died.
2This view is confirmed in Parappa v. Nagamma where their 
Lordships of the Full Bench declared obiter:
"(l)f she divided herself from the other members of 
the family during her lifetime on her demise the 
succession would be traced to her husband on the 
basis that the property was her separate property.
If there was no severance, it would devolve by 
survivorship to other members of the joint Hindu 
family." 3
1. Ibid, at 83.
2. A.I.R. 195^ Mad. 576 (F.B.).
3. Ibid, at 579. While generally approving of this observation, 
Nayudu^J. 's view in Ramaswami v. Lakshamma,(1962) 2 An.W.R. 238 
that the interest vesting in the widow would not pass by 
survivorship to the surviving coparceners even if she did not 
claim partition as such, is open to question, Umamaheswaram J., 
laying down the correct position that only if she effects a 
severance in status or if she actually gets the property divided, 
can the course of devolution be traced to her husband's heirs.
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This it is submitted, must be the correct assertion of the law 
as it stood before 17th June 1956,^ and keeping in mind that the Act 
of 1937 must not be so construed as to impinge on areas of the Hindu 
law for which it did not provide, the rule of survivorship must be 
upheld where the widow died without effecting severance of status.
That the position could be very different where the widow died
at the moment where there were no coparceners in the joint-family is
2indicated in Harekrishna v. Ju.jesthi. The widow having taken under 
s. 3 (2), her son, the only surviving coparcener died thereafter, and 
it was held that if on partition the property reverts to the husband's 
heirs, while, in the undivided state, the right of survivorship is 
put in abeyance to revive as soon as the widow dies, it should follow 
logically "that the interest of the widow succeeding to her husband's 
interest in coparcenary property goes to the heirs of her husband 
after her, in the absence of any coparcener living at the time of 
her death." ^
This eminently equitable position was however resiled from and 
the High Court of Madhya Bharat adopted an entirely different attitude 
in Laxman v. Gangabai.
B3T -B" XT RB
| [ (M)
BSD -V" .
(pi.) (M°p- 5°n)
1. That survivorship as such is no longer operative after the 17th June 
1956 even where the widow remains joint with her husband's copaiv 
ceners has been established by judicial decisions, and Parappa v. 
Fagamma, A. I.R. ,1956 Mad. 576 (F.B.), has been effectively over­
ruled in Chockalingam v. Alamelu, A.I.R. 1982 Mad. 29.
2. A.I.R. 1956 Or. 73.
3. Ibid, at 76.
4. A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 138.
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The suit properties "belonged to one B, whose death was followed in
quick succession by the deaths first of his adopted son V, and then
by his widow R. The plaintiff, B's sister's daughter, alleged that
R became owner of half of the property after her husband's death
by virtue of s. 3 (2), and at V's death the rest of the property
vested in her, and as such she, the plaintiff, claimed to be entitled
to a moiety of the property which R, the widow, had taken under the
Act. The defendant who was R's brother, contended that R did not
get any share on the death of her husband, and the whole property
devolved upon him being the nearest heir of the last male holder, V.
The Court held that under the Bombay school of Hindu law, there was
no doubt but that the defendant was entitled to the entire property
of B, moveable and immoveable. It is submitted that this cannot be
taken to be the correct view, for their Lordships did not take into
consideration the extent to which the existing law must be held to
have been modified by the Act of 1937- It must with respect be
pointed out that the share which the widow took under s. 3 (2) was
the share of her husband in the joint-family property, and in the
absence of coparcener's, the claim that such share would devolve
upon the husband's reversioners, must be upheld. h o X v,
Ipcxruc- s A.I.ft. A.C. 3-"| X j (jxk- A-lfi .
(b). Where She Died Pending the Suit for Partition
The institution of a suit for partition is the best possible 
evidence, in the absence of special circumstances, both of the 
intention to separate and of intimation to other parties. The widow 
therefore who dies after suing for partition must be considered to 
have been notionally separate at the moment of her death.^
1. Derrett, "Three Questions Arising ," _oj>. cit., at 1^ 5* The
same author explains that "(t)he right to sever the status of
P.T.O.
However, this rule i.e. that the date of posting the notice of severance 
to the manager was the operative date, must he subject to revision in the 
light of the decision in Raghavamma v. Chenchamma, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136- 
In the Supreme Court's view, communication must be made to all interested 
parties, not merely to the manager, and if the communication is received 
by different members on different dates, their receipts related back to 
the time of dispatch of the notice (simultaneously sent, it is presumed), 
so that the separating member is not to be understood to have separated 
from the different receipents on different dates.
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However, judicial decisions have not been uniform on this 
particular issue, and where the widow died pending a suit for 
partition, the question of succession to the interest that she took 
under the Act was once again brought into sharp focus.
In Subba Rao v. Krishna Prasadam,^  the widow, having brought 
a suit for partition, died during its pendency, and there was an 
application for bringing her daughter on record as her legal repre­
sentative. In disallowing the claim, their Lordships were agreed 
that the object of the Act was to confer better rights on women, 
and not to put an end to the joint-family system under the Mitak$ara 
law. Since s. 3 is based on the principle that the widow is the 
surviving half of her husband, her right is a personal right which 
comes to an end on her death, and the right of the coparceners to 
take by survivorship which was in abeyance so long as she was alive 
reasserts itself, so that the cause of action which the plaintiff 
had held did not survive to her daughter.
jointness is distinct from the right to a physically separated 
share. The right to separate possession is however dependent 
on the severance of status which must precede the acquisition 
of a separate share (which is its natural end-product) by however 
short a time." : IMHL, op. cit., at 317* Accordingly it has
been held that the major coparcener or owner of a coparcenary 
interest may sever in interest merely by the unequivocal 
communication of a settled intention to sever. See Suraj v. 
Ikbal, (1913) L.R. kO I.A. *K); Girja v. Sadashiv, A.I.R. 1916 
P.C. 104; and the operative moment is when the intention is 
communicated and not the moment when it is received. Otherwise 
the members' severance would occur at different times if the 
communication were received by non-managing members at different 
times. : Narayana v. Purshotama, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 390« (^ covOc,.^ *
1. A.I.R. 195^  Mad. 227. See also Shamrao v. Kashibai, A.I.R. 195^  
Nag. 110, and Alamelu v. Chellammal, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 100 where 
exactly similar decisions were arrived at.
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On the other hand, in a Bombay case^ an interesting situation
developed.
-S' 7 T
SI SZ S3
A joint Hindu family consisted of G and his two sons by his first 
wife S, and a son by his second wife L. S and her sons filed a 
suit for partition against G, L and their son. G died during the 
pendency of the suit, and S died thereafter. On the quantum of 
shares of the parties to the suit, it was held that the three sons 
of G were entitled to a one-fourth share each, while the two widows 
of G took together G*s one-fourth share under s. 3 (2) as hejldied WxA, 
in a state of jointness with L and their son. On S's death L's 
one eighth share was augmented by the fact that S *s one-eighth 
share which had vested in her on G's death, devolved upon L.
In essence the effect of the judgment was that "the status of 
jointness by which the members of the family were bound before the 
institution of the suit came to be terminated at the date when the 
suit was filed." In other words, the Bombay High Court has in 
Shyamu*s case, by giving S 's undivided share to L (however objec­
tionable on other grounds) signified that it rejected the Madras 
notion that S notwithstanding her suit for partition would have died 
leaving no interest that could pass by succession to reversioners.
The learned Bombay judges have distinctly said not merely that
1. Shyamu v. Vishwanath, (1955) 5? Bom. L. R. 807.
2. Ibid.
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S and L were entitled, while S lived, to a one-fourth share between
them, but also that S's one-eighth devolved on L, though S never
lived to see a final partition decree, not to speak of partition
by metes and bounds. ^
That Bombay is right and the High Courts of Nagpur, Orissa
and Madras -wrong, has been firmly restated by the Supreme Court in
2
Satrughan v. Sabujpari which was an appeal from the Patna suit of
3
Sabujpari v. Satrughan . The widow having died after filing a suit 
for partition, her daughters were brought on the record of the suit 
as her heirs and legal representatives, and the contention then was 
that the expression "partition" in s. 3 (3) does not mean actual 
severance by metes and bounds followed by assumption of exclusive 
possession by the widow. In negativing the reverse inference the 
Supreme Court laid down in unambiguous language that when the widow 
instituted a suit for partition, her interest became defined, and 
vested in her free from all claims of her husband's coparceners. On 
her death, even though the interest was not separated by metes and
1. Derrett. "Two Difficult Bombay Cases in Hindu Law", (1956) 58 Bom. 
L.R. (j; 97-1C&, at 101-2. In marked contrast to the Bombay 
decision is the earlier Nagpur view in Bhiwra v. Renuka, l.L. R. 
(19^ +9) Nag 400. A joint Hindu family consisted of B, his two 
wives R and S, and two sons A, and D by R. A filed a suit for 
partition against B, and R and S were Impleaded as party 
defendants. During the pendency of the suit B died, and A then 
claimed that he was entitled to a one-third share. It was held 
that by the provisions of the Act, the rule of the Mitakgara —  
which gave the ladies a share in the property at partition was 
abrogated, and the two widows became entitled to inherit the 
share of B only. In effect what the Nagpur Court was stressing 
was that the right of a female who is entitled to a share on 
partition becomes concrete only when acutal division is made, 
and possession is handed over; and if before actual division is 
made the female dies, her share reverts to the estate from which 
it was initially carved out. However as Shah J., in criticism of 
this viewpoint asserts in Shyamu's case at 8ll: "The assumption 
made by the Court in Bhiwra *s case that the right of inheritance 
or substitution to which a Hindu female is entitled under the 
Hindu Nomen's Right to Property Act is in lieu of all other rights 
they may have under the Hindu law appears open to serious doubt."
2. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 272. 3. A.I.R. 1958 Pat. J+05.
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bounds, and not in her exclusive possession, it still devolved upon 
the nearest heirs of her husband, her daughters.
From this it may well be concluded that when a widow institutes 
a suit for partition and then dies during the pendency of the suit, 
the correct view - confirmed by the Supreme Court dicta - is that 
having evinced a definite and unambiguous intention to separate, she
v
must be deemed to have separated herself from the joint status, and 
the share that she took under the Act must therefore devolve 
accordingly. ^
(c). Where She Died Separated
Where the widow had effectively separated, i.e. when under 
s* 3 (3) she exercises her right and there is a partition by metes 
and bounds, the question remains as to the devolution of such interest 
after her death.
If we now turn ouv- attention to judicial decisions, the
consensus of opinion seems to have been set by the ruling in Parappa
2 3v. Nagamma. The obiter dicta J of the Full Bench had far-reaching
consequences as we shall presently see , and was followed by another
1. This would be in keeping with the Mitaksara law where severance 
takes place in two stages, a severance of status (by demand) 
followed by a partition by metes and bounds; and where there
is a severance of status by demand—and surely there can be no 
more tangible proof of such demand for severance than the 
institution of a suit for partition —  the effect is nonetheless 
of actual partition which follows. It therefore follows that 
after the passing of the HSA, s. 14 applies even where the widow 
merely demanded partition, and dicta to the contrary, it is 
submitted, is unfairly restrictive of female entitlement under 
the Act. See below at 536 ff.
2. A.I.R. 195^  Mad. 576 (F.B.).
3. Ibid., at 579.
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Full Bench of the same High Court in Ranu v. Santu. Partition
having been effected, the widow subsequently died, and it was held
that though an alienation by her had been without legal necessity,
no member of the coparcenary could challenge it, as such property
passed not by survivorship but by succession to the heir of her
2
husband, the daughter.
This was the authority for the subsequent decision in Manda v.
3
Pandurang. On the remarriage of the widow after partition, it was 
held that on her death, civil or natural, the property allotted to 
her on partition was incapable of reverting to the coparcenary, and 
the deceased husband's heir must be held to be entitled by succession.
However, a discordant note had been struck in Subba Rao v.
Krishna Prasadam, where in holding that the widow's right of 
partition was a personal one, their Lordships were further of the 
opinion that the "precise" effect of the interposition of the widow 
under s. 3 (2) was a mere postponement of survivorship, so that the 
subsequent devolution after the widow's death is not affected by a 
division enforced by her in her lifetime. The result of this was 
that a partition at the instance of the widow would not have the 
effect of converting her husband's coparcenary interest into his 
separate property, and on her death, the estate would not devolve on 
her husband 's heirs but would pass by survivorship to the coparceners?
1. A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 1.
2. The Patna High Court taok the same view in Bhuri Bai v. Manohar 
Lai, A.I.R. 1967 Pat. 323-
3. A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 3*K>.
A.I.R. 195^ Mad. 227.
5. That this line of reasoning is unattractive is clear from the
eminently equitable view expressed in Parappa v. Nagamma, A.I.R.195^  
Mad. 576,(F.B.) (which effectively overrules this decision), 
and approved of in Satrughan v. Sabujpari, A.I.R. I967 S.C.
272.
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While this might be considered to be merely an opinion - albeit
a valuable one - the hard core of the ratio in Bhagobai v. Bhaiyalal^
^maffected then by the decision in Parappa's case^  proceeded along
the same lines, i.e. on the death of a widow who takes on partition,
there is a reverter of the property back to the coparcenary.
While this seems to be in keeping with the principle that the
statute must be so interpreted as not to disturb the unamended law
so that the "better rights" envisaged by the Act must not be thought
to extend to the reversion (who are usually very different people
from the deceased husband's surviving coparceners), one must also
keep in mind the conflicting point of view and the logic inherent in it.
If the fiction that the legal persona of the husband continues
to live in her is given any credence, then the widow's estate at
partition is indeed separate property, and must devolve as such under
the ordin.<cry Hindu law. Objection might then be raised as to the
very concept of this fiction, and perhaps rightly so. We have then
to consider the effect of s. 3 (3) under which she takes the "limited"
interest, and there can be no argument but that one of the incidents
of this estate was that she could alienate absolutely for legal
necessity or for the benefit of the estate. This being so, to say
3
as was said in Subba Rap's case , that on the widow's death, the rights 
of the parties must be determined exactly as if there had been no
4interposition of the widow, must be considered with some reservation.
It is only to the residue (free from valid alienations) that such a 
remark can apply.
1. A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 29.
2. A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 576 (F.B.).
3. A.I.R. 1954- Mad. 227.
4. The reader's attention is directed to M. Rao "Conflict Between 
Parappa v. Ragamma, (195*0 L.M. L.J. 250 (F.B.) and Subba Rao v. 
Krishna Prasadam, (1953) 2 M. L.J. 56I, "(195*0 1 M.L.J. (j),
52-4, which carefully examines this conflict.
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Parappa steers clear of such anomalies, and considering its
2
wide appeal not least of all on the Supreme Court , it is respectfully- 
submitted that what the Act left unsaid is perhaps best explained by
the latter interpretation. This would also be in accord with the
3 ^now partly exploded decision in Pratapmull v. Dhanabati that the
female sharer, be she wife or mother, is not entitled to initiate a
partition, and her right to a share arises for the first time when
the coparceners separate the property by metes and bounds; until such
division actually takes place she is not recognised as the owner of
such share, as she has no pre-existing right in the estate save a
right of maintenance,-^  and if she dies before such partition is effected,
her share reverts back to the coparcenary from which it was carved out.
It would therefore follow that when a Hindu widow acquired under
s. 3 (2)# and that interest was defined on partition, it must
necessarily devolve by succession upon the heirs of her husband.
(9) The Actual Benefits That the Act Conferred on the Widow
Having analysed the express provisions (as also the lack of 
them) of this "troublesome"^ statute, and having noted the baffling
*
ambiguities and anomalies inherent in it, we must nevertheless in
1. A.I.R. 195k Mad. 576, (F.B.).
2. In Satrughan v. Sabujpari, A.I.R. 19&7 S.C. 272.
3. See Munnalal v. Raj Kumar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1^ 93» discussed
below at 5^ 3-5-
k. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
5. This statement no longer has any relevance as it has now been 
established after much conflict of decisions that, the right 
of maintenance is a pre-existiijg right under s. 1^ of the HSA.
See below at
6. HIM. Derrett,"The HWRPA 1937* A Change of Direction in Madras and an 
Apology”, (1965) l.M. L. J. (j) 13-15* at 13- The same author also 
refers to it as "this puzzling Act",! "Five Doubtful Cases in
Hindu Law from Madras,v (1963) 1«M. L.,J. (j), 20-** at 20/and
"this dreadful statute", "which has given endless trouble",!
"The HWRPA 1937* A Sting...," on. cit., at 35? an~ one could 
not agree more.
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the light of judicial construction attempt to assess the "better 
rights" that the Act of 1937 envisaged and actually conferred on the 
widow.
There can be no doubt but that the effect of the statute as it 
finally emerged was to bring about material changes both in the law 
governing the devolution of a Hindu intestate's separate property 
as well as the law governing any interest which he might have in 
undivided joint-family properties.
The changes are in a sense dramatic. We are told in unambi­
guous language that the Hindu widow so long denied equal rights of 
inheritance, became by virtue of the provisions of the Act an heir 
in her own right. In direct contrast to the traditional Mitak^ara 
law, where the widow could succeed to the separate property of the 
deceased only in the absence of descendants in the male line up to 
three generations,^ the Act provided that the widow shall be entitled 
to the share in the inheritance along and equally with the sons even 
if these are not her own sons.
It also conferred for the first time, under all schools of law, 
a concurrent heritable capacity on the widow of a predeceased son, 
and the widow of a predeceased son's predeceased son. This is all 
the more remarkable in that in bringing in these two latter widows 
as heirs, they were given a very high rank in the line of succession 
superseding even the daughter and the daughter's son, specially 
when we consider that under the ordinary Hindu law, their only claim, 
whether they became widows prior, or subsequent to, the death of the 
father-in-law, was to a mere right to maintenance against the father- 
in-law's property in the hands of his heirs.
1. Mit. II.I.3. See also II.1.6. o£. cit.
-449-
Perhaps even more startling is the effect of s. 3 (2) under 
which the widow took in the Mitakgara coparcenary, the same interest 
in the joint-family property as the deceased husband himself had. The 
effect of this is at once clear; the widow took in spite of, and in 
the presence of coparceners, and in so doing interrupted the rule 
of survivorship which has for millennia been of the very essence of 
the Mitakgara coparcenary. This was a valuable right which the Act of 
1937 conferred on the widow, and mitigated, in the vast majority of 
cases, any hardship conceivably inflicted on her where her husband's 
interest passed by survivorship while she was simultaneously confined 
to rights of maintenance. In any case, by a stroke of the pen 
(however inept) the status of the widow —  and therefore wife —  was 
upgraded.
At the same time she was further given the right to claim 
partition as any undisqualified male member had, and thereby to get 
her interest quantified, and though this right was to no mean extent 
qualified by the stipulation that her interest would be the limited 
interest known as the Hindu "woman's estate”, the dissatisfied widow 
could always exercise her option of partition and thus effectively 
keep at bay any unscrupulous designs of other members of the copar­
cenary} the manager included, not to speak of their actual or 
suspected incompetence. Her relative lack of experience was no longer 
the handicap it had been previous to the passing of the Act, for to 
drive the widow to the exercise of this right would have meant, in 
effect, substantial loss of the joint stock, and hence not to the 
advantage of the survivorship. In sum then partition was a weapon, 
as it were, in the hands of the widow, and the compelling reason for 
the Legislature to confer on her this right was no more than to make 
a sure and certain provision for her maintenance at a rate not more
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than she was entitled to prior to the Act. This seems to he the 
only plausible explanation for the apparent dichotomy, i.e. she is 
entitled to a share "in like manner as it devolves upon a son" under 
s. 3 (l), and she takes the "same interest as her husband" under s. 3(2), 
provided however that she takes it subject to the limited estate 
under s. 3 (3)*
(10), Dissatisfaction with the Act
However if the benefits conveyed to the widow under the Act 
were in a measure substantial, there is much in the provisions, or 
in the lack of them, that has come in for criticism and justifiably so.
G.V. Deshmukh, the sponser of the bill, originally projected to 
bring women other than widows within the ambit of its provisions. 
However opposition from the more conservative section of the 
legislators, generally opposed to any change in their time-hallowed 
law, was such that the ambitiously proclaimed HWRPA, the express 
purpose of which was to give "better rights" to women in property 
belies its name, and was forced to be restricted in its benefits; 
the rights finally conferred were only on widows answering a particular 
description i.e. the three categories of widows specified therein.
The rights of all other women - wives, daughters, mothers, sisters - 
were ignored. Not only that, s. ^ pointedly lays down:
" (N)othing in this Act shall apply to the property of 
any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of 
this Act."
Not having any retrospective effect therefore, there is a 
further exclusion from its purview of the numbers of those to whom 
any benefit accrued in so far as all widows whose husbands had died 
before the passing of the Act were excluded. How significant this 
exclusion was, is reinforced only when we consider that child widows
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are by no means rare in India. While the Act had to be restricted 
in its scope as a result of conservative opposition to the extension
of its benefits to all women, (though that is by no means an
extenuating factor for the title), what is incomprehensible is the 
non-retrospective aspect of the Act, and the exclusion from its ambit 
of those hapless females, widows all, whose only fault was the death
of their husbands prior to the passing of the Act.
The construction of the words "separate property" in s. 3 (l) 
coupled with the non-retrospective character of the Act led to even 
more hardships. If the Federal Court's interpretation is accepted 
(and it is, as we have already seen), then the restricted meaning 
given to the words excludes property obtained at partition as also 
property which devolved on the sole surviving coparcener. This had 
resulted in a denial of any benefit of the Act accruing to a widow 
of a predeceased son, and the widow of a predeceased son of a 
predeceased son in cases where the husbands of these two died before 
the passing of the Act, and for all that they are expressly mentioned 
as beneficiaries in the Act, they joined league with the legion of 
widows whom the Act operates to deprive rather than provide.
The provision for partition, praiseworthy in certain respects 
as it obviously was, must also come in for criticism, not for the 
conferment of the right itself, but for the unfortunate step that 
the Legislature took in that it made the widow only compete with sons 
for separate property, including a share in Da.yabh5.ga joint-family 
property, and made widows alone statutory heirs to their deceased 
husband's interests in joint-family property at Mitakgaia law. The 
result was that mothers and daughters were liable to be prejudiced 
because the responsibility for looking after them was legally divided 
between the sons and the widow, who could demand partition at her
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option and so be difficult to consult thereafter. Indeed it was this
right of partition conferred by s. 3 (3) of the Act which was felt to
be onerous and was said to be the partial undoing of the Act.^
But if that was the partial undoing of the Act, it is surely not
overstating the matter to say that the actual undoing of the statute was
the retention of the "limited estate" which in effect nullified almost
all the benefits which the Act conferred, or sought to confer.
The incidents of the "limited estate" are well-known, and have
been elaborated elsewhere at length. Suffice to say that, the widow's
entitlements notwithstanding, the overall limitation or circumscription
which was conceived by the Act, viz. that she should not, for reasons not
contemplated or accepted by the then personal law of the Hindus, sell or
2
alienate her share except for accredited and sanctioned purposes, could 
not possibly be justified in an Act, in the contemplation of which it was 
to give "better rights" to females.
Once that clause was incorporated, the reforming zeal of the Act 
may well be said to have been inchoate, proleptic, and we have to recog­
nise it for what it was - partial, imperfect, transitional, not in conso­
nance with modern popular notions of "justice" and "equity". It was only 
a matter of time before Parliament in Independent India undid this piece 
of unintentional mischief which had received legislative recognition in 1937• 
S. 14 of the HSA, which repeals the HWRPA by providing that the Hindu 
female shall become the absolute owner of any property in her possession, 
frees her at a stroke, from the disabilities to which she had hitherto been 
subjected in regard to the holding of, and title to, property, and which 
as we have seen, the Act of 1937 had not seriously considered mitigating."^
1. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 196.
2. Narasimhachari v. Andammal, A.I.R. 1979 Mad. 31, at 3*+.
3- See in this respect the comments of Fazal Ali, J., in Tulasamma v. Sesha 
Reddi, A.I.R. I977 S.C. 19^, at 197*1. ----
CHAPTER SIX
S. 14 of the HSA, 1956
"The wheel has come full circle, and the proposition 
of the MitSksara upheld ... There is no going hack."
J.D.M. Derrett, 
From "The Rights of Inheritance op. cit. , at 353*
1. The History of the "Hindu Code" Bill
The HWRPA, 1937, confined as it was to a single aspect of so compli­
cated and inter-connected a structure as the Hindu law, is an instance of 
uncc^rdinated attempts at piecemeal legislation, which not only ran into 
unforeseen and complicated problems of construction, but was also,,at best, 
a timid and half-hearted attempt at reform which could not be tolerated 
for long.
By 1939 the strong current of opinion against the statute had com­
pelled the Government into an awareness of its not inconsiderable draw­
backs, and of a serious consideration of a systematic overhauling of the 
entire Hindu law. What precipated the chain of events - the eventual 
outcome of which was the "Hindu Code" Bill - was in the first place the 
number of pending Bills which sought to clarify existing legislation and 
to.seeure more positive rights for women.
The first of these was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly 
on 18 February, 1939» By one A.C. Datta, who sought by an amendment of 
the HWRPA, to secure for daughters the right to inherit in their deceased 
parents' estates. However, there was a strong feeling against further 
piecemeal legislation, and the desire evident for comprehensive reform 
under the supervision of experts.
Under the circumstances, when on September 22, 19*K) the non­
official member moved that his Bill be referred to a select committee, 
the Government gave an undertaking to appoint a committee of eminent 
lawyers and scholars to advise them as to how the existing legislation 
regarding succession under the Hindu law should be clarified.
In persuance of that undertaking, the Government of India 
appointed a Hindu law Committee on January 25* l^l* with Sir B.H. Rau 
as the Chairman, and D.N. Mitter, J.R. Gharpure and Y.V. Joshi as 
members of the Committee with the following terras of reference*
(a) "to examine the HWRPA, 1937** •• and to suggest such 
amendments to the Act as would —
(1) resolve the doubts felt as to the construction of 
that Act?
(2) clarify the nature of the right conferred by the 
Act upon the widow; and
(3) remove any injustice that may have been done by 
the Act to the daughter..." 1
After performing what the Committee considered to be a
"(d) is tasteful analysis of the technical defects of a 
legislative measure which was inspired by high motives 
and which, in spite of its faults marks an important 
stage in the evolution of women's rights," 2
in its Report dated June 8, 19 1^, it unanimously recommended codification
in gradual stages, of the entire Hindu law beginning with the law
of succession followed by the law of marriage and in due course, by
other branches of the Hindu law.
The 19^1 Report was accompanied by two draft Bills, each of
which was laid before a select committee of both Houses of the
Legislature.
Much publicity was given to the project, and in view of the 
recommendation that steps should be taken to resuscitate the Hindu
1. Report of the Hindu Law Committee, 19 1^* at 1.
2. Ibid, at 10.
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Law Committee and to encourage the formulation of the remaining part 
of the projected Code, the Rau Committee —  as it came to the known —  
was revived in 19^* and under its auspices a Draft Code dealing 
with Succession, Maintenance, Marriage and Divorce, Minority and 
Guardianship and Adoption, prepared. It was this Code which was 
widely circulated and discussed and which gave the name "Hindu Code 
Bill" to the whole project. After publication in twelve regional 
languages and the utmost publicity, the Bau Committee, after three 
years of deliberation during which it had toured the country and exa­
mined witnesses, finally submitted its Report to the Government on 
February 21, 19^ 7* which included a revised draft of the Code, 
compiled in the light of oral evidence and replies to question^^'
The revised Code was published in the Gazette of India on April 19#
19^ 7 after introduction in the Legislative Assembly as Bill No. **2 
of 19^7 The Central Government asked the opinion of the Provincial 
Governments on the Bill and while many Governments would not commit 
themselves to an answer, those of Bombay, Orissa, Madras and Delhi
, 2
were among those which replied in general agreement with the proposals.
Intended originally that the Bill should become law on 
January 1, 19^ 8, the progress of the project was however interrupted 
by the country gaining Independence,and the Legislature's entire 
energies were directed towards the formation and consolidation of 
the new government.
In the meanwhile,though, the Bill did not lapse, and while it 
was still pending in the House, the Ministry of Law after due scrutiny 
and revision produced a revised draft which, without making any
1. The name of the Bill as stated in the Gazette was: A Bill to
Amend and Codify Certain Branches of the Hindu Law.
2. Derrett, HLFP, op. cit., at 59-60.
substantial changes in the Bill, rearranged the clauses and effected 
an improvement in the general arrangement. Thereafter the Constituent 
Assembly referred this revised draft to a select committee under the 
Chairmanship of the then Law Minister, B.R. Ambedkar.
The select committee considered both the original and the 
revised drafts in seven sittings, and though the changes brought 
in by the law Minister were almost entirely accepted by his Committee, 
they did not let this second draft as a whole pass without certain 
significant modifications of their own. The select committee's 
Report together with a third revised draft was presented to the 
House on August 12, 19^ 8.
The "Hindu Code Bill" in this its third draft aroused wide­
spread controversy and indeed downright antagonism. The abolition 
of the Mitafcgara joint-family, equal shares for daughters, the 
abolition of the widow's limited estate, and the generally hostile 
stance adopted towards customs —  all of which the "Hindu Code" 
incorporated in its third draft, aroused ire and opposition from all 
quarters. In particular, the clause incorporating divorce for 
oppressed spouses became the target of vehement indignation. The 
inevitable cry of religion in danger was raised, and inevitably, 
this further fanned the flames of hostile, and not infrequently, 
vituperative resistance. A number of pamphlets were written con­
demning the Code'*' and there were debasing references to the
qualifications and social origins of the prime mover and author of 
2
the third draft. In short, so charged was the atmosphere both in 
and out of Parliament that the Government wondered whether it was
1. See for instance Why the Hindu Code is Detestable, published by 
Shastra Dharma Prachar Sabha (All. - Cal. Author(s) unknown.
2. The law Minister belonged to Scheduled Caste, i.e. a Harijan.
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at all feasible to carry the project through in the atmosphere of 
violent hostility that it had generated.
The law Minister however persevered, and utilised the interval 
between 19^9 and 1951 to canvass further public opinion on the Code.
He convened a conference in 1950 participants to which were leading 
authorities in the Hindu law from all walks of life and which 
included pagdits from Banares. All the areas of controversy in the 
"Hindu Code Bill" were placed before the conference, and the views 
expressed were subsequently given careful consideration by the 
Government. In addition, a special conference was held at Trivandrum 
to consider how far persons governed by the special systems of law 
in force in that part of the country* could be brought within the 
scope of the Code. Certain proposals were made by a special 
committee appointed by this conference. As a result of these 
conferences^  several amendments were drafted on behalf on the 
Government to be moved in the House when the Code next came up for 
consideration.
When the third draft came to be considered by the Constituent 
Assembly (Legislative) which had become the provisional Parliament 
as a result of the Constitution coming into force, it was clear that 
many of the members were nervous about the changes sought to be made 
in the law and fearful of the unfavourable reaction that it might 
provoke in the country.
The debate dragged on and amendment after amendment was tabled 
until by September 195^* all the heroic efforts of the Law Minister, 
the session ended with only four clauses passed. That the fourth 
came to be passed was itself no mean achievement, for that clause 
gave the Bill its over-riding effect. The principle of codification
1. The Marumakkattayam and Allyasantana laws.
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vas admitted, while retaining at the same time the right of members 
to question and debate on the individual clauses of the Code?' The 
sessions ended, and in 1952 fresh elections saw the dissolution 
of the provisional Parliament and with it the "Hindu Code Bill" 
stood lapsed for all intents and purposes.
It may be mentioned in passing that when the "Hindu Code Bill" 
was being debated before the provisional Parliament, those in 
opposition to it were vehement in their protests that in respect 
of such a revolutionary measure of social reform vitally affecting 
the religion, culture and traditions of the Hindus, the provisional 
Parliament had no mandate to pass such a Bill in the absence of a 
Referendum or other sign of approval by the majority of the people. 
Consequently Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, as leader of the Congress Party, 
made it in terms a part of the Congress Manifesto that if returned 
to power in the elections of 1952» they would enact the "Hindu Code 
Bill", and true to this promise, when Parliament assembled for the 
first time under the Constitution in 1952» the matter of the Hindu 
Code Bill was again taken up with renewed vigour.
The nature of the discussions on the Hindu Code in the pro­
visional Parliament, the diversity of views, and the tactics adopted 
by many a member to delay the passage of the Bill, if not to kill it 
altogether, had by then convinced the Government that the wiser 
course would be to introduce the Code in the form of separate Bills, 
one to each Chapter or Part, and each with identical "application" 
and "over-riding effect" clauses.
In order to test the temper of Parliament the first part to 
be dealt with was not that part which was logically first, Marriage
1. Derrett, HLPP, op. cit., at 71-
and Divorce, but only that part of it which proposed to deal with
civil marriages. The most tactful method, and the most appropriate,
was to take up the question in the form of a repeal and re-enactment
with amendments of the Special Marriage Act, 1872.^
The Special Marriage Bill of 1952 which sought to provide a
civil and secular form of marriage for all persons in the country,
irrespective of the faith which the parties may profess, was
referred to the Joint Committee of both the Houses in December 1953,
under the chairmanship of the then Law Minister C.C. Biswas. The
two Houses rapidly passed the Bill and the President's Assent was
2
given in October of that year.
The success of the SMA, 190& gave, as it were, a new lease of 
life to the till then moribund "Hindu Code Bill", and soon there­
after, the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Bill, dealing exclusively 
with the Hindu "sacramental" marriage was introduced and passed 
with some amendments first in the Ra.jya Sabha (Council of States) 
and then by the Lok Sabha (the House of the People), as the HMA, 1955* 
While the Hindu Marriage Bill was still pending, the Government 
turned its attention to what was conceivably the most momentous 
part of the Hindu Code, the law relating to intestate succession 
among Hindus, which was first published, and then formally presented 
to the Halva Sabha on September 19, 1955* and subsequently in the 
Lok Sabha.
The Hindu Succession Bill, as it was called, received a large 
measure of support in both the Houses. Gone were the days of 
vitriolic opposition, and in fact members vied with another in
1. Derrett, HLPP, op. cit., at 73*
2. Ibid., at 73-J+.
3. See Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II, s.2, at 339-59*
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recommending a better deal for women. Objections were levelled, in 
particular, at the exclusion of joint-family property from the 
purview of the Bill, and the half share that the Bill suggested as 
the daughter's inheritance.
The select committee to which the Bill was thereafter referred, 
took serious note of these objections, and its recommendations, 
geared^as they were, towards the improving of the status of women, 
were eventually incorporated in the H5A, 1956, when the Bill became 
law. It suggested a share equal to that of the son for the daughter, 
and at the same time recommended the abolition of the limited estate 
with retrospective effect, that is to say, whatever property the 
female Hindu was possessed of at the commencement of the new law, 
was to be possessed by her as her absolute estate. The Committee 
also displayed considerable sympathy for the widow for obvious 
reasons, and despite the generally accepted proposition that property 
ordinarily descends rather than ascends, was of the view that the 
mother be placed in the first group of heirs, to inherit equally 
and along with the lineal descendants, their widows and the widow(s) 
of the deceased. The result of this was that, when the H5A came 
into existence, the father alone was relegated as secondary heir 
to class II of the Schedule.
On a further recommendation of the ever conciliatory though 
extremely capable H.V. Fataskar, —  a minister of State who had 
been appointed in the Law Ministry and designatedj^ the onerous task 
of reform in place of the ailing Law Minister —  a clause was 
incorporated whereby the share of a Mitakgara coparcener in joint- 
family property was deemed heritable by his heirs i for the purpose 
of calculating his interest, the device of a notional partition 
which was deemed to have taken place between him and the other
coparceners immediately before his death, was adopted.
To remove further opposition to the Bill, and to put at rest 
the agitation in regard to the family dwelling house, Pataskar's 
advice was acted upon, and a provision included/ whereby a female 
heir would not be able to claim partition of the dwelling house 
unless the male heirs chose to divide their respective shares. At 
the same time her right to live in the family dwelling house was
guaranteed so long as she remained unmarried, or was widowed or
deserted by her husband. In this its amended form, the Bill received 
practically the unanimous approval of both the Houses of Parliament, 
and on June 17, 1956, the HSA became the law of the land.
The story thereafter is one of smooth progress, and further 
instalments of the Hindu Code followed in quick succession. The 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill was introduced in the Rajya 
Sabha in April 1953* and was referred to a select committee by 
motions adopted by both the Houses. The select committee presented 
its Report on March 16, 19551 and after being passed by both the
Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha came into force as the HMGA, 1956*
on August 25, 1956 when it was assented to by the President. Con­
sistent with the new trend of thought, the position of women under 
this law was also considerably improved.^
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Bill —  the last Bill in 
the series was introduced in the Ra.tya Sabha on August 23, 1956.
It was then referred to a select committee of both the Houses, and 
on the committee presenting its Report on November 19, 1956, there 
was no dissenting note on any of the important provisions of the 
Bill; thus unimpeded, it made rapid progress and became law on 
December 21, 1956 as the HAMA. Like the earlier Acts, there is
1. See above at 71 for a fhller discussion.
much in the HAMA as well that puts the female in a more advantageous 
position than heretofore in regard to adoption. One important 
aspect of the Act must however be mentioned. S. 11, (iii) and (iv), 
is a safeguard against immoral purposes in that it provides that, 
where the adoption is by a male or female, of a child of the opposite 
sex, the difference between the age of the adoptive parent and that 
of the adopted child must be at least twenty-one years. The provis­
ions regarding maintenance are largely a codification of the exist­
ing law.
Thus was passed successfully a very substantial part of the
2 3* Hindu Code Bill" as originally envisaged. "Only a half-way house"
towards the codification of the entirety of the Hindu law it may be,
but the desire inherent in it to do away with restrictive and antiquated
practices which stood in the way of the Constitutional promise of
equality of all in the eye of the law, has a significance all its own
from the Hindu female's perspective. In particular, the new rules of
inheritance and succession - the giving to her the right of absolute
ownership in property - frees her at a stroke from the tutelage which
for millenniahad been her fate, and, provided that she is herself able
to shake off the shackles of subservience that, to this day, is in
evidence as being of the essence of her mental ethos, the Hindu female
need be in no further apprehension of the indiscriminate biases of
the past.
With this background, we must turn our attention to an examina­
tion of the same right, how far it has worked to the female's advan­
tage, the satisfactory settling of the problems of construction connected 
with it and those that still elude resolution - aspects of a state
1. For a fuller discussion see above at 55*
2. The only part of the Code that did not become law was the Joint- 
Family Bill.
3- D;erret, RIBI, op. gj£..321.
of affairs inevitably consequent upon piecemeal legislation.
2. The HSA 1956 —  Its Scope
The dedicated and tireless —  if often frustrating - efforts 
of the social reformers had at last borne fruit in 1956, and when 
on June 17 of that year, the HSA became operative, it was the 
culmination of a movement which had aimed at changing the ancient 
Hindu law for a more equitable, consistent and coherent form of 
jurisprudence. ^
"An Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate
2succession among Hindus," it is a consolidating statute and must 
be interpreted as containing in complete form the whole body of law
3
on the subject it deals with, including testamentary succession 
among Hindus, uninfluenced by considerations derived from the previous 
state of law. To the extent therefore that there is a provision in 
this Act with reference to any matter relating to succession, 
that provision must apply whatever the previous law night have been. 
However, an enactment of this nature should not be so construed as 
to affect or alter any incident which does not fall either expressly 
or by necessary implication within its ambit, for it is axiomatic 
in the interpretation of an amending statute that it should be
1. Per Chhangani J., Mat. Bhuri Bai ▼. Mst. Champl Bai, A.I.R.
1958 Raj. 139 at lEu
2. Preamble to the HSA, 1956.
3. Notwithstanding the express words of the Preamble, s. 30 of the 
HSA lays downi "Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other 
testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of 
being so disposed by him, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Indian Succession Act. 1925, or any other law for the time 
being in force and applicable to Hindus j" and according to the 
Explanation, the words "any property" in the section would 
include the interest of a male Hindu in a MitakgarS. coparcenary 
property.
construed strictly, as rigorously confined to the subject-matter 
of its express provisions.^-
In view of the changed social and economic conditions, and 
the backdrop of the impetus to accord equal status and treatment to 
women in matters of succession, the essential scheme of the Act is 
to bring about fundamental and far-reaching changes. One basic 
principle that ran through the estate inherited by a female heir, 
namely, that she took a limited estate, has been abolished except 
where expressly created by will or other instrument, and whatever 
property she now inherits, whether from a male or a female, and by 
whatever school of Hindu law she is governed, is now taken by her as 
her absolute property. In addition to the female heirs specified 
in the traditional law and those introduced by the Hindu law of
Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 192^ and the HWRPA 1937* numerous
-a
other female heirs have been newly added to the list. Their 
position in the line of heirs has been considerably advanced, and 
the widow, daughter and mother being class I heirs, they take the 
property simultaneously and equally with the son. Conversion to 
another religion, unchastity and remarriage subsequent to the HSA 
(it is submitted), are no longer bars to succession, and the female 
Hindu now constitutes a fresh stock of descent, so that the property 
after her descends to her own heirs and not to reversioners as 
heretofore.
Broad as these outlines sure, the ameliorative sweep of the 
HSA is nonetheless put in perspective, and with this backdrop we 
must now turn our attention to its provisions and the judicial
1. Ra$iav^/£hariar, 7th ed., Vol. H, op. cit., at 813.
2. Hereinafter referred to as the HU(A)A.
3. See the Schedule to the HSA, 1956.
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decisions thereufctv to assess how far the legislative intendment 
has been practically achieved.
3. The Provisions of S. l*f
Radical as the HSA is in many respects, by far the most radical 
departure from the traditional law is the incorporation of s. Ik 
in the Act, the provisions of which leave no manner of doubt that 
the overall intent of the Legislature was to abrogate the stringent 
provisions of Hindu law which militated against full proprietary 
rights of a female owner, and to confer upon her the status of an 
independent and absolute owner of property. Sub-s. (l) of s. I** 
lays downt
**(A)ny property possessed by a female Hindu, whether 
acquired before or after the commencement of th Act, 
shall be held, by her as full owner thereof and not as 
a limited owner#
11 (EExplanation. In this subsection, •property' includes 
both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a 
female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, 
or in lieu of maintenance A or by gift from any person, I ox. 
whether a relative or not,before, at or after her \  Yvi^^ejncx^ce,
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase 
or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, 
and also any such property held by her as stridhana 
immediately before the commencement of this Act."
The scope of the w o r d " is thus enlarged, so that in 
the light of thi E* pLc^<xh^ must be understood Co ^
Vrv- j p o O p  ln other wordSf the object
of the sub-s. is to extinguish the estate called "limited estate" or 
"widow's estate" in Hindu law and to make a Hindu woman, who under 
the old law would have been only a "limited" owner, a full owner 
of property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate
heritable by her own heirs^ and not revertible to the heirs of the 
2
last male holder.
It is also noteworthy that the emphaBis is on the word 
"acquired" which —  as the Supreme Court has emphasised —  has to 
be given the widest possible meaning^ in view of the comprehensive 
Explanation which amplifies the scope of the words "any property" 
to include within its ambit every description of property, moveable 
or immoveable, and howsoever acquired, the object of the Legislature 
being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female 
suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Gastric 
law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights 
which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage, 
and to recognise her status as an independent and absolute owner
if
of property.
However, if the purpose of sub-s. (l) of s. Ik was calculated 
to achieve a social purpose by bringing about a change in the 
social and economic position of women in Hindu society, it was 
certainly not the intention of the Legislature to discriminate In 
favour of females by granting them privileges denied to males. So
1. The general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus 
are governed by the provisions of s. 15 which lays downs
(l) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall 
devolve..., —
(a) firstly upon the sons and daughters
(including the children of any predeceased 
son or daughter) and the husband^" (b) ...
2. Per Ramaswami J., Eramma v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879. at 
1522.
3. Per Grover. J., Seth Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi, A.I.R. 1970 
S.C. 1963, at 195£
k. Per Bhagwati. J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 
l^ft, at 19^7.
as to maintain this balance, sub-s. (2) of s. l*f declares*
H (N)othing contained in subsection (l) shall apply 
to any property acquired by way of gift or under 
a will or any other instrument or under a decree 
or order of a civil court or under an award where 
the terms of the gift, will or other instrument 
or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted 
estate in such property."
This provision is more in the nature of an exception to
sub-s. (l), and keeping in mind the social purpose of the latter, it
must therefore be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as
possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision of sub-s. (l).^
It specifies that where the terms of the instrument prescribe a
restricted estate, such acquisition of property will be excepted
from the operation of sub-s. (l). Or to expand more fully, where
the instrument, typically a will, deed, or compromise or decree 
2
for the first time confers on a woman an interest in property, and
does so with a limitation cutting down the tenure to something less
than an absolute estate, the limitation stands. In all other cases
whatever the original intention of the parties, the woman holds
3
the property absolutely.
1. Ibid.
2. Seth Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1963# at 1966. 
In explaining the significance of the word "acquired" in 
sub-s. (2) of s. 1^ , Patel, J., had this to say*
"... ordinarily the word in a statute must receive its ordinary 
meaning. But a word may have a wider or limited meaning by 
reason of the context of its purpose. The Court has, while 
construing a statutory provision, to consider the language used, 
other relevant provisions, the circumstances under which the 
statute was enacted and its purpose. Having regard to the 
intention of the Legislature in enacting s. 14 of the Act which 
was to reform the Hindu law and give full status to women, the 
word "acquired" must mean acquisition for the first time."*
Udhav Shankar v. Tarabai. A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 308, at 309.
3. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 203.
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(l) Judicial Construction of the Word. "Possessed" in S. 14 (l)
No difficulty is likely to arise in respect of property acquired
by a female after the commencement of the Act, as it is clear that
any such property would be held and possessed by her as absolute
owner with full powers of disposition except where a restricted
estate is prescribed as provided in sub-s. (2).
However, though the section is retrospective in so far as it
enlarges the Hindu woman's limited estate into an absolute tenure even
in respect of property which had been acquired by her before the Act
came into force,^ its operation is nevertheless confined to property
2
in the possession of the female on the date the Act came into force.
What could be regarded as such "possession" was the subject
3
of considerable controversy, the interpretation of which may now
1. See for instance the decision in Brundaban Misra v. Iswar Swain, 
A.I.R. 1983 Or. 172, where the widow having remained in possession 
as a limited owner since 1940, thereafter when the HSA had come 
into force, it was held that a gift made by her in 19&9 was valid.
2. Shortly after the enactment of the HSA, it was held in Kamla 
Devi v. Bachulal, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. at Wft
" (T)here can be no doubt that by reason of the expression,
'whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act,' 
the section is retrospective in effect." It is submitted that in 
those early days, the full implication of the words perhaps escaped 
the Supreme Court, for in fact s. 14 is only partly retrospective 
in that the property may be acquired by her either before or 
after the commencement of the Act; however that it is also partly 
prospective is evident from the stipulation that she must be 
possessed of such property at the time the Act came into force,
"and the two things, that is, the acquisition and possession, 
either actual or constructive, must co-exist for the conferral of 
an absolute estate on a Hindu female."* Per Tare, J«, Anandibai v. 
Sundarabai, A.I.R. 1965 M.P. 85, at 90.
3. G.K. Dabke draws our attention to this controversy when he points 
out that "(l)t is said that the said term (possessed), is not a 
happy one, and that the Legislature should have used the term 
'held' in its stead (vide Marudakkal v. Arumugha, A.I.R. 1958 
Had. 255)« In another case the term 'owned* is suggested as a 
better substitute (vide Annapumamma v. Sankararao, A.I.R. i960
A.P. 359). In some other quarters it is suggested that the phrase 
'belonging to' would have been more appropriate." But in 
explaining the problems of construction, the same writer makes 
the pertinent point that, though it is also possible to suggest 
more phrases such as "'acquired by', 'vested in' etc, "(i)t will 
however have, to be borne in mind that none of the aforesaid 
terms would have been less exposed to the difficulties of
P.T.O.
however be regarded as satisfactorily settled in view of certain 
authoritative Supreme and High Court pronouncements.
The first clear exposition of the word "possessed" as used 
in s. 1^ (1) is to be found in the judgment of Mookherjee, J. f in 
Gostha Bihari v. Haridas^ where his Lordship spelt out in clear 
terms that
"(T)he opening words 'any property possessed by a female 
Hindu' obviously meant that, to come within the purview 
of the section, the property must be in the possession 
of the female concerned at the date of the commencement 
of the Act... That possession might have been actual 
or constructive or in any form recognised by law... 2 
taking the word "possession*in its widest connotation..."
What the words "widest connotation" might imply was then
explained by the Supreme Court to.mean that the word "possessed" is
used in s. l4> (l) in a broad sense, and in the context means the
state of owning or having in one's hand or power. Such possession
need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the
property by the female Hindu, but may be possession in law.
Jt
In Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno, it was reiterated that the 
use of the expression "possessed of" instead of "in possession of" 
in s. l*f (l) was intended to enlarge the meaning of this expression.-^ 
The woman must therefore have ownership with a right to possession.
In case where property is in actual physical possession, it would 
obviously be in one's own hands; if it is in constructive possession,
it would be in one's own power. But in explaining the expression
n 6"the state of owning in Mangal Singh's case, Bhargava, J.,
interpretation than the term actually used."* "Full Ownership of 
Hindu Women," (i960) 62 Bom. L.R. (j), 162-68 and 177-82, at’164.
1. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557. 2. Ibid,, at 559.
3* Kotturuswami v.Veerawa, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577» at 5^1 approving 
Yenkayamma v. Veerayya, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280.
k. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786. teXovAj ojs .
5. Ibid., at 1789.
6.
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cons id ered a third category, that is
"(w)here there may not be actual, physical or constructive 
possession and yet, the person still possesses the right 
to recover actual physical possession or constructive 
possession; that would be a case covered by the expression 
"the state of owning," 1
or possession in law which would have the effect of bringing it
within the purview of s. Ik (l).
From the foregoing one may deduce that a female Hindu is
"possessed" of property, (l) of which she is in actual lawful
possession, (2) of which she is in lawful constructive possession,
(3) of which she may be the owner and entitled to recover possession
2
from a third party holding not on her behalf or with her permission.
(a) Constructive Possession
The right of ownership has two dominant characteristics, that 
is, title and usufruct. If the limited owner retains the title and the 
usufruct is parted with in any of the modes permissible under law, 
such as mortgage, lease (temporary or permanent), licence and the 
like, those who take from her merely retain derivative title under 
her, admitting and recognising the female owner as the owner of the 
property in their possession. In all such cases of constructive 
possession s. Ik (l) applies and the reversionary rights stand 
extinguished.
1. Ibid., at 1790.
_ a
2. R.D. and A.B. Dial, A Commentary on the HSA, 1956, 3 * (New
Delhi, Anand, 1979)» at 120.
3. In concurrence with this view, it was held in Venkayamma v.
Veerayya, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280 at 281 that the possession of a
licencee, lessee or mortgagee from the female owner, or the 
possession of a guardian, or trustee, or agent would be her 
possession.wrvder a.Ik, This was quoted with approval in 
Kotturuswamifs case, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 at 5Sl» and followed 
in numerous other decisions. On parity of reasoning, s, 1^- (l)
cannot apply where the widow herself is in possession in any of
these capacities. So it was held in Chandradeep v. Mahip, A.I.R. 
i960 Pat. 112, where the rehan bond apart, the limited owner
P.T.O.
-*+71-
(i) Mortgage
Where the mortgage is a simple mortgage and the female holder 
is in possession of the property at the time that the Act came into 
force, it is obvious that the operation of s. 1*+ (l) would bar the 
reversioners from questioning its validity on grounds of lack of 
legal necessity or benefit of the estate.
The question whether, if the mortgage was a usufructuary 
one with possession transferred to the mortgagee, and s. 1*+ (l) 
would apply to enlarge the interest of the mortgagor into an absolute 
estate is more difficult, and falls to be answered by considering 
the proper meaning to be given to the word "possessed" in the sub-s.
In a usufructuary mortgage no doubt the corporeal possession 
of the property is transferred to the mortgagee, but the female 
mortgagor is still entitled to the equity of redemption which is 
certainly property, and that property admits only of what may be 
called constructive possession in the sense of a right to possession 
on redemption.'*'
This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Arumugha 
2
v. Nachiamuthu, where the presumptive reversioners brought a suit
had also executed a deed of trust in favour of a particular deity 
and was in possession as a trustee when the HSA came into force. 
Rai J.*s, ruling was to the effect that the possession of the 
limited owner as a trustee of the properties endowed, would not 
be "possession" within the meaning of s, l*f (l). Similarly it 
was held in Hathuni v. Mst. Kachnar, A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 160, that 
in respect of property which had gone out of ownership and 
possession of a Hindu widow on account of alienation by way of 
dedication to a deity prior to the passing of the Act, the widow 
could not acquire absolute ownership under s. l*f (l). On a 
further finding of the invalidity of the dedication itself, the 
claim of the reversioners as not binding on them was upheld.
1. Raghavachariar, 7th ed., Vol. II, op. cit., at 907.
2. A.I.R. 1958 Mad. *+59.
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for a declaration that the mortgage deed executed by the limited
owner would not be binding on them beyond her lifetime. During the
pendency of the suit however, the HSA came into force, and in ruling
against the reversionary claim, Ramaswami, J., emphasised that the
widow not having parted with the equity of redemption, she would be
deemed to be in constructive possession of the property within the
meaning of s. 1*+ (l).^
It would therefore follow that s. l*f (1) applies to enlarge
the limited owner's interest in the equity of redemption to that of
an absolute estate subject to the rights of the mortgagee to be in
enjoyment of the property till the mortgage debt is paid off.
2
Accordingly in Jai Ram v. Tota Ram where the woman executed a 
usufructuary mortgage which continued at the time and after the Act 
was passed, it was held that the female was in constructive 
possession, and despite the invalidity of the mortgage the revexv 
sionary claims must be regarded as extinguished.
This view was however resiled from in Madras, and in
3
Kanthimathinatha v. Vayyapuri in circumstances similar to the 
Punjab decision, Anantanarayanan, J., —  ruling in favour of the
1. The same decision was arrived at in Chandradeep v. Mahip, A. I.R.
I960 Pat. 112; see also Rabari v. Bad Manl. (1976) 1? Guj. L.R. 729, 
where the husband mortgaged property, and subsequent to his death, 
his son executed two further mortgage deeds —  all prior to the
HSA —  and it was held that in view of the ratio in Munnalal v. 
Rajkumar, (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. l*+93 at l*+99-1500), abrogating 
Pratapmull's case (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20), the mere fact that the 
Hindu widow had not demanded partition, did not disentitle her 
to her half share under s. 3 \2) of the HWRPA, 1937* As a result, 
she would be deemed to have been in constructive possession of 
her share in the mortgaged properties when the Act of 1956 came 
into force, and continued to be in such possession till her
death in 1961.
2. A.I.R. 1961 Pun j. 395.
3. A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 37.
*+. Jai Ram v. Tota Ram, cited above.
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plaintiff who was both the reversioner to the estate as well as 
the actual heir of the limited owner, —  stressed that since the 
real object of the Act was to improve the legal status of Hindu 
women, it was never the intention of the Legislature that alienees 
from such limited owners should be benefitted from any consequential 
and automatic enlargement of their estate. This being so, "there 
is no room in principle for distinguishing the case of a mortgage 
which is one kind of alienation from outright sale which is another 
kind."1 It is however submitted that there is in fact a quite 
distinct difference in the nature of the two alienations. In 
alienation by way of sale, there is a total relinquishment with no 
present or future interest. But since the limited owner could not 
convey more than she herself possessed, all that the alienee stood 
to gain was the limited interest of the female, so that at her death, 
and despite s. 1*+ (l), the reversionary right subsisted. On the 
other hand, where a usufructuary mortgage is executed, the heir at 
the widow's death after the HSA must be entitled to the property, 
but it is submitted, he is entitled only to the extent that he is 
heir to the right in her of future physical possession, and not in 
any reversionary capacity.
(ii) Lease
The principle as applicable to the case of a mortgage by the 
limited owner is equally applicable in the case of a lease under 
which she puts the lessee in physical possession of the property, but
retains ownership thereof.
2
In Thakur v. Jago, the contention was that the two permanent 
leases executed by the widow could not be invalidated even if the
1. Kanthimathinatha v. Vayyapuri, A.I.H. 1963 Mad. 37» at 38*
2. A.I.R. 1962 Pat. 131.
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money raised by them were not for legal necessity. Concurring 
with this view, the Court's ruling was that there is essentially 
no difference between a temporary and a permanent lease, and as with 
the former so also with the latter, the widow still retains some 
interest which is capable of being converted to absolute estate 
under s. lb (l). The fact that the lease is for a notional rent 
would make no difference, and the reversioner's right to challenge 
the alienation on the ground of lack of necessity stands nullified.^
(iii) Property in the Hands of an Agent
S. l*f (1) was undoubtedly meant to improve the legal status
of females, so the Courts have consistently held, and in Sampat
2Kumari v. Iakshmi Ammal, the word "possessed" was held to include
1. The obiter dicta in an unreported judgment of the Madras High 
Court, and quoted in Sampat Kumari v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R.
1963 Mad. 50* at 57 i® to the effect that "(I)f for instance, 
at the date of the commencement of the Act, property inherited 
by a woman were in possession of a lessee from her, it cannot 
be contended that s. l*f (l) does not apply to the case on the 
ground that the woman was not in physical possession of the 
property." In criticising the view taken by the Courts in 
regard to mortgages and leases, G.K. Dabke has this to sayt"But 
with great respect, what has been overlooked is that though in 
one sense the possession of the mortgagee or the lessee is on 
behalf of the mortgagor or the lessor, as the case may be, 
strictly legally speaking in transactions involving transfer 
of interest in the property there is a qualitative division of 
the property, the alienee getting into possession of what is 
transferred, and the alienor continuing in possession of the 
residue;" and he submits "with respect" that, "it is the residue 
that will transform into full estate, and what is transferred 
being the subject-matter of unauthorised alienation will go to 
the reversioners. To hold otherwise would be to give (the) 
benefit of the Act to the alienees for whose benefit it has not 
been enacted. " —  see "The HSA, Section l*f," (1962) 6b Bom. L. R. 
(j)., 97-101, at 99* Such an argument is, it is submitted,self 
defeating, for once the mortgage is redeemed or the lease 
terminated, whether in the lifetime of the widow or not, the 
property reverts to the female Hindu or her heirs under s. 15» 
as an absolute estate.
2. A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 50.
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property in the hands of an agent. In a case burdened with convoluted 
facts, one of the contentions by the appellant, the surviving 
daughter, was that the widow having surrendered control of her 
portion of the estate by executing a general power of attorney in 
favour of a third party, had thereby forfeited her right to remain 
in possession, and was in effect "civilly dead altogether."^ In 
refuting this argument the learned Judge, Venkataraman, J., reiterated 
on the authority of earlier judgments that, the word "possessed" in 
s. lb (l) means the state of owning, and as there can be no ownership 
without title, it would follow that in the present case, the actual 
physical ownership of the property being with the agent who was 
nevertheless accountable to the widow, such possession would be 
"possession" within the meaning of s. lb (l).
(iv) Property in the Hands of a Co-sharer
It has also consistently been the view of the Courts that, a
widow may be deemed to be in constructive possession through other
co-sharers, as in law the possession of one co-sharer is the
possession of, and on behalf of all the co-sharers. So the Madhya
2
Predesh High Court held in Anandibai v. Sundarabai.
After the death of the father in 1951» S filed a suit in 1953 f °r
1. Ibid., at 56.
2. A.I.R. 1965 M.P. 85.
S
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partition and separate possession of the property from her sister A,
who however alleged that, not she hut her son K, was in exclusive
possession by reason of his adoption by their father. The claim of
adoption having been negatived, it was found that both A and K were
in fact jointly in possession. To the extent that the principle
of co-ownership was involved, Tare, J., in delivering judgment
was quite clear that the right of a co-widow or sister as co-heir,
to claim partition was there even before the enactment of the HSA,
1956, so that after the Act had come into force, there could be no
doubt but that such a suit was tenable, and to the extent that the
property was in the hands of A,^ S would be deemed to be in
2
constructive possession thereof.
(v) Sham or Fictitious Transfer Effected by the Widow
The principle that the female is in constructive possession 
though the actual possession is of another under an invalid transfer, 
will apply to those cases where the transfer by the female is such 
as would not bind her. Obviously where it is binding on her during 
her lifetime, she has no right to possession despite the HSA and is to 
the advantage of the reversion.
1. For a discussion of the rights of a female owner as against a 
trespasser, see below at ^82 ff.
2. See also Amar Kaur v. Joginder Kaur, (1967) 69 Punj. L.R. 5^5 
where property was mutated jointlyin favour of the step-mother 
and the unmarried daughter for the latter's maintenance in 
accordance with customary law, and it was held that despite 
her marriage in 1961, the provisions of sub-s. (l) of s. l*f 
were attracted, as in 1956 she was in possession of it construc­
tively through her other co-sharer. Similarly in Madhab Chandra 
v. Smt. Joymati, A.I.R. 1976 Gau. 10, where neither the plaintiff 
nor her widowed mother through whom she claimed title, was in 
actual possession of the suit properties but which was for over 
twenty years in the possession of persons who were co-owners 
with the father, it was held that even if the plaintiff, and 
before her, her mother, was not in actual physical possession, 
the possession of the defendants in the eye of the law, was the 
constructive possession of the plaintiff and before her, her 
mother.
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The question for consideration before the Patna High Court ^
was whether the reversionary right could be asserted where the two
deeds of gift executed by the widow were attacked as "farzi, collusive,
illegal, null and void and ineffective." In the view of the learned
judge^Misra, J., since the reversioners themselves alleged in strong
language that the gift was invalid so that obviously possession did
not pass to the donees, it would follow that the property was still
in the possession of the Hindu female. S. l*f (l) applied in terras
3
to the case so as to nullify all reversionary claims.
An incomplete gift not resulting in transfer of title stands on
It
the same footing. Thus in Viswapathi v. Venkatakrishna, the 
decision was to the effect that the female holder would be deemed to 
be in possession of the property after the Act, where she had executed 
an ineffective deed of gift prior to the Act, the Court holding that 
mere execution of a deed of gift is ineffective J it must be 
accompanied by delivery from the donor to the donee. Where therefore 
on the plaintiff's own averment that, "she... is now in possession 
of the same in widow's estate,"-* her right to the estate would be
1. Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 75-
2. Ibid., at 80.
3. See also Shib Dai v. Ghausi Lai, A.I.R. 1965 J. & K. 11, another 
decision on collusive gift by the widow. For collusive sale see 
Jainuna v. Ramsarup, A.I.R. i960 Pat. 182, where it was held that, 
on the plaintiff's own case, the sale deeds being sham tran­
sactions, illegal and invalid and not binding on them, the 
possession of the transferees must be regarded as merely 
permissive, and the widow deemed in law to be in constructive 
possession thereof. However that this view is not free from doubt 
is evident from the ruling in Sheopu.jan v. Ramsewak, A.I.R. 1963 
Pat. 330, reversing Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, cited above. On the 
other hand the dicta in Rangammal v. Marudarauthu (1970) 2 M. L. J.
620, that even if the widow retained possession during her lifetime 
after executing a settlement deed, that possessory right alone would 
not attract the provisions of s. l*f (l) is open to serious objection. 
The correct position it is submitted, is that established in Kaduri 
v. Abburi, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 2k6t where the settlement deed having 
proved ineffective, it was held that the widow's ownership rights 
still subsisted and was capable of being enlarged into full owner­
ship under s. 1^ (l).
*+. A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 9 5. Ibid., at 12.
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enlarged to an absolute tenure by reason of s. Ik (l). ^
(vi) Where the Property is Transferred under an Invalid! Will I uce- £ 
by the Widow
In the traditional law, as we have already seen, the limited 
owner had no authority to dispose of her estate except for accredited 
purposes, but where she did alienate by way of an invalid will, 
the effect of s. l*f (l) has been to convert such estate into an 
absolute tenure, the principle being that as a will is normally 
made for the purpose of making dispositions of property to take 
effect after the testator’s death there is no transfer of property 
as such, and the reversionary claims must be regarded as effectively 
terminated in all such cases.
Judicial decisions have construed accordingly, and in the 
Rajasthan High Court a bequest by a Hindu widow to a temple, made 
prior to the passing of the HSA, was held &> valid after her death 
in August, 1956» on the principle that the defect that was attached 
to the will when it was executed, was cured by the HSA when it
1. See also Chhagunram v. Naginram, I. L.R. (1966) Guj. 900, where 
on the same principle it was held that the widow’s gift prior 
to the Act, to a minor relative, herself acting as the guardian, 
having been invalidated, the subsequent sale by her after the 
commencement of the HSA, could not be impeached, as she had both 
title to, and possession of property.
The operation of s. 14- (l) on property in other ways 
bound, prior to the coming into effect of the HSA, is evident 
in Subbareddi v. Penchalamma, A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 3&Q.. The widow 
retained the property in her possession and made only a gift 
of the vested remainder after her lifetime to her daughters.
The ISA having come into effect while she was alive, it was held 
that s. l*f (l) operated to the detriment of the reversion in 
enlarging her estate to absolute property. See also Rathinasamy 
v. Nagammal, A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 133» where one of two widows 
relinquished her rights in the property in favour of her co- 
widow and her daughter, retaining only the right to possess and 
enjoy the same during her lifetime. At her death after 1956* 
it was held that she had become absolute owner of her share by 
virtue of s. 1^  (l), and had therefore been entirely within her 
rights to settle the property on a third party. A similar decision 
was arrived at in Venkatasubba v. Penchalamma, (1962) 2 An. V. R.
came into force and conferred the right of absolute ownership on the 
widow in respect of the disputed property which was undoubtedly possessed 
by her.^
(vii) Where an Invalid Adoption is Effected by the Widow
Adoption by the widow under the traditional law, had the effect 
of divesting her of her limited estate as a consequence of the theory 
of "relation back" whereby the adopted son was deemed to have come 
into existence at the moment of his adoptive father's death* However, 
where such adoption was proved to be invalid on technical grounds,
its effect would be precisely that of any other invalid transfer of pro­
perty and the widow deemed to be in constructive possession to the 
elimination of the reversioners.
2
The question was first touched upon in So mi ah v. Rattamma,
where the alleged invalid adoption by the widow in 1950 having been
negatived, the Court was nevertheless at pains to underscore the conse­
quences that must flow in circumstances where there had indeed been an
1* Mst. Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shri.ji, A.I.E. 1965 Raj. 41. Similarly the 
survival of the widow after the commencement of the HSA validates 
the bequest. In Smt. Sunderdevi v. Manakchand, A.I.R. 1975 211,
where to the contention that the limited owner had no authority to 
dispose of her widow’s estate in 1953» the. Court's response was that 
since the will speaks at the death of the testator, and admittedly as at 
that time the widow had unfettered capacity to dispose of the said 
property, the will was perfectly valid; and this would be in harmony 
with the general principle that: "A will unless a contrary intention 
appears therein must be construed, with reference to the real estate 
comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed 
immediately before the death of the testator and as if the condition 
of things to which it refers in this respect is that existing immed­
iately before his death.": Halsbury’s laws of England, Simonds sd.,
1962, op. cit., Likewise even where the property had been transferred 
under an invalid gift, a later will —  after the HSA became operative —  
was held to be valid on the basis of the widow’s constructive 
possession.: Bai Champa v. Chandrakanta, A.I.R. 1973 Guj. 227.
2. A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 244.
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invalid adoption. Under such circumstances the widow must in law be 
deemed to be in possession of her husband's estate, there being no 
legal vesting of the property in the adoptee, and s. 14 (l) would then 
be applicable in terms to such property.
This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Kotturu-swciml 
v. Veerawa.^ The last male holder who died in 1920, had by his will 
authorised his widow to adopt a son, and in compliance therewith she 
effected an adoption in 1 24. Thereupon the appellant purporting to 
be the nearest reversioner, filed a suit for a declaration that the 
adoption was invalid and not binding on him. Making short shrift of 
the contention that the words "any property possessed by a female 
Hindu" in s. 14 (1) of the HSA referred to actual possession of the
Z
property, and citing with approval the dicta in Venkayamma v. Veerayya 
and Gostha Behari v. Haridas^to the effect that the word "possessed"
4is used in s. 14 (1) in a broad sense and must be given the widest 
connotation,-^ his Lordship, Imam, J., ruled that if the adoption was 
invalid, the full owner of the deceased Hindu's estate was his widow. 
Assuming moreover that the adoptee was in actual possession of the 
property, then by reason of the invalidity of the adoption, his possess­
ion in law was merely permissive, and constructive possession being 
with the widow, the effect of s. 14 (l) would be to abrogate all re­
versionary claims.^
If we now turn our attention once again to the Andhra decison
7
in Vishwapathi v. Venkatakrishnan, the Court did not touch on the
1. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577- 2. A.I.R. 1957 a.p. 28o.
3. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557* 4. Venkayamma's case cited above.
5. Gostha Behari's case, cited above.
6. See also Nathuni v. Mst. Kachner, A.I.R. 19&5 Pat. 160, and Bassavant 
v. Channabasawwa, A.I.R. 1977 Mys. 15^ » where similar decisions were 
arrived at.
7- A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 9, discussed above at 477-
question of the invalidity of the adoption (which one migit add was per­
tinent to the suit), and merely decreed in favour of the widow on the 
basis of an incomplete gift. What had actually happened was that while 
a suit questioning the legality of the adoption was still pending, the 
HSA came into force, and on the plea of the widow that the suit was no 
longer maintainable as a consequence of s. 14 (1) of the Act, the re­
versioner's further rejoinder was that, as she had already gifted away 
the property in 1952, the widow was not competent to derive benefit from 
the Act. Consequently the original challenge in regard to the alleged 
invalid adoption was not resolved. It is submitted that his lordship, 
Chandra Reddy, C.J., should have further augmented the force of his de­
cision in favour of the widow by drawing attention to the contention of 
the invalid adoption to hold that, granted the two factors, i.e. the in­
validity of the gift by the limited owner, and —  on the plaintiff's own 
admission —  the invalidity of the adoption, the widow would in any event 
be deemed to be in constructive possession so as to oust the reversion.
(b) Possession in Law
In fulfilment of the social purpose of the HSA, and so as to give 
the female the widest possible benefit of the sub-s., the word "possessed" 
in s. 14 (1) has been construed to be significant enough to also include 
within its ambit, property of which the limited owner may not have been 
in actual or constructive possession but to which she had a right to 
title or possession in law."*'
(i) Where the Assets are Vested in the Receiver
It was argued before the Calcutta High Court that if possession 
is the test of applicability, then the property allotted to a female
1. Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786, at 1790, and 
quoted afc- Au^xar> 1^ 10
in a preliminary decree for partition but in the hands of the 
Receiver appointed by the Court, is not property "possessed" by 
her for the purpose of s. 14 (l), for all that she may still have 
a right to possession of it. Such a view was however firmly 
dismissed, the Court holding that in fact title or ownership being 
of the essence of possession, the possession of the Receiver in 
law is the possession of the female, and at the material date, she 
acquires absolute ownership under s. 14 (l). ^
(ii) Property in the Hands of a Trespasser
If ownership is the test of possession, it would then naturally 
follow that where a third party held illegally as against the female 
Hindu, s. 14 (l) would effectively convert the juridicalpossession of 
such female into an absolute tenure.
This would seem to stand to reason but it was almost 
immediately apparent that judicial opinion, at least in the initial 
stages, was neither clear nor in agreement, and we must of necessity 
take into account the observations —  in the nature of obiter dicta.
1. Krishna v. Akhll, A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 671. The same view was taken 
by the Madras Bench in an unreported judgment cited in Sampat 
Kumari v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. 1963 Mad. $0, at 57 where it was 
stressed that, the limited estate which vested in the Receiver 
to safeguard the reversionary interest is converted, on the 
relevant date into an absolute tenure for "s. 14 does not, in 
our opinion connote possession as distinct from title," and the 
fact that the widow herself had been appointed Receiver could 
make no difference to the result. See also Janak Dulari v. Dist. 
Judge Kanpur, A.I.R. I96I All. 294, where the zamindari having 
been abolished, part of the compensation money was paid to the 
limited heir and part of it retained in the Court of the District 
Judge. On the coming into force of the HSA, BhargavajJ., held 
that as she was in law possessed of it, the rest of the 
compensation must be hers to hold absolutely. Similar decisions 
were also arrived at in Saila v. Saila, A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 26, 
and Shakuntala Devi v. Beni Madhav, A.I.R. 1964 All. 165 where 
the compensation money invested in bonds and Government Securities 
were held to be the female Hindu's possession in law so as to 
convert to absolute property under s. 14 (l).
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bat significant all the same —  in a number of decisions which were 
however not directly related to the widow's rights as against a 
trespasser.
In Venkayamma v. Veerayya,^  Sastri, J*sf observations obiter
were to the effect that if the limited owner had the right to the
property on the date the HSA came into force, she might "conceivably"
be regarded as an absolute owner, although the property might be in
the hands of a trespasser, provided however that such trespasser had
not perfected his title by adverse possession before the coming
2
into effect of the Act.
As tentative as this suggestion was, their Lordships of the 
3
Supreme Court were ready to concede even less, and having taken
note of the Andhra viewpoint, nevertheless left open the question of
L
the widow's rights vis - a - vis the trespasser, and in this fluid 
and ambiguous atmosphere judicial opinion was hard put to arriving 
at a solution to this vexed problem.
Ve have for instance, the clear dicta of Shah, J., in Yamunabai 
v. Maharaj,^  to the effect that, where the property vested in
1. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280.
2. Ibid., at 81 and quoted with approval in Bamsaroop Singh v. 
Hiralal Singh. A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 319, at 322J Krishna v. Akhil, 
A.I.R, 1958 Cal. 671, at 674J Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, A.I.R. 1959 
Pat. 75, at 77- See also the obiter dicta in Marudakkal v. 
Anunugha, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255, at 260, which strikes an exactly 
similar note.
3. Kotturus,vacnviiv. Veerayva, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577.
4. To quote Imam, J., who speaking on behalf of his learned brothers 
had this to say* "Ve do not think that it is necessary in the 
present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges
(of the Andhra High Court in Venkayamma v. Veerayya, A.I.R. 1957 
A.P. 280), went. It is sufficient to say that "possessed" in 
s. 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state 
of owning or having in one's hand or power."* Ibid., at 581-2.
5. A.I.R. i960 Bom. 463.
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the widow but was in the actual possession of the defendant who had
failed to establish his adoption,
"... the possession contemplated by s. 14 is legal 
possession and property in the wrongful occupation 
of a trespasser either directly or through his 
tenants is nonetheless possessed by a Hindu female 
within the meaning of s. 14. 1
However, that the question could by no means be regarded as
settled was soon enough clear when the Madhya Pradesh High Court
2
was faced with the same problem in Anandibai v. Sundarabai. In
Tare, J's, view for s. 14 (l) to be operative the female owner must
be possessed of the property, and given the fact that in its broadest
3
connotation the Supreme Court was not willing to concede that this
4would also include property in the trespasser's hands — a point of 
view with which his Lordship was in complete agreement"* —  his 
solution was to the effect that where the alleged adoption had been 
disproved and the holder manifestly a trespasser, the female could, 
nevertheless not be said to be in possession even constructively. 
Possession as such lay with the stranger —  albeit without any right —  
and the female's remedy against such trespasser would be to dispossess 
him and obtain juridical possession, which possession then and then 
only, would come within the ambit of s. 14 (l). Ingenious as this 
reasoning is, the dichotomy inherent in it is immediately noticeable.
1. Ibid., at 467. See also Sivaiah v. Tekchand, A.I.R. 1966 A.P. 305» 
where the daughter claiming under a fraudulent will was held to be 
a trespasser from whom the widow was entitled to recover the 
property and hold it absolutely under s. 14 (l).
2. A.I.R. 1965 M.P. 85. See above at 475-6.
3. Kotturuswami v. Veerawa, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 577*
4. Ibid., at 581-2.
5* "I do not propose to go to the length of stating that the property, 
although in the possession of a trespasser, will become the
absolute property of the female Hindu."* Per Tare, J., Anandibai
v. Sundarabai, A.I.R. 1965 M.P. 85, at 89.
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Illegal occupation cannot deprive the rightful owner of possession 
except hy prescriptive title, and, one submits, under such 
circumstances while juridical possession may be a wise practical 
step to gain control of the property, it is nevertheless not essential - 
the widow's title being sufficient to bring it within the purview of 
s. Ik (1).
Hardly had the ink dried on the Madhya Pradesh judgment^ when
the Supreme Court found itself faced once again with the same issue
2
in Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno. The decision may be regarded as a 
landmark in as much as unlike the earlier noncommittal attitude 
apparent in Kottuiuswami's case^ the highest judicial authority in 
the country could ill afford to resort to its earlier evasiveness in 
a decision where the central issue was the widow's rights under 
s. in regard to property in the hands of a trespasser.
Briefly the facts were that, a Hindu widow who had entered 
into possession of land belonging to her deceased husband in 1917* 
but had been illegally dispossessed by her husband *s collaterals in 
195^ * brought a suit for repossession on the plea that the present
occupiers were mere trespassers. During the pendency of the suit,
the HSA came into force in 1956, and subsequently in 1958 the widow 
died, and her legal representative was brought on record. The 
question for decision was that, as on her own admission, the widow
If
was out of actual possession and the property in the hands of 
trespassers continuously since 195^ » could she under such circumstances 
be said to be possessed of such property as envisaged in s. 1^ (l)?
1. Anandibai v. Sundarabai, A.I.R. 19^5 M.P. 85.
2. A.I.R. 1967, S.C. 1786.
3. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577.
4. Emphasis mine.
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In a judgment remarkable for its extension of the meaning of the 
word "possessed" so as to give it even wider applicability than 
heretofore, Bhargava, J., speaking on behalf of the Bench, drew 
attention to the significant use of the expression "possessed by" 
instead of "in possession of" in s. 1*+ (l) to stress that the 
former expression must, in effect, cover cases other than actual or 
constructive possession, and since legally the word "possession" is 
defined as equivalent as "the state of owning or having a thing 
in one's own hands or power," it would follow that three different 
meanings jure derived; one is the state of owning, the second is 
having a thing in one's own hands, and the third is having a thing 
in ones own power, and where both physical and constructive possession 
are lost, one may still, retain at law, the right of ownership. It 
would therefore irrefutably follow on the language of s. 1*+ (l) 
and its interpretation in other Supreme Court decisions^ " that 
in the present case, despite the illegal occupation of trespassers, 
the widow nevertheless possessed the right to recover actual physical 
possessioi? or constructive possession, and she was therefore held 
to have been "possessed" of it when she died in 1958 it to pass 
by succession to her heirs under s. 15 (l) of the HSA.
1. The decisions dwelt upon were Kotturuswami v. Yeerawa. A.I.R. 1959
S.C. 577» where despite the reluctance ot the Supreme Court to 
commit itself, the learned judge held that their Lordships of the 
earlier Bench certainly included the state of owning within the 
broad definition of the word "possessed"; Munnalal v. Rajkumar,
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 14-93, where it was laid down that the female 
Hindu would be regarded as possessed of the property where in a 
suit for partition, only a preliminary decree declaring her right 
to a share had been passed. See below at 543-5* and in Eramma v. 
Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879* which by emphasising that mere 
physical possession of the property by the female Hindu without 
the right of ownership, would not attract the provisions of s.
s. 14- (l), reinforces the converse view that property in the hands
of a trespasser is property possessed by the widow. See below at 488-9.
2. See also Rani Bai v. Tadunandan Ram, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1118. The 
stranger having dispossessed the widow of property which she held 
in lieu of maintenance, it was held that she was entitled to 
restoration of possession, as the respondent had no right, title 
or interest and was a mere trespasser. See below at 601.
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Thus it may now be regarded as settled that, as the trespasser 
holds illegally as against the widow, she must be held to be in 
ownership in implementation of the intention of the Legislature to 
accord to the word "possessed”, the meaning of the "right to possess"^
(ii-a) The Widow’s Acquisition as a Trespasser
Since the word "possessed" in s. 1^ (l) connotes legal 
possession, the mere fact that the female is in possession of 
another's property as a trespasser without any right thereto does not
attract the provisions of the subsection so as to confer on her
2
absolute rigit therein.
1. On the other hand it must follow that if the trespasser had 
acquired title to such property by adverse possession prior to 
the commencement of the HSA, s. 1h (l) would have no application. 
Thus where the widow alienated her husband's property to her son- 
in-law in 19^ 3 who thereafter transferred it to a stranger in the 
same year, and the latter remained in occupation thereof for more 
than twelve years continuously, the Court ruled in Elijah v. 
Gangamma, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 776, that he got absolute title by 
adverse possession; and the fact that the transaction in favour 
of the son-in-law was only a nominal transaction and therefore not 
valid, would make no difference, as the HSA leaves untouched the 
general law in regard to property. This, it is submitted, is the 
correct interpretation, and in view of this the obiter dicta in 
Sansir v. Satyabati, A.I.R. 1958 Or. 75t at 78 to the effect that 
"Viswanatha Sastri, J., (in Venkayamma v. Veerayya, A.I.R. 1957 
A.P. 280), while giving a wider meaning to the word 'possessed' 
had made an observation that it might also include the possession 
of a trespasser. In my opinion it is putting too wider (sic. for 
wide), a meaning. A trespasser's possession can never (emphasis 
mine) be taken to be a possession in any mode of the rightful 
owner as his possession is completely adverse to the interest of 
the rightful owner," cannot be said to be the correct law.
2. This however was not the view that Tek Chand,J., took in Mst.
Prito v. Gurdas, (1958) 60 Punj. L. R. 19^ » infra, at 615. To 
contention that the words "any property possessed by a female 
Hindu occurring in subsection (l) of s. 14 should be given 
restricted meaning confining them to lawful possession of the 
property , his Lordship held that the language of subsection (l) 
of s. l*f is of broad amplitude. The Explanation leaves no doubt
as to its broad scope, and in particular the word "whatsoever* has 
a very wide and comprehensive meaning, so that the above indicated 
words cannot be given restricted meaning confining them to lawful 
possession of the property. But subsequent judicial decisions
P.T.O.
Legal decisions confirm this viewpoint and in Madras, where 
the grand-daughter who had been in continuous but not hostile 
possession of her grandmother's limited estate since 1922 purported 
to be possessed of it absolutely under s. l*f (l), the Court negatived 
her claim to rule that she had not held adversely to her grandmother,* 
she was at best a trespasser, and her acquisition could not possibly 
be included within the comprehensive wording " any other manner 
whatsoever* which must be interpreted only ejusdem generis with the 
other terras which confer a right of ownership.1
However, it was left to the Supreme Court to consider the 
matter ejchaustively and authoritatively so as to lay to rest any
lingering vestiges of doubt in regard to the matter. In Eramma v.
2
Veerupana, where a competent Court had decided that the maternal 
uncle was the heir of a deceased Hindu minor, on appeal the step­
mother, who was in occupation of the property, contended that the HSA 
having come into force in the meanwhile, s. l*f (l) had the effect of 
converting it to an absolute estate. The Court ruled firmly that, 
as the HWRPA 1937* had not come into force at the time of her 
husband's death, the widow could have no manner of title to the 
property at the promulgation of the HSA. The fact of possession alone 
is not sufficient to attract the operation of s. 1^ for, their
clearly take the opposite, and it is submitted,the correct view 
that illegal possession does not come within the purview of 
s. lh (l). See for instance the observation of Khosla, J., in 
Mst. Dassi v. Mst. Kapur. A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 208, at 209 to the 
effect that "(T)his section, however, cannot be interpreted to 
validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it cannot 
confer any rights on a trespasser."
, Andal v. Sivaprakasa, A.I.R. 19&3 Ksu^ - 5^2.
2. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879* affirming Veerupana v. Eramma, A.I.R. 
1966 Mys. 130.
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Lordships explained,
”(t)he section cannot be interpreted so as to validate 
the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does 
not confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other 
words the provisions of s. 14 (l) of the Act cannot be 
attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in 
possession of the property of the last male holder on 
the date of the commencement of the Act, when she is 
only a trespasser without any right to property." 1
Not long thereafter, the Supreme Court had occasion to confirm
2
this dictumin Dindayal ▼. Rajaram.y
33 3SI DSZ BSZSI B S2SX
A separation having been effected between A and B, A died in 1920 
leaving behind —  for our purposes —  his widow w, and a daughter. The 
widow made a gift of her husband’s property in her possession to her 
daughter in 1936 who later died in 1941. Thereupon oh repossession 
of the properties she gifted them first in 1952 and then in 1957 "to 
IB2S1 and BS2S2. The contention on behalf of the donees was that, as 
the widow’s repossession had revived her right to hold as limited 
owner, the effect of s. 14 (l) of the HSA was to convert such estate 
to an absolute tenure. In invalidating this claim, Hegde, J., 
explained in clear and succinct terms that as the validity of the 
original gift to the daughter had effectively destroyed the widow's 
title, and her repossession being that of a trespasser, s. 14 (l)
■y
1. Ibid., at 1882.
2. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1019.
-490-
would have no application.
It is thus clear from these pronouncements that however 
broadly and sympathetically one may interpret s. 1** (1) in favour of 
the female Hindu, the trespasser's acquisition being by definition 
illegal acquisition, the provisions of the subsection stop short of 
endorsing it, and the law as it stands must be of impartial 
application to illegal occupation be it that of male or female.
(iii) The Widow's Acquisition by Adverse Possession
The title acquired by adverse possession is likewise independent
of the Hindu law, and is regulated by Art. 65 of the Limitation Act
of 1963 which corresponds to Art. **4 of the old Schedule under the
repealed Limitation Act of 1908.^
Adverse possession, as its words imply, must be actual possession
of another's land with intention to hold it and claim it as his own
2
to the exclusion of the rightful owner. In other words, if the 
possessor holds by any title, he cannot hold adversely to any other 
person who is either entitled to the remainder of the estate, the
1. The normal period within which a person,who obtains possession of 
immoveable property and holds it adversely as against the true 
owner -can perfect his title to Buch property, is twelve years as 
prescribed by Art. 65 of the Limitation Act of 1963.
2. R. Mitra, The Limitation Act, 3*** ed., C.L. Gupta and J. Lai revised, 
(Allah. Law Publishers, 1978)» at 58?* Judicial decisions have 
construed accordingly. Thus it was held in Ramlal v. Chetu, A.I.R. 
1958 Pun;}. 335* at 336 that adverseness must commence with the 
wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner at some particular 
time, and must commence in wrong andjmaintained against right. It ^  
must be actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim or right, 
continuous and exclusive and maintained for the statutory period.
See also P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshml Reddy, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314 
where his Lordship, Jagannadhadas, J., in reliance upon Secretary 
of State for India r. Debendra Lai Khan, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 23, laid 
down at 317-8 that, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse 
possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precarlo, and 
as such the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in 
publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to 
the competitor.
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reversion, or the beneficial or other interest in the property. If 
on the other hand he has no title at all, it follows that he holds 
adversely to all the world.^
There is no reason why female trespassers should he hampered 
in their unjustified acquisitions, and yet in the days before the 
revolutionary changes brought about by the Act of 1956, the nature 
of the title which a Hindu widow acquired by prescription depended 
on the nature of her claim. Thus where she acquired by adverse 
possession lands to which she had no shadow of title, she must 
have acquired to herself against all the world, and the resulting 
estate would be stridhana under the pre-1956 law.^
On the other hand, where she acquired prescriptive title in 
immoveable property on the assertion that she held as her husband ’s 
heir, or where she prescribed adversely to joint-family property from 
which in any case she was entitled to maintenance —  in all such cases 
while she possessed adversely to the true owners, she excluded only 
those who might, during her lifetime, have enjoyed the property. In 
other words she exceeded her rights —  she dispossessed people who 
in the first instance were her husband’s heirs, and in the second 
instance were in any case obliged to her. Thus at her death no
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "A Strange Privy Council Decision and the HVRA
1856," A.I.R. 1955 (J)., 10-19 at l*f.
2. Thus it was held in Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachan Singh, (195®) 21
S.C.J. 1*38, that the possession of the widow of a predeceased
son, not proved to be under any arrangement with the heirs of the 
deceased, or claiming as the heir of the deceased, must be taken 
to be adverse to the reversion. See also Tilakdhari Rai v. Parma 
Rai, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 356.
3. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 208.
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rightful benefit could accrue to her own heirs or legateessince
it was presumed (irrespective of her intention), that her possession
2
was related to her right which enured only for her lifetime.
With this background we must now turn our attention to the
statute of 1956* arK^  there need be no doubt but that under s. (l) a
woman who has prescribed against the true owner or owners will
prescribe for an absolute estate, unless perhaps she has a restricted
estate within s. l*f (2), in which case no length of time will improve
her tenure in respect of it or its income beyond the terms laid down
3
in the instrument from which she takes her title.
1. The Privy Council established this in Mt. la .j want! v. Safa Chand.
A.I.R. 192J+ P.C. 121, where a Hindu widow held property claiming 
as an heir though she was only entitled to maintenance, and it
was laid down that her possession though adverse to the reversioners, 
she did not acquire the property as stridhana but only as an 
accretion to the husband's property, and as such it would pass, 
after her death, to the husband's heirs in preference to the 
reversioners and (it is submitted), her stridhana heirs.
2. See the decision of the F.B. in Gunderao v. Venkamma, A.I.R. 1955 
Hyd. 3» at 1^ where the majority view was that where a Hindu widow 
not entitled to inherit an estate enters into possession of that 
estate and remains in possession for over the statutory period, 
the nature of her estate (a) where she asserts a title as an 
absolute owner from the very beginning of her possession, will be 
an absolute estate, and (b) where she does not assert her absolute 
title it does not become her absolute property but becomes an 
accretion to the estate of the last male holder. See also Sampat 
v. Surajmal, A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 50^ a-t 505 » where it was reiterated 
that what a widow acquires by adverse possession becomes her 
stridhana and does not become an accretion to her husband's estate 
unless it is shown that she took adverse possession of the property 
as representing her husband's estate. On this principle it was 
decided in Thailambal v. Kesavan, A.I.R. 1957 Ker. 86, that where 
it was established in a previous litigation that the nature of
the title prescribed for by the widow was only a limited estate, 
it was not consequently open for her grand-daughters to say that 
she had prescribed for an absolute estate by adverse possession 
and claim as her stridhana heirs.
3. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 207. This would apply equally to cases 
where the Act of 1956 would operate as an interruption to adverse title 
of the trespasser's hostile possession of the limited estate, there­
by depriving him from acquiring any title, unless he holds possession 
for a further statutory period beginning from the date of the com­
mencement of the Act. See C.R. Ravi, "Effect of Section l*f, HSA,
1956, on Rights of Trespasser in Adverse Possession Against Female 
Hindu," (1971) 1 M.L.J. (j), 5-8 at .7-8.
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So the Patna High Court held in Gulab Chand v. Sheo Karam'*' where
the widow of one of two joint brothers having been in possession of the
family house from 1918, on the claim that her husband had died as
separate from his coparceners, Mahapatra, J., on the strength of the
2
decisions in Satgur Prasad v. Rajkishore Ial, Mt. Kirpal Kaur v.
3 **Bachan Singh, and Ramanna v. Sambamoorthy ruled that by the 17th
June 1956 she had prescribed her limited title to that property
against the other members of the family and the effect of s. l*f was
that such adverse possession had ripened into full ownership.-'*
The Punjab High Court held likewise in Mst. Harmal Kaur v. Smt.
Kartar Kaur,^  where the question for determination was whether the 
provisions of s. l*f (l) of the Act would cover the possession of a 
Hindu widow who had entered into possession of the property of her 
father-in-law without any right or title, but with the intention to 
hold it as a limited owner on a life tenure more than twelve years 
before the commencement of the HSA, and continues to be in such 
possession right up to the date of the commencement of the Act. Up­
holding this contention, Sarkaria, J., was quite clear that though 
s. l*f cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession 
of a female Hindu and does not confer any title on a mere trespasser,
1. A.I.R. 196^ Pat. 45.
2. A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 60.
3. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 199.
A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 361.
5. Note also the obiter dicta of the same learned Judge in Sheoji 
Tiwary v. Prema Kuer, A.I.R. 196** Pat. 187 at 193 where in ex­
plaining the wide amplitude of sub-s. (l) of s. 14- and the 
Explanation thereof, he had this to says "(E)ven if the female 
Hindu comes in possession as a trespasser in any property and 
continues to be so for a period of twelve years, she prescribes 
her title in as much as a suit by a rightful owner for her eviction 
will be barred by the laws of limitation."
6. A.I.R. 1968 P. & H. 295.
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nonetheless when the alleged wrongful possession started about forty- 
one years before the suit, and the widow had since been in continuous, 
uninterrupted and open possession, such possession though that of a 
trespasser at its inception, would ripen into limited ownership after 
the expiry of twelve years* adverse possession, which prescriptive 
limited title would then fall within the ambit of the words "property 
possessed by a female Hindu" in s. 14 (l) to thereby convert her 
limited estate into full ownership.'*'
2In evaluating the Punjab case, Gupte's criticisms are levelled 
at the fact that
"(T)his decision discloses a certain amount of confusion 
in as much as if the woman was in possession claiming 
title by adverse possession she would acquire absolute 
title to the property without the assistance of s. 14 (l)j 
and even if she entered into possession as a limited 
owner (though a trespasser) her title would not be 
enlarged by s. 14 (1)." 3
It is however submitted that the learned author in fact himself betrays
a certain confusion of thought in that he seems to have lost sight of
the subtleties inherent in the interaction of the law of prescription
in relation to the Hindu woman’s estate and the statutory law of
1956. True enough, as he asserts, the widow does not require the
1. That Punjab has consistently kept to this line of thought is also 
evident in its earlier ruling in Jangir Singh v. Kst. Daya Kaur, 
A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 481 where it was held that any other considerations 
apart, by the very fact that the erstwhile reversioners had allowed 
the widow to remain in possession for more than twelve years, they 
had lost their right to the estate by reason of her adverse 
possession. See also Nand Lai v. Smt. Khillian, (1970) 72 Punj.
L. R. 54. The widow having been in possession for thirty years 
before the HSA came into force, the Court held that she was no 
mere trespasser, the implication being, that her right of maintenance 
apart, at the very least she could claim prescriptive limited title 
which converted to an absolute tenure under s. 14 of the HSA, 1956*
2. Mst. Harmal Kaur v. Smt. Kartar Kaur, A.I.R. I968 P. & H. 295.
3* Hindu Law of Succession, (Bora. Tripathi, 1972), at 528.
assistance of s. 14 where she acquires absolute ownership by her 
adverse possession? true also that s. 14 can have no effect on the 
limited estate of a trespasser; but where she prescribes for a limited 
estate, that is to say, where for all practical purposes she is the 
absolute owner except that she could never be a fresh stock of 
descent of such property, the widow can no longer be regarded as a 
trespasser, and s. 14 then converts such limited estate into full 
ownership.
(2) Remarriage of Widows
(a) The Position of the Widow
The sastric law, as we have already seen, did not sanction the 
remarriage of the Hindu widow. No longer the patnl of her deceased 
husband, such an act on her part is regarded, in the classical law, 
as unchastity at the very least with the consequences attendant upon it.
The HWRA I856, for all its seemingly reforming zeal is, in the 
ultimate analysis, merely an extension of this deeply entrenched 
attitude in that it envisages remarriage as, what is known to law, as 
civil death, and as in the case of natural death, so with remarriage, 
the limited estate which the widow acquired either by inheritance or 
by will, reverted to the next heirs of her deceased husband or other 
persons entitled to the property on her death.^
With the coming into force of the HWRPA, 1937* the Act of I856 
was still operative, but it was a matter of some debate whether an 
unchaste widow could take in view of the words "Notwithstanding any 
rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary..." prefixed to the rules
1. HWRA, 1856, s. 2, supra, at 196.
enabling a widow to inherit. On a strict construction, the words 
would seem to suggest that the normal rule of Hindu law which dis­
entitles a Hindu widow from succeeding to her husbandfe property, could
1 2no longer be operative, a view taken by the Bombay and Calcutta 
High Courts. However, given the generally restrictive nature of the 
rights conferred on widows by the Act of 1937* it is doubtful u W R t x  
the Legislature intended to abrogate this ancient rule, and the 
majority of the Courts leaned towards the strict view that the ante­
cedent and fundamental Hindu law could not be repealed without express 
words to that effect.
A fortiori a widow remarrying forfeited her right of succession
4
to the property of her deceased husband. This was so whether she
married according to caste custom^ or in reliance upon the HWRA,
c 7
1856, and the HWRPA, 1937 mad© no difference/
With the enactment of the HSA, 1956, the traditional disquali­
fications in regard to inheritance are swept away. 8 Essentially 
secular in character, the prime purpose of the statute is to put an 
end to discrimination on grounds of sex and to place females on par
1. Akoba v. Sai, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 204.
2. Surja v. Manmatha, A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 200.
3. See Ramaiya v. Mottayya, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 954 (F.B.); Appa v. Gurubasawwa, 
A.I.R! I960 Mys. 79; Kanailal v. Pannasashi, A.I.R. 1954 Cai/'588.
4. Manabai v. Chandan Bai, A.I.R. 19^* Nag. 284.
5. Hira v. Bodhi, A.I.R. 1954 Or. 172; Rama v. Sakhu, A.I.R. 1954
Bom. 315* opposite view expressed in Ram v. Occha, A.I.R.
1951 M.B. 97, must be taken to have been overruled by Kishan v.
Arjun. A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 429.
6. Thangavelu v. Iakshmi, A.I.R. 1957 Mad- 534.
7. In Krishna v. Ammalu, A.I.R. 1972 Ker. 91, it was: held that a woman 
married to several brothers, was entitled, under the statute of 1937, 
to succeed to the interest in the joint-family property as the widow 
of one while she continued to be the wife of the other two. But this 
ruling, it is submitted, was incapable of uniform application to the 
rest of India, and Kerala with its long tradition of matriarchy must 
be regarded as the exception.
8. See s. 28 of the HSA, supra, at 268.
with males in respect of property rights; and to the extent it applies, 
the ancient law as also any statutory provision stand abrogated. The
provisions of s. 4 make this abundantly clear. It provides:
M(o)verriding effect of the Act 
(l) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, —
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of
Hindu law or any custom or usage as
part of that law in force immediately 
before the commencement of this Act 
shall cease to have effect with respect 
to any matter for which provision is 
made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately
before the commencement of this Act 
shall cease to apply to Hindus in so 
far as it is inconsistent with any of 
the provisions contained in this Act."
By the very fact that s. 14 (l) abolishes the limited estate and
converts it to an absolute tenure, it would therefore follow that on
and from June 17, 1956, the widow's subsequent remarriage would not 
have the effect of divesting her in view of the provisions of s. 4, 
and s.2 of the HWRA, I856, must be held to have been implicitly 
repealed, provided however that the widow was "possessed" of such 
property at the date that succession opened.
Nonetheless in the face of such overriding provisions (i.e.
those of ss. 4 and 14 (l) of the HSA), some scholars would have us
believe that it is the civil death as envisaged in s. 2 of the HWRA,
1856, that appears the basis of the rule of divesting, and the quality
and nature of the estate inherited appears to be of no moment to its
application^ so that in spite of s. 14 (l), the widow must be held to
1. G.K. Dabke, "Divesting of an Estate on Remarriage," (1957) 17 Bom.
L.R. (j)., 132-8 at 134. S.V. Guptc holds the same view when he
states: "(A)lthougfr s. 2 of the HWRA, I856 was drafted at a time when 
the . widow succeeding to her husband or his lineal successor,
took only a limited estate, the language of that section is, it is
submitted, capable of applying to a widow having an absolute 
estate." : Hindu Law of Succession, op. cit., at 458.
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be divested on her civil death in the face of her remarriage
Happily this theory has not been borne out by judicial decisions, 
and we have the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court that by virtue 
of s. 4 of the HSA, the Legislature abrogated the rules of Hindu law 
in all matters in respect of which there is an express provision in 
the Act.^ As such therefore, the ambit of the estate that a female 
Hindu takes under s. 14 cannot be cut by any text, rule or inter­
pretation of Hindu law, for such an estate is an absolute one and not
2 3defeasible under any circumstances.
S. 24 of the Act does of course stipulate that certain widows
remarrying may not inherit as widows. It provides*
"(A)ny heir who is related to an intestate as the widow 
of a predeceased son, the widow of a predeceased son of a 
predeceased son or the widow of a brother shall not be en­
titled to succeed to the property of the intestate as such
widow, if on the date the succession opens, she has remarried."
However that there is no inconsistency between this provision 
and s. 4 is evident when we consider that the disability of an ex­
widow under this section is, strictly speaking, not a disqualification:
it is merely logical. They cease to be widows and so cease to be 
Lf
related. Even for such widows as are disqualified under s. 24
remarriage must have taken place before the opening of the 
succession, for the section does not provide for the divesting of the 
estate vested in the widow on her remarriage subsequent to the date
1. Munnalal v. Rajkumar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493, at 1500.
2. Emphasis mine.
3- Punithavalli v. Ramalingam, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730 at 1731.
4. Derrett, IMHL, jyg. cit., at 373- The omission of the intestate's
widow in the section appears to be due to the fact that it is not 
possible to conceive of a person leaving a widow who had 
remarried.
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the succession opens.
The consequences that follow from the foregoing are:
(l) All widows are divested of their husband's estate in the event 
of their remarriage prior to the Act of 1956 in accordance with 
the provisions of s. 2 of the HWRA, I856.
(ii) The remarriage of the widow of the deceased after the commencement 
of the HSA does not divest her of her full tenure.
(iii) The remarriage of certain widows specified in s. 2b of the HSA 
diS^ ue^ tithem where such remarriage takes place prior to the 
date that succession opens.
(i) The Remarriage of the Widow Prior to the Enactment of the HSA, 1956
The rule of forfeiture is based upon the general principle of 
2
Hindu law so that when on remarriage the widow is divested of her 
limited estate, s. lb cannot have any effect in the vacuum thus 
created, and s. b must not be held to have abrogated the provisions of 
s. 2 of the HWRA, 1856; in the event that the remarrying widow is in 
possession of such property, her possession will be regarded in law 
as the possession of a trespasser without any right or title, and the 
reversioners in constructive possession.
So it was held in Mst. Bisarti v. Mst. Sukarti. where the 
widow's possession of her late husband's property was invalidated as 
a consequence of her remarriage in 1953# the Court holding that since 
the possession must be a consequence of, and related to, the life 
estate which a Hindu widow has in her husband's property, it is only 
when such possession continues that her rights are enlarged under s. l*f
1. The same view was taken in Bhuri Bai v. Champa Bai. A.I.R. 1968 
Raj. 139, where his Lordship, Chhangani, J., pointed out at 1*4-5 
that, while the principle embodied in s. 2b of the Act disentitling 
certain other widows from inheriting, points to the non-applica­
bility of s. 2 of the Act of I856 to a widow succeeding or 
acquiring absolute estate under the HSA, the omission of the 
intestate's widow in s. 2b cannot lend support to a contrary view.
2. Per Mahapatra, J., Rup Raut v. Basudeo Raut, A.I.R. 1962 Pat. b36j 
at bbo.
3- A.I.R. I960 M.P. 156.
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of the 1956 Act. Hence as remarriage divests her of such estate, the
reversioners would become entitled immediately on her remarriage, and
the fact that they neglected to take action to dispossess her, would
not enlarge the rights of the widow. ^
This very satisfactory exposition of the extent of the operation
of s. 14 has generally been favourably received, so that we must
3
regard with some reservation the dicta in Padala v. Mutchi. After 
the widow's remarriage, the deceased husband's father brought a suit 
in or about April or May 1956* claiming that in accordance with the 
custom prevailing in the community to which the parties belonged, he 
was entitled to recover ornaments and jewels from the remarried widow. 
Naidu, J., however disagreed to hold that s. 5 of the HWRA safeguards
1. An essential requisite for this principle to prevail is that where 
such allegation is made, before the plea of remarriage can be 
regarded as established, there must be legal proof that the widow 
had in fact and in law contracted a valid second marriage; where 
such proof is lacking, s. 14 would have the effect of converting 
the limited estate estate to a full tenure.: Mst. Chabu v. Roma 
Kanta Rai. A.I.R. 1964 Ass. 106.
2. For similar rulings see Mst. Anar.jia v. Tengari Kabar. A.I.R. 1962 
Pat# 65; Rup Raut v. Basudeo Raut, A.I.R. 1962 Pat. 436; Setabai v. 
Ramdhani, A.I.R. 1966 Cal, 66, where the minor coparcener on 
attaining majority sought to set aside a partition suit which had 
dragged on since 1955* and the Court negatived the remarried widow's 
claim to institute a fresh suit on the basis that she had become
Ha stranger to the coparcenary” and as such had no right to fritter 
away joint-family funds in costly litigation; Sankar v. Ushabala, 
A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 525* In ruling against the widow who had re­
married prior to the enactment of the HSA Maitra, J. f held that 
after such remarriage, she continued to be in constructive possession 
without any title. What his Lordship meant, it is respectfully 
submitted, is that hers was a trespasser's possession for to con­
note constructive possession as such, is to militate against the 
legal construction of the term.
3. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 55.
4. S. 5 of the HWRA, I856, reads w(E)xcept as in the three preceding
sections is provided, a widow shall not, by reason of her re­
marriage forfeit any property or any right to which she would
otherwise be entitled; and every widow who has remarried shall 
have the same right of inheritance as she would have had, had such 
marriage been her first marriage."
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and provides against the forfeiture of any such property, and any 
custom that contravenes its provisions must be struck down as invalid. 
Further, his Lordship held, the Explanation to s. 14 (l) converts all 
moveables in the possession of a female Hindu, and however acquired, 
as her absolute property, and to engraft upon that section a condition 
that on her remarriage the gift would be forfeited to the donor, is to 
nullify the operation of that section. It is however submitted, that 
excellent as the learned Judge's decision is, his line of reasoning 
requires careful reconsideration. In any objective assessment of the 
HSA, it must always be kept in mind that s. 14 is only partly 
retrospective, and can therefore have no application where the female 
is already divested, so that in the decision under discussion, the 
widow is saved from being divested not on the strength of the 
Explanation to s. 14 (l) alone, but because s. 5 of the HWRA had 
already exempted such moveables from forfeiture. This it is sub­
mitted, is a subtle distinction which his Lordship should have 
expounded more incisively.^
(ii) The Remarriage of the Widow in the Period 1956 C)Y\*AiayEis
If the remarriage of the widow while she was yet a limited owner, 
worked a forfeiture of her estate so as to oust the applicability of 
s. 14 (l), in view of the provisions of ss. (4) and 14 of the HSA, 
and despite expressions of doubt to the contrary no less than by
1. In view of decisions such as these and in the light of the express
provisions of ss. 4 and 14 of the HSA, the decision in Gurbachan Singh 
v. Khicher Singh A.I.R. 1971 R & H. 240 cannot be construed as laying 
down the correct law. Despite her remarriage before 1956/ the widow was 
in possession of her late husband's estate, and at her death in 
September 1956» it was held that whatever might have been the 
limitations earlier with regard to her title to the property, the 
widow became full owner with the coming into force of the HSA and 
succession to such estate would be regulated by s. 15 (1) (aj to the 
exclusion of her late husband's reversioners. Such a ruling, it is 
submitted, can have validity only if the widow had acquired pre­
scriptive title of which incidently there is no mention in the 
judgment.
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the Supreme Court the general consensus of judicial opinion has 
nevertheless —  and it is submitted, rightly —  been that the Act of 
1856 stands abrogated to the extent of repugnancy with the provisions 
of the HSA, 1956.
2
The Orissa Higi Court was faced with the contention of the judg­
ment - debtors that in spite of the passing of a preliminary decree for 
declaration of title and possession of her deceased husband's estate, 
the widow's application for a final decree could not be entertained as 
a result of her subsequent remarriage. Decreeing in favour of the 
widow, Misra, J., was of the view that as the widow's title to the 
property was based on inheritance from her husband, the limited estate 
which she had thus acquired was converted to an absolute tenure under 
s. l*f (l) of the HSA, 1956* Since the specification for forfeiture 
under s. 2 of the HWRA, 1856, is the limited estate, both the provisions 
put together, his Lordship reasoned, led to the irrefutable conclusion 
that, where the limited estate is converted to an absolute one, and 
her remarriage is subsequent to the acquisition of that absolute 
interest, the remarrying widow could not be divested of the property 
as admittedly she was in possession of the same on the date of the
1. "This is a moot question and not free from doubt."* Per Fazl AliyJ., 
Kasturi Devi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, A.I.R. 1976 S.C.
2595 at 2597* In view of our exposition of the law both traditional
and statutory, and the consensus of judicial opinion in favour of
such widow, such doubts must be held to be without foundation in 
view of the pronouncement in yet another Supreme Court decision to 
the effect that an estate once vested cannot be divested. See 
Punithavalli v. Ramalingam, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730aat 1731*
2. Ballabha v. Jasodhara, I.L.R. (1965) Cut. 398.
3- The preliminary decree for partition being a confirmation of this
possession. See below at 5^0 ff«
/
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passing of the Act.
(iii) The Position of the Widowed Daughter-in-law
We have already seen that the remarriage of widows prior to the 
enactment of the HSA, 1956 > has the effect of divesting them of their 
limited estate so as to oust the applicability of s. 1*+, and this 
applies equally to the widow of the intestate, the widow of the pre­
deceased son, the widow of the predeceased son's predeceased son and 
the brother's widow. S. 2h additionally provides that the intestate's 
widow apart, all other categories of widows mentioned in the section 
are divested on their remarriage prior to the opening of succession. 
Necessarily therefore, where any such widow remarries after succession 
has already opened, the provisions of s. 2 of the HWRA, 1856, must be 
held to be in repugnance to the provisions of the HSA.
1. The same view, that is, that the remarriage of a Hindu widow will 
not work a forfeiture of her rights, was taken in Mst. Bhuri Bai 
v. Mst. Champa Bai, A.I.R. 1968 Raj. 139» Chhangani, J., reinfor­
cing his view by pointing out at 1^5 that, "(W)hen the widows 
specified in s. zh do not forfeit the property vested in them 
on remarriage, it will be hardly proper to hold that the widow 
of the intestate himself should forfeit the property on remarriage 
even after she has become absolute owner." The Madras High Court 
after some slight expression of doubt arrived at the same con­
clusion to hold that, if under the old law the F.B. could rule in 
Ramaiya v. Mottaya, A.I.R. 1951 (F.B.), that the widow's
subsequent unchastity would not work a forfeiture of her limited 
estate, it must correspondingly follow that the intention of the 
HSA, whether it is deliberate or not, appears to be that a 
subsequent remarriage will not divest the widow of her absolute 
estate. On the same principle it was held in Keshri v. Harprasad,
A.I.R. 1971 MP 129,that where the widow had acquired the property 
of her deceased second husband as an absolute owner, at her death 
in 1962 the devolution of such property would be governed by the 
provisions of s. 15 so as to entitle her son by her first marriage 
to succeed to the detriment of the reversioners of the late estate-
holder. See also Pandurang v. Sindhu,A.I.R. 1971 Bom. *fl3j Chinnappavu
v. Meenakshi, A.I.R. 1971 Mad, 453; Jagdish v.'Tfohammad Elahl, A.I.R.
1973 Pat. 170; Vallayammal v. Sivakami Ammal, (197*0 2 M. L. J. 7 (N.O. C.);
Sm Sankaribala v. Sm Asita, A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 289, where Sen, J., held that
though'the estate vested in the widow by way of inheritance ~ "
P.T.O.
In Annapurna v. Kalpana, where the widowed daughter-in-law 
took the suit properties under s. 3 (l) of the HWRPA, 1937» and later 
remarried in 195®r the contention raised against her was that she 
stood divested of her limited estate on the basis of s. 2 of the Act 
of 1856. The Gauhati High Court however held that, on and from June 
17» 195^ * the widowed daughter-in-law having become the absolute owner 
of the suit land by virtue of s. 1*4-, s. 2 of the HWRA would have no 
application in view of the provisions of s. k of the HSA.
The same contention was raised under similar circumstances in 
2
Sasanka v. Amiya, and a like decision arrived at, the Calcutta High 
Court further elaborating that the provisions of s. 2k of the HSA make it 
clear that the widow must be related to the intestate as envisaged in the 
section and that she must not have remarried on the date succession 
opens. In this case the widow had inherited and possessed the property 
of her father-in-law in her share in limited interest as the widow 
of the predeceased son. Thereafter when she was remarried^ admittedly 
long after the succession had opened and the HSA come into operation, 
she could not be held to have lost her right, title and interest as 
absolute owner thereof.
Undoubtedly correct as these dicta are, it is submitted that 
s. 2k has nevertheless restricted applicability to cases governed by 
the Dayabhaga law, for where she takes the same share as her deceased 
husband under s. 3 (2) of the HWRPA, 1937» the Mit5kgara system 
precludes her from taking as heir to her father-in-law. An assessment
would not be divested as 
a consequence of her remarriage after 1956* in his Lordship's view the 
gifted property would continue as a limited tenure for the widow 
to hold for her lifetime only, under the terms of the gift deed.
See below at 6k6~7; Harbatl v. Jasodhara, A.I.R. 1977 Or. 1*4-2;
Chando Mahtain v. Khublal Mahto, A.I.R. 1983 Pat. 33.
1. A.I.R. 1972 Gau. 107.
2. (1973) 73 G.W.N. 1011.
-505-
of s. 2k would not be complete however, without a reference to the 
incomprehensible omission of the father's widowj^from the list 
widows disqualified on remarriage. One can at best attribute this to 
an oversight on the part of the Legislature, for in the interests of 
justice and equity there seems no reason why there should be this 
discrimination in favour of the father's widow, and it is submitted 
that, when Parliament considers such amendments in the HSA as must 
necessarily be made, this omission be rectified, and she placed with 
the other three categories of widows who stand divested on remarriage.
(b) The Position of the Mother
We must now turn our attention to the position of the mother 
and the effect of s. l*f at her remarriage. It is now well settled that 
under the old law, a Hindu widow who had inherited property from her 
son, forfeited by remarriage her interest in such property^ though
2
she was not divested of any property the son had himself acquired. On 
the other hand a remarried Hindu widow was entitled after her second re­
marriage to succeed to the property of her son by her first husband on 
the principle that she was no longer the widow of the man whose son's estate 
was in the first place in question and through whom her rights are 
traced. In 1956 with the enactment of the ISA, for all that certain 
radical changes were effected, an examination of judicial decisions 
will help us assess how far its provisions have impinged upon these 
basic and fundamental rules of Hindu law.
kIn Ramchandra v. Sakhram, the husband having died in 1944, and 
the son a few months later, the property devolved on the mother who
1. Vithu v. Govinda, I.L.R. (1898) 22 Bom. 321 (F.B. )•
2. Thayamma v. Giriyamma, A.I.R. i960 Mys. 176.
3. Akora v. Boreani, (1868) 2 Beng. L.R. 199 (F.B.)| Basappa v. R a gfruva.
I. L.R. (1905) Bom. 91; Faguniswari v. Dhum, A.I.R. 1951 eal. *259;
Ramaswami v. Thivar, A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 31^ *
A'I.R. 1958 Bom. 2kk.
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then made a gift of it to her deceased husband's sister, and shortly 
thereafter contracted remarriage in 19^ 5 • To the plea made on behalf 
of the widow's alienee that such remarriage did not have the effect 
of divesting her, the learned Judge, Shah, J., held on the authority 
of Vithu v. Gobinda  ^that in accordance with the rule of Hindu law 
that, where she contracts remarriage after coming into inheritance 
from her son, the property thus acquired must be traced to the deceased 
husband as a consequence of which she is divested under the provisions 
of s. 2 of the HWRA. In such circumstances, his Lordship decreed
"(u)nder the rules of Hindu law and Act XV of 1856 
her interest in her husband's property stood 
determined} and there is nothing in the HSA which 
revives an interest already determined." 2
In effect therefore s. k of the HSA would have no application, and
as possession is in terms made a postulate to the enlargement of her
estate, there is nothing in s. l*f which revives the estate of a
limited owner determined before the commencement of the Act by death,
actual or civil.
Praiseworthy as the dicta is for its clear exposition of the 
interaction of the classical Hindu law, the Act of I856 and the statute 
of 19561 it is submitted that whatever the defendants might have 
pleaded, the true position was that the widow was divested of her 
estate not merely as a mother, but also in her capacity as widow, for 
in 19^+ the Act of 1937 was still operative, under which she had 
acquired the same interest as her deceased husband in the suit 
properties —  a point of law to which the trial Court drew attention,
1. I.L.R. (I898) 22 Bom. 321 (F.B.).
2. Ramchandra's case, cited above, at 2*f6.
3. The Court further clarifying that any text, rule or interpretation 
of Hindu law as also laws in force immediately before the commence­
ment of the HSA, stand pro tanto repealed by s. but only to the 
extent of repugnancy with the new Act.
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but which on appeal, the Bombay High Court overlooked altogether.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court was faced with a quite different 
situation in Mantorahai v. Paretaribai^  where the widow having remarried lost 
her rights to the property left by her deceased husband, the question 
for decision was whether she was entitled to any share of the property 
when succession opened in I960 at the death of her son, the sole 
surviving coparcener. His Lordship Surajbhan, J., decreeing in her 
favour, drew attention to s. 2k of the HSA to hold that the disqualifi­
cation of remarriage is confined to the cases of the three female heirs 
mentioned therein who are entitled to succeed under the Act as 
widows or relatives of the intestate. The mother on the other hand, 
does not succeed as the widow of the father but in her own right as 
one of the simultaneous heirs mentioned in class I of the Schedule, 
so that in this case notwithstanding her remarriage, she was entitled 
to take absolutely under s. l*f along with the son's widow.
This, it is submitted, is an eminently equitable reading of the 
combined intent of the old law and the effect of the various relevant 
sections of the HSA, which from the purely juridical point of view 
violates no principle of justice or of impartiality, and the Supreme 
Court in holding the same view further propounded that where the widow 
remarried in 19&3 and son died subsequently in 1970* the principle 
which disqualifies a widow, that is, that on her remarriage she re­
linquishes her link with her husband and enters a new family, cannot 
be the basis of divesting of the mother, and as such, her remarriage
1. A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 1^ 5.
2. See also Gurdit Singh v. Darshan Singh, A.I.R. 1973 & H. 3^2
where the relationship of mother and son was similarly stressed to 
hold that notwithstanding her remarriage many years ago, the widow 
continued to be the mother of her son, and what she got at his 
death in 1959, was an absolute estate with unrestricted powers 
under the law, to transfer, waste, neglect or abandon the land, and 
no reversioner or heir had the right to object to the manner in 
which she managed or mismanaged the property.
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1is no bar to her succeeding as heir to her son.
(3) The Effect of the Doctrine of "Relation Back" After the Coming 
into Force of the HSA. 1956. and the HAMA, 195&
(a) "Relation Back” in the Traditional Law
The foundation of the doctrine of adoption according to traditional
Hindu principles is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors
to provide for the continuation of the line and to ensure spiritual
salvation after his death by the periodic offerings of rice oblations
2
and libations of water to the manes. For the reason that women were
power to adopt j she could adopt only to her husband, never to herself, 
and that by virtue of the express or implied authority of the husband.
An adoption which is valid in all respects has the effect of 
transferring the adopted boy from his natural family into his adoptive 
family; it confers on the adoptee the same privileges and rights in 
the family of his adoption as an aurasa son, and these relate back to 
the date of death of the adoptive father.
As a consequence of this doctrine of "relation back," that is
1. Smt. Kasturi Devi v. Deoutv Director of Consolidation. A.I.R. 197& 
S.C. 2595.
2. Both the P.C. and the S.C. are however agreed that the substitution 
of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of 
adoption, and the consequent devolution of property, a mere accessory 
to it. s Amarendra Sinrfi v. Sanatan Singh, A. I.R. 1933 P.C. 155#
158; Chandrasekara v. Kulandalvelu, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 185, at 193.
3- See the judgment of Ameer Ali, J., in Pratapsing v. Agarsinghji, 
A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 192, where the learned Judge held that an adopted 
son and a son of the body standing exactly in the same position 
in so far as continuity of line is concerned, an adoption has 
retrospective effect. The later decision of the P.C. in Amarendra 
Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh. A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 155 is generally 
considered as reinforcing the view that property vested in another 
is divested by the application of the doctrine of "relation back."
See also Srinivas Krishnarao v. Narayan Dev.ji. A.I.R. 195** S.C.
widow
379
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to say, of the fiction that the adoption —  and the rights it confers —
date back to the death of the adoptive father, the vesting of the
property in others in the interval between the period of the death of
the father and the adoption is treated as provisional, and the emergence
of the adopted son with a superior title divests the estate which had
in the meanwhile vested in them.
This retrospective effect given to adoption, caused not a few
problems as can well be imagined though not in Dayabhaga law since the
adoption by the widow merely had the effect of substituting an heir,
her own nominee, for herself in the property owned by the deceased
husband. Meanwhile at Mltaksara law, grave difficulties were caused, for
necessarily relation back had the effect of disturbing titles to
property, both the separate property of the deceased husband, and his
interest in joint-family property which, at least till 1937» would not
be within her control. Logic was added to theory* "relation back"
was taken to its logical conclusion. The inconvenience, not to say
injustice of this could not go on indefinitely,^ " and the Supreme Court
2
determined at last in Srinivas v. Narayan that the claim of the 
adopted son to divest a vested estate rests on a legal fiction and the 
legal fiction must not be extended so as to lead to unjust results, and 
the fiction of "relation back" was trimmed to perform precisely the
purpose for which it was intended, namely the continuation of the
_ 3
santana and the family of the deceased adoptive father.
The efforts of the Supreme Court did not however remedy the
mischief: it merely contained it; and the basic notion that a son
adopted by the widow is the son of her husband for all purposes remained
1. Derrett, Critique, op. cit., at 125.
2. A.I.R. 195^ S.C. 379.
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 125. For a comprehensive synopsis of 
the S.C. dicta see ibid., at 125-8.
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unirapaired.
(b) The Effect of s. Ik (l) on the Doctrine of "Relation Back" Prior 
to the Passing of the HAMA, 1956
Necessarily confined as our study must be to the effects of
"relation back" on the widow*s entitlements after the enactment of the
HSA, the first question that we are confronted with is whether, prior
to the passing of the HAMA, the doctrine would continue to operate so
as to divest the widow notwithstanding the absoluteness of her tenure
under s. l^f (l) of the HSA.
The principle that we must stress is that where the adoption
was made before the HAMA but after the HSA had come into force there
can be no doubt but that the adoption does not work a defeasance of the
absolute estate of the widow. So the Courts have consistently held,^ and
2
in Yamunabai v. Ram Maharaj. where pending the regularisation of 
the adoption, the adoptive mother died, and the property that passed 
to the co-widow was converted to a full estate as a result of the HSA 
coming into force in the meanwhile, it was held that a sanction ex 
post facto to an adoption may have the effect of divesting property 
vested in another person by inheritance from the sole surviving 
coparcener or a limited owner, but that incident of the estate does 
not justify the imposition of a limitation restricting the connotation 
of the expression "full owner" used in s. l*f of the HSA. Full
1. Madras held otherwise in Ramalingam v. Punithavalli Ammal, (196^ )
2 M. L. J. 571 to lay down that adoption at Anglo-Hindu law which 
enables the adopted son to divest property belonging to his father 
no matter in whose hands it might have passed in the interval 
between the father's death and the adoption, had not been abolished 
by anything in the HSA, 1956, which alone fell to be discussed. On 
appeal however, the S.C. overruled the Madras decision in Puni­
thavalli Ammal v. Ramalingam, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730, discussed 
below.
2. A.I.R. i960 Bom. **63.
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ownership as contemplated by that section is not made by the Legis­
lature subject to any incident of divesti*^ by adoption.^-
The Supreme Court held likewise in Punithavalli Ammal v. Rama-
2
lingam and in a brief but remarkably lucid exposition of the law 
confirmed the viewpoint of the Bombay High Court. The facts briefly 
are that on the death of a Hindu governed by the Mit5k?ara school of 
law in 1937* his widow inherited the property and was possessed of it 
in 1956 which thereupon converted to an absolute estate under s. 1k (l) 
of the HSA.- On July 13, 1956. that is to say, before the coming into 
effect of the HAMA, she adopted a son, and soon thereafter made a 
settlement of the property on one of her daughters, and the question 
for decision was whether the matter dealt with under s. l*f (l) of the 
HSA impinges on the rule of adoption relating back to the date of death 
of the adoptive father. Hegde, J., speaking on behalf of their Lord­
ships, ruled that
"(F)rom a plain reading of s. l*f (l), it is clear that 
the estate taken by a Hindu female under that provision 
is an absolute one and not defeasible under any 
circumstances. The ambit of that estate cannot be cut 
by any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law. ... The 
fiction mentioned earlier (that of "relation back"), is 
abrogated to the extent it conflicts with the rights 
conferred on a Hindu female under s. Ik (l) of the Act." 3
kThe actual rationale in Punithavalli*s case is simply this, 
that even before the HAMA but after the HSA, a widow's adoption of a
1. Followed in Kisan v. Hari, A.I.R. 197^ Bom. 65, where Chandurkar, J., 
approving the decision in Yamunabai's case, above, held that the son 
adopted by the widow prior to the HAMA, could not question the 
alienations effected hy the widow in her capacity of full owner 
under s. 14- (l) of the HSA, his Lordship further maintaining at 67 
that, "(t)his principle has been given effect in s. 12 of the HAMA... 
where... the Legislature has clearly provided in clause (c) of the 
proviso of this section that the adopted child shall not divest 
any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the 
adoption. See also Banabai v. Wasudeo, A.I.R. 1979 Bom. 181.
2. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730.
3. Ibid, at 1731.
k. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730.
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son could not divest her of her absolute estate made absolute by s. 1^  (l) 
of the HSA, not because ofsl2 proviso (c) of the HAMA, but simply because 
an absolute estate could not be divested by an adoption if it had 
become absolute in the terms laid down in s. l*f (l).^
(c) The Persistence of "Relation Back" After the Enactment of the 
HAMA, 195&
But what of adoptions made after the coming into force of the
HAMA? We have already seen that the subject gave rise to endless
difficulties. Everyone was agreed that the chaos caused in respect
of property rights as a result of divesting subsequent to the adoption
2
was a disgrace, "a confounded nuisance" and should be stopped. Then 
the HAMA by s. 12 proviso (c) appeared to remedy the mischiei by 
bold words;
"(t)he adopted child shall not divest any person of any 
estate which vested in him or her before the adoption."
However the remainder of the statute did not abolish the doctrine of
"relation back" in so many words? it allowed the adopted child to
acquire ties in the family of his adoption in substitution for those
which he had obtained by birth in the family of his birth? and it left
under the plain terms of s. ^ (identical in all aspects to s. 4 of the
HSA, 1956), all the previous law in force which was not contrary to
any provision in the statute itself. The question remained how far
s. 12 proviso (c) had abolished the doctrine of "relation back" since
it evidently did not wipe it totally away.
What happens when a widow adopts a son according to Anglo-Hindu
1. Derrett, "Adoption and Relation Back oj>. cit., at 3*K
2. Ibid., at Jl, In Baisnab v. Parma, A.I.R. 196^ Or. 156* 'the validity 
of adoption having been established in 1957* the reversionary claim 
was held abrogated. It is however submitted that if the adoption 
had been effected in the intervening period between the death of the 
husband in 195& and the recognition of the adoption in 1957* (a vital 
point which is omitted altogether in the set of given facts) the re­
versioner would have no claim, not because of the adoption as the 
Court held, but by virtue of s. l*f (l).
3- Derrett, "Adoption and Relation Back...,": op. cit. , at Jl.
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law and conformably with the HAMA, 1956, *nd- thereupon the adopted son 
claims to represent the widow's deceased husband in respect of the 
latter's separate property and in respect of his interest in MitSksafS. 
joint-family property? Judicial decisions indicate that the judiciary 
was severely puzzled. On the one hand it was thought that the adoption 
made after the Act had come into effect could give the adoptee no 
rights at all; while on the other hand it was felt that he was a 
member of his adoptive father's family and could participate in its 
property.
In Hanumantha Rao v. Hanumayya,^  where the estate had passed to
the sole surviving coparcener in 1936 long before the widow's adoption
in 195?» their Lordships held that the language of clause (c) of the
proviso as also the expression "with effect from the date of adoption"
in s. 12 had the effect of abrogating the legal fiction of "relation
back" in the traditional law of adoption, so that the rights of the
adoptee must be determined with effect from the date of adoption. It
is clear that the Andhra judges had based their reasoning on the
entirely unfounded premise that the property had "vested" in the sole
surviving coparcener, for it is respectfully submitted, the sole
surviving coparcener is not a vestee of the property so long as a
widow survives with power to adopt. Proviso (c) of s. 12 can thus
have no relevance where potentially the coparcenary survives with all
2
the incidents appertaining thereto.
That "relation back" survives despite the effort of the Legis­
lature to do away with it, soon became evident from the Supreme Court 
decision in Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti. The widow as limited owner alienated
1. (1964) 1 An.W.R. 156.
2. See below at 5^8 f.n. 3*
3. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761.
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property by way of mortgage and sale, and on the next presumptive
reversioner challenging the alienations as being without legal necessity
and therefore not binding on him, the suit was decreed. During pendency
of the appeal before the High Court the widow adopted a son in 1959*
In spite of the adoption the appeal was dismissed, and the position
remained that the reversioner was entitled to the alienated property
after the death of the widow. At her death soon after, the appellant
brought a suit for possession of the property. It was argued before
1 2their Lordships that in view of the provisions of ss. 12, 13 and l*f,
the HAMA gives the female Hindu an independent right of adoption, and
where a widow adopts a son, he becomes the adopted son of the widow
but not necessarily the son of the deceased husband. The learned
Judges however, unimpressed by such pleadings drew attention to the
provisions of s. 5 (l) of the HAMA to the effect that
"(n )o adoption shall be made after the commencement of 
this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with 
the provisions contained in this Chapter, and any 
adoptions made in contravention of the said provisions 
shall be void."
In their view the significance of the little word "to" could not be
ignored, and opting for cultural continuity held that the widow not
3
only adopts to herself but also to her husband who is dead, or has 
completely and finally renounced the world or has been declared to be 
of unsound mind, and this would tie in neatly with s. 12 which specifies
1. S. 13 of the HAMA lays down : "Subject to any agreement to the
contrary, an adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother
of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter
vivos or t>y will.
2. S. 1** of the HAMA specifies: "(1) Where a Hindu who has a wife living 
adopts a child, she shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother
(2) ... (3) Where the adoption has been made with the consent of
more than one wife, the seniormost in marriage among them shall be 
deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be step-mothers."
3. Emphasis mine.
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that the rights that the adopted son loses in the family of his "birth 
are replaced by the rights created by the adoption in the adoptive 
family, that is the widow‘s family which is her deceased husband's 
family. ^
The importance of this decision lies for us in that it effectively 
reprieves the doctrine of relation back to establish, not that the 
improperly alienated property is recoverable, for that in any case is 
established, but that by the same doctrine the adopted son is entitled 
to dislodge the presumptive reversioner of the right to recover such 
property, the Supreme Court holding that the adopted son being the next 
heir of the deceased Hindu, he was entitled to the property as the 
nearest reversioner.^
1. That this reprieval of "relation back" has brought grief to many a 
veteran scholar of the Hindu law of adoption is evident from the 
spate of articles in criticism of the Supreme Court *s decision in 
Sawan Ram's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761. Instances of such hostile 
reaction are: G. K. Dabke, "Divesting on Adoption," 0-968) 70 Bom.
L.R. (J)., at 1^3-9* P. Diwan, "Adoption by a Hindu Widow: Adopted 
Son*s Relationship with the Deceased Husband," 21 law Review, (Univ. 
of Punjab), April 1969, at i-xviii| G.K. Dabke, "That Little Word 
"To" in s. 5 (1) of the HAMA, 1956," (1969) 71 Bom. L.R. (j)., at 
13-*f; B.N. SarapatU;"The Doctrine of Relation Back: An Unfortunate 
Revival, (1970) 2 S.C.J. (j)., at 1-10; J.D.M. Derrett too gives 
only guarded support. He has this to say: "Hence relation back is 
saved under the Act by that little word "to." Had it been up to 
the Supreme Court to determine what that word meant the present 
writer would have advised, cautiously, against giving it that sense: 
but the Supreme Court has performed its function, and there will be 
no going back.Adoption in the Joint Hindu Family: A Recent 
Supreme Court Decision and Its Limits," (1968) 70 Bom. L.R. (j).,
51-5, at 55* See also H. Gujrathi, "Adoption by a Widow After 21st 
December, 1956," A. I.R. 1966 JoumL, 19^20, which merely attacks the 
decision in Ankush Harayan v. Janabai, A.I.R. 1966 Bom. 17^ (discussed 
below), for its upholding of the principle of "relation back"; but 
the effect of s. 14 (l) of the HSA —  of supreme importance in the 
set of given facts, is ignored altogether.
2. That the right of the presumptive reversioner is a mere spes 
successionis, and a decree in his favour against improperly alienated 
property does not thereby have the effect of vesting the land in him, 
was the basis of the decision in Dunni Chand v. Paras Ram, A.I.R.
1970 Del. 202, where Khanna, J., held that under such circumstances, 
the adopted son as preferential heir was entitled to the estate of 
his deceased adoptive father. On a similar set of facts, it was
P.T.O.
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That despite the HAMA, "relation hack" did indeed persist, was
reiterated by the Supreme Court in Snrt. Sitabai v. Ramchandra. ^ Where
on the death in 1930# of one of two brothers who constituted a joint
Hindu family, an illegitimate son was bom to the widow as a result of
a liaison with the surviving brother. At the latter*s death in 1958#
the son adopted by the widow shortly afterwards was held entitled to
take as coparcener by survivorship from the adoptive father thereby
2
ousting the illegitimate son.
held in Arumugha Udayar v. VaUiammal, A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 72, at 81
that, "(I)t is too much to argue that this fiction of affiliation
to the deceased husband has been kept alive for the limited classes 
of cases in which the estate of the widow did not become absolute 
by reason of the widow not being in possession of the property within 
the meaning of s. l*f of the HSA.” However we must regard this decision 
as expunged from our list of authorities now that the S.C. has 
established without doubt that "this fiction of affiliation" 
does indeed live on. Similarly what vests in the alienee as a result 
of alienations effected by the widow as a limited owner, is only a 
life estate, and as a consequence of his new status in the adoptive 
family, the adopted son, despite proviso (c) of s. 12, is entitled 
to challenge all such alienations. So it was held in Hausabai v. 
Jijabai, A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 981 Kiran Bala v. Ashok Kumar, A.I.R.
1974 Pat. 291.
1. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 3^ 3.
2. Followed in Bai Chanchal v. Manishankar, (1971) 12 Guj. L.R. 576,
where on the principles established in Smt. Sitabai*s case, cited 
above, their Lordships were of the view that the ancestral property 
held by the sole surviving coparcener after the death of his brother 
in 1923# continued to be joint-family property in the presence of 
the deceased's widow with a right of maintenance and residence.
Thus by reason of her adoption in 1958# the adopted son became a 
coparcener entitled to take by survivorship and so participate in
a partition of the joint-family property, and the question of 
divesting the sole surviving coparcener could not arise because 
exclusive and absolute title to it had not vested in him by devo­
lution. For an appreciative assessment of this case see J.D.M. 
Derrett, "Adoption* The Whole Hog," (1972) 7** Bom. L.R. (j)., 97-9. 
This principle is in direct conflict to the declaration of their 
Lordships obiter in Sawan Ram's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761, which 
postulates that where a coparcenary unit is reduced to a single 
coparcener, the joint property vests in him, and he holds a fixed 
interest incapable of any fluctuation or disturbance by a sub­
sequent adoption by the widow of the deceased coparcener. That 
Sitabai's case, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 3^ 3# is undoubtedly right, based 
as it is upon more convincing reasoning and upon the logical exten­
sion of the basic concepts governing a Hindu undivided family, is 
given greater credence in view of yet another S.C. ruling in 
Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore. A.I.R. i960 
S.C. 1523# which held that the property of the joint-family did not
P.T.O.
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(d) The Effect of S. (l) on "Relation Back" After the Enactment
of the HAMA, 1956
The significance of the foregoing, which might at first sight seem et 
disgression, is to explore the question since the pernicious
principle of "relation back" and its disastrous consequences are in­
deed a reality, despite vociferous and vehement protests what may 
its effect be on the estate that the widow takes under s. 1^ (l).
In Ankush v. Janabal, at the death of the senior widow in 19^ 8, 
the junior widow came into possession of the entire estate of her 
husband who had died in 1917. In 1957 she adopted a son who thereupon 
sued her for possession of the estate. Reliance was placed on her 
behalf on s. 12 and its proviso (c) to claim that when an adoption is 
made under the new system, the widow does not divest herself, for the 
son that she obtains to herself has no relationship whatever with her 
deceased husband's family. Their Lordships took the view that s. 12 
did indeed apply, but that the most important part of the section was 
the last phrase before the provisos commenced. On a clear reading
cease to belong to the joint-family merely because the family is 
represented by a single coparcener who possesses rights which an 
absolute owner of property may possess. In view of this, the 
remark obiter of Hegde, J., in Punithavalli Annual v. Ramalingam, 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730, at 1731# that "(t)he alienation effected by 
a sole surviving male (sic) coparcener can be successfully challenged 
by a person adopted subsequent to the alienation," must be upheld 
despite expressions of doubt to the contrary. See Derrett,
"Adoption and Relation Back..." op. cit., at 3**-5« Se© also Subhash 
Mislr v. Thagai Mislr, A.I.R. 19&7 All. where the widow-
heiress died pending litigation for recovery of property from her 
deceased husband's collateral who purported to be in exclusive 
possession, and it was held that the son adopted by her in 1961 
must be deemed to be the child of her husband as well and therefore 
entitled to the property.
1. Supra, at 5^ 5# f-n. 1.
2. A.I.R. 1966 Bom. 17*k
therefore of the latter section and sub-s. VI of s. 11,^ the effect of 
adoption under the Act is that when either of two spouses adopts^  both 
get a child and all the ties of the child in the family of his or her 
birth become completely severed to be replaced by those created by 
the adoption in the adoptive family, as the expressions "family of 
its adoption" and "adoptive family" in the two sections would indicate, 
and this would be true for all different purposes. As a consequence, 
the adopted son was held entitled to divest the adopting mother. Im­
plicit in their Lordships* judgment is a concern that adoption should
have its entire and proper effect unhampered by anything that the HAMA
2
might say unless it said it in plain words, but, it is submitted, 
the intendment of the HAMA could not be clearer* it says in so many 
words that an estate once vested cannot be divested as a consequence 
of subsequent adoption. Where therefore the adoptive mother obtains 
property under s. 14 (l) of the HSA, she has an absolute estate already, 
which (with the special and only apparent exception of the estate 
created under the Act of 1937 &nd still capable of fluctuation) vests* 
she is not divested by the adoption and if she wants to make provision
3
for the child she has adopted she must do it by settlement or will.-'
1. Sub-s. VI of s. 11 lays downs "The child to be adopted must be
actually given and taken in adoption... with intent to transfer the
child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption."
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "Adoption, Succession and the Present State of the 
Hindu law," (1966) 68 Bom. L.R. (j)., 4l-8 at 44.
3. Ibid., at 45. Incorrect as the decision in Hanumantha Rap *s case,
(1964) 1 An.W.R. 156 is, we must nevertheless note here the correct­
ness of the obiter dicta at 159» that when a widow now adopts, she 
is not divested by the adoption. In Rukmani Bai v. Commr. of Wealth 
Tax,Bihar and Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 Or. 274 at 27%  the same view is 
evident but on the mistaken premises and a denial of relation back 
as "from the date of adoption he could only be her next heir and 
cannot divest her of the property that has already vested in her.
In Smt. Sitabai*s case, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343# the S.C. gave specific 
approval to Ankush Narayan's case, A.I.R. 1966 Bom., 173» an& Lerrett 
correctly doubts in his Critique, op. cit., at 144 that "... since in 
that case the Bombay High Court actually allowed the adopted son to 
divest his adoptive mother's inheritance which vested in her absolutely 
under s. 14 of the H5A, (and) unless we are to imagine a new doctrine 
of 'provisional vesting*, this would appear to be flatly contrary to 
the statute."
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That the question of "relation "back" under the scheme of the
"Hindu Code" was by no means settled soon became evident in Banabai v.
Vasudeo,^ where the ratio was simply and firmly thisj The fiction of
relation back as a result of the adoption has been done away with by 
2
s. 12 of the HAMA. Briefly the facts were that a Hindu widow's
alienation of property in 19&0 was challenged by the son she had adopted
in 1959 shortly after her husband's death in 195®* on the ground that
as a consequence of the adoption he had become a member of the deceased
husband's family and had acquired the status and rights of a natural
bom son in it. His Lordship, Tulpule, J., however held that s. 12
is clearly to the effect that the adopted son becomes a member of the
adoptive family only from the date of adoption, and as a result the
status and rights which accrue to him are controlled by, and subject
to hi6 incapacity to divest any person of an estate which had already
vested in him under the clear terms of proviso (c) to s. 12. Thus as
her late husband's estate had vested absolutely in her under the
provisions of the HSA, the widow could not be held to have lost her
ownership of the property as a consequence of a subsequent adoption by
her. Neither could an ante-adoption agreement the terms of which merely
spelt out the legal consequences of the adoption, i.e. that the adopted
son would get all the rights of a natural bom son to the widow and her
deceased husband, be regarded as having the effect of abating the
3
widow's full ownership of the property, for s. 13 makes it abundantly 
clear that unless there is a specific agreement imposing restrictions, 
the right or power to transfer is not affected by the adoption. Correctly
1. A.I.R. 1979 Bom. 181.
2. Ibid, at 187.
3. S. 13 lays down that, "(S)ubject to any agreement to the contrary, 
an adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of the 
power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter vivos or 
by will.
decided on fact, the judgment, it is submitted, must nevertheless be 
subject to criticism, for nowhere does the learned Judge state the 
correct position, i.e. that "relation back" is abrogated only to the 
extent it clashes with the provisons of s. 14 (l) of the HSA. In fact 
the conclusive pronouncement of its extinction apart, implicit in the 
obiter dicta the same view is apparent. In considering obiter, the 
rights of the natural bom son in the joint-family property after the 
HSA, his Lordship rightly explains that a notional partition would be 
deemed to have been effected between the deceased coparcener and his 
sons and widow just prior to his death and the shares going by succession 
under s. 8 worked out. But, maintains the learned Judge, the question 
is irrelevant, for shorn of the fiction of "relation back", the adopted 
son's rights in the property would spring into existence only from the 
date of his adoption. That this interpretation is untenable, that 
"relation back" survives where property has not vested absolutely, we 
have already seen; that it lives on to affect the interest in joint- 
family property even after the HSA —  a subtlety which escaped 
his Lordship entirely —  is brought to our view when it is explained 
that
"(A)fter 1956 the interest in joint-family property will 
pass by testamentary or intestate succession in every case, 
because the presence of the widow (who adopts) makes this 
certain (see s. 6 of the HSA). But the share that passes 
by succession must be established... by making a calculation 
to find out what proportion of the joint-family property 
would have fallen to the deceased if there had been a 
distribution of the property itself by metes and bounds 
immediately before his death. Now since relation back 
has been reprieved, our adopted son must be understood 
as alive at the moment of the adoptive father's death.
Thus there are three people to be considered, the father 
himself, his widow (the adoptive mother-to-be) and the 
(adopted son)s hence the proportion that passes to the 
heirs is one-third (see Eangubai's case), 1
1. Derrett, "Adoption in the Joint Hindu Family...," op. cit., at
In Rangubai v. Laxman, A.I.R. 1966 Bom. 169, (followed in Ananda v. 
Haribandhu, A.I.R. 1967 Or. 19*0» where the coparcener died leaving
P.T.O.
and this one-third of the father's share does not vest in anybody but 
passes by succession to be shared equally by the heirs mentioned in 
class I of the Schedule thus entitling the adopted son to take his 
share of the undivided joint-family property, together with his birth­
right in respect of one-third of that estate.^ However, that "relation
If
back in regard to joint-family property is valid only where in the 
presence of heirs other than the widow a notional partition is con­
templated, is obvious when we consider that where the widow is the sole 
heir, the property vests absolutely in her under s. l*f (l), and of 
she cannot be divested by a subsequent adoption.
That the question continued to agitate judicial minds is again
2
evident in Hirabai v. Babu Manika. Long after the death of the sole 
surviving coparcener prior to the passing of the HWRPA, 1937* the widow, 
his sole heir, adopted a son in 1962, and once again the question for 
determination was whether the adopted son had acquired any interest in 
the property of which the widow had become full owner under s. l*f (l) 
of the HSA, so as to challenge the alienation effected by her sifter 
his adoption. In the view of their Lordships, Masodkar and Rele, JJ.,
a widow and an adopted son, the widow instituted a suit claiming a 
half share in the property, i.e. a one-third share on the basis of 
a notional partition as envisaged in Explanation I to b . 6 of the 
HSA, and one-half of the one-third on succession to her husband*s 
share. Patel, J., held that under the Explanation there is not 
merely a notional partition but a partition in fact and in substance, 
and as such the widow's claim must be upheld so as to entitle her 
not only to her share on inheritance but also to her share on 
partition, both of which must be separated and given to her. On the 
alternative basis the widow's entitlement would have only been to 
a one-sixth share, the son getting two-thirds by survivorship and 
one-sixth by succession out of the one-third undivided interest 
along with his adoptive mother. For a critical assessment of the 
ratio in this decision see S. Manohar, "Rangubai Lalji v. Iaxraan 
Lalji and s. 6 of the HSA, 1956,*(1966) 68 Bom. L.R. (j), 60-2; 
Derrett, "Adoption, Succession...," op. cit., at 6^-8.
1. Derrett, "Adoption in the Joint Hindu Family:...," op. cit., at 5*+«
2. A.I.R. 1980 Bom. 315-
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under the express terms of s. 12 of the HAMA, the fiction of "relation 
back" had been done away with to be replaced by what they call "pro­
spective furthering," that is to say, that with effect from the date 
of adoption, the son adopted by the widow must be deemed to be a member 
of the deceased husband's family as well, entitled to similar rights in 
the property as a natural child, subject however to proviso (c) of s. 12
so as not to divest other members of the family of the estate vested in
them. However, as the nature of the property continues to be joint- 
family property despite the full ownership of the widow, the adopted 
son gets title as if by birth on the date of the adoption, and by virtue 
of prospective-furthering, the rights and privileges thereto would get 
annexed to whatever remains of the property. In short as the adopted 
child gets interest in the joint-family property from the date of his 
adoption, he is entitled to question alienations made by the widow in
that part of it which vests in him by reason of his civil birth as a
coparcener; and as in this case, the adoptive mother had validly 
surrendered her interest in his favour, he was held entitled to divest 
the alienee from her. Its excruciating tortuousness and verbosity 
apart, it soon became evident to those involved in the dramas of the 
Hindu law of adoption that the judgment, if left unscot died, was likely 
to create further conundrums in an already complicated state of law, and 
criticisms of it were not slow in coming.^ In the first place, that 
"relation back" can have no application in the present case, we are 
all agreed and there can be no quarrel with that; but to hold as the
1. For an incisive critical analysis of the case see J.D.M. Derrett,
"A Bombay Experiment in the Law of Adoption," (1981) 2 M.L.J. (j), 
1-3 J see also Kesharbai v. The State of Maharashtra, A. I.R. I98I 
Bom. 115 which mercifully overrules this decision.
learned judges do that it is abrogated under s. 12, is an altogether 
untenable proposition as we have already seen. Mischievous as it 
certainly is, it nevertheless survives, so the highest judicial authority 
has held, and so very many High Court cases including Bombay cases 
acknowledged. We are then told that the widow possessed full pro­
prietary rights in the estate under s. l*f (l) but that what she held 
was joint-family property and the adopted son, from the date of adoption, 
is co-owner with the mother to the extent of a moiety, an altogether 
paradoxical situation, it is submitted. The misunderstanding that 
property in the hands of the widow, living joint-family style, with no 
surviving coparcener is still joint-family property is dispelled when 
we consider that, the Hindu law proposition that property does not 
cease to be joint-family property so long as a widow survives capable 
of adoption is true only when a coparcener, formerly joint with her
husband survives. Then the adoption recreates a joint-family, or
1 2 rather a coparcenary so that partition and back-accounting can occur.
Such property is the property of a"Hindu undivided family" for tax
purposes, and where the widow obtains it under s. l*f (l) her absolute
title in it cannot be impugned. Finally, the flimsy evidence of
surrender in favour of the adopted son and upheld by the learned Judges,
1. Derrett, "A Bombay Experiment.. . op. cit., at 2.
2. Derrett at ibid, vindicates this view by drawing our attention to the 
decision in Gurupadappa v. Karishiddappa, A.I.R. 195^ Bom. 318* to 
the effect that the dattaka is entitled to cause the alienation of 
joint-family property that would not have been binding upon him, 
made by the sharers during the period when an adoption to his adop­
tive father might conceivably have been anticipated, to be set off 
in South India (including the former Bombay districts of Mysore and 
some districts of Orissa State, but excluding pre-1956 Mysore), 
against the share of the alienors respectively, so that he might 
take his share as far as possible free of non-binding alienations.
See also Kristappa v. Gopal, A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 21*4- where the reopening 
of partition was held to be a simple case of doing equities in order 
that the property should be redivided on a fair and equitable basis.
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must come in for close scrutiny. Undoubtedly under the traditional law 
a widow could surrender orally to a reversioner, but once her limited 
tenure is converted to an absolute one under s. l*f (l), reversionary 
rights are pro tanto extinguished,^ and the allegation that the adopted
2Bon's rights emanated from such surrender must be rejected out of hand.
However matters were put in correct perspective again by the Pull 
Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Kesharbai v. The State of 
Maharashtra. In an effort to avoid the consequences of holding surplus 
land under the amended Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on 
Holdings) Act, which came into retrospective effect from 1970» the 
widow claimed that the son she had adopted in 1964- was entitled to a 
one-half share in the property of her husband who had died in 193*+• In 
determing the question as to whether a subsequent adoption would have 
any repercussions on the full ownership conferred upon a Hindu female 
under s. l*f (1) of the HSA, their Lordships, held that as the ownership
contemplated in the HSA would have all the attributes of full ownership
as is normally understood in law, and comparable in many respects to the 
self-acquired property of a Hindu male over which the adopted son could 
claim no rights, the "full ownership" contemplated by s. 1^ of the HSA 
is similarly not made by the Legislature subject to any incident of
divest m 3 on adoption. In a situation therefore, where the only
person surviving was a widow who becomes full owner of the property under
the HSA and who thereafter adopts a son, s. 12 of the HAMA can have no
application, for as there is no joint-family property in existence, the 
adopted son cannot claim on the date of his artificial birth in the
1. Infra, at 5Z5-7-
2. Derrett, "A Bombay Experiment...," at 2-3.
3. A.I.R. 1981 Bom. 115.
Effectively overruling the Division Bench decision in Hirabai v.
Babu Manika, A.I.R. I98O Bom. 315.
family any right in the property. HiB claims could arise only after 
his adoptive mother's death as her heir or legatee, or during her life­
time where she executes a deed of gift in his favour by virtue of the 
provisions of s. 13. Lucid and conclusive as this view of the law is, 
a footnote is nevertheless in order. Their Lordships declare in express 
terms that
"(t)he adoption after the (Hindu) Succession Act operates 
prospectively and not retrospectively. 1 There is 
no relation back." 2
But what where the widow is not the sole heir? What where the deceased
leaves behind heirs other than the widow mentioned in class I of the
Schedule? Their Lordships did not ask, indeed did not need to ask,
given the facts of the case, what under those circumstances would the
3
position of relation back be. It is submitted —  and has been shown —  
that "relation back" is then indeed a reality, and the adoptive son 
participates in the notional partition to determine the share that 
passes by succession.
(if) S. lif (l) and the Reversionary Right
We must next consider what was once the controversial question as 
to the effect of s. l*f (l) on the reversionary right. Obviously where
1. Shripad Goyanan v. Dattaram Kashinath, A.I.R. 197*+ S.C. 878, which 
deals with adoption in the Anglo-Hindu law nevertheless anticipates 
this interpretation at 881, where in regard to the doctrine of 
"relation back" after the HSA had come into force, the observation 
is made obiter that "(l)t is unlikely that a similar question will 
arise hereafter since s. 4 of the HSA, 195^ has practically swept 
off texts, rules and the like in Hindu law, which were part of that 
law in force, immediately before the commencement of the Act, till 
provisions have been made for such matters in the Act. Since on the 
husband's death the widow takes an absolute estate, questions of the 
type which engage us in this appeal will be stilled forever."
2. Kesharbai v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1981 Boa. 115» at 122.
3. Supra at 512 ff.
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the female Hindu was in possession of the property when the HSA came
into force, the plain terms of s. l*f (l) convert her limited estate
to a full tenure, and there is no question hut that in such cases the
reversionary rights are extinguished.
So their Lordships of the Orissa High Court held in Sm. Laxmi Devi
v. Surendra Kumar Panda, ^ where a suit by the full sister of the last
male holder for a declaration of her reversionary rigjit was dismissed
on the ground that, having been relegated to the list of heirs in class II,
she had neither any legal character nor any interest in praesenti, as
the HSA had effectively conferred full ownership on the widows in
2
possession of their deceased husband's property.
The reversioners would have no right either, to challenge the
3
validity of a mortgage, lease, settlement or other perpetual grants 
in which the widow had preserved even a nominal right because all that
1. A.I.R. 1957 Or. 1, followed in Bhabhani Prosad v. Snrt. Sarat Sundari, 
A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 527.
2. Consequently as the power to dispose of it absolutely is an incident 
of the absolute estate, it was held in Hari Ram v. Harbans Singh# 
A.I.R. 1973 H.P. 71#that where the widow sells subsequent to the HSA, 
there is no doubt but that such sale passes to the purchaser an 
absolute interest in the property, because as absolute owner she can 
deal with it in any manner she likes irrespective of any question of 
a binding purpose. So too in Harak Singh ▼. Kailash Singh, A.I.R.
1958 Pat. 581 (F.B.), where their Lordships of the F.B. declared 
obiter at 58*f that, "she has the absolute power to dispose of such 
property by sale, mortgage, gift, lease, exchange etc. ... The 
devolution of such property after her death is governed by s. 15 of 
the Act and the Hindu woman becomes a fresh stock of descent. ..."
See also Mt. Lukai v. Niranjan, A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 160 (F.B.), at l6l; 
Marudakkal v. Arumugha, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255* at 2591 Ramsewak v. 
Sheopujan, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 75* at 78; Dayal v. Bu.ja, A.I.R. 1959 
Punj. 326 at 326 j Mt. Janku v. His an, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 5, at 2 and
Shivram Hede v. Aba Madne, A.I.R. i960 Bom. 32 at 35? Subbareddl 
v. Penchalamma, A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 368, where it was held that the 
life-interest that the widow retained for herself in settling the 
properties on her grand-daughters, was converted to an absolute estate 
under s. l*f (l), so as to extinguish the reversionary right completely. 
Lalchand Bhur v. Sushi la Sundari, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 623 where a con- * 
sent decree which embodied an undertaking by the widow not to alienate, 
or encumber or otherwise deal with the estate so as to prejudicially 
affect the reversionary interest was held to have become inoperative 
after the passing of the HSA.
3. Supra, at *+70 ft.
-527-
might be comprehended within the word "possessed".^  This would be
equally applicable to property which may not be in her actual possession
2
but to which she may have a right in law to recover possession, as it
3
would to all cases of fraudulent and invalid transfers.
(a ) The View That Reversionary Rights are Extinguished Despite the
Widows Improper Alienation Prior to the HSA
How eve what of situations where the female Hindu alienated her 
limited interest without the consent of reversioners and without 
justification, and the alienees cannot prove that they made sufficient 
bona fide enquiry and satisfied themselves that circumstances justifying 
the alienation existed? The question that then falls to be considered 
is whether the widow is entitled to the beneficial provisions of s. l*f(l) 
so as to convey to the alienee a valid title to the total abrogation of 
reversionary rights.
If
In the initial stages, some perplexity of judicial opinion apart, 
the weight of considerable authority lent support to the view that the 
effect of the HSA was to do away with reversioners altogether. ^ That
1. Ramsewak v. Sheopujan, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 75» at 79-
2. Supra, at *+8l ff. 3« Supra, at 7^6-9.
4. See for instance Kamla Devi v. Bachulal, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. vhere 
Das, C.J. , left open the question as to the validity of the alienation 
made by the widow in favour of her daughter in the light of the 
provisions of the ISA, merely stating at W +  that, as under the Hindu 
law it was a valid gift "it is unnecessary to decide in this case the 
true scope and effect of s. l*f of the ISA." See also Sita Bai v. 
Kothulal, A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 78, where it was contended inter alia 
that as the HSA had put an end to the reversioners, the widow's im­
proper alienations prior to the Act could not be challenged. While 
upholding the principle of reversion in regard to devolution of 
tenancy rights in respect of agricultural holdings, Vyas, J., however, 
left open the more specific question as to whether or not the rever­
sion had been abrogated under the 1956 Act.
5. J.D.M. Derrett, "Some Problems Arising under the HSA, 1956," (1957)
59 Bom. L.R. (j), 33-9» and ^ 9-55» at *f9-50* To the contradictory 
dicta in Venkayamjna v. Veerayya, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280, (discussed 
below), the same author, in his article "Recent Decisions and Some
• Queries in Hindu law," (1957) 59 Bom L.R. (j), 178-89, brou^it the 
objection at I87 that, "Surely on the cessation of her (the widow's)
P.T.O.
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despite dissenting voicesthis view did somewhat find favour in the 
High Courts, is evident in the number of minority decisions in affirma­
tion of this attitude.
2
In Ram Ayodhya v. Raghunath Missir, the plaintiff as the next 
reversioner brought a suit for a declaration that the alienations effected 
by the widow in 1914 were without consideration and without legal 
necessity and therefore not binding upon him. The Patna High Court 
quite simply held that the retrospective nature of s. 14 having trans­
formed the limited estate into an absolute one, the reversionary right 
which was not in any case a vested interest and hitherto a mere spes
successionls, is extinguished,the property devolving, after the widow's
3
death, under the provisions of s. 15 of the HSA.
That the right of the reversioner is obliterated once for all, was
Zf
reiterated in Patna in Ramsaroop v. Hiralal Singh. Along the same lines
tr
as the earlier decision in holding that the word "possessed" in s. 14(1)
did not refer to the time when the possession was claimed by the widow,
it went even further to assert that where the widow had made over the
possession of the properties to her alienees, her full ownership would
enure to the benefit of the latter. Such a position, it is submitted^  is
estate the term of the alienation, which was not authorised prior 
to the coming into force of the Act, is completed, and the reversion 
is not to them, (the reversioners under the old law) for the limited 
estate is abolished, but to the woman's legal representatives?" —  
an ingenious argument from which —  doubtless on deeper reflection —  
he resiles. See J.D.M. Derrett, "Anomalous Decisions from Patna on 
the HSA, 1956,H (1958) 21 S.C.J.(j), 259-66, at 264 ff.
1. Dabke, "Full Ownership...," op. cit., at 178-9*
2. A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480.
3. Followed in Mst. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 674}
Dhlrajkunwar v. Lakhansingh, A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 38} Mankumar v. Mt Bodhi, 
A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 211; Bajjnath v Raman tar, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 227l 
Kanuman Prasad v. Mst. Indrawatl, A.I.R. 1958 All. 304.
4. A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 319.
5. Ayodhya v. Raghunath Missir, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480.
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untenable, for as we have already seen, the retroactive effect is to 
property acquired not to that possessed by the female Hindu; moreover 
when it is assumed that the Act retrospectively improved the alienor's 
title, by giving her an absolute estate when she was selling at the 
price applicable to the sale of the property held subject to the woman's 
limited estate, the next step is to assert that without any extra payment 
the alienee becomes, upon the coming into force of the Act, absolute 
owner of the property —  a viewpoint entirely unjustified by the general 
concept, let alone the words, of the statute.^
(b) The View That Reversionary Ri^vts Subsist in Cases of Improper 
Alienations
Decisions such as the foregoing proceed on the assumption that the
widow is the owner with limited powers of alienation, whereas the true
position is that, though from many points of view she appears to be an
owner, representing the estate, in fact she is only a representative
during a hiatus in the full vesting, and that is why the rights which
pass to the alienee depend to a vital extent upon the presence or absence
of justification, of the reversioner's consent, or of equitable relief 
2
for the alienee. It also proceeds on the view that with the coming 
into force of the HSA, s. 4 (l) (b) has the effect of abolishing rever­
sioners altogether, as their existence is now inconsistent with the new 
scheme of succession as propounded in the statute. The observations of
3
the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra v. Sakharam to the effect that
"... the text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law stands 
superseded only qua any matter on which provision is made 
in the Act; and s. 14 (l) makes no provision concerning 
property not possessed by a Hindu female," 4
1. Derrett, "Anomalous Decisions...," op. cit., at 265.
2. Ibid., at 266.
3. A.I.R. 1958 Bora. 244.
4. Ibid., at 246.
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sufficiently clarifies that despite the over-riding effect of s. 4 the 
fair conclusion must be that the right of the reversioners to challenge 
improper alienations effected by the female Hindu prior to the HSA, is 
not affected by the Act.
This may now be taken to be settled law inasmuch as judicial 
interpretation of sub-s. (l) of s. 14 leaves no room for doubt that in 
so far as the widow had parted with possession before the coming into 
force of the Act, the benefit of the sub-s. will accrue neither to her 
nor to her alienee^ So their Lordships of the Andhra and Calcutta High
Courts held, where the question first came up almost simultaneously in
1 2 Venkayyamma v. Veerawa and Gostha Beharl v. Haridas respectively. In
a significant and far-reaching interpretation of the sub-s. Sastri, J., 
in the former decision was of the view that, for all the broad connota­
tion of the word "possessed", the retrospective operation of the sub-s. 
could not be extended to the female Hindu who had parted with possession 
of her limited interest and put the vendee in possession. Neither, his 
Lordship stressed, could the vendee take advantage of the beneficient 
provisions of s. 14 (l), for
"(T)he Act was not intended to benefit alienees who, with 
their eyes open, purchased property from the female limited 
owners without any justifying necessity before the Act 
came into force and at a time when the female vendors 
had only the limited interest of a Hindu woman." 3
The rationale for this, the learned Judge explained, was that on a trans­
fer of property, it is only the transferor's interest that would pass to 
the transferee, the general principle being that a person cannot trans­
fer to another more that what he or she is entitled to; as such the 
alienee took subject to the limitations inherent in the limited estate,
1. A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 280.
2. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557.
3. Venkayyamma*s case, cited above, at 282.
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and the reversionary right in respect of such property enured.
Coming to exactly the Bame conclusion, Mookherjee, J., in Gostha
Behari*s case^ further negatived the contention that in view of s. 4 of
the Act, the limited estate would absolutely cease and reversioners 
altogether disappear from the picture, to hold that
M(S). 4 in its relevant clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s. (l), 
merely abrogates the Hindu law and other laws so long 
applicable to Hindus, as against provisions made in the 
Act..." 2
the clear implication being that where the limited estate subsists, the
o
rights of reversioners remain intact.
1. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 557-
2. Ibid., at 560.
3* The same view is evident in numerous decisions. See Hari Kishen 
v.Hira A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 89Thailambal v. Kesavan, A.I.R. 1957 Ker.
86; Marudakkal v. Arumigha, A.I.R. 1958 Mai. 255l Chandrasekhara 
v. Slvaramakrishna. A.I.R. I958 Ker. 142; Mt. Lukai v. Niranjan, 
A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 160 (F.B.), dissenting with Ram Ayodhya v. Raghunath. 
A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480} Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad, A.I.R. 1957 
Pat. 674 and overruling Dhira jkunwar v. Iakhansin^h. A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 
38} Ramchandra v. Sakharam, A^.R. 1958 Bom. 244, where the mother 
made a gift of the property and then remarried, and it was held that 
despite the HSA, the reversionary right subsisted. Sanslr Patelin 
v. Satyabati. A.I.R. 1958 Or. 75* Harak Sin^i v. Kailash Singh, A.I.R. 
1958 Pat. 581 (F*B.) overruling Ram Ayodhya v. Raghunath, cited above, 
Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad, cited above, and Ramsaroop Singh v. 
Hiralal Singh, A. I. R. 1958 Pat. 319» approved of in Kotturswami v. 
Veerawa, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 at 58I; Dayal v. Buja, A.I.R. 1959 
Punj. 326, where Singh, J. ’s, specious reasoning was that the gift to 
the heir was merely acceleration of succession and distinguishable 
from alienation by sale, but despite his entire agreement with the 
retrogade observations of the Patna High Court, felt bound by the 
decision in Hari Klshan v. Hlra, cited above} Brahmadeo Singh v. 
Deomani Missir, Civil Appeal Ro. 130 of I96O5 Ramappa v. Chandangouda, 
AIR I960 Mys. 2o0t Pathumma Beebi v. Krishnan Asari. A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 
247} Amar Singh v. Seva Ram. A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 530} Devi Singh v.
Mst. Phuima, A.I.R. 1961 H.P. 10} Ram Gulam Singh v. Palakdhard Singh, 
A. I. R. I96I Pat. 60, where it was further clarified that the aliena- 
tions of the widow being binding on her, the alienees could never 
be trespassers qua the widow, though on the termination of the Hindu 
widow's estate, their position would certainly be that of trespassers 
qua the reversion} Bapurao v. Hero.ji, A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 300; Renuka 
Bala v. Aswlni Kumar, A.I.R. 1961 Pat. **98} Tulsi Ahlr v. Mt Sonia, 
A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 296} Gangadhar v. Smt. Saraswati. A.I.R. 1962 Or. 
190} Sheopu.jan v. Ramsewak, A.I.R. 19^3 Pat. 330} Nathuni Missir v. 
Ratna Kuer. A.I.R. 19^3 Pat. 337» where the alienation was by way of 
invalid surrender; Kanheylal v. Banwari, I.L.R. (1963) 2 All. 308; 
Arkhita Das v. Hari Mohapatra, A.I.R. 1963 Or. 162} Rameshwar v. 
Hardas, A.I.R. 1964 All. 308 where it was stressed that the gastric
P.T.O.
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That there can now be no quarrel with this view of the law is 
evident from the wealth of decided cases from all over the country 
affirming and reiterating the correct position, and while the Patna High 
Court does no less in Gobardhan v. Hari ram the decision must, it is 
submitted, be subject to closer scrutiny. The widow and daughter of 
the last male holder executed a sale deed in 19^7» and the plaintiff, 
the daughter’s son, claiming reversionary right, filed a suit for a 
declaration that the sale was without consideration or legal necessity. 
During pendency of the suit, the widow died in I960. In negativing the 
plaintiff's claim, their Lordships, Misra and Singh, JJ.f acknowledged 
that, as a consequence of the improper alienation, the property had not
Hindu law not having been abrogated in its entirety by s. 4 of the 
HSA, the reversioners who are the creation of that law, continue to 
be part of the scene as does their right to challenge the validity of 
alienations effected by the female Hindu; Bai Kamla v. Occharlal, 
A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 84; Karuppadayar v. Periathambi, A.I.R. 1966 Mad.
165; Radha Rani v. Hanuman Prasad, A.I.R. S.C. 216, reversing 
Hanuman Prasad v. Mst. Indrawati, A.I.R. 195® AH» 30^» where the 
further assertion of the Supreme Court was that, the reversioners are 
not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the 
widow, They can sue the alienee for possession after her death, treat­
ing the alienation as a nullity without the Court's intervention; 
Kempiah v. Girigamma, A.I.R. I966 Mys. 189; Chaturbhuj v. Sarbeshwar, 
A.I.R. 1967 Pat. 138; Jandebi v. Upendra Sahu, A.I.R. 1968 Dr. 1^ 7;
Bai Champa v. Chandrakanta, A.I.R. 1973 Guj. 227; Radhey Krishnan 
v. Shiva Shankar. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2405; Bhaghirathi v. Nanibala,
(197^1 79 C.W.N. 387; Ananth Bandhu v. Chanchala Bala, A.I.R. 1976 
Cal. 303 (F.B.); Shiv Pass v. Smt. Devki, A.I.R. I97B P.& H. 285;
Puran Singh v. Ran Lok, A.I.R. I983 P.& H. 162, where the contention 
that the sale (which had only partly been for legal necessity) had 
been converted into a mortgage so as to give the widow the benefit 
of s. 14 (l), was negatived, and the reversionary rigfrt upheld with 
the stipulation that the sum found to be for legal necessity be paid 
to the purchaser, on the principle evident in Bharpnr Singh v. Malian 
Sin^h, A.I.R. 1952 Pepsu 5^ that, a person seeking equity must do 
equity. It is submitted that, the foregoing apart, where the Hindu 
male bequeathed or made a gift inter vivos under the old law, to 
females who had no subsisting right of maintenance in the property, 
the property so conveyed, is a restricted estate within the meaning 
of s. 14 (2), and the reversionary right is not extinguished. Simi- 
where the female Hindu disposed by will and died before the 
commencement of the HSA, or made a gift inter vivos of her limited 
estate, such property is incapable of being enlarged under s. 14 (l), 
as she could not convey more than her life estate, and reversioners 
are again very much in the picture. I full discussion of decided cases 
see below at 613 ff. ^ ^
1. l<U3 Pat,
converted to an absolute tenure, and the daughter but for being co­
executant, would have been entitled to challenge the alienation as 
heir and reversioner. But, reasoned their Lordships, the HSA having 
terminated reversionary rights, the daughter's son's suit was not 
maintainable, and the result would be that the property would lie 
where it should be in terras of the sale deed, under which the title 
had been acquired by the defendant as the vendee.
To this ratio we put forward two objections. No doubt s. 15 
does indeed terminate the reversion, but only in respect of property 
of which the female Hindu is absolute owner. By the learned Judges' 
own admission this did not happen, and since the reversionary right 
is a mere spes successionis, the incapacity of the daughter, the 
presumptive reversioner, does not thereby extinguish the reversion, 
and the search for the next reversioner, must go on. For, —  and 
here our second objection is submitted —  it was never in the con­
templation of the Act to benefit alienees, and to enlarge their in­
terest into an absolute indefeasible interest to the detriment of 
the reversion*'*'
(5) The Effect of S. 14 (l) on Property Reconveyed to the Widow
After Her Alienation
The reconveyance by the alienee of the same property to the 
widow and its effect in the light of s. 14 (l) was a matter of some 
debate, and the question in brief, was whether, while no benefits of 
s. 14 (l) may accrue to the alienee, would the limited estate re­
conveyed by sale, gift or otherwise to the female Hindu be converted 
to an absolute tenure after the commencement of the HSA?
1. See also Mohinder Singh v. Lachhman Singh, A.I.R. 1965 Punj. 317» 
objectionable on the same grounds.
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A seemingly plausible argument put forward in support of the
view that such reconveyance does not come within the purview of s. 14
(1) is the distinction made between the more generally applicable "life
interest", as opposed to the "limited estate" which has definite legal
connotations, and is an institution peculiar to Hindu Jurisprudence,
so that what a transferee from the limited owner held was not the
"limited interest", it being the particular preserve of the female
Hindu, and defeasible on the happening of certain contingencies such
as death, conversion, remarriage, surrender etc., but merely the more
generally familiar "life estate" in legal systems. This being so, even
where the same properties were reconveyed by the transferee either
before or after the commencement of the HSA, as s. 14 (l) envisages
the conversion into an absolute tenure of the limited estate only, the
female Hindu could not avail of its provisions inasmuch as the alienee
could not pass a better title than what he himself had.^
Such a reasoning, one submits, is untenable, based as it is on
misconceptions for to hold that the words "limited interest" in s. 14
(l) does not include the life estate is to do less than justice to the
broad sweep of the Act, the words "any property" being indicative of
2the wider compass to which the sub-s. applies.
As we turn now to judicial decisions, it is at once apparent that 
it was generally this line of thought that the Orissa High Court 
adopted in Ganesh v. Sukriya,-^ to hold that where a pre-1956 donee
1. A.Y. Krishna Murti, "Effect of Mode of Acquisition of the Property
' Possessed by a Female Hindu on s. 14 (l)," (1972) 1 An.W.R. (j),
13-15. This view is to a degree understandable in a South Indian 
for time was when Madras persisted in this retrograde approach 
and Andhra followed suit in Gopisetti Kondiah v. Gunda Subbara- 
yudu. (1968) 2 An.W.R. 455- Balance however, was finally res­
tored, and the myth exploded by the Madras High Court itself in 
Muthu Bhattar v. Chokku Bhattar, A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8. Infra, 597-9-
2. Discussed below at length at 579 ff“-
3- A.I.R. 1963 Or. 167.
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from the widow retransferred the property to her in 1957* the interest 
of the donee being that of the limited owner, the provisions of s. 14 
(l) would not be attracted as he could not transmit any higher title 
than he himself had.
It was likewise held in Andhra Pradesh that, where the property 
sold by the widow was then resold to her prior to the HSA, and she 
subsequently made a gift of it in 1959# the reversionary right sub­
sisted, for the effect of her sale in 1937 waa to rob her of any 
vestige of title therein; her purchase back in 19*+0 could therefore 
have no extra significance, and she took as any stranger would have 
done.^ The correctness of decisions such as these are open to doubt,
and in dissenting, the Madras High Court in criticism of the Orissa 
2
judgment pointed out that the fallacy of the reasoning lay in treating 
alike a reconveyance in favour of the widow, and an alienation in 
favour of a stranger. For in fact there is this vital difference that 
whereas in the latter case, the estate conveyed would not have been in 
the possession of the widow and therefore open to challenge, in the 
case of an annulment of a conveyance by the consent of both parties, 
the effect of the alienation is wiped out and the original position 
restored. Since the Hindu female had acquired the property by lawful 
means, having purchased it for consideration, and was in possession 
with limited rights therein, when the HSA came into force —  these 
facts alone are sufficient for the application of s. 14 (l) read with 
the Explanation added thereto.
That this view did generally find acceptance soon became evident 
in Te.ja Singh v. Jagat Sin^i, where in exactly similar circumstances
1. Venkatratnam v. Palamma, (1970) 2 An.W.R. 264.
2. Ganesh v. Sukriya, cited above.
3. These arguments are put forward cogently in S. Malleswaram, "HSA,
1956, Section 14, Scope Of," (1972) 2 An.W.R. (j), 50-2.
4. A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 403, affirmed on appeal in Jagat Singh v.
Teja Singh. A.I.R, 1970 P.&H.3°9
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Kahajan^Xi persuasive argument vas that, despite the decree in favour 
of the reversion, at "both points of time, i.e. at the point of time 
when the limited owner had parted with possession of the property in 
1938, and at the point of time when she had reacquired it after the 
ISA had come into force, she was in lawful possession, for given the 
wide phraseology of s. 14- (l), the effect of the two transactions, the 
gift and the gift back put together was to nullify the alienation made 
by her and to convert the estate gifted back to her to an absolute 
tenure.*
(6) The Effect of S. 1** (l) on Property which is the Subject-Matter
of Pending Litigation
Every Act speaks with effect from the date of its commencement, 
and it would therefore follow that the words "property possessed" in 
s. l*f (l) of the HSA would apply to property possessed by the female 
Hindu at the commencement of the Act, i.e. to property acquired before 
its commencement. But with a view to obviate argument and litigation, 
the Legislature wisely introduced the clause "whether acquired before 
or after the commencement of the Act," thereby maki ng it clear that
1. In vindication of this view, Ramamurti, J., expressly dissenting 
from the ratio in Ganesh v. Sukriya, A.I.R. i960 Or. 167, further 
elucidated in Chinnakolandi v. Thanji, A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 497* that 
there is nothing in the Hindu law or under the general principles 
of the law of transfer which would prevent the alienee conveying 
back the property to the alienor in the same capacity and in the 
same right in which it was conveyed by the widow. This being so, 
the effect of s. 1^  (1) would be to put an end to the reversionary 
suit by converting such estate into an absolute one. Followed 
in Jagannathan v. Kunjithapathaa, A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 390; see also 
Bai Champa v. Ghandrakanta, A.I.R. 1973 Guj. 227, where the donee 
having relinguished any interest he might have derived from the 
oral gift, this had the effect of reconveying the property to the 
widow so as to validate a testamentary disposition made by her 
after 1956; Bhagwan v. Vishwanath, A.I.R. 1979 Bom. 1 where 
Vaidya, J., held that notwithstanding the decree in favour of the 
reversioner prescribing a restricted estate, the repurchase by the 
widow of the previously alienated property, could not be said to 
come under s. l*f (2) as that decree was not the source of her
P.T.O.
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the section also applied to property which a Hindu woman had inherited 
earlier before the commencement of the Act, provided it was in her 
possession at the commencement of the Act. The question however that 
the Courts were faced with was whether, where the female Hindu who 
might otherwise be entitled, could be regarded as "possessed" of that 
property where the HSA came into force during pendency of litigation.
A perusal of judicial decisions indicatesthat the Courts have 
uniformly construed that, given the wide amplitude of s. 14 (l), the 
female under such circumstances may indeed be said to be in possession 
within the meaning of the sub-s. In Ram Ayodhya v. Ra^iunath Missir,^  
for instance, the dicta, otherwise objectionable in upholding the 
widow's claim to absolute ownership despite previous improper alie­
nations by her, is nevertheless in point. For in scotching the argu­
ment that the provisions of s. 14 (1) would have no application to 
property which is the subject-matter of litigation, the view that 
their Lordships took was that since s. 14 (2) only refers to a final 
decree or order of a civil court by which a restricted estate is
prescribed, there is no power to such argument specially as s. 1*4- (l)
2
is made expressly retrospective.
title. As such she conveyed her full title to the alienee in a 
subsequent sale to the abrogation of the reversionary right. Hari 
Ram v. Harbans Sinfiji, A.I.R. 1973 H.P. 71» where the gifted*pro­
perty having been retransferred, it was held that the earlier 
declaratory decree obtained by the reversioners, neither prevented 
the reconveying of the property to the widow which effectively 
annulled the previous transfer, nor did it estop the widow from 
making a subsequent gift of it after the HSA had come into force.
1. A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480.
2. A like attitude is evident in Dhira.jkunwar v. Iakhansingh, A.I.R. 
1957 M.P. 38# and Hanuman Prasad v. Mst Indrawati, A.I.R. 195$
All. 304. See also Bai Kamla v. Occharlal, A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 8^ , 
where pending a suit for reversionary claims, the court held that 
the effect of the HSA on property still in the possession of the 
widow would be to convert it to an absolute tenure. On the other 
hand, in Marudakkal v. Arumugha, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 255 the limited
P.T.O.
The question however as Burned greater prominence for the first 
time in Bhabhani Pros ad v. Smt. Sarat Sundari where it was pleaded 
on behalf of the widow that, as the HSA had come into force during the 
pendency of the suit, the limited estate in her possession as the sole 
heir of her husband who had died in 1914, was no longer open to re­
versionary claims. In upholding this claim their Lordships, Iahiri 
and Sen, JJ., ruled that on a plain construction of s. 14 (1), it is 
clear that it confers a right of full ownership upon a female Hindu 
in respect of the properties described in the Explanation. In this 
view of the matter, whether she had acquired the disputed property as 
heir to her husband or with her own funds, as she alleged, the widow 
must be held to have become absolute owner, and the fact that the 
HSA came into effect during the pendency of the appeal would make no 
difference. For, their Lordships held
"(S). 14 of the Act makes no reservations in favour 
of pending litigations and lays down in unqualified 
terms that any property which is in the possession 
of a female Hindu whether acquired before or after 
the commencement of this Act shall be held by her 
as full owner and not as a limited owner." 2
estate having been improperly alienated prior to the commencement 
of the HSA, the Court rightly held that there could be no force 
to the widow's contention that, as the HSA had come into force 
during pendency of appeal, she had become absolute owner. See 
also Bameshwar v. Hardas, A.I.R. 1964 All. 30®» where a like 
decision was arrived at. Conversely it was held in Rukmani v. 
Krishnamoorthy, A.I.R. i960 Mad. 576, that a pending litigation 
in regard to a sale in execution of a debt, which was decided only
after the coming into effect of the HSA, would in no way give a
new right to the daughter to claim a share in the father’s property.
1. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 527.
2. Ibid., at 528, following Iaxmi Devi v. Surendra Kumar Panda, A.I.R.
1957 Or. 1. See also Venkamma v. Venkatareddi, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 
158, where during the pendency of the widow's appeal against a 
decree obtained by the next presumptive reversioner declaring a 
will alleged to have been executed by her husband and under which 
she claimed, to be a forgery, the HSA came into force, and 
Subbarao C. J., held that as s. 14 (2j cannot have any application 
to a case where the decree is the subject-matter of the appeal 
during the pendency of which the Act of 1956 came into force, the 
widow must be held to have become absolute owner. Followed in 
Annapumamma v. Sankararao, A.I.R. i960 A.P. 359, at 362.
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That Madras applied the same principle is evident from the line 
of thought employed in Subbalakshmi v. Ramalakshml. ^ The widow having 
died after instituting proceedings for partition and separate posses­
sion and even before a preliminary decree had been passed, the con­
tention was that unless there had been a partition by metes and bounds, 
the right conferred on her by the HWRPA, 1937* would automatically 
lapse. In the opinion of Ramamurti, J., however, such a contention 
was wholly untenable and utterly lacking in substance, for the rights 
conferred by the HWRPA being neither inchoate nor imperfect, the 
widow merely worked out the right which had devolved upon her at her 
husband *s death, by a demand for partition. As such therefore, where 
the widow was in possession of the property in a broad and compre­
hensive sense, the effect of s. 14 (1) would be that, on her death
it would pass to her strldhana heirs so as to entitle them to further
2prosecute the suit for partition filed by the widow.
The Supreme Court confirms this view in Mangal Singh v. Smt. 
Rattno to hold that
"(l)f on the date when the provisions of this section 
are sought to be applied, the property is possessed 
by a female Hindu, it would be held that she is full
owner of it. •. Such a question may arise in her own
lifetime, or may arise subsequently when succession 
to her property opens on her death," 4
1. A.I.E. 1964 Mad. 76.
2. Followed in Banarsi v. Marcchia. A.I.R. 1967 Pat. 340. That the
female Hindu does become full owner of such property is also 
brought out by implication in Raghuwar v. Janki, A.I.R. I98I M.P.
4-1, where the female claiming as heir to her father, died during 
the pendency of the suit, and the Court held that even assuming 
that she was indeed the heir and therefore full owner, her hus­
band could nevertheless not be brought on record as her legal 
representative, as the devolution of such property is governed by 
s. 15 (2) (a) which lays down that "any property inherited by a 
female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the 
absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the 
children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other 
heirs referred to in sub-s. (l) in the order specified therein, 
but upon the heirs of the father."
3. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1786. '4. Ibid., at 1791.
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so that the property being in the hands of trespassers, the widow 
must be held to have been possessed of it in law at the time of her 
death during pendency of litigation, and her legal representative who 
was brought on record was entitled to become full owner.
In this, the broad and comprehensive definition of the word 
"possessed", all such decisions., it is submitted, lay down the correct 
position, so as to give the fullest scope to the ameliorative intent 
of s. 14 (l) in fulfilment of the object of the Legislature to wipe 
out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to 
ownership of property under the old sastric law, to abridge the strin­
gent provisions against proprietqry rights which were often regarded as 
evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognise her status as an 
independant and absolute owner of property.'*'
(7) The Effect of S. 14 (l) on Property Allotted in a Preliminary 
Decree for Partition
In the traditional Hindu law, the right to sever the status of
joint ness was the special preserve of the major coparcener or owner
of a coparcenary interest who could bring about such severance merely
2by an unequivocal communication of a settled intention to sever. How­
ever, while the female members were not entitled to initiate a parti­
tion, they were nevertheless entitled to shares should the joint 
status be disrupted. The basic rule is that the wives of the father, 
or, where the father is dead, or does not participate, the mothers
and grandmothers take shares equal to those of their sons and grand­
's
sons as the case may be, and whenever sons separate their mothers 
and step-mothers are entitled to share, each taking a share equal to
1. Per Bhagwati, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C.
1944, at 1947.
2. Suraj v. Ikbal, (1913) L.R. 40 I.A. 40; Girja v. Sadashiv,- A.I.R. 
1916 P. C. 104.
3. Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 323*
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a son.^ Mere severance of status however is not enough, and their
rights to shares arose for the first time when the coparceners sepa-
2
rated the property by metes and bounds.
In 1937t the HWRPA, for all its limitations brought about a 
change in that for the first time the widow became an owner by statute 
of her husband's interest in the joint-family property, and the right 
to demand partition as if she were a male owner was specially conferred 
on her under s. 3 (3)* so that in the event of a partition, she became 
owner in severalty of her share, subject to the restrictions on dis­
position and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on her death, 
actual or civil.
The question however acquired a degree of complexity where on 
the institution of a suit for partition, the share of the joint pro­
perties allotted to a widow in a preliminary decree could be said to 
have converted to an absolute estate under the provisions of s. 1* (l) 
of the H5A. In the initial stages when the Judiciary was yet to com­
prehend the full impact of the complexities and subtleties inherent 
in the sub-section, there was some considerable doubt, and an unwil­
lingness on its part to commit itself to one or the other view.
3
In Hiralal Roy Choudhary v. Kumud Behari, the share of the 
widow having been defined under a preliminary decree for partition, 
on her death in 195?» "the daughter claimed an equal share with the 
son by virtue of the provisions of s. 15 (l) (a). It was pleaded on 
her behalf that the widow did not acquire the property under the pre­
liminary decree but by inheritance? all that the preliminary decree 
did was to declare her share in the property under the provisions of
1. Ibid., at 325.
2. Pratapimill v. Dhanbati, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
3. A.I.R. 195? Cal. 571.
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the Hindu law then in force. To this eminently sensible and coherent 
reasoning, the learned Judge, Mullick, J., for all that he did not
"consider it proper to record any final opinion on such an important
1 2 question," nevertheless "assume(d)" for the purpose of the case that
as the property had been acquired under a preliminary decree which
prescribed a restricted estate, sub-s. (2) of s. Ik  would rule out the
application of s. (l), emphasising at the same time that,
"(l)t is to be remembered , however, that no property
is 'acquired* under a preliminary decree, and it is 
only under the final decree that a party can be said 
to acquire exclusive ownership in the property 
allotted to him." 3
Quite obviously his Lordship was influenced by the ratio in Pratap-
mull*s case to which however the objection may be brought that, in
view of the statute of 1956» the full implication of the revolutionary
provisions of s. Ik  was lost sight of, for in abolishing the limited
estate, Parliament abolished simultaneously all such fetters as may
have hindered the woman's absolute enjoyment of that property over
which the Act gives her absolute right. Looming large in the decision
is a foretaste of things yet to come, the formidable array of case
law based on a misconstruction*of the fundamental intent of the two
sub-sections, i.e. that the antecedent right that a widow possessed
1. Ibid., at 572. See also Bepln Behary v. Sm. Iakshasona, A.I.R.
1959 Cal. 27, where a similar judicial perplexity is evident, and 
doubt expressed as to the applicability of s. l*f (l) even on that 
property which the widow had acquired under a final decree for 
partition.
2. Hiralal's case, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 571* at 572. In Bepin Behary's 
case, cited above, the same assumption is evident, and the obiter 
dicta is to the effect that while the application of s. l^f (2) 
may be avoided where there is a final decree on the reasoning 
that such decree merely recognised the widow's antecedent right 
under the HWRPA, it might plausibly be urged that s. 1*4- (2) 
might apply to a preliminary decree.
3* Hiralal's case, cited above, 572. Having negatived the daughter's 
claim on this count, the learned Judge nevertheless held her en­
titled equally with the son on another, and it is submitted, quite 
unfounded reasoning.with which, we are not at the moment concerned.
k. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
in the property of her husband, either as his heir, or by virtue of 
her subsisting right of maintenance in the joint estate saves such 
property from the purview of s. (2) which has application only where 
the property is acquired for the first time under a decree, order, 
award and the like, and of which more presently.
Judicial opinion of such doubtful veracity however not to 
last, and a much surer grasp, a much firmer stance was soon enough 
evident in Billabasini v. Dulal Chandra,^  where the widow, who had in 
195^ i been allotted a share of the family estate in a preliminary de­
cree for partition, made an application after the HSA had come into 
force, claiming that she was entitled to hold such property as full 
owner. In allowing the claim Bctchawat, J., rightly observed that the 
source of her title not being the preliminary decree, which merely 
recognised her antecedent title acquired by way of inheritance under 
the HWRPA, 1937# the nature of the widow's interest was enlarged to 
full ownership under s. l*f (l) of the HSA.
That this is by far the more judicially sound, because the more
equitible, interpretation, was soon enough ratified by the Supreme
3
Court in Munnalal v. RajkrT"a~
1. A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 7^2.
2. Followed in Krishna v. Akhil, A.I.R. 195^ Cal. 67I. See also the 
obiter dicta in Sasadhar Chandra Day v. Sm. Tara Sundari Dasi,
A. I. R. 1962 Cal. -^38, at ^40 to the effect that w(T)t fiannnt be 
said that by (such) a declaration in the preliminary decree the 
Hindu female acquires a share in the joint-family property. Nor 
does the direction in the preliminary decree to allot her proper­
ty... in lieu of her undivided share... amounts to acquisition of 
new property by her. The preliminary decree... cannot therefore, 
be said to be a decree within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of s. l*f.'
3. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1^ 93.
»---- 1— JT T—SI SZ S3
The facts were briefly that three brothers, M, P, and R formed 
a joint Hindu family. In a partition suit instituted in 1952 by one 
of the Bons of M, a preliminary decree was passed allotting a one- 
fourth share to each of the branches of M, P, ( whose branch was 
represented by his adopted son AS) and R, the other one-fourth going 
to the grandmother K. At the death of K in July 1956, it was the con­
tention of her grandsons, M and R that under s. Ik (l) of the HSA, K 
became full owner of the share declared in her favour and it passed 
to them as her nearest heirs under s. 15. AS claimed on the other hand, 
that b. 1*+ (l) did not apply and the share came back to the estate out 
of which it was carved to be roteably divided among them all. The 
whole issue thus revolved round the question as to whether the share 
of a widow declared in a preliminary decree remained inchoate and 
fluctuating (as the High Court had held), or whether it was property 
possessed by her within the meaning of s. Ik (l). Shah, J., declaring 
unequivocally in favour of the widow held that the Explanation to 
s. 1^ (l) of the HSA gives to the expression "property" the widest possible 
connotation so as to include the share declared in a preliminary decree 
for partition. The rule of Hindu law as embodied in Pratapmull *s case?' 
i.e. that till actual division of the share by metes and bounds of 
the joint-family estate, a Hindu female cannot be recognised as owner, 
must, his Lordship ruled, be held to be abrogated in view of the reme­
dial nature of the HSA, which supersedes the rules of Hindu law in 
all matters expressly provided for in the Act.
Clearly reasoned and in keeping with the legislative intendment
as this view is, it nevertheless came in for censure in a learned 
2
article. In attacking the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, the crux
1. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
2. S.R. Gokhale, "A Note on Munnalal v. Rajkumar (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 
lk<?3) and s. Ik of the HSA, 1956," A.I.R. 19^5 (j), 85-7.
-5**5-
of the attack rests on the premises that the grandmother's rights at
partition clearly belong to the law relating to a joint Hindu family
and stand on quite a different plane and are distinct in nature from
the rights provided for in the HSA. For, the argument continues, such
property as was given to her, was given to her as a provision for her
maintenance  ^(her husband having died prior to the Act of 1937)» anc^
there was therefore no ownership in her of the property so as to pass
on her death to her heirs or to the heirs of her husband; once the
necessity for maintenance ceases, the property would revert to the
estate out of which it was taken. S. 14 cannot therefore apply for,
in the author's assertion
"(T)here must in the first instance be some property in 
limited ownership in the widow before the^KSA can 
convert it into full ownership under s. l*f, and there 
is no such property in the grandmother according to 
the law of the joint-family which prevailed at the 
time of the partition." 3
It would be a different matter, the writer contends, where, as
k
the Privy Council pointed out in Debi Mangal Prasad v. Mahadeo Prasad, 
the coparceners may agree to give property to a female at a partition 
in lieu of maintenance, or as an absolute gift, and in such cases s. l*f 
(1) may apply. But, runs the argument, where specific agreement is
absent, it cannot be said that the HSA provides for the changing of the
rights of a female in the position of K into absolute ownership.
To such objections the rejoinder must be that the opening words 
of s. Ik (l), "Any property" are, as the Supreme Court explained, even 
without amp^ccdion large enough to cover any and every kind of property.-^
1. Emphasis mine. The significance of this admission cannot be under­
estimated in negativing the argument put forward by the learned 
author as we shall presently see.
2. Shades of the earlier Madras attitude, discussed below at 573
3. Gokhale, op. clt., at 86.
k. I.L.R. (1912) 3*f All. 23^ (P.C.).
5. Per Bhagwati, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddl, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^» 
at 19^ 7-
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But so as to expand the reach and ambit of the section, and to make 
it all coapprehensive the Legislature has enacted an Explanation (the 
purpose of which, as Mr. Gokhale so rigfrtly points out, is to explain 
and not confer new rights^) which includes every kind of property 
including that acquired by her "at a partition or in lieu of mainte­
nance... or in any other manner whatsoever immediately before the 
commencement of the Act." In view of this there can be no validity to 
the argument that unless the property allotted to the female Hindu as 
. a provision for her maintenance is allotted to her absolutely, it must
revert to the estate from which it was carved out. So the Supreme
2
Court has held in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi which lays down in no 
uncertain terms that such property is indeed property within the 
meaning of s. 1^  (l), thus laying to rest the protracted controversy 
that had so preoccupied the Courts earlier. It cannot now be contended 
that the effect of such an interpretation would be to divest the co­
parceners of their vested right in the family property, for we must 
keep in mind that though s. 6 of the HSA does not in toto abrogate the 
Mltakgaia coparcenary, the very same section by making the females 
specified in class I of the Schedule heirs of the intestate in regard 
to his undivided share, makes considerable inroads in the law relating 
to the joint Hindu family, and to the extent that s. 14- (l) impinges 
upon it —  as certainly impinge it did in this case —  it must be held 
to have been abrogated. Neither is there any validity in the argument 
that the application of the sub-section is restricted to the legal 
limited estate; the effect of such a forced construction would be to 
rob the Act of its beneficial aspects, for it was surely not the in­
tention of Parliament to discriminate between widows who took under
1. Gokhale, op. cit., at 86.
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^.
the HWRPA, 1937* and those who did not, and between those Mlt&ksara 
families which were bound to give shares to females at a partition and 
those that were not.^
Entirely unjustified is also the comment that the construction
2 3in Munnalal*s case leads to "unnatural and unfair results," and as
such
"(t)he Court is entitled and bound to assume that the 
Legislature did not intend such a construction to be 
adopted and to try and find out some more rational 
construction." 4-
But, it is submitted this was precisely what Parliament intended, to
right a most ancient wrong, to remove the disability of the female
Hindu to absolute ownership —  and if this worked to the disadvantage
of coparceners, to "unnatural and unfair results" in that they are
divested of a moiety of the joint property so as to benefit the female
Hindu, then so be it.
A landmark in the progressive interpretation of s. 14> (l), the
authoritative dicta in Munnalal *8 case"* thus paved the way for other
like decisions. In Swaminatha v. Kamalammal,^  the preliminary decree
for partition in 194-1 was followed by a compromise under the terms of
which the widow was given a life estate in certain items of the joint-
family property. In upholding her claim to absolute ownership in 1961,
Ismail, J., clarified that notwithstanding the restrictions imposed on
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "S. l*f of the ISA Once Again," (1973) K.L.T. (j), 
19-22, at 20.
2. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1^ 93.
3. Gokhale, o£. cit., at 86.
rbld>
5. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493, followed verbatim in Dulei Bewa v. Bimali 
Bewa, A.I.R. 1964* Or. 33* See also Ballabha v. Jasodhara, l.L.R.
(1965) Cut. 398, supra at 5^2 , where the widow, after the Act
of 1956 was held to have become the absolute owner of her deceased 
husband*s share on the basis of the preliminary decree for par­
tition that was passed prior to her remarriage.
6. Second Appeal No. 1358 of 1963 (Mad.).
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her by the compromise, sub-B. (2) of s. 14 would have no application
as the preliminary decree which had declared the widow’s share in the 
family property could never by itself constitute the source and foun­
dation of her title, the very basis of the preliminary decree being the 
recognition and the working out of a pre-existing right in the pro­
perties sought to be partitioned.
Kerala ruled along similar lines in Saraswathi v. Anantha.^  The
contention of the grandson being that such items of the joint-family
property as were allotted to the widowed grandmother in a preliminary
decree for partition in 195® was way of "concession" on their parts,
and as such she could not challenge the condition of reverter on her
share of it notwithstanding s. 14 (l) of the HSA. Repudiating the
claim of concession, Nair, J., referred to the authority of the
Mitakgara to the effect that the widowed mother is entitled at a par-
2
tition of the joint-family property among her sons, to a share therein 
equal to that of a son. The preliminary decree for partition, his 
Lordship held, merely confirmed this share, and in view of the ruling
her, and despite the restrictive clause of reverter s. 14 (2) would 
have no application as its applicability does not arise in an appeal
1. A.I.R. 1966 Ker. 66.
2. The rule is that "on the death of a father his separate property
issue1) —  a position which persists notwithstanding the reforms 
of the HSA.. ,"t Derrett, IMHL, op. cit., at 252. This is con­
firmed by the S.C. in Arunchala v. Muruganatha, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 
495 where it was laid down that on the death of the grandfather 
or at a partition, his property comes to the father by virtue of 
the latter's legal right as a son of the former, and consequently 
assumes the character of ancestral property in his hands.
3. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493-
4. It must be borne in mind that the position of the Mitakgaia Hindu 
widow in the erstwhile Princely State of Travancore was not mate­
rially different from the position of the Mitakgaia widow in 
British India. The provisions of the HWRPA, 1937# having no
would be property possessed by
(or divided share) passes to his sons as ancestral property be­
tween them and the sons and grandsons of each of them (the 'male
P.T.O.
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against a decree where the question is of the propriety of the impo­
sition of a restriction and not the effect of it, whereas a decree 
within the meaning of s. 1^  (2) cannot he a decree which is under appeal 
but only a decree which has become final.
In exercise of her right under s. 3 (3) of the HWRPA. 1937 r insti­
tuted a suit for partition of the joint estate, and the question was 
whether, for all that the preliminary decree passed in 19#f did not 
declare any share in favour of D as she had not been impleaded as a 
party to the suit, the one-fourth share due to her in law, passed to 
her husband at her death in 1966, so as to entitle him to a half share 
in the property as opposed to the one-fourth share each of Aw and BSS. 
Negativing the contention that such share could only accrue at a final
decree for partition, Singh, J., following the dicta in Hunnalal*s 
2
case, was quite clear that the right to a share has not to wait for 
its accrual till the property is actually divided, but arises even at 
the stage when shares in the property are declared in a preliminary
application there, under the sastric law which prevailed, the 
widow had no right to claim partition, but in case the sons 
partitioned, the widowed mother had the right to claim her share 
which she held as the widow*s limited estate as contemplated by 
the Mitaksara law, and such restricted or limited estate, on the 
coming into force of the HSA, was enlarged into an absolute 
estate. In this case however, the preliminary decree for par­
tition having been effected in 1958, it was not the conversion 
of the limited estate into an absolute estate, but the absolute 
estate itself as contemplated by s. l*f (1) to which no restric­
tions could apply that fell to the share of the widowed grand­
mother.
The same question came up again in Bhawarsingh v. Pilabai.1
BSS
1. A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 20^ .
2. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1^ 93.
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decree, his Lordship further clarifying that
"(S)imply because parties to a partition do not assign 
any share to a woman who on partition is entitled to 
a share, she cannot be deprived of her rightful share..." 1
In view of the foregoing, it must be regarded as settled law
that such property is indeed "possessed" by the female in the broader
meaning of the word and dicta to the contrary must be viewed with
2grave reservation. In Modi Nathubhai v. Chhotubhai. for instance, 
despite a partition by metes and bounds between the father and his sons, 
it waB held that not even in its broadest sense could the mother be 
said to be "possessed" of any property because at the time of partition 
it cannot be postulated that her right of possession had any reference 
to any particular item of the property, which could only arise at a 
partition by metes bounds between the sons. Based on the now exploded
3
view as evident in Pratapmull's case,^  it is submitted that after the 
passing of the HSA, and given the expressly remedial character of 
s. 1^  (1), decisions such as these are no longer good law.
(8) The Effect of S. Ik (l) on the Undivided Coparcenary Interest
(a) The Absolute Right of the Widow in Such Property
We are next led to consider the entitlement of the widow in the
coparcenary interest where the property had not been separated nor 
indeed a suit for partition instituted. The term "inherit" signifies 
acquisition by succession and not under a will. It is receiving pro- 
perty as heir on succession by descent. It covers not only inheritance
1. Ibid., at 205, following Radhabai v. Pandharinath, A.I.R. 19^1 
Nag. 135.
2. A.I.R. 1962 Guj. 68.
3. A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 20.
k, Ayi Animal v. Subramania, A.I.R. 1966 Mad. 3^ 9, at 370; Kameswara
v. Vasudeva, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 189, at 191. It is to be noted however
that for the purposes of determining the claims of dependants un­
der the HAMA, 1956, "heirs" would also include those who took by 
testamentary disposition.
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under the ordinary Hindu law hut also includes the share that a Hindu 
widow acquits: as statutory heir to her deceased husband's joint 
interest under s. 2 of the HWRPA, 1937*
However clear as the terms of the Explanation to s. Ik (l) 
might seem that inherited property would also include within its pur­
view the undivided limited interest that a Hindu widow acquired under
the Act of 1937, such an interpretation was open to challenge, and in
1
Kuppathammal v. Sakthi, it was pleaded that in view of the repealing
2
provisions of the HSA, the HWRPA, 1937 stood repealed, and therefore 
under the Hindu law as distinct from the statute of 1937, the widows 
of the deceased would not be entitled to any share in the property in 
the presence of the son. Negativing this contention the Court held 
that, for all that the HSA repeals the Act of 1937, and there is no 
savings in it of any rights conferred or privileges which had accTtued 
under the repealed enactment, nonetheless the effect of this repeal as 
obliterating all rights conferred by the repealed statute is subject to 
the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which lays 
down that
"(W)here this Act, or any Central Act... made after the 
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto 
made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different 
intention appears the repeal shall not... (c) affect any 
right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, 3 
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed^ .
as such therefore, for all that the learned Judge, Ayyangar, J., did
not consider the effect of s. l*f (l) to determine whether the widow
1. A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 695.
2. S. 31 of the HSA, 195&, to the effect that "(T)he Hindu law of 
Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, and the Hindu Women's Rights to 
Property Act, 1937, ar® hereby repealed, was itself repealed in i960.
3. The same view, i.e. that the provisions of the HWRPA, 1937, (not­
withstanding the repeal of the statute by s. 31 of the HSA) are 
saved by s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Is evident in 
Sankara Rao v. Rajyalakshamma, A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 2&1, at 2kk; Subba- 
lakshmi v. Ramalakshmi, A.I.R. 196k Mad. 76, at 77; Ranganayakamma 
v. Rajeswaramma, A.I.R. 196k A.P. 3^ 0, at 381-
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obtains an absolute interest or not in the property which devolved on 
her under the HWRPA, it is submitted that given the wide amplitude 
of the word "possessed", there can be no doubt but that such property 
did indeed convert to an absolute tenure under the HSA, and judicial 
confirmation of this view was not slow in coming.
Thus in Iateshwar Jha v. Mt. Uma Ojhain,^  objectionable though 
it certainly is on other counts, it was nevertheless correctly held 
that, where the husband had died after the passing of the HWRPA, 1937» 
the widow got the same interest in the joint-estate under s. 3 (2) 
as her husband himself had and this limited estate became her absolute 
property after the passing of the Act of 1956 fhe commencement of 
which the disputed property in respect of which partition was sought 
must be considered possessed by her.
A similar view is in evidence in Sankara Rao v. Rajyalakshamma.
A Hindu died just before the passing of the HSA, 1956, leaving behind 
his widow and adopted son. The latter filed a suit for partition after 
the passing of the HSA claiming a three-fourth share in the property of 
the deceased as against the widow's one-fourth on the ground that as 
she had not exercised her right of partition under s. 3 (3) of the 
HWRPA 1937, it must be held that she continued the legal persona of
the husband till partition so as to entitle her to an equal share with
the son in her husband's share of the joint-family property. Umamahes- 
waram, J., however, refused to accede to this view, holding on the
1. A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 502.
2. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 2kl.
3- That where the widow died after partition proceedings had been 
instituted s. Ik (l) would prevail, was the view taken in Subba- 
lakshmi v. Ramalakshmi, A.I.R. 196k Mad. 76, supra, at ,
and in Smt. Indubai v. Vyankati t A.I.R. 1966 Bom. 6k, where 
the express words in favour of her right were that, the widow 
having acquired full ownership over her interest in the joint- 
family property after her husband's death, it was not necessary 
for her to reduce her share to possession, either by actual 
partition or even by asking for partition, and her daughter
P.T.O.
contrary that, as no legal fiction is imported in s. 3 (2), the right 
of the widow under the Act of 1937 is not inchoate or imperfect till 
a claim for partition is made, but quite a concrete and tangible rigit 
with possession, which therefore inheres in her as an absolute right 
under s. l*f (l) of the K>A, and the mere fact that the widow did not 
claim partition, would not amount to her being regarded as not in joint 
possession of her husband's interest along with the surviving coparcener.
as heir would succeed to such property under s. 15 of the HSA.
Nor would her absolute right to her share -of the joint-family pro­
perty be affected where no property is allotted to her at an actual, 
or preliminary decree for partition; after her death such property 
would pass on to her own heirs, and the fact that she was not in 
physical possession, nor indeed had herself demanded a partition, 
would make no difference.: Soliappa v. Meenakshi, (1970) 1 M.L.J.
383, and SinghrJ's remark obiter in Bhawarsingh v. Pilabi, A.I.R.
1972 M.P. 20k at 205, quoted at supra, 550.
1. See also Rup Raut v. Basudeo Raut, A.I.R. 1962 Pat. kj6, at 440, 
where it was held that, had the widow not forfeited by reason of 
her remarriage prior to the Act of 1956, she would have acquired an 
right in respect of her deceased husband's undivided interest in the 
coparcenary property on the coming into force of the HSA. Other 
decisions attesting to this view are: Triloki Mandar v. Dukhni Devi,
A.I.R. 1966 Pat. 3§9, Prasad, J., ruling that the very fact the 
widow had a right of partition implied that she was in possession 
with the other co-sharers; Commr. of Income Tax v. Roop Chand,
(I967) 2 Mys. L.J. 31; Machiah v. Ponnawa, A.I.R. 1973 Mys. 1, where 
at the death of the widow who was in possession of her husband's 
estate, the daughter was held entitled as against the surviving male 
descendant of the common ancestor, the ratio being that the mother's 
entitlement to the coparcenary property under the HWRPA, 1937, had 
enlarged into a full right under s. Ik (l) of the HSA; Basta Ram v.
Ved Prakash, A.I.R. 197^ P.AH. 152, where it was further clarified 
that as the coparcenary interest that a widow inherits, ripens into 
a fuU. tenure under s. Ik (l), her sons alone are her heirs, the 
co-widow's son having no right of succession in such property;
Dhanalakshmi v. The Official Trustee of Madras, I.L.R. (197k) 3 Mad.
113; Hairumappa v. Dase Ck>uda. I. L.R. (1975) 25 Kant. 175; Rabari v.
Bai Marti, 11976) 17 Gu.j. 729. where at the widow's death in 1961, 
the sale by her son of her undivided share, was held to be invalid 
and recoverable by the other heirs; see also Jagiribai v. Ramkhilawan, 
A.I.R. 1976 M.P. 106, for a similar ruling; Animuthu v. Gandhiammal,
A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 372, where the Court in upholding the option of 
the daughter-in-law to maintenance from the joint estate under s.19 
of the HAMA, 1956, rather than a separated share of it, implicitly 
acknowledged that she was indeed entitled to her late husband's shares tfu.
P.T.O.
(b) The Kartas Power of Management of Such Property
The full heritable capacity that the HSA confers on the widow 
over even the undivided estate must nevertheless, it is submitted, be 
subject to the karta's powers of management of the joint estate. It 
must be remembered that while the il^^rusion of the widow upon the co­
parcenary as a quasi-coparcener by the operation of the HWRPA, 1937* 
was a device to enable a widow to live separately and as her own mis­
tress if she so wished, in the undivided state however, the Act pre­
served so far as was possible consistently with such an aim the essen­
tial features of the male issue's "birth-right*' and the other copar­
ceners' right of survivorship,^ as also the right of the karta, to 
bring within his managerial ambit, the estate of the widow who preferred, 
the, in many ways, haven of the joint-family to the separated state.
It may well be asked whether the same attitude can be taken
family property. That whether she could at all opt for maintenance 
rather than take her share of the undivided estate under the HSA 
is questionable (See J.D.M. Derrett, "HSA and HAMA, a 22: A Serious 
Conflict of Decisions," (1978) 80 Bom. L.R. (j). 1-3, at 2 —  a 
point of law however with which we are at the moment not concerned; 
Narasimhachari v. Andalammal, A.I.R. 1979 Mad* 31, where the son's 
claim that his widowed mother had no manner of right in the joint 
estate as she was never in corporeal possession of it, was negatived, 
the court holding that her entitlement and right to possess it under 
the Act of 1937* enlarges itself by reason of the liberal and wide 
amplitude of s. 1^ (l) of the HSA, 1958; Rasamani v. Patrabala, A.I.R. 
1981 Gau. 2^, where the same view was taken to demonstrate that even 
in the Dayabhaga territory where the widow took under s. 3 (l) of 
the HWRPA, the effect of s. 1^ (l) of the HSA was to entitle her 
daughters as heirs to such property, and to which the son of the 
predeceased wife of the deceased husband could lay no claim; 
Chockalingam v. Alamelu, A.I.R. 1982 Mad. 29, which reiterates the 
view taken in the foregoing decisions to hold that the son and 
daughter were equally entitled to the undivided share of the widowed 
mother in the joint-estate, over-ruling at the same time, the leading 
Madras case of Parappa v. Nagamma, A.I.R. 195^ Mad-* 5?8 (F.B.), 
the effect that where the widow dies without effecting a partition, 
her share of the joint-family property would revert to the copar­
cenary, the coparceners taking by survivorship, for in view of s. Ity 
(l) of the HSA, 1958, and its wide and comprehensive amplitude, 
the earlier F.B. decision loses all relevance. See also Vrat v. Srat. 
Gargi, A.I.R. 1983 All. 17*f (N.O.C.), where it was held that, as the^  
daughter was possessed of the undivided estate for her maintenance,1 it 
became her absolute property after the coming into force of the HSA.
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Law and the Predicament of the Hindu Joint-Family," 
The Economic Weekly, 13 Feb. 1980, 305“l-d» 307*
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tovards the provisions of the Hindu "Code". There the coparcenary
interest is rudely wrested from the joint-family and distributed amongst
many heirs. If they do not authorise the manager in the proper form,
and give him the proper indemnities, untold inconveniences will follow
when he carries on as before especially in the case of those who live
in the joint-family anyhow.^
As such therefore, the widow entitled under the Acts of 1937 and
1958, has no doubt since 1958 an absolute interest in a coparcenary
2
which, however, does not thereby cease to fluctuate and to be subject 
to the manager's ordinary rights of management and representation. So 
the Patna High Court held in Jiwanandan v. Sia Ram, where the plain­
tiff brought a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell 
some landed property executed by the defendant who had been impleaded 
in his capacity as the kartS. of the joint-family. The defense raised 
was that the mother being the absolute owner in respect to her husband's 
share in the coparcenary, she would not be bound by any such agreement 
entered into by the managing member of the coparcenary. The learned 
Judge, Mahapatra, JL, held that as she was a member of the joint-family 
the mother was bound by the act of the karta so far as it had been 
consistent with legal necessity and for adequate consideration.
Sound in essence as the ratio is, i.e. that the widow-mother of 
the undivided family is subject to the karta's authority as any other 
member of the joint-family, the further ruling that she is so subject 
to his authority because without partition a Hindu widow cannot be
1. Ibid.
2. As opposed to the coparcenary share that a female heir takes under 
s. 8 read with s. 6 of the HSA, 1958. Such share cannot fluctuate, 
for it has been statutorily quantified under the notional parti­
tion envisaged in Explanation I to s. 6.
3. A.I.R. 1981 Pat. 3^ 7.
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taken to possess a property and in that sense the absolute ownership 
as provided in s. 14 (l) would not come to her benefit, is open to 
serious criticism. We have already noted, and judicial decisions have 
confirmed, that s. l^f (l) of the HSA merely converts into full owner­
ship the limited entitlement of the widow under s. 3 (2) of the HWRPA,
1937, ajsd for this purpose it is immaterial whether she chooses to 
remain joint or opts for partition.'*' Thus while on the one hand the 
judgment quite rightly subjects her to the karta's authority so long 
as she remains joint, it loses sight at the same time of the
essential purpose of her right to demand partition under the HWRPA, 
i.e. that was merely a means of securing and ensuring her maintenance 
from the joint estate against recalcitrant male members of the joint- 
family. Once it is recognised that under the HSA, the widow becomes 
absolute owner of such property, the question of partition, it is 
submitted, no longer has any relevance.
It has to be borne in mind that the HSA has left untouched the
law relating to the Mitakgaia joint-family except in so far as further
accessions of property to an existing nucleus of survivorship is
drastically reduced by the operation of s. 6 of that Act, and every
attempt must quite legitimately be made to confine the meaning of this
3
departure within its narrowest possible construction.
1. It is interesting to note that the same learned judge resiles from 
this view in Rup Raut v. Basudeo Raut, A.I.R. 1962 Pat. **36, to 
come round to the opposite, and it is submitted, the correct 
interpretation, supra, at 5^ 0,. f.n. 2, and in overruling'his own decision 
in Jiwanandan's case, A.I.R. 1981 Pat. 3^7 explains at 440, "...
I did not consider the nature or the rights of the Hindu widow 
under the HWRPA, 1937. Those observations of mine with reference 
to s. 14 were more or less obiter... **
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "Alienations at Hindu Law* A Revolutionary Full 
Bench Decision," (1997) 20 S.C. (j). 85-96, at 85.
3- Ibid., at 86.
-557-
Thus in Parvathi Ammal v. Ramanatha Iyer. where the coparceners 
for the purpose of their joint-family trade executed an equitable 
mortgage, the plea of the predeceased coparcener's widow was that, since,, 
by s. l*f (l) of the HSA, she had become absolute owner of her share 
in the coparcenary property, she became divided from the joint-family 
the day the Act came into force, and hence the equitable mortgage and 
the subsequent decree and court sale would not bind her share of the 
property. Negativing this contention, Iyer, J., held in clear terms 
that the widow's interest in such property is not imperfect or inchoate,but 
it is nevertheless an undefined share, for there is nothing in s. l*f (l) 
that indicates that such interest has become defined or been made 
definite by giving the widow a divided status separating her from other 
members of the joint-family from the commencement of the Act. The 
effect of s. 1*+ read with s. k (1) (b), his Lordship explained, is 
only to take away the conception of the woman's estate created by s. 3 
(3) of the HWRPA, 1937* It does not however bring about a change in 
the widow's status in the joint-family, and so long as the undivided 
state continues, the representative capacity of the eldest son to 
encumber her interest in the joint-family property for binding family 
necessity, or to represent her in litigations connected with the joint- 
family property is not in any way affected by anything contained in 
the HSA.
To this very sound statement of the law, strength was added by
2
the pronouncement in Fathimunnisa Begum v. Tamirasa, where even though 
the mother was not originally impleaded in a suit by her sons to recover 
money due on a mortgage debt, it was held that an omission to include
1. I.L.R. (1970) 1 Ker. 326.
2. A.I.R. 1977 A.P. 2k.
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a member of the joint-family is not a fatal defect in the framing of 
a suit, for
"(A) Hindu widow inheriting her husband's share under 
the HWRPA does not by itself disrupt the joint-family 
status... The enlargement of her limited estate into 
a full estate by virtue of s. 14 of the HSA, does not 
in any way bring about a change in the character of 
the joint-family or the widow's status as a member 
of the joint-family or the karta's power to repre­
sent the joint-family including her." 1
However, simultaneously with the Andhra decision we are faced
2with an exactly opposite ratio in Smt. Shankaramma v. Madappa, to 
the effect that despite legal necessity and the liability to discharge 
antecedent debts, the alienation of family property by the sole sur­
viving coparcener would not bind the undivided female members who had
become absolute owners under s. 1^ (l) of the HSA, and this despite
3
the precedent in Mysore in Melagiriyappa v. Ialithamma that a single
coparcener does indeed have the right to alienate the share of a female
relative for legal necessity. Undoubtedly under the Hindu law Women's
Rigfots Act, Mysore 1933» the female member's right to a share accrues
independently of partition as was pointed out in Nagendra Prasad v. 
k
Kempananjamma, but the view that once that share becomes an absolute 
estate, the karta's powers are abrogated over that part of the estate 
which the female owns jointly with the sole surviving coparcener or 
the coparceners as the case may be, needs careful reconsideration. For, 
it is submitted, the HSA does not, as we have already seen, impinge 
upon the law of the joint-family except in a limited sense, and as and
1. Per Rao, C.J. , ibid., at 28.
2. A.I.R. 1977 Kant. 188.
3. a.i.r. 1961 rtys. 152.
k. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 209-
Whereas the widow who took under ithe Act of 1937 and the Act of 1956 is 
"bound by the acts of the karta, one who takes a share in family property 
for the first time under the Act of 1956 is not.
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when necessary, the undivided female member's share must be subject 
to the incidents of joint-family property including the karta's autho­
rity to alienate for legal necessity. To hold otherwise would be 
inequitable, for should the female owner opt for the protection and 
relative security of the joint state, she must likewise be prepared 
for such hazards as may have to be borne like any other owner of the 
coparcenary property. *
(c) The Widow's Ri^it to Alienate Her Undivided Share in the
Coparcenary Property
While it may be justifiable that absolute owner though she cer­
tainly is, as a member of the joint-family the widow must be subject to the 
incidents and liabilities arising out of the joint status, the more 
vexed question that faces us next is as to the extent of her right over 
that property over which she enjoys full ownership by virtue of s. l^f 
(l) of the HSA, the necessary corollary to which must be the absolute 
power to deal with it in accordance with the absolute owner's wishes 
on the one hand, and the restrictions qua alienations which by defini­
tion are intrinsic in such property, on the other.
In other words, the practical dilemma that called for resolution 
was whether, the widow having acquired full interest in her share of 
the coparcenary property, she had a greater right than did the copar­
ceners themselves, by way of alienation of such interest.
Faced with this paradoxical situation,judicial construction has 
however tilted in favour of the widow in keeping with both the letter 
and the spirit of the new legislation. Thus in Madhusadan v. Ananta^ 
where the widow's sale of her undivided interest after the HSA, was
1. A.I.R. 1963 Or. 183.
challenged on the basis that there having been no disruption of the 
joint status, she was incompetent to alienate, Misra, J's., ruling 
was to the effect that in fact s. 1*+ (l) gave her just such a right, 
the joint status and the fluctuations of her interest by births and 
deaths in the joint-family not being inconsistent with her right of 
alienation. For, his Lordship emphasised, as she was a statutory heir, 
and not a coparcener, she was merely a member of the joint-family, and 
in the absence of any statutory restriction, she could effect a valid 
alienation and the consent of other coparceners for this purpose, was 
immaterial. ^
That by far the most comprehensive and forceful of such decisions
2
is that of the Supreme Court's in Sukh Ram v. Gauri Shankar is evident 
even at a glance, as within its brief compass the most controversial 
aspects are touched upon and summarily dealt with. The widow having 
alienated her undivided interest by way of sale, the contention of her 
husband's coparceners was that, since under the Benaras School of the 
Mitaksafa, a male copacener is not entitled to alienate even for value 
his undivided interest in coparcenary property without the consent of 
the other coparceners unless the alienation be for legal or other 
justifying necessity, it could not have been intended by Parliament to 
confer upon the widow a larger right over the coparcenary property than 
the right which the surviving coparceners could exercise at the date 
of the sale. In fact the Act of 1956» in their view, while it intended 
to confer upon the Hindu widow rights of full ownership in the interest
in property in which she had prior to that Act, only a limited interest,
1. Contrast with this the erroneous view evident in Bindroo v. Munshi, 
A.I.R. 1971 J & K 1^ 2, to the effect that as the widow could not be
a member of the coparcenary under the sastric law, her right of main­
tenance from the joint-family property was not a pre-existing right 
to property to convert to full tenure in 1956 so as to validate the 
alienation made by her in 1969. It is submitted that the judgment 
ignores altogether; her entitlement under the Kashmir Act analogous to 
the H3A, which whether divided or not, did indeed convert to an 
absolute estate under s. l*f (l) of the HSA.
2. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365, on appeal from Gauri Shankar v. Sukh Ram, A.I.R. 
1962 All. 18.
it certainly did not intend to destroy the essential character of the 
joint-family property so as to invest the widow with power to alienate 
that interest without the assent of her husband's coparceners.
Such contentions were however baseless in Shah, J. *s, view for
the "express and explicit"'*’ intendment of s. l*f (l) being to convert
the limited tenure of the Hindu widow in the joint-family property into
a full estate, she "acquired a right unlimited in point of user and
2
duration and uninhibited in point of disposition." As such, for all 
that there are restrictions qua alienation of his interest in the joint- 
family property on a male member of a Hindu family governed by the 
Benaras School as established by the decisions in Madho Parshad v.
Mehrban Singh, Balgovind Das v. Narain Ial, and Chandradeo Singh v.
Mata Prasad,-^ nonetheless a widow acquiring an interest in that property 
by virtue of the HSA, is not subject to any such restrictions, and having 
become full owner on 17 June, 19561 she was competent to alienate such 
property of her own volition without the consent of the surviving copar­
ceners. For, his Lordship added conclusively, there is "not a ground 
for importing limitations which (the) Parliament has not chosen to 
impose."^
1. Ibid., at 366. 2. Ibid.
3. (1891) L.R. 7 I. A. 194- (P.C.).
4. (1893) L.R. 20 I.A. 116 (P.G.).
5. I.L.R. (1909) 31 All. 176 (F.B.).
6. Sukh Ram v. Gauri Shankar, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365t 366. For like
decisions, where on similar reasoning, and following the S.C.,
the widow's right to alienate her undivided share in the coparcenary 
property was upheld, see Rajendra Nath v. Shiva Rath, A.I.R. 1971 
All. 44-8; La la Sri Krishna v. Smt. Phool Kumari. A.I.R. 1973 All,
3^9* Mst. Sonakali v. Smt. Bahuria, A.I.R. 1973 Pat. **77* which 
further stressed that S.C. decisions are binding on all the Courts 
in India; Prithi Pal Singh v. Milka Singh, A.I.R. 1976 P. & H. 157 
(F.B.), at 167; Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1982 P. & H. 
372, stating at 3^ 6: "The provisions of s. 14 virtually abolished 
those (the traditional) limitations thereby making a Hindu female 
an absolute owner of her property, and indeed putting her on a 
higher pedestal than a Hindu male who may well be subject to the 
limitations of a Hindu coparcenary."
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On a resume of decisions such as these, and particularly in view of 
the unequivocal pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sukh Ram's case,^  
we are faced with the paradoxical situation where the female is sudden­
ly elevated to ownership rights even greater than those of a copar­
cener in coparcenary property. As was toj^ expected, there is, in cer-k„ 
tain quarters, a marked reluctance to accept this formula, and at least 
one instance is evident where the attack on the Supreme Court's view 
in regard to the coparceners' right of alienation of the joint property, 
is essentially an oblique unwillingness to accede to the full rights 
of alienation that a female is construed to possess in such property. 
Shah, J.'s, statement to the effect that
"(W)e are unable to agree... that restrictions on the 
right of the male members of the Hindu joint-family 
form the bed-rock on which the law relating to joint- 
family property is founded," 2
especially, his Lordship clarifying, as in schools other than the
Benaras School (to which this case belonged), this limitation has been 
3
dispensed with, has been pounced upon as "taking the principles too
If
far, and may be reconsidered."
But, it is submitted, even if his Lordship did take the principles 
too far, it does not affect the hard core of the ratio, for the limita­
tions on alienation on coparceners notwithstanding, the estate made 
absolute under the HSA cannot be subject to similar restrictions, for 
s. l*f (l) contemplates a secular law free of such impediments as the
1. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365.
2. Ibid., at 366.
3. Ibid.
I*. R. Dhavan, The Supreme Court of India, (Bom., Tripathi, 1977), at 
37^ . The same author stresses at ibid. that what rights of alie­
nation of his share a coparcener does possess is really a con­
cession to convenience, and is in spirit opposed to the joint- 
family principle. See also ibid., at 279 •» and Derrett, RISI,
op. cit., at bzk ff. —  a point of view with which there can be 
no quarrel when considered on its own merits as a separate issue.
cr
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sastra might have chosen to impose on male members who were> in any 
case, the only beneficiaries under the old law.
The more frontal attack is the kind expressed in Hirabai v.
Babu Manika,^  where we are told that
*'(w)hen the female is a widow and gets the property 
in her hands because she happens to be the widow 
in the joint-family, all the previous historical 
impediments on her entitlement have been expressly 
removed, but nonetheless we do not find any evidence 
in the text in the several sections of the Succession 
Act so as to infer a change in the character of that 
property. Like every full owner she is entitled to 
deal with it but along with that are the inalienable  ^
attributes which are the part of the property itself.”
while such an opinion may, on the face of it seem justified in that, 
since no provision is made in the H5A in regard to coparcenary pro­
perty, the law relating to joint-family property cannot be held abro­
gated under the provision of s. ^ of the Act, it must nevertheless be 
emphasised that s. 14 (l) does indeed make inroads in the coparcenary, 
and that to the extent-it does, the law relating to joint-family pro­
perty is indeed implicitly impinged uponj to construe otherwise would 
be to read limitations in the subsection where there are none, and 
violative of the entire scheme and intent of the Act of 1956 which 
postulates for the female Hindu as absolute an estate as the word 
"absolute” connotes.
It might equally be argued that the Act is not exproprmtory 
and there cannot be confiscation, as it were, of others* properties 
merely because the person in possession happens to be a female who has 
acquired it for the satisfaction of her right of maintenance, whether 
under the old law, or by reason of her statutory entitlement under 
the HWRPA, 1937* But, it is submitted, it is precisely this "confiscation
1. A.I.R. 1980 Bom. 315* sugra, 521-3-
2. Ibid., Per Masodkar, J., at 329-
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that s. (l) contemplates in that any property acquired hy the 
female Hindu and possessed by her at the commencement of the HSAy "in 
lieu of maintenance" is converted into an absolute tenure. Besides, 
it must be borne in mind that absolute logic and consistency cannot 
be maintained in the operation of the provisions of s. 1**, when the 
HSA is essentially a legislation of social reforms involving extinguish­
ment , fresh distribution and modification of property rights.
So, having arrived at this impasse, what are we to make of it?
The great temptation is to regard this as, in a sense, poetic justice, 
the just deserts of those who for millennium and more, had subjugated 
their females to subordination hy a denial to them of any meaningful 
property rights. But as a work of this nature does not allow for the 
luxury of emotional bias —  objectivity being of its essence —  we 
must not lose sight of perspective, and keeping in mind that the in­
tention of Parliament was to accord equal rights to women, not better 
rights than men, that "any system of law that lasted suited all people's 
interests",^- we have to recognise itj^ for what it is, an inadve 
anomaly, the inevitable result of piecemeal legislation, and the con­
structional dilemma that accompanies it.
That s. 14 (l) is a fait accompli we are all agreed, and as the 
absolute rights of the widow may not be tampered with, the remedy lies 
in extending to the male members of the coparcenary, a corresponding 
absolute right of alienation of coparcenary property. As fragmentation 
of joint-family property is already in the contemplation of the Act 
in that, s. 30 lays down that
"(A)ny Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary 
disposition any property, which is capable of being so
1. J.D.M. Derrett, in a letter to the present writer dated 20 Sept. 
1983 (Unpub.).
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disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions 
of the ISA or any other law for the time being in force,"
it is submitted that an amendment of s. 30 of the HSA is m  order, for if
1
the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakgara coparcenary property is capable 
of being disposed of by testamentary disposition, there seems no valid 
ground why he may not likewise be entitled to alienate in his lifetime 
by gift inter vivos, sale or other method of alienation, specially as the 
same right has been accorded to the female under s. l*f and in the same 
property. Fears that moves such as this may effectively bring about the 
destruction of the joint-family, appear ill-founded to those who know its 
incidents well and its enduring character. Assuming moreover that that 
were to happen, as the abolition of the "birthright" would be a further 
step towards the equalising of claims in the joint estate as between male 
and female members, it is submitted that the resuscitation of the Mitakgara 
joint-family in the "Hindu Code" was uncalled for, and the time ripe for 
legislation to effect its extinction as originally envisaged in the "Hindu 
Code" Bill.
(9) The Effect of S. l*f on Property Allotted to the Female for Her 
Maintenance
We have already examined the imperative nature, in the traditional 
Hindu law, of the widow's rigfrt to maintenance out of the separate property 
of her husband where he died leaving behind a son, grandson or great- 
grandson, and out of the estate of the joint-family of which her deceased 
husband was a coparcener. Such property as was allotted to the female 
for maintenance purposes, was essentially and intrincally a part of the 
estate, and after her death it reverted to the next heir(s) of the hus­
band, or to his coparceners as the oase be.
1. See the Explanation to s. 30 of the HSA.
2. Derrett amongst others shares this optimism. See RIS-i, 0p. cit.. at 
^3 5, where he is of the view that, "so long as the father andhis sons 
regard themselves as jointly and successively responsible for the 
maintenance of the members of the family, the joint family will remain 
and the MHL has not taken away its juridical framework."
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After the coming into force of the HSA, the problem that for some 
long time perplexed the Judiciary was whether such property as was in the 
possession of the female Hindu in lieu of her maintenance when she was not 
an heir, whether in the classical law, or under the terms of the HWRPA,
19371 could be regarded as her absolute property by virtue of the provi­
sions of s. l*f (1).
It would seem that, in view of the clear wording of the sub-section, and 
the specific inclusion in the Explanation thereof, of the words "in lieu of 
maintenance or arrears of maintenance," there would be no room for contro­
versy. Yet till recently there was in fact an alarming divergence of judicial 
opinion, and the conflict in the interpretation of the two sub-ss. of 
s. 1^  —  already evident in areas other than maintenance —  became all the 
more accute when the High Courts, and even the Supreme Court, were faced with 
the apparent dilemma as to the effect of s. 14 on a grant of land for mainte­
nance to a female which she got under a gift, will, decree, order, award, 
or other instrument, the terms of which specified a restricted estate.
The pjwa-W*™. that seemed to defy judicial solution revolved round the 
question as to whether a mere right of maintenance could be regarded as a 
right to property. Divergent attitudes emerged, the conservative stance 
negativing a rigfrt of maintenance as a pre-existing, an antecedent right, 
so that in their view former grants to secure maintenance, even if they 
amounted to shares in the family estate had to be considered as within 
sub-s. (2), so that the female took subject to whatever limitations were 
written into the grant; on the other hand the progressive attitude was that 
a right of maintenance being a subsisting right, it would prevent the 
"acquisition" from being an "acquisition" within the meaning of s. Ik (2).
In other words, what the female acquired in lieu of maintenance is in the 
nature of a right to property, and notwithstanding the limitations written 
into it, such grant is converted into an absolute or "full" tenure.*
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "S. 1^ of’the HSA,1956, and a Recent Supreme Court, 
Decision," (1971) 73 Bom. L.R.H[j.), 50-4, at 50.
This depressing polarization of viewpoints had assumed alarming pro­
portions by 1977, and in Madras, and its associate, the Andhra Pradesh, 
High Courts in particular, the conservative rigid posture gained ascen­
dency, and was further reinforced, at one time, by the extraordinary notion 
that the only estate to be upgraded to an absolute estate by s. 14 (l) 
was the Hindu woman's "limited" estate, whereas if the estate sought 
to be enlarged was any other kind of estate short of full ownership 
capable of being called "restricted estate" in s. 14 (2), that estate 
remained subject to its restriction and was not enlarged;* in other 
words, what the female got in lieu of her maintenance under a gift, will, 
etc, was not a right to property under s. 1*4- (l), but an estate subject 
to the restrictions in the instrument and therefore clearly a "restricted" 
estate within the meaning of s. 1^ (2)i
It is against this back-drop that we must now turn our attention 
to the flood of conflicting judicial decisions that this once "disagree- 
ably disputed topic"^provoked, and establish the true position, by inter­
preting correctly the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of 
a section in the statute the consequences of which were to have such 
far-reaching significance.
(a) The View That a Right of Maintenance is Hot a Right to Property
The majority of the Courts were agreed some long time ago, and the 
Supreme Court has confirmed, that
"(S)ub-s. (2) of s. l^f is more in the nature of a 
proviso or exception to sub-s. (l). It can come 
into operation only if acquisition in any of the 
methods indicated therein is made for the first
1. Derrett, "S. Ik of the HSA : A Gratifying op. cit.. at 21.
2. Derrett, "S. l*f of the HSA Once op. cit.; at 19.
time without there being any pre-existing right 
in the female Hindu who is in possession of the 
property." 1
Or in other words, if the female had no right in the estate prior to the 
grant etc. , the grantor could thereby create a limited or restricted estate 
in her favour, since what the statute aimed to abolish was the legal limited 
estate, the woman *s estate which simply arose by operation of the Hindu 
law.
The question however was whether a bare right of maintenance could 
be regarded as just such a pre-existing right so as to rule out the appli­
cation of s. l*f (2). The abundance of instances indicate if nothing more, 
that despite specific words to that effect in the Explanation to s. l*f (l). 
the Courts were, till only recently, unwilling to see a right of mainte­
nance as a foundation for a woman's right to treat as an absolute estate 
even that property which is conveyed to her in recognition of her right to 
be maintained where she accepted a limited or otherwise restricted estate; 
so that maintenance not being a pre-existing right, as they saw it, grants
made in satisfaction of that right were subject to any limitations imposed 
2thereby.
3
Jaria Devi v. Shyam Sundar. is an early example of this restrictive 
interpretation of the sub-s., the unwillingness, or even the incapacity, 
on the part of the Courts, to free themselves from traditional attitudes 
in the light of the legislative intendment as indicated in s. 14 (l).
Where the widow had been allotted a moiety share of the property along with 
others in lieu of her admitted one—fourth share in the joint property 
under what was ostensibly a deed of partition but which the Court rightly
Seth Badri Prasad v. Kanso Devi, A.I.R. I970 S.C. 1963, at 1965
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "A Note on Kunji Thoitman v. Meenakshi , A.I.R. 1970 
Ker.28*f," (1971) k.L.T. (j), 25-6, at 25.
3- A.I.R. I959 Cal 338
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interpreted els a deed of family arrangement v it was held that , as the 
family settlement expressly stipulated that she would have no more than a 
life interest therein, the case would fall within the exception to s. 14 (2) 
and not within the general rule enacted in s. l*f (l), the clear inference 
being that her right having commenced for the first time under the 
settlement deed, the widow had no pre-existing right as such, and the 
restriction must thus be upheld. ^
The ruling in Mali Bewa v. Dadhi Das, similarly adheres to the 
notion that a bare right of maintenance may not convert to a right of property, 
that the widow's right having commenced under the compromise with her 
adopted son, it was not an antecedent right, and she was therefore bound 
by the terms of the compromise. What was overlooked here, as indeed in 
all other like decisions, was that the maintenance of the widow was a 
burden on the joint-family estate, and when a share of the estate is given
1. A sizeable number of decisions indicate a similar view. See 
Basdeo v. Director of Consolidation. U.P., (1969) 67 All. L.J.
1027; Smt. Prcma Devi v. Director of Consolidation , A.I.R. 1970 
All. 23b; Likhmi Charxi v. Smt. Sukhdevi, A.I.R. 1970 Raj. 285?
Suba Bewa v. Gauranga Chandra. A.I.R. 1971 Or. 2*f2; Baj Parson v. 
Bhagwandas, (1972) 13 Guj. L.R. 123* having reiterated at 127 that,
"a bare ri^ht of residence creates no estate in her (the widow's) 
favour," irrationally concludes at 128 that, "even though she may 
be in lawful possession of the property within the meaning of s. 1^ , 
she cannot be said to have acquired it so as to make her the full and 
absolute owner thereof by virtue of the operation of s. lU." Contrast, 
as against this, the excellent perspective in Kusumgauri v. Umiben, 
A.I.R. 1975 Guj. 126, discussed below at 699 ; Bindroo v. Munshi,
A.I.R. 1971 K. lA-2? Sarat Iakshmi v. Sisir Kumar, 1^973)
78 C.W.N. 357i Ram Jag v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P., A.I.R. 
1975 All. 151* Consider also the same retrograde attitude in 
Naraini Devi v. Damp Devi, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2198, where the Supreme 
Court in a shallowly considered judgment, reminiscent of the earlier 
Gujarat stance, refused to countenance the widow's pre-existing claim 
to residence in the house obtained under an award, ruling instead 
that as her interest came under s. l^f (2), she was entitled to nothing 
more than the rent, "the wretched part about this decision (being) 
that the award stated that the rent was in lieu of maintenance." :
J.D.M. Derrett, "A Hindu law Miscellany," (1977) 79 Bom. L.R. (j),
21 —IS* atXi . And again "an unfortunate decision which does not deal 
adequately with the arguments in favour of the widow's inherent right 
of maintenance and consequently a pre-existing right in the nature of 
property adequate to enable a grant for maintenance to be' converted into 
an absolute estate in 1956. ": J.D.M. Derrett, (unpub.).
2. A.I.R. i960 Or. 81.
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to her in satisfaction of that precise burden, it cannot be said to be
an acquisition of a new right, and
"(i)n fact in that family if anyone can be said to 
have acquired a right it was the son before whose 
adoption these ladies (the living widow and her de­
ceased co-widow, both of whom were parties to the 
compromise), had, or might have had, the properties 
to themselves." 1
But quite apart from this question of maintenance as a subsisting right, 
it is submitted that on yet another count, his Lordship, Barman, J., could 
well have given the widow the benefit of s. l*f (l). The terms of the compro­
mise expressly provided that the widows were to hold their shares for their 
lifetime and meet their maintenance out of the usufruct and if the usufruct 
be not sufficient for this purpose, then they would be entitled to sell 
such portions of their shares as might be necessary. The compromise decree 
therefore clearly envisaged the grant of the "limited" estate as known to 
Hindu law, and even if the word "limited" in the sub-s. is misconstrued to 
mean quite literally the legal limited estate, the widow's entitlement 
under the compromise was still capable of attracting the provisions of s. l*f 
s. 14 (l).2
The reluctance on the part of the Punjab Hi^i Court to concede to the 
female the full benefits of s. l*f (l) is also apparent in Puran Singh v. 
Resham Singh. The widow having forfeited the estate inherited by her by 
reason of her unchastity, it was held that a part of the land reallotted
1. Derrett, "S. l*f (2) of the HSA: A Disturbing ...," jd£. cit., at ?1.
2. See also Arkhita Das v. Hari Mohapatra, A.I.R. I963 Or. 162, which was 
decided along similar lines, but the more so reprehensible for a singular 
lack of cohesion and clarity of thought. While acknowledging that the 
restricted estate thus created was the "limited" estate well known in 
Hindu law and which is usually called widow's estate which carried with 
it the restrictions inherent in the legal conception itself, the learned 
Judge, Misra, J., was of the opinion that it was nevertheless a restricted 
right created prior to the commencement of the HSA, and therefore incapable 
of being enlarged into full ownership. The dichotomy inherent in this 
line of reasoning is self-evident, for, it is submitted, it is just such
a limited ri^it, i.e. one created prior to the commencement of the Act, 
that can at all come within the purview of s. 1^ (l).
3. (1965) Curr. L.J. 8^ 8, cited at Bai Jabar v. DhanJCaur, (1967) 69 
Punj. L.R. 558.
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to her for her maintenance would attract the provisions of s. Ik (2), as 
it is an acquisition for the first time under a decree of court. It is 
however submitted that such a grant of land for maintenance purposes even 
under a court decree would be capable of being enlarged as a full estate 
under s. l*f (l), for it has to be borne in mind that though unchastity may 
work a forfeiture of her inheritance, it does not, in the traditional law, 
similarly work a forfeiture of her maintenance. The right of maintenance 
persists, albeit in a diminished form, and what the decree confirmed was 
precisely this bare or starving maintenance —  a subsisting right, and 
therefore capable of attracting s. 1^  (l).
As one turns one's thoughts to the Patna decision in Shiva Pu.jan v.
Janruna Missir,^  one is tempted to dismiss, and would indeed have dismissed 
it, as yet another instance of those "rogue" cases which persist in constru­
ing s. lk9 as far els possible, to women's disadvantage, but for a disturb­
ing, because thought-provoking, extension of the same view established in
2
Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi. Where in the one, under a compromise, and in 
the other, under a family arrangement, land was given to the widowed daughter- 
in-law for her maintenance, it was held that her husband having predeceased 
his father, it was manifest that the widow did not acquire any interest in 
the estate of her father-in-law by inheritance or otherwise, and the instru­
ment prescribing restrictions being the source of her title, she acquired 
a restricted estate under s. 1^  (2). The Kerala High Court, in explaining 
the rationale for their decision held that though the principle of Hindu 
law settled by judicial decisions is that whereas a father-in-law who had 
separate properties was under a moral obligation to maintain his widowed 
daughter-in-law as a dependant during his lifetime, and upon his death her 
maintenance out of such property becomes a strictly legal liability in the
1. I.L.R. (1968) k7 Pat. 1118.
2. A.I.R. 1970 Ker. 28k.
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hands of his heirs to the extent of the estate inherited,1 nevertheless
"(l)f a daw^iter-in-law has got properties from 
out of which she could have maintained herself very 
comfortably we do not think it right to hold that 
still there would be a moral obligation on the part 
of the father-in-law. In the absence of any moral 
obligation, no legal obligation against the heirs 
inheriting the estate can arise." 2
It was further held that assuming that there was in fact a legal obliga­
tion on the part of the heir to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law out 
of the estate inherited by the former "we do not think that the second
3
defendant can take advantage of s. 14- (l) of the HSA," for, reasoned 
their Lordships, the widow consented to allotment of properties not accord­
ing to strict legal rights, in a deed which expressly stated that she had
only a life interest in the properties given to her creating a vested re-
Jf
mainder in favour of others.
However, despite this weight of authority in favour of the dicta, 
a nagging doubt persists as to its merits. It is submitted that in the 
absence of proof to the contrary, the recognition by the father-in-law
1. Ibid., at 285-6.
2. Ibid., at 287. In agreeing with this view, Derrett maintains that
**.. .in order to be so entitled the daughter-in-law must have been
poor and a dependant de facto. This point has been brought out 
splendidly in the judgment, and is not altogether obsolete law in 
spite of the different formulation of the daughter-in-law's rights 
under the HAMA, 1956, which did notapply in this case." See "A Note 
On ...," og. cit., at 26.
3’ Kunji Thomman*s case,A.I.R. I970 Ker. 2#t, at 287.
Ibid., at 288. Derrett likewise endorses this position, stating
that "Granted that, had the pleading established the facts, (which, 
it may be noted, it did not), the daughter-in-law might have had a 
claim against the estate in the hands of her widowed mother-in-law, 
the arrangement in this case, beautifully and ... correctly identi­
fied as a family arrangement amounted to a distribution of the deceased 
father-in-law’s estate amongst five people, four of whom had no right 
to be maintained out of it ... and the fifth had only a contingent and 
hypothetical right of maintenance." s MA Note On ...," cit., at 26. 
But is such a right merely a "contingent" and "hypothetical*4 right?
This difficult problem is dealt with below.
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of his moral duty to maintain the widow of his predeceased son is indi­
cative of that "inadequacy of her own assets" which the learned judges felt 
was a prerequisite for the burden of maintenance to fall on such property. 
Under such circumstances, the heir or heirs cannot escape their legal 
liability, and notwithstanding that the distribution of the estate was 
under a family arrangement with four of the participants not having any 
right of maintenance in it, to hold that despite this legal right, merely 
because the widow took under a family arrangement, s. 14- (2) must apply, 
seems strange reasoning. For, while certainly it is true that, the allot­
ment did not purport to satisfy any right of maintenance of those who 
could claim no such right of maintenance, the burden of legal obligation 
towards the widowed daughter-in-law would it is submitted, save her entitle­
ment from the operation of s. lb (2). That the issue is not free from 
doubt, it is acknowledged here, and has been acknowledged elsewhere,1 
and it is submitted that a careful reappraisal might be in order in view 
of the vast number of decisions where the widow's subsisting right of mainte­
nance has been vindicated as a right of property despite restrictions in 
the family arrangement or other instrument under which she took.
(i) The Ascendency of This View in Madras and Andhra Pradesh
This misconception of the sub-s., and the denial of maintenance as 
a ri^vt to property appears to have held special appeal for Tamil Nadu
1. See J.D.M. Derrett, "A Hindu law Miscellany," (1971) 73 Bom. L.R. (J.), 
80-3, at 81, where on second thoughts, he has this to say: "This
particular part of the judgment makes me pause, for I feel sure that 
she, a daughter-in-law, had an antecedent right of maintenance, such 
as would give to the share she took such a quality as would be bound 
to bring it within s. lb (l)." "But" adds the writer, "the case is 
complex." Significant also is the passing over, by the Supreme Court 
in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, at I97I, of this 
case, where, while approving of Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha. A.I.R.
1966 Ker. 66, in so many words, Fazal Ali, J., confined himself to 
projecting the latter Kerala view without comment.
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and Andhra Pradesh, and in fact it was from the latter High Court that the 
first reasoned judgment, given after mature deliberation and deep thought, 
further entrenched this rigid posture. In Gopisetti Kondiah v. Gundu 
Subbarayudu,^  there were two cases before the division bench. In the 
Second Appeal, under the terms of his will, the deceased who had died in 
1918, bequeathed half of the property to his mother for life, and the 
remainder to his widow, who would thereafter hold the estate absolutely. 
The mother in turn gifted away her portion in October, 1956, whereupon 
the widow sued for its recovery alleging that, as what the mother had got 
under the terms of the will was merely a limited estate, the alienation 
effected by the latter would not bind her. Their Lordships, in explain­
ing the nature of the right of maintenance held that, in the traditional 
law, the right of maintenance vjos an indefinite right which dcd- not by 
itself create in the widow a proprietory right in the property. But if 
that right is translated into a specific right in property, the estate so 
transferred in her favour can either be in recognition of her right to 
maintenance under the Hindu law, or create a restricted estate recognised 
under any other law in force. If it is the former, the mere transfer or 
acquisition and possession thereof in lieu of her right of maintenance 
would itself be sufficient to create an absolute estate under s. 14 (l). 
But as in this case the testator, while intending to give the entire pro­
perties absolutely to his wife, had interposed a life estate in respect 
of a moiety in favour of his mother, which after her death was to be a 
gift over absolutely to his wife, what the will conferred on the mother
1. (1968) 2 An.~ W.R. 455.
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was a new an! therefore restricted right under s. 14 (2).^
This extraordinary notion, i.e. that a right of maintenance is not a 
right to property, based as it is on the supposition that it is not a sub­
sisting right, was further reinforced in a number of decisions by reference 
to the concept of maintenance in the traditional law to the effect that, 
however imperative the nature of a right of maintenance nay fee, it is 
nonetheless an indefinite right which "by itself does not confer on her
(the widow) any possessory lien or proprietory right or title in the pro- 
2
perty." The creation of a charge against such property, so the argument 
goes, may enforce the right of maintenance, but beyond that a charge does
3
not have the effect of transferring or creating a right in it, and it is
1. For similar decisions in South India, see also Santhana v. Subramania,
I.L.R. (1967) l.Mad. 685 Sesha Reddi v. Tulasamma, A.l7R. 1969 A.P. 300; 
overruled by the Supreme Court in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 1944, itself a milestone in resolving the controversy as to 
the nature of a female*s right of maintenance and the effect of s. 14 
on it; Pattibiraman v. Pari jatham, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 257; Unnamalai v. 
Vellaya, (1971) 1 M.L.J. 147; Thayammal v. Salammal, A.I.R. 1972 Mad.
83; Velimirugayya v. Iafcshmana, (1974)2 M.L.J. 295; Sound ararajan v. 
Venkataraman, 1*1976) 2 M. L.J. 4o6; Subbalakshmi v. Andiappa, (1977)
1 M.L.J. 2 (N.R.C.); Subba Naidu v. Bajammal, A.I.R. I977 Mad. 64.
The same erroneous construction of s. 14 is evident in Narayan Patra 
v. Tara Pat rani. A.I.R. 1970 Or. 131, where the learned Judge, Patra, J., 
derived his inspiration from the retrograde decisions in the South to 
arrive at a conclusion that follows Gopisetti's case. (1968) 2 An. W.R. 
455, verbatim.
2. Gurunadham v. Navaneethamma, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 429, at 430. See also 
Gopisetti s case, cited above, at 460; Likhmi Chand v. Smt. Sukhdevi, 
A.I.R. 1970 Raj. 285, at 286; Karayan Patra's case, cited above, at 134} 
Santhanam K. Gurukkal v. Subramania Gurukkal. A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 279, 
at284.
3- Gurunadham1s case, cited above, at 431; Gopisetti*s case, cited above, 
at 468; Iakhmi Chand's case, cited above, at 286; Narayan Patra*s case, 
cited above, at 134; Santhanam's case, cited above, stating at 282 
that, "There is nothing to show that she claimed any charge over the 
joint family properties," thereby reinforcing the erroneous notion 
that such a charge might conceivably alter the nature of her right so 
as to entitle her to the benefit of s. 14 (1). As against this, Derrett, 
all too aware of the haplessness of females in the face of their own
5 °Ja?Ce and "t?6 intfigues of others "who could dispute females' claims 
and drive them into disadvantageous compromises," firmly refutes this 
view to hold that "The word 'acquired' in s. 14 (l) should then apply 
not only to property over which a charge has been made in the woman's 
favour, but also property over which she has a floating right to be 
maintained." • "S. 14 of the HSA Once ...," op. cit., at 22.
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in fact liable to be defeated by a transfer of the property to a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice of the widow's claim of maintenance.
It is however submitted that this kind of construction cannot lend
itself to any sensible interpretation of s. 14. True, a bare right of
maintenance may be frustrated by certain alienations by the owners of the
corpus, as has rightly been said. True also, that a charge when made,
creates only a right of payment out of the property. But in invoking the
traditional law, what has to be kept sight of is that a wife's right of
maintenance out of her husband's properties stemmed from the notion that
the wife is half her husband's body, and the right of maintenance therefore
is an interest in the nature of property as a direct consequence of her co-
ownership with her husband. Thus she is entitled by marriage alone to be
maintained and this, charge or no charge, is an encumbrance on the family
unless very special circumstances apply, in which prior valid charges take
precedence, or an equity in favour of a special kind of bona fide purchaser 
3
ousts her claim. The charge therefore, which a widow may obtain does not
if
make proprietary what was not proprietary before!
1. Santhanam's case, A.I.R. 1972 Maid. 279» at 284
2. This has been attractively set out by their Lordships of the Patna High 
Court in Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath. A.I.R. 1970 Ba-t. 3^ 8, at 351* where 
they explain that "The right of a Hindu widow to get maintenance out
of the joint family properties is an indefinite right; yet it is a right 
and she does not get maintenance gratis or by way of charity. She gets 
it in her right under the Hindu law." Equally attractive is the reitera­
tion of this theory in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, 
at 1954t s "The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is notan empty 
formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indul-^
gence, grace or gratis or generosity, but is a valuable spiritual and
moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship 
of the husband and wife. As the wife is in a sense a part of the body 
of her husband, she becomes co-owner of the property of her husband 
though in a subordinate sense."
3. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA Once ...," o£. cit., at 21.
4. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA: A Gratifying oj>. cit., at 53. Note
the perverseness of the, dicta in Sesha Reddi v. Tulasamma. A.I.R. 1969 
A.P. 300, where despite the prior charge obtained by the widow, it was
held that s. 14 (2) would apply to such property, as it was only under
the later compromise decree that she had acquired possession of it.
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Nor is there any merit in the contention that a distinction must be 
drawn between a widow with a bare right of maintenance, i.e. one whose 
husband had died prior to the passing of the HWRPA, 1937» and in cases 
where the grants, settlements, compromises and decrees arose out of claims 
based on the Act of 1937- Conditions imposed in all such cases, so it 
was construed, could be ignored, as it acknowledged or effectuated the 
widow's pre-existing right of property, the Act of 1937 having statutorily 
quantified her share as equal to that of a son in the separate, and the 
share of her husband in the joint-family, properties.^
1. See sub-ss. 3 (l) and 3 (2) of the HWRPA. This denial of a bare right 
of maintenance as a right of property, as against the entitlement of 
the widow under the Act of 1937* and the recognition of it as a pre­
existing right, is adhered to in Gurunadham's case, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 
429, where the Court held that that,the decisions in Sasadhar Chandra 
v. Tara Sundari, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 438, Sampat Kumari v. Lakshmi Ammal, 
A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 50* and Sharbati Devi v. Hiralal, A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 
114, could be of little assistance to the widow in the present case, 
as those were instances of a pre-acquired right either under the Hindu 
law, or under the HWRPA. The decision was in turn approved of in 
Gopisetti*s case, (1968) 2 An. W.R. 455* at 467* See also Narayan 
Patra's case, A.I.R. 1970 Or. 131, at 135? Pattdbiraman's case,A.I.R. 
1970 Mad. 257, at 259? Bai Parson v. Bhagwandas, 11972) 13 G11 j» L.R. 
123, where in refuting the widow's right of residence as a right of 
property, Sheth, J., states at 125: "It has not been disputed before 
me that the HWRPA, 1937, was not applicable to Bhavnagar at any time 
before it was repealed by the HSA, 1956," imputing thereby that while 
he was willing to concede that the widow's share under the Act of 
1937 would attract the provisions of s. 14 (l), the widow with merely 
a right of residence could claim no such benefit? Baja Rao v. Hastimal, 
A.I.R. 1972 Raj. 191» at 196. A similar distinction is implied in 
Subba Naidu v. Rajammal, A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 64, at 65. Reprehensible 
as this construction is, note the even more incomprehensible attitude 
adopted in Sarat lakshmi v. Sisir Kumar. (1973) 78 C.W.N. 357, 
following Jaria Devi v. Shyam Sundar. A.I.R. I959 Cal. 338, where 
despite the widow's entitlement under the HWRPA, (of which incidently, 
inexplicably there is no mention in the judjment), it was held that, 
as she took property not strictly according to her share under a 
family arrangement, s. 14 (2) applied? Ram Jag v. The Director of 
Consolidation, U.P., A.I.R. 1975 All. 151* likewise ignores the Act 
of 1937 to arrive at an identical decision. See also Bindroo v.
Munshi, A.I.R. 1971 J.&K. 142, discussed above at 569, f.n. 1
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That this view is untenable is evident if we recall the nature of 
the interest that the widow acquired under the HWRPA, 1937- At her 
demand for partition under that Act she took property producing an income 
exactly the same as the minimum she could have claimed had she claimed 
separate maintenance in 1936.1 The woman’s interest under the Act of 
1937 therefore enlarged on a right she had before, (that of maintenance 
which was never technically abolished), and the Act of 1956 merely manipu- 
lated and converted it further. Nor is this inconsistent with the inten­
tion of Parliament which surely did not desire to discriminate between 
widows who took under the statute of 1937 arid those who did not, nor between
those Mitakgaia families who were bound to give shares to females at a
3
partition and those that were not.
If a right is denied to women when they claimed no more than mainte­
nance i.e. where they were at their weakest and least defended condition,
If
while a right is acknowledged when they claimed a share, then we are 
attributing to Parliament a frankly discriminatory outlook inconsistent 
with the legislative intendment; this attitude belittles the existing right 
of maintenance, and rests on the essentially inequitable notion that it 
cannot be a basis upon which a grant to secure it can be a grant to secure 
a right pre-existing that grant, with the effect that women taking grants 
for their maintenance when they are already dependants of the joint-family 
lose their chance for holding the land for an absolute estate, whereas 
those who took under the Act of 1937 and whether or not they have taken 
part in any agreement, arrangement or settlement find themselves owners 
of an absolute estate in undivided assets as from 17 June, 1956. This 
is a conservative position understandably kind to males but incorrect.^
1. Derrett, "S. Ilf of the HSA Once ...," oj>. cit., at 21.
2. Derrett, "S. Ilf of the ISA: A Gratifying . . . o£. cit., at 53.
3. Derrett, "S. Ilf of the ISA Once op. cit., at20.
If. Derrett, nS. Ilf of the HSA: A Disturbing ...,** op. cit., at 67.
5. J.D.M. Derrett, "The Tenure of Widows Who are Granted land for Their
Maintenance," (1972) K.L.T. (j), 33^ , at 33, f.n. k.
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(ii) The Reinforcement of the Conservative Stance on the Ground that 
the Restricted Estate Tinder an Instrument is Not the Legal 
"Limited"* Estate under s.
The stance that a right of maintenance is not a right of property 
weis abetted in the Madras and its allied High Court by a fundamental 
misconception of the word "restricted" in sub-s. (2) of s. 1*K In 
any meaningful construction of s. 14-, what we have to bear in mind is 
the purpose of s. Ik (2), that it is in the nature of an exception to 
s. Ik (l)f so that while the intention of Parliament was to abolish the 
legal limited estate, it preserved to anyone who had the right to convey 
property to a woman the natural and obvious right of conveying it subject 
to a limitation of his own choice. To read more into it would be to 
misconstrue the sub-s. to the detriment of the new rights conveyed to 
the female under the HSA. And yet this is exactly what happened, and 
for some considerable time the view held sway in the South that, despite 
her right of maintenance under the Hindu law, where the female acquired 
property under an instrument which prescribed a restricted estate other 
than the "limited" estate, such acquisition was incapable of attracting 
the provisions of s. l*f (1), and she was bound by the terms of the instru­
ment.
The second Appeal in Gopisetti "s case^ is the prototype of this kind 
of reasoning, and the extension and hardening of this theory is apparent 
in the Letters Patent Appeal in the same case.
M
i
i
si
_L
sz
1. (1968) 2 An. W.R. 455.
-580-
The facts briefly, and shorn of irrelevances, were that after P's 
death in 1918, ana as a result of lack of amicability between W2 and her 
minor stepsons, P's mother acting as de facto guardian of the minors 
executed a maintenance deed in favour of W2 whereby some land was allotted 
to her for her maintenance. In 1957 W2 sold the land in reliance upon 
s. 14 (1) of the HSA, whereupon the sons of SI and S2 contended that the 
alienation would not be valid and binding on them after W2's lifetime as 
what the maintenance deed had conferred upon her was merely a life estate. 
Their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court concurred with the judg­
ment of Chandrasekhara Sastry, J., in the second appeal that such grant 
would indeed come within the purview of s. 14 (l), but it is submitted, it 
is their reasoning at arriving at this decision which requires careful re­
consideration. In the Letters Patent Appeal they had made it clear that
"(W)e cannot accept the contention... that a right 
to maintenance is a right in property; that it is a 
pre-existing right in lieu of which that property or 
portion thereof is given and, therefore, sub-s. (2) 
of s. 14 does not apply to property transferred in 
lieu of maintenance whether the instrument trans­
ferring the property creates a restricted estate or not." 1
On the other hand the pre-existing rigjrt of a Hindu female is in respect
of property to which she would, under the Hindu law, obtain a limited 
2
interest. Thus where specific property is transferred to her in discharge 
of her right of maintenance from out of the estate of her hustand or of
the property of the family, the widow acquired a right in such property
in lieu of her maintenance which is the source of her title, and provided 
that no restrictions are placed by the instrument under which it is trans­
ferred, she takes an estate free of restrictions under sub-s. (l) of
1. Ibid., at 462.
2. Ibid., at 460. Reiterated at 468 to the effect that, "if the transfer
is only in lieu of a pre-existing right of maintenance and the terms 
and conditions are consistent with that, she would get an absolute 
estate under s. 14 (l)."
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s. 1*K In the present case therefore, as the maintenance deed did not 
stipulate any express prohibition against any alienation of the pro­
perty, the recital merely stating that after her lifetime the property 
would revert to the minors, this was in accord with the rights she 
would have had in case the property had been transferred to her in lieu 
of her maintenance. Under such circumstances, s. l*f (l) applied, and 
her absolute right under itj^ undeniable.^  l\ ^
As one turns the dicta over in one's mind, it is at once apparent 
that the Court did not overtly look so much to the merits of the matter, 
as to the technical, construction of the two expressions "limited owner* 
and"restricted estate" There is of course no doubt but that one of 
the chief objects of the reformers from whose endeavours the HSA derives
1. The denial of the right of maintenance as a pre-existing right apart, 
the same reasoning, that is, that it is only the legal limited estate 
in respect of which s. l*f (l) may be invoked, was also the basis of 
the reasoning in Seetharamayya v. Perajah, A. I.R. 19#* A.P. ?
Venkat Narsing Rao v. Keshava Rao,\ 196*0 2 An. W.R. 383» at 385? 
Gurunadham's case7 A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 429f at**31» Pharma Udayar v. 
Ramchandra, (1969) 1 M.L.J. 181; Thayammal v. Salammal, A.I.R.
1972 Mad. 83, following the decision of Natesan, j., in Lakshmi 
Ammal v. Sappanimuthu Rader, S.A. Ho. 1*+15 of 1965 (had.), at 85? 
Santhanam *s case . A. l7R. 1972 Mad. 279, at 282^3; Chipnammal v.
Kaveri, (197*0 2 M.L.J. 7 (N. C.), at 7? Velmurugayya v. Iakshmana 
(197*0 2 M.L.J. 295t at 298. On the other hand, it was held in 
Ram Jag v. Director of Consolidation, U.P.. A.I.R. 1968 All. **19, 
that as it was nowhere mentioned in the deed of family arrangement 
under which the widow held the property for her maintenance that, 
after her death the property was to revert to her husband's collaterals, 
the effect of s. 1** (l) was to convert it to an absolute estate. 
Similarly, in Rama Vanti v. Bal Kaur, (1968) 70 Punj. L. R. 90,
Maha jan, J., held that as the decree under which the widow was granted 
property for her maintenance merely stipulated that she was to hold 
it till her death, it did not either in express terms or by necessary 
implication prescribe a restricted estate so as to attract s. 1** (2).
See also Hussain v. Venkatachala. A.I.R. 1975 Mad. 8, where while 
refusing to recognise a mere right of maintenance as a right to pro— 
Perty» Maharajan, J., ruled that, as the compromise deed merely 
recognised the widow's pre-existing estate settled upon her under her 
husband's will, and the impositions of restrictions in the former 
being consistent with the limited estate, s. l*f (l) would have applied 
but that the female was not possessed of the estate on 17.6.56. 
Reminiscent of the Letters Patent Appeal in Gopisetti's case, (1968)
2 An. W.R. *f55, these decisions are correct, but the reasoning, it 
is submitted, quite as misleading as that in the Andhra judgment.
In contradistinction to these, see Thayyanayaki v. Vemisopala. (197*0 
2 M.L.J. 1+25, infra, at 659. --- ---
2. Derrett, -S. H* (2) of the jBAJ A.Disturbing ... f. eif., at 68.
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was to abolish the woman's limited estate."*" However, just as the word 
"restricted" in s.l** (2) literally means any restriction short of full 
ownership, and therefore includes the traditional limited estate, si­
milarly the words "limited owner in s. l**(l) is not intended to exclude
an owner of a "restricted* estate, but means merely an owner of an estate
2
subject to a limitation. The two words are an elegant variation, and
3
not in contradiction or contradistinction.
"The error in Gopisetti's case** is briefly this, that the 
learned Judges believed that the test whether an estate is enlarged 
from a nominal restricted estate into an absolute estate, was not 
whether the woman acquired contractually or consensually the estate 
under the disposition relied upon, but whether the limitation chosen by 
the opposite parties was the old limited estate of Hindu females or some 
other restriction incompatible with that. They implied that the limited 
estate stricto sensu was removed in favour of an absolute estate; but 
that restricted estates, being restrictions unknown to the previous law, 
would bring the matter within s.l*+ (2) even if the woman had acquired a 
new right, independently of any earlier claim,"*" that in effect and con­
versely, where restrictions were inserted in the instrument, the widow 
could not claim under s.l*f (1), and this despite her pre-existing right 
of maintenance, which their Lordships acknowledged in so many words.5 
That this was surely not Parliament's intention, j^ that the words 
"limited owner" must be taken in their natural sense, namely "subject to 
limitation", is proved by the careful wording of the Explanation which
1. Ibid., at 63.
2. Derrett, "s.l** of the HSA: A Gratifying ...," op. cit., at
3- J.D.M. Derrett, "S.l*| of the HSA : A Deadlock Ready for the Supreme
Court to Break," (Unpub.), 1-7, at 2.
Gopisette's case, (I968) 2 An. W.R. **55, at **68.
5. Derrett, S. l*f of the HSA s A Disturbing ...," op. cit. at 68.
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amounts to this:
"(N)o matter where the property came from, provided she 
was lawfully entitled to it, where she acquired it "by virtue 
of the law, she is full owner and not a limited owner."
The reason for this is clear. Parliament wanted, at the expense of re­
versioners and other male participants, if necessary to enlarge women's 
existing rights in property, to give as much property to women of all 
ages and lengths of widowhood as was possible, thus righting a social 
injustice of long standing. If this could be prevented by their agree­
ing (in whatever circumstances) to any estate, short (in any way) of 
an absolute estate, whether the agreement might have been in 1936, 1955
or 1957* the purpose of the Legislature which was frankly discriminatory
2
in favour of some women, would have been frustrated.
Thus though it is ideal not to deprive reversioners where the widow's 
husband died before 19371 the notion that her right to maintenance is a
3
subsisting right to property is not only consistent with Hindu tradition,
but is also a step towards the equalising of claims of females against
males; and this generosity, a generosity shown to female heirs in the
absence of male issue, and to all female heirs and share-takers under
the HWRPA, 1937• extending it in favour of women who could not be heirs
and share-takers before 1937 because of the number and identity of sur-
II
vivors of the deceased husband, is a realistic and progressive solution 
to which the South Indian view, unused as it was to females having shares 
as such - and which probably was at the root of the regressive stance 
once adopted there - finally caved in.
1. Derrett, "S. l*f (2) of the HSA: A Disturbing ...," op. cit., at 65.
2. Derrett, "S. 1** of the HSA, 1956: A Deadlock ...,** op. cit., at 2.
3. Supra, at 27**-6.
4. ' Derrett, "S. 1** of the HSA Once ...," pp. cit., at 21-2.
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(b) The View That a Right to Maintenance is a Right of Property
The formula which has eventually emerged after a protracted
conflict of decisions, and now confirmed by the Supreme Court in
1Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi is that, where the female has a right to
be maintained out of property at the time that a grant out of
that property is made to her in recognition of this right or
otherwise, then that grant must be construed as if it conveyed
an absolute estate. But where, at the time when the grant is made,
she had no right in the estate, and she is given a limited or
other restricted estate in a portion of it or the whole of it,
the condition in the instrument must be upheld, and the restriction 
2will stand. In other words, where the female had a subsisting 
right prior to the arrangement, any share given to her will become 
her absolute property notwithstanding the terms of the arrangement 
and irrespective of her consent to take it subject to limitations;^  
and this would apply equally to the pre-existing title of the widow 
in the property acquired by her as heir to her husband whether 
under the traditional law or the HRWPA, 1937-
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944.
2. Derrett, "S. 14 of the HSA: A Disturbing...,f, op.cit., at 67 •
3. Ibid., at-66.
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(i) The Operation of S. 14 (1) on Property Acquired by Inheritance
Almost immediately after the enactment of the HSA, when the 
controversy centering round s. 14 could hardly have been envisaged, 
their Lordships of the Patna High Court, Ramaswami, C.J., and 
Prasad, J., aware of the subtle nuances inherent in the two sub-ss., 
held in Mt. Phan wan tia v. Deonandan, that where under a compromise in 
1938, land had been allocated to the widows of the deceased coparcener 
for their maintenance, the reversionary right stood abrogated with 
the coming into force of the HSA, and there having been partition of 
the joint estate the half share of the widows under the HWRPA, 1937* 
would convert to an absolute estate under s. 14 (1) so as to render 
nugatory all restrictions on alienations imposed by the compromise 
decree. Correct as the decision is, it is submitted that what has 
not been brought out, for the reason that it was perhaps not clear at 
that early stage, is that the abrogation of the reversion was a 
direct consequence, not of partition nor of s. 14, as the learned 
Judges at one point indicate, but of an interest pre-existent to the 
instrument imposing restrictions, as numerous subsequent dicta were 
to testify.
A greater degree of force is added to this line of reasoning in
2Janak Dulari v. Dist. Judge, Kanpur, where in explaining the nature 
of the two sub-ss. of s. 14, Bhargava, J., held that as the decree 
restricting her right was not the means of the widow’s acquisition, 
the limitations prescribed in it could no longer have any validity 
in view of s. 14 (1) which converted her limited entitlement under
1. A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 477.
2. A.I.R. 1961 All. 294.
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statute of 1937 to an absolute estate.
Or to put it in the words of the Calcutta High Court, as
"(t)here was no longer a limited Hindu Widow's Estate 
in respect of the properties nor any reversionary 
interest in respect thereof,”1
the entire basis of the consent decree prescribing a widow's estate
had ceased to exist since the passing of the HSA, the same High Court
further adding that whereas the word "acquired" in sub-s. (1) has to
be given the widest possible meaning, the language used in sub-s. (2)
indicates that the same word will have a restricted meaning, namely a
creation or acquisition of title for the first time where no prior 
2title existed. Thus where the female had already come by the 
property as heir under the traditional law, on partition she does not 
acquire any property in which she has no interest or title prior to 
partition.^
This progressive view is perhaps best exemplified by the 
authoritative interpretation of the much disputed s. 14 in Seth Badri
1. Lalchand v. Sushila, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 623, at 624.
2. Sasadhar Chandra Day v. Sm. Tara Sundari Dassi, A.I.R. 1962 Cal.
433 440.
3. Ibid. As against the numerous instances of instruments prescribing 
restrictions on the estate a female took, contrast the set of facts 
in Sant Ram v. Gurdev Singh, A.I.R. I960 Punj. 462, where the Ruler 
of the Native State gave his sanction to a will bequeathing 
property to a male Hindu, the sanction prescribing restrictions on 
alienation, and after the legatee's death, it was held that the 
limitations put by the sanctions given to the will were not put on 
the estate, and as the estate that his widow got was by succession 
to her husband and not under any instrument, by force of s. 14 (1) 
it vested absolutely in her divorced of all limitations. As 
against this see Swaran Singh v. Smt. Amro, (1967) 69 Punj. L.R.
391f where it was held that as the Riwaj-i-Am or general custom 
(under which the unmarried daughter was heir to her father's 
estates, both ancestral and self-acquired till her marriage) could
not be called an instrument under which she had acquired, at her
marriage in 1969» her father's collaterals could not claim the 
property,as her limited estate had become absolute under s. 14 (1).
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Prasad v. KansoJDevi, where under an arbitration award, the widow had 
been given certain properties subject to the widow's estate, her 
stepson sought an injunction against her to prevent her selling the 
property or committing waste, and the only question for determination 
was whether in 1961 she still held the property subject to the women's 
limited estate. In the view of the appellant as the provision in the 
award was for a widow's estate under the Hindu law, sub-s. (1) of 
s. l*t could have no application, while it was argued on behalf of 
the widow that as she was possessed of an interest which stemmed from 
the provisions of the HWRPA, 1937» she had become full owner thereof 
by virtue of s. 1^ (1). Grover, J*, speaking on behalf of his learned 
brothers was rightly of the view that the lady's antecedent right 
under the Act of 1937 which pre-existed the award, had the effect 
of bringing the share itself under s. Ik (1) and she had an absolute 
estate in it. His Lordship drew attention to the significance of 
the words "possessed" and "acquired" in sub-s. (1), and opined that 
just as the word "possessed" had been used in its widest connotation 
and it may be either actual or constructive or in any form recognised 
by law, so too the word "acquired" has to be given the widest possible 
meaning so as to make sense of the wide amplitude of the language 
used in the Explanation to sub-s. (1). On the other hand, the 
learned Judge reasoned, s. l*f (2) being more in the nature of a 
proviso or an exception to s. l4 (1), it could come into operation 
only if the acquisition is for the first time without there being 
any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of 
the property. As such, therefore,
1. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1963.
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”(W)here at the commencement of the Act a female Hindu 
has a share in joint properties which are later on 
partitioned by metes and bounds and she gets possession 
of the properties allotted to her, there can be no 
manner of doubt that she is not only possessed of that 
property at the time of the coming into force of the 
Act, but has also acquired the same before its 
commenc ement.”^
1. Ibid., at 1966. For an appreciative critical assessment of this 
case see Derrett, f,S. 1^ of the HSA, 1956 and a Recent... This, 
the correct interpretation of s. l4 and in keeping with the avowed 
aim of the Legislature to bring about social reform by upgrading 
the position of women in Hindu society, is indicated in a host 
of decisions, both before and after the Supreme Court 
pronouncement. The favourable decisions in Madras apart, which 
are dealt with separately below, see also Saraswathi Ammal v. 
Krishna Iyer, A.I.E. 1965 Ker. 226; Raghunath Sahu v. Bhimsen 
Naik, A.I.E. 1965 Or. 59; Raropali Devi v. Mannalal, A.I.R.
1966 All. 58^ ; Lachhia Sahuain v. Bam Shankar, A.I.E. 1966 
Pat. 191; Ude Chand v. Mst. Rajo, A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 329?
Bhai Jabar v. Phan Kaur, (1967) 69 Punj. L.R. 558; Jagannathpuri 
v. Kamleshwaripuri, A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 25; Udhav Shankar v.
Tarabai, A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 308; Brij Ram v. Gurdas Ram, (1968)
70 Punj. L.R. 292; Chhajju Ram v. Mst. Bhuri, A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 
273; Mahadeo Pandey v. Mt. Bensraji, A.I.R. 1971 All. 515J 
Ram Sarup v. Sm. Toti, A.I.R. 1973 P.& H. 329; Guneshwar v.
Haren, A.I.R. 1971* Gau. 73; Asharam v. Sarjubai, A.I.R. 1976 
Bom. 272; Sam pur an Singh v. Labh Singft, A.I.R. 1977 P-& H. 17;
Smt. Sunderdevi v. Manakchand, A.I.R. 1975 Raj. 211; Dukhit 
Thakur v. Mst. Godami, A.I.R. 1980 Pat. 101; Mahabir Pandey 
v. Sashi Bhusan, A.I.R. 1981 Cal. 7**; Shrimati Roop v. Sultan 
Singh, A.I.R. 1983 Delhi,77; Hirday Narain v. Kashi Prasad,
A.I.R. 1983 All. 187. Note also the obiter dicta to the 
same effect in Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath, A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 3^ 8, 
at 351, M... in all cases where the widow had a right to get 
property under the HWRPA or otherwise, and where she got such 
an estate on partition (and even in the undivided state, it 
is submitted), before the coming into force of the Act, her 
limited estate will become her absolute estate on and from 
17th June, 1956.11
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(ii) The Operation of s. (1) on Property Acquired in Lieu of 
Maintenance - -
Now that we have established the correct position, i.e. that 
s. l*f (2) of the HSA cannot apply where the lady acquired her right 
otherwise than under the instrument, etc., the more difficult question 
that at one time so perplexed the judicial mind was whether, when a 
grant of land to a widow, who was as a matter of fact entitled to 
maintenance, is made subject to a condition that she shall not 
alienate it except for necessity, and/or that after her death it 
shall pass to other relatives, namely the grantors or their heirs, 
the result after June 17, 1956 was that under s. 1*+ (1) it became 
an absolute estate of which she could make an absolute disposition at 
her discretion; or was it rather still subject to a limitation coming 
within s. 1^ (2)?^
The conservative position “which seems even at a glance, to be
2legalistic, formalistic, pedantic and unprogressive,11 must be 
dismissed out of hand, for the correct approach is that, whether or 
not it is mentioned in the deed, where the female had a right to be 
maintained it must be construed as a right to property and she could 
ignore the limitations and so could her transferees.^
In Sheojee Tiwary v. Prema Kuer, where in two branches of a
1. Derrett, “A Hindu Law Miscellany,” (1971) op.cit., at 8l.
2. Derrett, ”S. l*f of-the HSA and a Recent.*.,” op.cit., at 52. 
3- Derrett, ”A Hindu Law Miscellany,” (1971) op.cit., at 8l.
A.I.R. 19&* Pat. 187.
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divided family, the widows whose husbands had died prior to 1937, came 
into possession of the properties at the deaths of the last surviving 
male members of their respective branches, it was held that apart from 
the presumption that such estates were "in lieu of maintenance,"1 the 
word "whatsoever" in the Explanation indicates the wide amplitude of 
s. 1** (1), so that even assuming that the ladies had not acquired in 
lieu of maintenance, but "in any other manner whatsoever", the irresis­
tible conclusion could not be other than that s. 1** (1) applied. It 
is however submitted that though the true position has been admirably 
brought out here, on the set of given facts, this hypothetical exten­
sion of the application of s. 1** (1) was unnecessary, as it was pre­
cisely to that subsisting right of maintenance in lieu of which the 
widows held the property that s. 1** (1) applied, and the force of this 
right is such that however it may be given effect to
"(w)hat is of the essence is that all these devices 
were meant to satisfy and recognise her legal claim 
which exists independently of the arrangement, 
instrument or award.
1. The same presumption worked in favour of the widow in Gulab Chand 
v. Sheo Karan, A.I.R. 196** Pat. **5, discussed above at 49P where 
their Lordships having declared the widow absolute owner by virtue of 
her adverse possession held that even if she were presumed to be in 
possession in lieu of maintenance, her title would become absolute. 
See also Rani Bai v. Yadunandan, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1118, where it 
was similarly held that as the widowed daughter-in-law was presum­
ably in possession in lieu of her right of maintenance, she could 
not be deprived of the properties until some proper arrangement was 
made for her maintenance. Likewise in Mst. Gaumati v. Shankar Lai, 
A.I.R. 197** Raj. 1**7, where the Hindu widow entitled to maintenance 
was in possession and in exclusive control of the property for over 
fifty years, and there was nothing on record to show that any sep­
arate arrangement had been made for her maintenance, it was presumed 
that she held the property in lieu of maintenance, or "in any other 
manner whatsoever" so as to become full owner after the coming into 
force of the Act. Followed in Mool Ku-nwar v. Jeewalal, A.I.R. 1982 
Raj. 267.
2. Per. Deshpande, J., Yamunabai v. Parappa, (1968) 70 Bom. L.R. 6ll, 
at 6l5* This view that a right of maintenance is itself an ante­
cedent right capable of attracting the provisions of s. l*t (1) so 
as to rule out later restrictions imposed under various instruments
(continued on next page)
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Annasaheb v. Gangabai assumes the greater importance not only
for scrutinising the anomalies that would result on a narrow construc- 
tion of s. 14, nor only for laying to rest the artificial distinction 
made in the Madras decisions between the terms “limited owner" in 
s. 14 (1) and "restricted estate" in s. 14 (2)^ but more importantly 
for pointing out that in the context of Hindu widows the right to 
maintenance is indistinguishable in quality from her right to a share 
in the family property whether under the HWRPA, 1937 % or on actual par­
tition of the joint estate, his Lordship, Palekar, J., adding 
conclusively that
"(T)hat may well be the reason why the Explanation
to sub-s. (1) of s. 14 of the Act makes the female
allottee of property fin lieu of maintenance* as
much a limited owner as when the widow acquired on
'inheritance* or 'at a partition'. And if in the
latter two cases it is conceded that sub-s. (2) 
does not apply on the ground of antecedent right
to the family properties, we do not see any rational
justification to exclude a widow who has an equally
sufficient claim over the family properties for her
(continued from previous page)
is amply vindicated in Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Hiralal, A.I.R. 196**
Punj. 114; Purna Chandra v. Nimei Charan, A.I.R. 1968 Or. 196; Smt.
Sohag Wanti v. Smt. Sodhan, A.I.R. 196b, Punj. 24; Bindbashni v. Smt. 
Sheorati, A.I.R. 1971 Pat. 104; Hanamangouda v. Hanamangouda, A.I.R.
1972 Mys. 286, followed in Chanamma v. Lingamma, A.I.R. 1972 Mys.
333» and Kempanna v. Shantarajiah, A.I.R. 1973 Mys. 333; Lakshmi 
Devi v. Shankar Jha, A.I.R. 1974, Pat. 87; Nanak Singh v. Smt.
Chhindo, A.I.R. 1974, P.&.H. 220; Kand Singh v. Nacchatar Singh, 
A.I.R. 1975* P.&.H. 45; Siri Ram v. Hukmi, A.I.R. 1979- H.P. 46;
Adhinarayan v. Ramhari, A.I.R. 1980 Dr. 95; Champa Devi v. Madho
Sharan Singh, A.I.R. 1981 Pat. 103; Tirath v. Manmohan Singh, A.I.R.
1981 p I&.hT 174; Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Satendra Prakash, A.I.R. 19&3
All. 122 (N.O.C.).
1.(1970) 73 Bom. L.R. 407, followed in Radhabai v. Bhimrao (1973) 77 
Bom. L.R. 210.
2. Ibid., at 415-
3- His Lordship rightly holding at 412-3 that, while the term "restric­
ted estate" is a generic term by which all kinds of limited owner­
ships are covered, the expression "limited ownership has almost 
acquired a technical connotation with the estate of a Hindu female;
(continued on next page)
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maintenance.”
This fine line of distinction between the distinct right to
property under the HWRPA, 1937, and the more amorphous right of main-
2tenance, has been admirably illustrated in Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath, 
where their Lordships, Untwalia and Dutta, JJ., in dissenting with 
the dicta in Gurunadham*s case,^  and after pointing out the well 
established distinction between sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of s. 14, 
acknowledged that as against the limited estate acquired under the
(continued from previous page)
in essence however "limited ownership” is also restricted ownership 
and every case of limited ownership will fall within the meaning 
of "restricted estate" in sub-s. 2.
1. Ibid., at 415. J.D.M. Derrett expresses his delight at the cogent 
reasoning and the progressive view taken here at more than one 
place. See his "A Hindu Law Miscellany", (1971) op.cit., at 8l; 
"The Tenure of Widows...," op.cit., at 33* f.n. 5, "A Hindu Law 
Miscellany, 1972-3," (1973) 75 Bom. L.R. (J), 89-93, at 89. The 
view here is in conformity with that expressed in Yamunabai v. 
Parappa, (1968) 70 Bom. L.R. 611, at 6l6 that property acquired
in lieu of maintenance is on par with property acquired by inheri­
tance or at a partition. In Kerala too, a similar view is in evi­
dence in Radhakrishna Reddier v. Controller of Estate Duty, A.I.R. 
1971 Ker. 202, his Lordship, Raghavan, J., holding that the nature 
of the estate that a widow takes at a partition being no different 
than what she took under the HWRPA, 1937 in British India (which 
it might be recalled did not apply to the erstwhile Princely State 
of Travancore), s. 14 (1) would apply to such property notwith­
standing restrictions. It is however submitted that excellent as 
the rationale is, like the Bombay cases, the Court could well have 
enhanced the value of the judgment by emphasising on the nature 
of the right of maintenance itself, its pre-existing character, 
that had the HWRPA never been enacted, such estate would still 
have been capable of attracting s. 14 (1) as it was in lieu of 
maintenance. See also Premshankar v. Taradevi, A.I.R. I98O K.P. 
171, where to the argument that while a right of maintenance is 
a pre-existing right, the same could not be said in regard to a 
share which the mother gets at a partition of the joint-family 
assets inasmuch as it is dependent upon the happening of a certain 
event, i.e. partition, it was made clear at 175 that, "The 
provisions under the old sastric Hindu law ensuring a share equal 
to that of a son to the widow mother at the time of partition was 
really in lieu of her right to maintenance."
2. A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 348.
3. A.I.R. 1967. Mad. 429.
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HWRPA, 1937* which undoubtedly becomes an absolute estate under 
s. Ik (1), the question of property acquired in lieu of maintenance 
does create some difficulty.^ The female gets the property because 
she has some title to it; nevertheless as she does not get it gratis 
or by way of charity but in lieu of a right, i.e. that of maintenance; 
however indefinite that right may be, the distinction is not as to 
whether the instrument awarding it has a restrictive clause or not, 
but
"(t)he distinction is as to whether acquisition of 
the property is referable to some right or interest in 
the property in lieu of which she is getting it."
Thus the Patna decision^ makes it clear that a bare right of 
maintenance even if it has not been converted into a charge, does con­
stitute an interest, though of an uncertain character, sufficient to 
make a dependant a holder of a pre-existent right, satisfaction of 
which has the effect of bringing the grant under sec, 1^  (1), and 
where the question of a decree, award, order or other instrument does
1. Contrast this admission with the position taken in Radhakrishna 
Reddier v. Controller of Estate Duty, A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 202, dis­
cussed above at 592. Though the estate under discussion there was 
acquired at a partition of the joint family property, what we 
have to keep in mind is that under the Hindu law such estate was 
allotted to the female purely for her maintenance and was therefore 
essentially distinct from, because less distinct than, the estate 
that she acquired by inheritance, sis the Patna Judges say.
2. Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath, A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 3^ 8, at 352. Or as 
Derrett puts it: ’’The test is not the nature of the right granted,
but the nature of the grantee’s claim before it was made: l*f (2)
of the HSA : A Disturbing...,” op.cit., at 69. The same writer 
describes this judgment as "splendid,” and refers to it as ”a 
genuine piece of evolving Indian jurisprudence.": "A Note on Kunji 
...," op.cit., at 25. See also his approval of it at "S. Ik of the 
ESA and a Recent...," op.cit., at 52-53* "The Tenure of Widows...," 
op.cit., at 33* f-n. 5* and "S. 1^ of the HSA : A Gratifying...," 
op.cit., at 53-1*-
3» Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath, A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 3^ 8.
k. Derrett, "A Note on Kunji...," op.cit.. at 25.
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not arise at all, it becomes all the simpler to maintain that as the 
female held "in lieu of maintenance" within the meaning of the Expla­
nation to s. 14 (1), it became her absolute property on and from 
17 June, 1956.
Just such a question came up for determination in Mallawwa v. 
Kallappa and in negativing the contention that s. l*f (2) would apply 
to property given to a female for her maintenance, the Mysore High 
Court was clear that, if land is given to a Hindu widow for her main­
tenance, and she was in possession of it on 17th June, 1956 when the 
HSA c^me into force, then under s. l*f (1) read with the Explanation, 
her possession must be deemed to be as full owner and not as a limited
owner, for land given for maintenance is land given "in lieu of main-
2tenance within the Explanation."
In Smt. Amar Kaur v. Joginder Kaur,^  the unmarried daughter 
having come into possession of property for her maintenance at her 
marriage in 1961, the claim was that under the Riwaj-i-Am, this right 
of maintenance subsisted only for such time that she remained un­
1. (1966) 2 Mys. L.J. 635.
2. See also Limba v. Maikrao . A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 83, where the husband 
having died in 1950* the Court ignoring the undoubted claim of the 
widow under the HWRPA, 1937* nevertheless recognised her absolute 
ownership over property in recognition of her right of maintenance, 
for which purpose, Vaidya, J., ruled, it was not necessary for the 
possession of the female to be that of an owner or of a limited 
owner.
3. (1967) 69 Punj. L.R. 545. In contrast it was correctly held in 
Smt. Giano v. Moti Ram, A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 5^5
. that the daughter could make no such claim under s. 1^ (1) 
where she married before the enactment of the HSA, as her right 
to maintenance under the customary law ended with her marriage.
For a Rajasthan ruling similar to the later Punjab decision see 
Shiv Narain v. Raji, AIR. 1982 Raj. 119, where it was held that 
even after the deaths, first of her father and then of her brother, 
the unmarried daughter, possessed of property in satisfaction 
of her claim to maintenance out of the joint-family property, could 
successfully invoke s. l*f (1).
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married. Pandit, J., however held that as the daughter had been in 
lawful possession of that property which she had acquired in lieu of 
maintenance, and as her marriage was subsequent to the coming into 
force of the HSA, the effect of s. Ik (1) was to convert it to a full 
estate.
(iii) The Vindication of This View in Madras and Andhra Pradesh 
The ascendancy of the perverse view in Madras and Andhra not­
withstanding, there were early indications that there was not entirely
1
harmony of view, and despite some manifestation of indecision, side 
by side with the "rogue" cases, there was also an awareness that Par­
liament not only destroyed limited estates at law in 1956, but 
intended to destroy as well limited estates granted by parties who
were obliged to maintain or otherwise support women who were, to that
2extent, encumbrancers on the joint family assets, and it mattered not 
whether the estate sought to be destroyed was the "limited estate" 
under the HWRPA, 1957* or any other kind of restricted estate given 
to a woman in lien of a pre-existing right.^
1. See Venkataraman v. Lakshmi Ammal, A.I.R. 1961 Mad 32, where the 
Court held at 33 that, "whether she (the limited owner) has become 
entitled to an absolute estate will become relevant only after her 
death or as a result of any alienation made by her purporting to 
convey an absolute estate. If an alienation is made, the controv­
ersy will be between the alienee and the reversioner." This, it 
is submitted, is a most inequitable proposition, for not only does 
it leave the law in a state of flux, but displays as well, a singu­
lar lack of sensitivity as to the immense psychological satisfac­
tion that the female would surely derive from the secure knowledge 
that what she holds is hers free of all impediments, that her 
alienees, should she alienate, or her heirs after her, would have 
an absolute title with none of the problems of litigation that 
have so beridden the widow's estate in the traditional Hindu law.
2. Derrett, "The Tenure of Widows ...," op.cit., at J>k.
3- The adherence to this correct approach is the basis of the rulings 
in Subbareddi v. Penchalamma, A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 368; Venkatasubba 
Reddi v. Penchalamma, (1962) 2 An. W.R. 156; Rangaswami v. 
Chinnammal, A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 387; Sampatkumari v. lakshmi Ammal 
A.I.R. 1963 Mad 30* where one of the points decided at 60, was
(continued on next page)
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That Madras could on occasion display a singular magnanimity of
1
vision is illustrated in Chinnappa v. Valliammal. The husband having 
died in 19^, his father thereafter in discharge of his obligation to 
maintain members of the family, executed a maintenance deed in favour 
of his widowed daughter-in-law creating in her a restricted estate.
At his death in I960, despite the protests of the other heirs, it was
-  '  i
held that not only had her maintenance grant converted to an absolute
estate by virtue of s. l4 (1), but that she was absolutely entitled
to a further share equally with the other class I heirs in her
father-in-law's share of the joint-family property. The question that
we must ask ourselves is, "Was this unjust? Did the Madras High Court
go too far in so construing in her favour?" What must however be
borne in mind is that, had the daughter-in-law not been allotted a
maintenance grant (which would, it is submitted, in any event attract
s. l*f (1)), she could still have claimed her husband's share under
s. 3 (2) of the HWRPA, 1937» and under the principle in Sukhram*s
case, it would wot Vove wxa,tte.x«,cL whether there had been a partition
of the joint estate or not. Neither could her share as class I heir
in her father-in-law's property be affected by this prior right over
the family estate. Thus, bizarre as this seems, as Derrett comments,
"it will be noted on reflection, that no actual injustice has resulted."^
(continued from previous page)
that as the limited estates that the widows took by inheritance 
under the HWRPA, 1937* had become absolute under s. 1^ (1), the 
daughter could not claim as additional heir under s. 8 of the HSA. 
Venugopal v. Madhavkrishnan, A.I.R. 196** Mad. 155* following 
Sampatkumari's case, cited above; Gadam v. Varapula, A.I.R. 1965 
A.P. 66; Chinnakka v. Subbamma, (1968) 1 An. W.R. 65; Chellammal 
v. Valiammal, A.I.R. 1978 Mad. 21.
1. A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 187.
2. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 365» discussed above at 56O-3.
3. Critique, op.cit., at 221.
Chellammal v. Nallammal is likewise indicative of the progressive
instances in Madras, and despite some occasional doubtful comments in 
2it, Rammamurti, J., was clear that as what is carved and covered by
the proviso or the exception in s. 14 (2) is only the modes expressly
mentioned therein and arrangement ejusdem generis,*^ and as the claim
for maintenance by the widow of a deceased coparcener is not a personal
claim but has its basis upon the theory of survivorship whereby her
husband's assets vest in the surviving coparcener(s), the extreme view
that such restricted estate as she gets under a compromise etc. in
satisfaction of her right to maintenance
"(i)s wholly unrelated to the properties and the 
Hindu woman has no semblance of right to the 
properties so^as to hold that s. 14 (2) alone 
would apply,"
is without foundation.
However, by far the most effective vindication of the wide ampli­
tude of s. l4 (1) resting as it does, on a denial of both false propo­
sitions, i.e. that a right of maintenance is not a right of property 
and that s. 14 (1) embraces merely the "limited" estate and no other 
restricted estate, is the decision of the division bench in Muthu
1. (1971) 1 M.L.J.'439.
2. While critical enough of the view taken of the right of maintenance 
itself in cases like Gurunadham v. Navaneethamma, A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 
429, and Pharma Udayar v. Eamchandra, (1969) 1 M.L.J. l8l, his 
Lordship opined at h67 that they were distinguishable on the facts, 
and as the arrangement in each of the cases indicated "that the 
particular stipulation is not a mere setting out of the legal effect 
or describing the legal incidents of the estate created (i.e. the 
estate allotted to the women for their maintenance), but the 
parties have bestowed thought and were prescribing a particular 
restricted estate", s. 14 (2) would apply. Similarly his approval 
of the decision in Pnnamalai v. Vellaya, (1971) 1 M.L.J. 147, on 
like grounds at 467-8 is, it is submitted, quite as suspect*
3. Chellammal v. Nallammal, cited above, at 44?.
4. Ibid., at 471.
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1
Bhattar v. Chokku Bhattar. Where the widow in a joint Hindu family 
got possession of property for her residence, without any restriction 
or limitation attached to its enjoyment, the entire issue revolved 
round the usual question as to whether such property was capable of 
being enlarged to a full estate under s. l*f (1). The learned Judges, 
Pandian and Rao, JJ., in clear and concise terms distinguished between 
the "widow's estate" in the orthodox Hindu law, which was later on by 
usage described as the limited estate, and which "projected a particu­
lar circumstance whereby the limited owner could alienate the property
2for necessity etc.," and property acquired by a female Hindu in lieu
of maintenance which obviously enures for her life and cannot be the
subject-matter of any alienation at all; and in this sense their
Lordships held, the argument that a female Hindu acquiring property in
lieu of maintenance are-owners of the limited estate, is untenable.
But, the learned Judges continue, as each case has to be decided on its
own merits, what is of the utmost significance is that, the right of a
female member to reside in the family dwelling house which is but a
limb of the right of maintenance, is a pre-existing right, based as it
is upon her husband's right to share in the family property; and when
that interest is constituted into a specific charge, an actual existing
proprietary interest for the term of her life, to that extent "the
right of maintenance is a right in re or an interest in ancestral
3
property." In the present case, as the possession of the property in 
her own right as a maintenance holder was not attributable to any act 
of trespass or illegality on the widow's part, it would follow that in
1. A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8.
2. Ibid., at 12.
3. Ibid., at 11, quoting from Ramanandan v. Rangammal, I.L.R. (1889)
12 Had. 260 (F.B.), at 268.
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keeping with the Supreme Court*interpretation, such title, however
restricted or inchoate it may be, is automatically enlarged under the
statutory provisions of 1956. As such therefore
"(t)he words 'limited owner' appearing in the 
latter part of s. 14 (1) are mere positive 
expatiation of the situation and they have 
therefore no impact upon the concept in the 
orthodox Hindu Law which deals with limited 
ownership or widow's estate."
Praiseworthy as this extremely balanced reasoning is,^ the divi­
sion bench putting into proper perspective for the Madras High Court 
what decisions like Anna Saheb v. Gangabai had earlier indicated in 
the North, viz. the recognition that all restricted estates and not 
merely the Hindu woman's limited estate is capable of attracting 
s. l*t (1), its excellence, it is submitted, is somewhat tarnished by 
the dbiter dicta, where in a reference to Pharma Udayar v. Ramchandra,* 
the learned Judges held that where restrictions of reverter are im­
posed on grants for maintenance, s. l*t (2) would cover such cases.
This it is submitted, is a contradiction in terms of the intention of 
Parliament of which their Lordships were only too aware, and to which
7
they themselves refer, and Derrett is rightly dismissive of this
1. See Eramma v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. l879i at 1882, where it 
was held that "the section applies only to property to which the 
female Hindu has acquired some kind of title however restricted the 
nature of her interest may be."
2. Muthu Bhattar's case, A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8, at 12.
5. See Derrett's appreciation of it at "S. 1^ of the HSA: A Gratifying 
...", op.cit.
k. (1970) 73 Bom. L.R. *f07-
5. See above at 5^ 1, f .n. 1 .
6. (1969) 1 M.L.J. l8l.
7- Muthu Bhattarfs case, A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8 at 13, where it is ex­
plained that "...they (the Legislature) included this (the right 
of maintenance) in the Explanation to s. l^f (1) deliberately so as 
to expand that right and to make it an absolute right in the female 
concerned after the commencement of the HSA."
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view pointing out that as Parliament had made the basic decision, a 
grant in lieu of maintenance, irrespective of conditions thought 
reasonable before 1956, became the female's absolute property over­
night . ^
(iv) The Breaking of This Deadlock by the Supreme Court
3
The decision in Muthu Bhattar's case, for all its merits, is 
nevertheless indicative that even as late as 1976, the Judiciary as a
4
whole was not quite prepared to expand s. 1*+ to its fullest amplitude, 
and the head-on conflict between the correct view obtaining in certain 
liberal and progressive decisions and the wrong construction of s. l4, 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the section and the inten­
tion of Parliament, had resulted in a state of chaos. A classic 
instance of a statutory provision which by reason of its inept 
draughtsmanship had created endless confusion for litigants and proved 
a boon for lawyers, the time - long overdue - had at last come for 
the highest judicial authority, the Supreme Court, to step in end 
resolve the issue once and for all, thereby restoring to law that modi­
cum of "clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it 
easily intelligible to (the) people."^
1. See his "S. l4 of the HSA : A Gratifying...," op.cit. at where he 
states, "My opinion is that no such direction will prevent the abso­
lute estate from accruing on 17th June, 1956, unless the woman had 
not any right of property, including a right to be maintained, in the 
corpus from which the actual grant or settlement was made to her."
2. Ibid.
3. A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8.
Nor could the Supreme Court itself be absolved from blame, as is 
evident from the regressive view adopted in Naraini Devi v. Ramo 
Devi, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2198, discussed above at 5691 f«n. 1, betova, C,°‘*
5- Per. Bhagwati, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^» 
at 19^ 6.
6. Ibid.
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The Supreme Court was first faced with this particular issue in
1
Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti, and as the widow was an heir under the
HWRPA, 1937f it was held that as the partition deed under which she
was given a life estate with restrictions on alienations was a mere 
recording of the true legal position as it then stood, such estate 
would come squarely within s. 1** (1). Correct as the dicta* is, it
was not of much assistance in that the more complex question of the
nature of the right of maintenance and the effect of s. 1** on it 
remained unresolved.
2
In 1969 however, Rani Bai v. Yadunandan brought this problem to 
the fore, and the Supreme Court did indeed decree in favour of the 
widow, thereby indicating that even a bare right of maintenance was 
capable of converting to an absolute estate under s. l*f (1), but ob­
serving at the same time that the widow in possession of property for 
her maintenance could not be ousted until proper provision had been 
made for her maintenance. But what, we may well ask, might this
"proper provision" amount to? Would s. Ik (1) apply to any such pro­
vision, and why in the first place may she at all yield that of which
she was already lawfully possessed for some other apparently intangible
right? Hypothetical as these queries are, to the extent that they 
remain unanswered, the decision is, it is submitted, inconclusive.
However, the good work done by these decisions was soon enough 
rendered nugatory; Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi^ aggravated the situation 
further, and Madras, ever receptive to constructions disadvantageous
kto women, derived fresh inspiration to endorse the negative posture,
1. C.A. No. 609 of 1965* referred to in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi,
A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19kkt at 19^9-50.
2. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1118. 3. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2198.
*f. See S oundar ar a j an v. V enkataraman, (1976) 2 M.L.J. **66;
Subbalakshmi v. Andiappa, (l977) 1 M.L.J 2 (N.R.C.); Subba Naidu 
v. Rajammal, A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 6k.
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and this despite the refreshingly apposite ratio emanating from its
1
own High Court in Muthu Bhattar's case.
How long this state of flux and agitation might have continued
but for the Supreme Court's remarkably lucid and exhaustive exposition
2of the true state of the law in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, is now a 
matter of mere conjecture. The decision assumes the greater signifi­
cance in that it may be regarded as a denouement as it were, of the 
intricate drama of maintenance under s. 1*+, and the twists and quirks 
that the problem had brought in its wake.
The question before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was not 
the interaction of s. l*f (1) on property acquired under the Act of 
1937, nor merely the effect of the section on a maintenance grant - 
though these too were considered in the course of the judgment - but 
of its impact on the more problematic issue of a maintenance grant with
a contemporaneous restriction attached to it. That the ratio was fol-
3
lowed verbatim in Bai Vajrtt v. Thakorbai, which relies exclusively on 
it, is the measure, if not of its originality, at least of its incisive 
analysis of the right of maintenance in the traditional law, the inten­
tion of the Legislature in enacting s. l*t, the wide amplitude of 
s. l4 (1) and the critical assessment of decided cases holding one or 
the other view.
Bhagwati, J., (speaking for himself and on behalf of Gupta, J.,) 
and Fazal Ali, J., in separate judgments, but for substantially the 
same reasons, unanimously held that s. Ik (2) had no application where 
property is given to the Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an 
instrument which in so many words restricts the nature of the interest
1. A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8.
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19kk.
3. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 993-
given to her in the property, for in their Lordships' opinion there 
could not be any substance to the argument that as the right to main­
tenance simpliciter is lacking in all the necessary indicia of a legal 
right, it cannot be described as a pre-existing right. Neither, they 
held, was there any merit in the view that the instrument of compromise 
creates a restricted right incapable of attracting s. l*t (1).
In support of the first view, the learned Judge, Fazal Ali, J., 
in considering the legal nature of the incidents of a Hindu woman's 
right to maintenance referred to the ancient smptis and the works of 
eminent authors on the Hindu law, and having comprehensively surveyed 
authoritative judicial pronouncements, arrived at the conclusion that, 
the right of maintenance flows from the social and temporal relation­
ship between husband and wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a 
sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though such co-owner­
ship is of a subordinate nature. As such therefore, the personal 
obligation of the husband to maintain his wife becomes an equitable 
charge, a legal obligation to maintain his widow, in the hands of 
those who succeed to his property. Thus though such right to mainten­
ance is not strictly a right to property, it is undoubtedly a pre-exist­
ing right in property, not a jus in rem but certainly a jus ad rem 
which existed in the Hindu law long before the passing of any statutory 
enactments designed to give her just such a right.
This being so, and considering that in the changed social climate
s. Ik was specially enacted "to achieve a social purpose by bringing
about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu 
1
society," and to abolish the invidious distinction in matters of
1. Per. Bhagwati, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^» 
at 19^ 7.
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inheritance between a male and a female,1 the provisions of s. 14
must be liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Act
which is to enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow
2which was in consonance with the changing temper of the times. On 
the other hand sub-s. (2) of s. 14, being in the nature of an excep­
tion, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as 
possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in 
sub-s. (l),^ and must be confined to cases where property is acquired 
by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre­
existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, 
the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property, for 
to hold otherwise would virtually emasculate s. l4 (1). Thus as the 
claim or the right to maintenance is really a substitute for a share 
which the Hindu widow would have got in the property of her husband,
it would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing
5
right in the widow. As the claim for maintenance even without a
1. Per. Fazal Ali, J., ibid., at 1961. Or to put it in other words,
"It was a step in the direction of practical recognition of equal­
ity of the sexes and was meant to elevate women from a subservient 
position in the economic field to a pedestal where they could 
exercise full powers of enjoyment and disposal of the property held 
by them as owners, untrammelled by artificial limitations placed on 
their right of ownership by a society in which the will of the 
dominant male prevailed to bring about the subjugation of the 
opposite sex."; Per. Koshal, J., Bai Vajia v. Thakorbai, A.I.R.
1979 S.C. 993, at 1003.
2. Per. Fazal Ali, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, cited above, at 1966.
3. Per. Bhagwati, J., ibid., at 1947-
4. Ibid., at 1948.
5. Fazal Ali, J., explaining at 1967, ibid., that where a Hindu 
female who gets a share in her husband's property acquires 
an absolute interest by virtue of s. 14 (1) of the Act,
it could not have been intended by the Legislature that in the 
same circumstances a Hindu female who could not get a share 
but has a right of maintenance would not get an absolute 
interest.
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charge, is a pre-existing right, sub-s. 2
"(h) as absolutely no application and the female's 
limited interest would automatically be enlarged 
into an absolute one by force of s. 14 (1) and the 
restrictions placed if any under the document would 
have to be ignored."
To this eminently sensible construction of s. 14, supported by 
the authority of decided cases, their Lordships lent the considerable 
weight of their own opinion to negative the contention that the term 
"limited owner" in s. 14 (1) does not embrace the "restricted estate" 
mentioned in s. l4 (2), that unless the widow gets the property in 
lieu of maintenance, it is the conferment of a new right of a restric­
ted nature. In the view of Fazal Ali, J., this surmise suffers from 
a serious fallacy, which is based on a misconception of the true 
position of the Hindu widow's claim for maintenance, the learned Judge 
reiterating his argument that if the widow's claim for maintenance or 
right to get the share of a son existed before the Act of 1937, it is 
futile to dub this right as flowing from the Act of 1937, and in view 
of this,
"(t)he nature and extent of the right of the 
widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly a pre­
existing right, and it is wrong to say that such 
a right comes into existence only if the property 
is allotted to the widow in lieu of maintenance 
and not otherwise."^
1. Per. Fazal Ali, J., ibid., at 1978.
2. Ibid., at 1976. So too Bhagwati, J., at 1931 that "even if the 
instrument were silent as to the nature of the interest given to 
the widow in the property and did not in so many terms, prescribe 
that she should have a limited interest, she would have no more 
theui a limited interest in the property under the Hindu law as it 
stood prior to the enactment of the Act, and "...would be, to quote the 
words of this Court in Nirmal Chand's case, C.A. No. 609 of 1965, 
'merely recording the true legal position', and that would not 
attract the applicability of sub-s. 2 but would be governed by 
sub-s. 1 of s. l4." While it is certainly true that this would be 
merely recording the true legal position, nevertheless recalling 
the distinction made in Muthu Bhattar's case, A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8 
see above at 598), the doubt creeps in mind as to whether the
(continued on next page)
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In addition, as Derrett sums up, the Supreme Court most neatly
and convincingly reconsidered its previous rulings, explained some
1
and apologised for Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi as per incur iam. A 
whole rcw of mistaken "conservative” High Court decisions was over­
ruled, among them the troublesome Gopisetti Kondiah v. Gunda 
Subbarayudu, and another row of "progressive" decisions was approved, 
and the present position is that if a widow was given lands by settle­
ment or agreement or compromise in virtue of her right to be main­
tained by her husband's family, or out of her husband's estate, those 
lands became her absolute property on the day the HSA came into forced 
In Bai Vajyti v. Thakorbai, his Lordship, Koshal, J., was happy
enough with the overall exposition of the correct position in
5
Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi aund contented himself with quoting in 
extenso from it to establish that the appeal on behalf of the widow 
must succeed, "as the facts in the latter are on all fours with those 
in the former."^
(continued from previous page)
right of maintenance is indeed technically the same as the legal 
limited estate. Interestingly enough, while the learned Judges ad­
vert to a number of decisions from Madras, there is nowhere mention 
of this extremely important case, reference to which might have led 
to a further discussion of the subtle distinction made between the 
two in the Madras decision.
1. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2198.
2. (1968) 2 An. W.R. 455.
3- "Landmarks in Family...," op.cit., at 13. Fazal Ali, J., adverted 
to his own reasoning and that of his learned brother Bhagwati, J., 
in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 to rule likewise 
in Sellammal v. Nellammal, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1265, and Santhanam K. 
Gurukkal v. Subramanya Gurukkal, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2024, Kailasam,
J., doing the same in Krishna Das v. Venkayya, A.I.R. 1978, S.C. 361.
4. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 993-
5- Cited above.
6. Bai Vajv-q v. Thakorbai, cited above, at 1003. Ownership of a sort 
the right of maintenance certainly is, and clearly property to 
which the female has acquired some kind of title as envisaged in
(continued on next page)
Thus to sum up, what the Supreme Court has decided stands, and 
will not be resiled from. S. 14 (1) will apply to all cases where the 
woman has not acquired the property for the first time under the 
instrument or arrangement in question. If the woman had a right to be 
maintained out of the corpus from whence the grant was made, then it 
is submitted that she did not acquire the property for the first time 
under the grant etc., and any cases to the contrary (e.g. saying that 
a right of maintenance is not a property right) are wrong. Thus a 
grant subject to any restriction (whether limited estate, life estate, 
etc.) will be converted by the statute into an absolute estate under 
s. 14 (1).
(continued from previous page)
Eramma v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879, at 1882, and therefore 
capable of attracting the provisions of s. l4 (1). However, is it 
the ownership of a limited estate as known to Hindu law, as the 
learned Judge maintains at 1002 ? His Lordship sets out the inci­
dents common to the legal limited estate and the estate acquired in 
lieu of maintenance, but to revert to the pertinent distinction made 
in Muthu Bhattar's case, A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8, is a maintenance grant 
after all not a restricted estate which must nevertheless convert 
to an absolute estate under s. 14 (1) ?
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Summary of Recommendation for the Construction 
of HSA, s. 14," March, 1972, (Unpub.), 1-2, at 1. The same writer 
reiterates that, "A woman enters the family by marriage, or by 
birth. In either case she acquires rights vis-a-vis the family.
She is not given maintenance by its members as a matter of 
charity, as the Patna Judges (in Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath, A.I.R.
1970 Pat. 348, at 351) point out. Thus by marriage or birth 
she 'acquires' her right, including the right to receive land 
'in lieu of maintenance'. Thus grants for maintenance when 
made to widows of the family or unmarried daughters or widowed 
daughters in special circumstances are prima facie in recognition 
of a right previously acquired and come under s. 14 (1); and 
the conservative position is wrongs "S. 14 of the HSA, 1956, 
and a Recent...," op.cit., at 54.
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(lO) Where the Property is Acquired Subject to the Restricted Estate 
For the First Time, s. 14 (2) Applies
If s. 14 (1) applies to property acquired under an instrument or 
arrangement which is merely declaratory of that right to property ante- 
cedentL^ enjoyed by the female Hindu, there is consensus of judicial 
opinion that sub-s. (2) of s. l4 being in the nature of a proviso or 
an exception, its ambit is limited to covering only those cases of 
grants where the interest in the grantee is created by the grant 
itself or, in other words, where the gift, will, instrument, decree, 
order or award is the source or origin of the interest created in the 
grantee. ^
A caise in point is the division bench judgment of the Patna High
2Court in Mt. Sampato Kuer v. Dulhin Mukha Debi. The widow having 
gifted her limited estate to her daughters, a day later they in turn 
executed a maintenance deed in favour of their mother, whereby the 
latter was to be in possession for her lifetime in lieu of maintenance 
but with no power of alienation. On the coming into force of the HSA, 
it was argued that as the widow was admittedly in possession, s. 14 (1) 
would apply to such property. It was held however, that as the female 
had acquired the property under the deed of maintenance, such property
would be governed by the terms of the deed so as to rule out the
/
application of s. 14 (1).
Technically correct as the ratio is, it is apparently based 
mechanically upon the fact that a maintenance deed is an "instrument" 
within the meaning of s. l4 (2).^ It is submitted that the real 
position is that, the mother having validly gifted her limited inter­
est, she lost possession of the property; the maintenance deed was
1. Annas ah eb v. Gangabai (1970) 73 Bom. L.R. 407, at 4l0.
2. A.I.R. I960 Pat. 360.
3- Reminiscent of Ram Jag v. Director of Consolidation, U.P., A.I.R. 
1968 All. 419, discussed above at 381, l.rul.
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the conferment of a new right to which She could lay no antecedent 
claim, and to such property s. 14 (2) applies squarely.
1
A similar situation arose in Mst. Kirpo v. Bakhtawar Singh, where 
in settlement of a dispute as to whether the widow on her remarriage 
had forfeited her rights in her deceased husband’s property, a compro­
mise was arrived at whereby despite the forfeiture, she was allowed to 
retain possession of the property but with the specific stipulation 
that she could not alienate the same in any manner. It was held that 
s. 14 (2) applied to such a case, but unlike the Patna judgment,
MahajanI,explained in clear and concise terms that if the parties to a 
compromise give up their respective claims and accept the compromise 
as the basis of their titles, then their rights would flow from the 
compromise itself. Thus as the widow had lost the estate on her re­
marriage, and had re-acquired it by reason of the compromise, "the 
provisions of s. 14 (2) of the Act are satisfied to the hilt."^
if
In Veerabhadra v. Lakshmi, where under a family arrangement the 
suit properties were given to the paternal great-grandmother for her 
lifetime with certain restrictions, his Lordship, Ekbote, J., held 
likewise, the learned Judge explaining that while every Hindu irres­
pective of his possessing any ancestral property, is personally bound 
to maintain his aged parents, he is under no such obligation in res­
pect of grandparents, and inasmuch as the property in question was not 
ancestral qua the great-grandmother's maintenance, the instrument of 
family arrangement being the source and foundation of her right to it,
. . . . •
1. A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 474. . . , :
2. Mt. Sampato Kuer v. Dulhin Mukha Devi, A.I.R. i960 Pat. 360.
3. Mst Kjrpo's case cited above* at 475*
4. A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 367.
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it was clearly the acquisition of a right for the first time to which
s. 14 (2) was applicable. A straightforward case of the application
of s. l4 (2), what is objectionable is the general view taken of the
right of maintenance, and the distinction made between the limited and
the restricted estate for the applicability of s. l4 (1). The right
to be maintained, his Lordship says, is a quite distinct right from
the right to property, and where property is newly acquired under an
instrument, what it creates is a right to property recognising the
right of maintenance; if the instrument prescribes restrictions, the
restricted estate thus created cannot be equated with the woman's
estate or life estate as is commonly understood under the old Hindu
law. This attitude, now happily scouted, was to pave the way for 
2Gopisetti's case and other like decisions, with what results we have 
already seen.
That the effects of such a construction were long felt and merely 
served to exacerbate, further, an already controversial aspect of the 
law, is the measure of the ineptness of the Legislature, its lack of 
foresight and caution, in drafting a provision that could leni itself 
to such contradictory meanings. That in time the Madras High Court 
was itself to recognise the folly of this retrograde approach followed 
in 1977 by the Supreme Court’s setting out of the true legislative 
intendment, does not exonerate the cryptic, not to say faulty drafts­
manship.
1. His Lordship reiterating even more emphatically at 371, that "One 
may have one right (that of maintenance), but if in pursuance of 
that right, any right to property is created, then it is that 
instrument that creates such right."
2. (1968) 2 An. W.R. 455-
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(1^  The Effect of S. Ik Where the Property is Acquired under a 
Gift or Will
From the foregoing it will be clear that the problems that arose
in the wake of s. 1*+ have been satisfactorily resolved where they
related to sub-s. (1), and provided that the Supreme Court does not
resile on its own decisions (an unlikely and far-fetched hypothesis),
the most problematic of areas need not now be the subject of any
further controversy.
The same ease of mind is however wanting when we come to the 
1
second sub-s, though after prolonged controversy, it is now generally
agreed that it must be so construed as giving people the right to
create "restricted" estates where the female had no interest in the
property prior to the grant. Thus to come within s. 1*+ (2) the
disposition or grant must be the root of the female’s title, and this
makes perfect sense against the backdrop of legal history and the
motives of Parliament.
If we keep in mind that the ideal which the Legislature sought to
achieve was to equalise the rights of the two genders, and not to
elevate women's rights to a level unattainable by their male
relatives, it becomes clear that sub-s. (2) was enacted to maintain
this parity of rights between the Hindu male and female, that where a
life interest created in a Hindu male would give him no more than a
life interest, s. 1*+ (2) prevents a similarly worded grant made to the
if
Hindu female from becoming an absolute estate. Thus neither male
1. Derrett, "S. 1*+ of the HSA: A Disturbing...," op.cit., at 62.
2. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 221.
3. Ibid., at 22k.
k. To put it in the words of Palekar, J., in Annasaheb v. Gangabai, 
(1970) 73 Bom. L.R. k07 at *+10, where he points out that s. l4 (2)
(continued on next page)
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nor female has any right to claim that what is granted to him or her
inter vivos or by will must inevitably be construed as an absolute 
1
estate, for while legal limited estates are abolished, contractual
2or consensual limited estates are saved.
However, if the right of maintenance is an indefeasible right,
the question that next falls to be considered is whether, simply
because the gift or testamentary disposition under which it was
acquired, stops short of endorsing it as an absolute estate, it may be
regarded as that consensual limited estate that is incapable of
attracting s. lh (1).
It has been observed in Sumeshwar v. Swami Nath^ that where the
property is acquired under a gift or will without a restrictive clause
the woman would become full owner of it after the coming into force of
the Act of 1936. But if the acquisition was with a restrictive clause
in express terms, s. l*f (2) would subject her to that restriction,
for as their Lordships explained obiter
"(In) cases of will or gift she gets the property 
not as a matter of right but gratis or as a matter
of charity, may be for any other moral or laudable
consideration, yet it is not a legal right which 
can be traced antecedent to the acquisition of the 
property by gift or will."5
(continued from previous page)
therefore "emphasises that in all cases where a grant can lawfully 
create a limited estate in favour of a Hindu male grantee, it can 
equally do so in the case of a Hindu female grantee and the general 
rule of sub-s. (1) would have no application."
1. Derrett, "S. 1*+ (2) of the HSA : A Disturbing...," op.cit., at 6*+.
2. Ibid., at 68.
3. A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 352.
*+. Ibid., at 351-2.
5. Ibid., at 351-
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But this, it may be noted, is, if not oversimplification, at 
least an Incomplete interpretation; nor, given the circumstances of 
that particular case, did the Patna Judges need to elaborate at greater 
length. But circumstances may be envisaged where the property so 
acquired is traceable to a right antecedent to the gift or will, and 
it is this, it is submitted, which is at the crux of the problem and 
the criterion to utilise in unknotting the tangles of conflicting 
judicial views so as to arrive at an equitable solution in keeping 
with the legislative intendment.
(a) Acquisitions Inter Vivos and Bequests from the Limited Owner
When we consider cases of gifts, it must be borne in mind that 
before the promulgation of the HSA, 1956, a Hindu female’s ownership 
of property was hedged in by intricate limitations on her rights of 
its disposal by acts inter vivos and also as regards her testamentary 
powers in respect of the same. She could of course alienate for 
accredited purposes, but other than that, as the Act was not intended 
to benefit transferees from the limited owner, it was open to the next 
presumptive reversioner to avoid it as not affecting his reversionary 
right after the death of such female. In instances of gifts and 
bequests of the limited estate made to a female, we have to determine 
how far, after the coming in force of the HSA, could s. l4 be said to 
have modified the traditional law so as to operate in favour of the 
female, be she the donor or testatrix, or the donee or legatee.
(i) Gifts
That the female gifting the property cannot herself claim the
benefit of s. 1^  (1), is clear from the Full Bench decision of Amar
1
Singh v. Sewa Singh, where their Lordships were called upon to
1. A.I.E. I960 Punj. 530 (F.B.).
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c o n s i d e r  s e p a r a t e l y  t w o  c a s e s  o f  a l i e n a t i o n  m a d e  b y  t h e  l i m i t e d  o w n e r ,
1
t h e  o n e  b y  s a l e  a n d  t h e  o t h e r ,  K i s h e n  S i n g h  v .  K i s h n i , b y  g i f t .  T h e
w i d o w ' s  g i f t  o f  l a n d  t o  h e r  d a u g h t e r  b e i n g  i m p u g n e d  a s  n o t  b i n d i n g  o n
t h e  r e v e r s i o n a r y  r i g h t ,  i t  w a s  c o n t e n d e d  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  f e m a l e s  t h a t
t h e  c a s e  o f  a  g i f t  i s  u n l i k e  t h a t  o f  a  s a l e  a n d  m o r e  a k i n  t o  t h e  c a s e
2
o f  a n  i n v a l i d  a d o p t i o n ,  a n d  a s  i n  K o t t u r i w & v t e ^ r ^ c a s e  s o  t o o  t h e
w i d o w  i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  m u s t  b e  h e l d  t o  b e  i n  c o n s t r u c t i v e  p o s s e s s i o n
s o  a s  t o  a t t r a c t  s .  1*4 (1). T h e  m i n o r i t y  o p i n i o n  o f  D u l a t ,  J . ,  l e n d i n g
s u p p o r t  t o  t h i s  v i e w ^  c a n n o t ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d ,  b e  c o u n t e n a n c e d ,  n o r
i n d e e d  h i s  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t
" ( l ) f  t h e  m a i n  o b j e c t  o f  s .  1*4 i s  t o  e n l a r g e  t h e  
e s t a t e  a n d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  a  l i m i t e d  o w n e r  ... a s  t h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  h a s  s a i d ,  t h e n  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  m e  
n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  f e m a l e  o w n e r ' s  
a c t  i n  a  c a s e  w h e r e  s u c h  a c t  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  b e n e f i t  
h e r  a n d  n o t  a n y  p u r c h a s e r  w h o  m a y  h a v e  b o u g h t  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  w i t h  e y e s  o p e n , " * *
f o r  i n  m a k i n g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  a m  i n v a l i d  a d o p t i o n  a n d  a n
5
i n v a l i d  g i f t ,  h i s  L o r d s h i p ,  M e h a r  S i n g h ,  J . ,  m a d e  i t  " c r y s t a l  c l e a r "  
t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  g i f t  b y  t h e  H i n d u  f e m a l e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  p a s s e s  t o  
t h e  d o n e e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  l i f e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  f e m a l e  a n d
1. R e g u l a r  S e c o n d  A p p e a l  N o .  21*4 ( P )  o f  1951 •
2. A . I . R .  1959 S . O .  577, s u p r a , a t  489-1♦ -
3 - T h i s  e r r o n e o u s  v i e w  h a s  b e e n  e n d o r s e d  b y  t h e  F u l l  B e n c h  i n  S m t .  
C h i n t i  v .  S m t  D a u l t u , A . I . R .  1968 D e l h i  26*4 ( F . B . )  a t  267, t h e  
l e a r n e d  C h i e f  J u s t i c e ,  I . D .  D u a ,  h o l d i n g  t h a t  " I n  c a s e  t h e  g i f t  w e r e  
w h o l l y  i n v a l i d  t h e n  a l s o  o n  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  G u m m a l a p u r a 's c a s e , 
A . I . R .  1959 S . C .  577, s h e  m i g h t  h a v e  c l a i m e d  a b s o l u t e  o w n e r s h i p  o n  
t h e  g r o u n d  o f  b e i n g  i n  c o n s t r u c t i v e  p o s s e s s i o n ,  t h e  d o n e e - d a u g h t e r ' s  
p o s s e s s i o n  b e i n g  p e r m i s s i v e . "  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  f a l l a c y  i n h e r e n t  i n  
s u c h  a n a l o g y  h a s  b e e n  p i n - p o i n t e d  b y  y e t  a n o t h e r  F u l l  B e n c h  i n  
S m t .  P a r m e s h w a r i  v .  S m t .  S a n t o k h i , A . I . R .  1977 P.&-.H. 1*41 (F.B.), 
a t  1 5 2 ,  w h e r e  i t  w a s  o b s e r v e d  c o r r e c t l y  t h a t  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  
K o t t u r i i s v d a m l A  c a s e  A . I . R .  1959 S . C .  577, w a s  t o t a l l y  r e m o t e  t o  
t h e  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e ,  f o r  " T h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  d i s c u s s e d  t h e r e i n  
w a s  w h e t h e r  s .  1*4 v i s u a l i s e s  o n l y  t h o s e  l i m i t e d  o w n e r s  w h o  w e r e  
i n  p o s s e s s i o n  a n d  n o t  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  a l r e a d y  p a r t e d  w i t h  p o s s e s s i o n . "
*4. A mar Singh v. Sewa Singh, A.I.R. i960 Punj. 530, at 537-
5« Ibid., at 535*
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"(s)he could not in any case oust the donee from 
possession even though the gift may not be binding 
on the reversioners of her husband.""'
This being so, she did not obviously become absolute owner and ss. 15
and 16 could have no bearing in locating the heirs qua the same, for
"the Act in so many words does not abolish either reversioners or their 
2
rights or status.11 Thus sub-s. 2 of s. l*f would apply squarely to 
such property.
The principles established, it is clear that with the reversionary 
right subsisting, the donee is in no wise benefitted by such alienation 
either. Yet this was precisely the stance adopted by the Punjab High 
Court in Mt. Prito v. Gurdas. ^ The widow having made a gift of her 
limited estate to her daughters, to the claim of the reversioners that 
such gift being invalid, they would be entitled to the property after 
the donor's death, Tek Chand, J.'s rejoinder was that as legislative 
changes had to be taken into account, the effect of s. l*f in view of 
its retrospective character, was to abrogate reversionary rights 
altogether. Moreover as the gift did not prescribe a restricted 
estate, the donees must be held to have become full owners, his 
Lordship further holding that such is the broad scope of the words 
"Any property" in s. l*f (1) and the Explanation thereto, that they 
cannot be given restricted meaning, confining them to merely lawful 
possession. Simplistic as well as misleading, the judgment is, it is 
submitted, open to criticism on more than one count. The reversionary 
claim could only have been nullified if the donees could, as unmarried 
daughters, have claimed a pre-existing right of maintenance in the 
ancestral property, or as was customary in the Punjab, they were
1. Per. Gosain, J., ibid., at 538.
2. Per. Mehar Singh, J., ibid., at 533-
3- (1958) 60 Punj. L.R. 194.
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preferential heirs to the self-acquired property than remoter
collaterals. Other than these, their possession was tantamount to
that of a trespassers, for from the moment of the gifting over the
reversionary right asserted itself, and broad as its scope certainly
is, the elasticity of s. 1^ (1) cannot be so stretched as to include
unlawful possession as envisaged by the learned Judge, for it can
never be in the contemplation of a legislative enactment to endorse
2illegal possession. Thus despite the lack of restrictions the gifted 
property would undoubtedly be subject to s. l*f (2).
The gift to a married daughter is ratified neither by customary 
law nor either by the strict Hindu law for the obvious reason that 
with her marriage she becomes a stranger to her family of birth. Yet 
in Sm. Lai Devi v. Sri Muni Lal,^  Dua, J. *s bias in favour of the 
female donee is likewise based on the assumption that such female 
being a Hindu and possessed of the property, it was open for her to 
argue that she was entitled to the advantage of sub-s. (1) of s. 1**. 
Added to this fundamental misconstruction of the sub-s. is evident his 
Lordship’s state of indecision. as to the full import of s. l*f (2). 
To the further plea of the donee that as the deed of gift did not 
prescribe a restricted estate, s. lb (2) would have no application, 
the learned Judge contented himself with observing that,
1. And in such cases, as Gosain, J., explains in Amar Singh’s case, 
A.I.R. I960 P.& H. 5301 5*+0 that as ”Prima facie the daughter
would be entitled to succession qua the self-acquired property
... the gift in question may be unassailable, because it may amount 
to acceleration of succession.”
2. One must again draw attention to Eramroa v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 1879, where the Supreme Court puts to rest any such fallacious 
notion.
3- (I960) 62 Punj. L.R. 29.
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"(a)s this point has not been debated at the Bar ...
I do not think it either necessary or proper to go 
into this somewhat difficult and debatable question 
of law.f,<*
One submits that evasiveness of this nature has nothing in it to
commend,and; precisely because of the "debatable question of law”
involved, a more forthright attitude, however misapplied, might perhaps
have been a more salutory approach. It is submitted that neither of
these two arguments have any veracity, for in the first place what the
married daughter acquired was merely her mother's limited interest and
no more. Thus notwithstanding the lack of restrictions in the gift
deed, such property could only be a restricted estate within the
meaning of s. l^f (2).
The single Bench view of the same High Court in Smt. Chawli v.
2
Hansa in so far as it sought to give the benefit of s. 14 to even an 
alienee of a Hindu limited owner is, it is submitted, similarly 
erroneously decided. The relevant observation seems to have been made 
obiter entirely as an ancillary matter^  after the quarrel had been 
concluded in favour of the donee on the main issue, i.e. that the 
daughters were the preferential heirs to fifth degree collaterals in
respect of the gifted property. However, it is submitted that in this
too, the learned Judge's observation that this principle would apply 
to both separate as well as ancestral property is open to criticism, 
for under the Riwaj-i-Am in the Punjab, we are told on the strength of 
authority that
1. Ibid., at 36.
2. A.I.R. I960 Punj. bob.
3. A view with which Sandhawalia, J., is in agreement. See Smt.
Parmeshwari v. Smt. Santokhi, A.I.R. 1977 P-& H. 1^1 (F.B.), at 
133* where the learned Judge states that, "A reference to the 
judgment would show that this aspect of the case was decided
as if it was one of first impression.”
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*1
"(But) in regard>to the acquired property 
of the father, the daughter is preferred to 
collaterals.
Neither did the decision appeal to their Lordships of the Full Bench
and Sandhawalia, J., in overruling it in Smt. Parmeshvari v. Smt.
Santokhi,^ was of the view that, as the observations rested primarily
on the issue of the possession of the alienees in reliance upon the
if
interpretation of the word "possessed" in Kotturuswami's case, the
5
inference in their favour "was neither adequate nor well warranted."
A similar lack of perception as to the full import of s. l*f (2) 
is evident in Smt. Chinti v. Smt. Daultu.^  In negativing the 
contention that as the donee did not acquire a widow's estate in the 
gift, hers was not the limited estate which was intended to be enlarged 
into an absolute estate under s. l*f (1), their Lordships held on the
n
authority of Kotturuswami1 s case that, the word "possessed" in s. l*f (1)
must be given the widest connotation so as to include any property
over which the female had acquired some kind of title however restricted 
8that title may be. To construe otherwise, their Lordships held,
would be to lose sight of the social purpose of the Act which
"(i)s the culminating point of the process of 
emancipation and equality of woman in Hindu society. 
so far as the right of succession is concerned ..."
Thus as the donee-daughter was the owner as against the whole world,
1. Emphasis mine.
2. W.H. Rattigan, A Digest of Civil Law for the Punjab Based Chiefly
on the Customary Law, 13th ed., P.P. Aggarwala revised, (All-Delhi,, 
Law Book Publishers, 1953)i at 350.
3- A.I.R. 1977 P.& H. 1*U (F.B.). A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 377-
5* Smt. Parmeshwari v. Smt. Santokhi, cited above, at 153«
6. A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 26/f (F.B.). 7. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577.
8. Following Eramma v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879*
9. Per. Dua, C.J., Smt. Chinti v. Smt. Daultu, A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 26*f 
(F.B.), at 267-
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fully entitled and competent to protect her right, title and interest
under the gift-deed, her position could not be equated to that of a
trespasser's, and the restrictions on her power of alienation did not
thereby create a restricted estate as contemplated by s. Ik (2).
It is submitted that while certainly there can be no quarrel with
the view that s. l*f (1) was meant to put an end to all limited
1
estates of the Hindu female, the further ruling that
?,(T)o restrict the broad concept of the expression 
"property possessed" by reference to the rights of 
some collaterals, whether under the customary or 
personal law ... (is to) cut down the plain meaning 
of the statutory language...,"
cannot be countenanced, for as already indicated, one must^read into |s^ Vv0^
s. l*f (2) more than the words apparently indicate. The donee daughter
1. Their Lordships' view has come in for critical scrutiny at Krishna 
Muyti, op.cit., at 15, but, it is submitted, for the wrong reasons, 
for according to him it is only the limited estate of the female 
in Hindu law that is in the contemplation of s. l*f (1); all other 
life estates are subject to s. l*t (2). Iniquitous as this 
reasoning is, we need dwell upon it no further as in appropriate 
places this view has been quashed.
2. Smt. Chinti v. Smt. Daultu, A.I.R. 1968 Del. 26*f (F.B.), at 268. 
This construction of the Delhi Full Bench though in a sense 
laudable in that it strove so hard to stretch the meaning of s. l*f 
to the fullest advantage of the female, is nevertheless so 
patently contrary to the plain intendment of the section that 
critical dissent was soon enough forthcoming. In Anath Bandhu
v. Chanchala Bala, A.I.R. 1976 Cal.303, as there was no doubt in 
Mukherji's mind that a female's alienation by gift was on par 
with her alienation by sale, it was incomprehensible to the 
learned Judge how the Delhi Full Bench could be persuaded to 
hold that a donee-daughter had become full owner of the gifted 
property simply because she was in possession of it at the 
commencement of the Act. A similar express dissent with the 
Delhi view is voiced by the Punjab Full Bench in Sm.
Parmeshwari v. Sm. Santokhi, A.I.R. 1977 P.8e H. 1^1 where their 
Lordships "with the greatest deference" disagreed with their 
brothers of the Delhi Bench to hold at 150 that, where the 
female had parted with possession by executing a deed of 
sale or of gift *it would indeed be a strange result that 
though such a benefit plainly would not accrue to the 
original limited owner, it should nevertheless become 
available to someone deriving her title entirely from such 
an alienor.*
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was indeed lawfully possessed, but as despite the overriding effect 
of s. 4, the reversionary rights were not abrogated, her valid title 
subsisted only cluxwgthe donor's lifetime. To read more into sub-s. (1) 
of s. lU would be to stretch its scope artificially precisely beyond 
"the plain meaning of the statutory language."
1
The correct position obtains in Mst. Dassi v. Mst. Kapura, where
in Khosla, J.'s opinion, the widow's gift in 1951 of her second
husband's property to her granddaughter by her first marriage did not
! have the effect of extinguishing the reversion, his Lordship explaining
that "gift" in the Explanation to s. l4 (1) must of necessity refer to
2a valid gift which the widow was wholly incapable of making, for 
while s. lk cures the defect in the donee's title, the latter cannot
|
benefit as the defect in the donor's title is not thereby removed. In
|
| other words, the donor could pass no better title than she herself
possessed in the donated property.^ The law put in proper perspective,
a word of criticism is nevertheless due, for in holding that the widow
was "wholly incapable" of making a valid gift, what the learned Judge
meant was that, she was wholly incapable of making an absolute gift,
i*
a point that has been brought out splendidly in Amar Singh's case,
Mehar Singh, J., explaining that
"(W)hen it is said that a female Hindu cannot make 
a gift or a gift made by her is totally invalid, 
what is meant ... is that she cannot make a gift
1. A.I.R. 1958 Punj. 208.
2. Contrast this position with the incorrect interpretation 
contemporaneously held by the same High Court in Mt. Prito v.
Gurdas, (1958) 60 Punj. L.R. 19*+, supra, at 615-6
3. See also Gurdas v. Mst. Prito, A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 203, where the 
donees* claim to absolute ownership over property acquired by gift 
from their mother was similarly negatived on the ground that as the 
reversionary claim had been decreed when the gift was made, the 
mother's death in 1953, reduced their possession to that of a 
trespasser's title. 4. A.I.R. i960 Punj. 530 (F.B.).
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to the injury of the reversionary interest ... 
operating after her death, and the invalidity of
the gift when it is avoided is operative not during^
the lifetime of a Hindu female but upon her death."
2In Smt. Sumitra v. Smt. Maharaju, it was likewise held that as 
the donor did not have any absolute rights in the donated property, 
and ex hypothesi she was incompetent to transfer such rights, the 
donees, illegitimate daughters, did not acquire any absolute rights of 
ownership therein either. To construe otherwise, Capoor, C.J., held, 
would create an anomaly inasmuch as a male donee under similar 
circumstances would remain a limited owner whereas the female donee 
would become absolutely entitled. This it is submitted, is the correct 
interpretation, and an important point of consideration in any 
balanced construction of the two sub-ss. of s. l*t. It has to be borne
in mind that the purpose of s. 1^ (2) is to equalise, to maintain the
balance between the two sexes, that where neither of them has any 
right to the property, any grant as such must be construed as coming 
under s. l*f (2).
However this eminently sensible approach to the two sub-ss. has 
come in for sharp attack in Smt. Chinti v. Smt. Daultu,^  where Dua,
if
C.J., drew attention to the observation in Kaur Singh v. Jaggar Singh 
to the effect that whereas a Hindu male holder of ancestral immoveable 
property governed by the Punjab customary law is still subject to 
restrictions on his powers of disposition, a Hindu female must be held 
to be full owner of any property possessed by her whether acquired 
before or after the commencement of the Act. This indicated to the
learned Chief Justice that the anomaly was inherent in s. 1^  itself and
1. Ibid., at 535*
2. A.I.R. 1963 H.P. 21.
3. A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 26k (F.B.).
4. A.I.R. 1961 Punj. ^89.
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"... could only be remedied by (the) Parliament and  ^
not by judicial interpretation against Hindu females,"
2a point of view not to be countenanced for though the anomaly 
undoubtedly exists,*^  it is submitted that it springs into existence
i
only after the enactment of the HSA, and cannot be extended to the 
position prior to 1956 when the limited owner was precluded from any 
such privilege.
if
In Mst. Mukhtiar Kaur v. Mst. Kartar Kaur an interesting 
variation of the same question arose. On the male holder dying sonless 
in 19391 his widow gifted the entire property in 1955 in favour of one 
of her daughters to the exclusion of the other three. The suit for 
reversionary claims by the collaterals was decreed in respect of 
ancestral property but was dismissed in regard to the non-ancestral 
property. In 1961 the widow executed a will of the previously gifted 
property and died shortly thereafter. On the other daughters 
instituting a suit for joint possession, it was held that as in the 
first instance the widow had gifted away her widow's estate, she could 
not be said to have been "possessed" of the property so as validate
1. Smt. Chinti v. Smt Daultu, cited above, at 265»
2. See the dissenting comment of Sandhawalia, J., in Sm. Parmeshvari 
v. Sm. Santokhi, A.I.R. 1977 P.& H. 1^ 1, at 152 to the effect that 
"... they (their Lordships of the Full Bench in Smt. Chinti's 
case, cited above) brushed away this patent difficulty by observing 
that the anomaly was inherent in s. Ik itself. With great respect
I may say that this is not so. There is no compulsion, either, in 
the language of s. ik which necessitated the acceptance of such an 
anomaly as inherent. See also Krishna Murti, op.cit., who is 
rightly critical of this view, but on faulty reasoning, it is 
submitted. He notes at 15 that, "A donee either male or female 
from a limited owner ... would get only a life interest but not a 
limited estate. In such a case s. l*f (1) would not be attracted.
If s. l*f is thus understood there is no scope for any anomaly as 
held by the Delhi High Court. What degree of veracity if any, may 
be attributed to this approach, we have already noted.
3. Supra, at 564*
k. A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 31.
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her subsequent alienation by will. Neither could the donee's title be
that of a full owner, for with her mother's death, the gift of the
1
limited estate had ceased. However, as the donee in this case was
one among a number of preferential heirs to the self-acquired property,
his Lordship, Pandit, J., ruled that she was entitled to a share
equally with the rest in her capacity as such heir. This it is
submitted, is the correct approach, a satisfactory and equitable
solution in harmony with the spirit of the old law, and in tune with the
legislative intendment in the new.
The gifting of the ancestral estate poses a rider no different in
essence to that of a gift of self-acquired property, and in Sawan Mai 
2v. Smt. Gita Devi, where such property was in dispute, the donee's con­
tention was. that, not only was the.gift merely valid during the widow's 
lifetime, but it was not even void as against the reversioners. Being 
merely voidable, inasmuch as it had not been set aside at the donor's 
death in 1951, the HSA's effect on it was to convert it to an absolute 
estate in the hands of the donee-daughter. The Court however rightly 
held that as the reversioners had filed for possession in March 1956, 
simply because the HSA had come into force during the pendency of the 
suit, the donee could claim no title to such property, for
1. In similar circumstances, Untwalia, J., held likewise in Sulochana 
Kuer v. Deomati Kuer, A.I.R. 1970 Pat 352 in ruling that where a 
Hindu woman who was herself possessed of a Hindu woman's estate 
confers a similar estate on the donee by gift, the donee's 
acquisition cannot be said to be a limited estate within the 
meaning of s. 14 (1), and is open to challenge by the reversioners 
whether such transfer is absolute i.e. without restrictions, or 
otherwise. At the same time however, in his Lordship's view this 
was a pure question of the Anglo-Hindu law and the invoking of 
s. Ik irrelevant. This difference with the Punjab case apart, the 
learned Judge took it as read and did not deem it necessary either, 
to expand on the right of the donee as a reversioner jointly with 
her sisters.
2. (1966) 68 Punj. L.R. M*9.
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11 (A)s soon as they exercise their option to treat 
the alienation as void, if in law they are entitled 
to do bo and claim possession, i.e. if the property 
is ancestral, the possession of ... (the) donee must 
be treated as that of a trespasser and not under any 
claim.
But what where the next presumptive reversioner is a consenting
party to the gift? Was he by such consent estopped from challenging
the validity of the gift by the widow in favour of her daughter by a
previous marriage? On the other hand, did the donee*s consent to the
imposition of certain restrictions in the gift deed make it a
conditional gift? For such questions to be resolved, in Hardy, J. !s
2view in Smt. Kaushalya v. Mangtoo, what had to be determined was
whether the donee had agreed to a '’restricted estate" within the
meaning of s. 14 (2), the question assuming the greater importance as
she had no pre-existing right in the property. His Lordship was clear
that the proper interpretation of s. 14 (2) depends very much upon the
nature of the estate created and
"(i)f the instrument merely creates a life interest 
without any restrictions it is obvious that it cannot 
be a 'restricted estate*. But if along with the 
creation of a life interest certain valid restrictions , 
are put then what is created is a 'restricted estate*."
4
The test therefore is the intention of the parties and as in this
1. Ibid., at 451.
2. (1969) 71 Punj. L.R. (Delhi Sec.) 117.
J>. Ibid., at 124.
4. While this statement is certainly true, we must bear in mind that 
whatever the intention of the parties - and in more instances than 
not, the intention in the imposition of restrictions was to 
preserve the estate at the expense of the full rights of females - 
a pre-existing right would have had the effect of bringing into 
operation sub-s. (1) of s. 14. It is submitted that the learned 
Judge could well have enhanced the force of his reasoning by a 
more definitive reference to what he had in passing noted at 123,
i.e. "All her rights whatever they were, flowed from the gift", 
or in other words, the lack in the donee of a pre-existing claim.
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case the restrictions which the donee had imposed upon herself and
which in turn had induced the collateral to give his consent, the
resulting gift did not merely create in her a life interest but also
prevented her from alienating the same, and was thus a "restricted
estate" within the meaning of s. 14 (2); as the Act of 1956 in no way
abolishes reversioners or their reversionary rights or status
"(t)he position of law before and after the Act 
continues to be the same, and the next reversioner ^
is entitled in law to the protection of his reversion."
The bearing of a pre-existing right in the gifted property came to
2the fore in Siri Ram v. Smt. Hukmi.
The facts briefly were that S2W having come in possession of her 
husband's estate, gifted the same thereafter in favour of S2SW, the 
widow of her predeceased son. In a decree pursuant to a suit for the 
protection of his reversionary right by SI, it was agreed that the gift 
was valid ctwrin^ the lifetime of S2W. After the latter's death in 1940, 
the reversioner's suit was comprised, according to the terms of which
1. Smt. Kaushalya v. Mangtoo, (1969) 71 Punj. L.R. (Delhi Sec.) 117, 
at 123.
2. A.I.R. 1979 H.P. 46. We have already noted the bearing of this 
pre-existing right on s. 14 in Amar Kaur v. Joginder Kaur, (1967)
69 Punj. L.R. 545, supra at 594~5l
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S2SW was allowed to remain in possession of the property ^qx. her
lifetime in lieu of her maintenance. S2SW alienating the property
in 1966, it was contended that as her right over the property had
ended with the donor's death, the compromise decree being the source
of S2SW's title, the property would fall squarely within s. 14 (2) of
the HSA. Mehta C.J., however ruled on the authority of decided cases
1
a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l y i n g  h e a v i l y  o n  T u l a s a m m a  v .  S e s h a  R e d d i  t h a t ,
as on the death of one coparcener, his share in the joint estate
e n l a r g e s  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o p a r c e n e r s ,  t h e  H i n d u  l a w  p r o v i d e s ,
as reason and justice require, that the surviving coparceners maintain
t h e  w i d o w  o f  t h e  d e c e a s e d  c o p a r c e n e r .  A s  s u c h  t h e r e f o r e ,  w h e r e  t h e
widow is possessed of property precisely in lieu of that pre-existing
right of maintenance, her estate under s. 14 (1) is enlarged so as to
make her full owner of the disputed property, and there is no
s u b s t a n c e  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  h e r  r i g h t  s p r a n g  i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  f o r  t h e
f i r s t  t i m e  u n d e r  t h e  c o n s e n t  d e c r e e .  T r u e  a s  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s ,  i t
reinforces and reinstates the view that "the right of maintenance is a 
2matter of moment" and such is the force of that pre-existing right 
that it is in effect even capable of curing the defect in the donor's 
title to the extent of the gift conveyed.
This principle is well illustrated in Ram Sarup v. Smt. Patta.^  
The widow having transferred her limited estate in favour of her 
widowed destitute daughter who was unable to claim maintenance from 
her husband's family, at her alienation of the same after 1956 in 
apparent violation of the terms of the mutation, the reversioners who
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944.
2. Per. Fazal Ali, J., ibid., at i960.
3. A.I.R. 1981 P.8c H. 6S.
had been parties to the gift sought a declaration for the safeguarding
of their reversionary rights after the death of the donee on the
ground that, as the deed of gift was an instrument within the meaning
on s. 14 (2) the alienation would not bind them. In determining the
nature of the right conferred by the gift, it was however held that,
while it is undoubtedly true that a Hindu father is not bound to
maintain his married daughter under the law, his moral obligation is
not thereby diminished if she is widowed and destitute, for
"(a)fter all if the father has a legal duty to
maintain his unmarried daughter ... a married 
daughter can at least look towards maintenance
under his moral obligation ... for she walked out
of her father's family at his behest by (being given) 
away in marriage.
Thus since under the Hindu law a moral obligation becomes a legal duty 
and the estate is inherited subject to the burden of this legal 
obligation, the gift by the mother was in recognition of the widowed 
daughter's pre-existing claim to maintenance, and such property in the 
hands of the donee, would mature into an absolute estate so as to oust 
the applicability of s. 14 (2).
In sum then, it is clear that as the reversion can in no sense be 
regarded as extinguished by the Act of 1956, the widow's alienation by 
gift, - as it is on par with her alienation by sale - is still subject
I
to the limitations imposed by the old law, and impeachable by the 
reversioners. Decisions holding her as constructively possessed of 
such property must be dismissed out of hand. Neither in such cases, 
may the section be construed to the advantage of the female donee 
except, it is submitted, where the latter has an indefeasible 
subsisting right in it, the force of which is to render impotent all 
reversionary claims.
1. Ibid., at 71.
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(ii) -Bequests
The limited owner was by definition as much incapable of alien­
ating by will as by sale or gift, and in the event of her death prior 
to June 17, 1956, the reversionary claim was capable of asserting 
itself to the detriment of both the legatee and the donee. However, 
in the case of the female surviving the passing of the HSA, while the 
gift made prior to its enactment would remain subject to s. Ik (2), 
the position of the legatee is substantially improved, for the will 
executed by the female of her widow's estate cannot be regarded as 
invalid and inoperative, as the incapacity imposed by the Hindu law 
on her disposing power has subsequently been removed by s. ik (1) of 
the HSA by virtue of which she acquires absolute powers of alienation 
over property "possessed” by her.
We have already observed that under such circumstances the rever-
1
sion cannot claim to the detriment of the male legatee from the widow;
2on the same principles it was held in Harnam Kaur v. Sher Singh that 
where the widow in 195^ bequeathed the entire property which she had 
received by gift and by inheritance from her husband, to a female 
relative by marriage, the reversioner's claim that she had thereby ex­
ceeded her powers as a limited owner could only be partially accepted. 
His Lordship Khanna, J., was of the view that, while sub-s. (2) of 
s. 14 would apply to the property which was gifted in favour of the 
widow - with what degree of accuracy we shall presently see - as by 
operation of s. 14 (1) she had become full owner of the remaining 
estate which had come to her by inheritance, it was capable of being
1. Supra, at 479, f-n- 1«
2. A.I.E. 1963 Punj. 402.
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d i s p o s e d  o f  b y  w i l l .  T h e  l e a r n e d  J u d g e  f u r t h e r  r e a s o n e d  t h a t  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r e v e r s i o n e r  u n d e r  t h e  c u s t o m a r y  l a v  h a d  a s  m u c h  a  r i g h t  
t o  a s s a i l  a  t e s t a m e n t a r y  b e q u e s t  b y  t h e  l i m i t e d  o w n e r  a s  a  g i f t  o r  
s a l e  b y  h e r ,  c o u l d  b e  o f  n o  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  h i m  a f t e r  1 9 5 6 ,  f o r  w h i l e  i n  
t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e  t h e r e  i s  a n  i m m e d i a t e  t r a n s f e r  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  
l e g a t e e  i s  e n t i t l e d  a s  a  b e n e f i c i a r y  o n l y  a t  t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e  t e s t a ­
t r i x .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  h i s  L o r d s h i p  r e i t e r a t e d  t h e  w e l l - k n o w n  m a x i m  
t h a t  t h e  w i l l  s p e a k s  o n  t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ,  a n d  a s  i n  t h e  
p r e s e n t  c a s e  t h e  w i d o w  w a s  s t i l l  a l i v e ,  a n d  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e v o k i n g  t h e  
w i l l ,  h a d  c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  s h e  d e s i r e d  i t  t o  b e  a c t e d  u p o n ,  t h e  
i n f i r m i t y  o r i g i n a l l y  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  d o c u m e n t  m u s t  b e  h e l d  t o  b e  
c u r e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  h e r  f u l l  o w n e r s h i p ,  a n d  t h e  r e v e r s i o n a r y  r i g h t  
a c c o r d i n g l y  e x t i n g u i s h e d .
A  s i m i l a r  d e c i s i o n  w a s  a r r i v e d  a t  b y  t h e  B a j a s t h a n  H i g h  C o u r t  i n
1
S m t .  S u n d e r d e v i  v. M a n a k c h a n d . T h e  w i d o w  h a v i n g  w i l l e d  a w a y  h e r
limited estate in 1953, her death after the enactment of the HSA,
M o d i ,  J . , w a s  i n  c o m p l e t e  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  p l e a  o f  t h e  f e m a l e
legatee that as the will speaks at the death of the testator and not
a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  i t s  e x e c u t i o n ,  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  u n f e t t e r e d  c a p a c i t y  t o
d i s p o s e  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  w h i c h  t h e  H S A  h a d  u n d o u b t e d l y  c o n f e r r e d  u p o n
t h e  w i d o w ,  t h e  w i l l  w a s  p e r f e c t l y  v a l i d .  B e l y i n g  u p o n  t h e  d i c t a  i n
2
M s t .  S i r e k a n w a r  v. K a n w a r l a l , t h e  l e a r n e d  J u d g e  r u l e d  t h a t  w h e r e  
t h e r e  i s  n o  i n h e r e n t  i n c a p a c i t y  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  p r o p e r t y  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  a  p e r s o n  w h o  i s  a  m i n o r  o r  o f  u n s o u n d  m i n d ,  a  p e r s o n  w h o  d o e s  n o t  
p o s s e s s o r  o w n ^ o r  h a s  n o  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  a  t e s t a m e n t a r y  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f
1. A.I.B. 1975 Baj. 211.
2. I.L.B. (1953) 3 B a j .  1013.
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it may make a bequest, and such bequest would be valid provided the
testator happened to be the owner at the time of his death. In this
case the incapacity of the limited owner having been removed by the
HSA before her death, there could be no question but that the will
would take effect as a legitimate testamentary bequest, and this
would be in keeping with the general principle, that,
"(A) will unless a contrary intention appears therein 
must be construed, with reference to the real estate 
and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and 
take effect as if it had been executed immediately 
before the death of the testator and as if the 
condition of things to which it refers in this respect 
is that existing immediately before his death."1
To sum up this part of our study: where the widow alienates, by
way of gift or testamentary disposition her limited estate, and dies
prior to the coming into force of the HSA, the rights of the grantees 
in such cases cannot extend beyond her lifetime and the reversionary 
right is capable of being asserted immediately on her death. The same 
would apply to gifts inter vivos even if she survives till after 
17 June, 1956, for having parted with possession of limited estate,
the HSA has no application as s. l*t (1) cannot operate in a void. On
the other hand, given that the will speaks on the death of the Jtirv^ teA efctofc*., 
testator, a will made prior to 1956, but given effect to only after 
the passing of the HSA. effectively extinguishes all reversionary 
claims, the full benefit accruing to the female legatee. After 1956, 
the limited estate in the hands of the female Hindu is converted to a 
full tenure under s. 1^  (1), and she may freely alienate either for 
value or gratuitously.
1. Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 3^ * (Hailsham Edition), Para 291
at 236. :---- -----  ---
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(b) Acquisitions Inter Vivos and Bequests from a Hale:
The Position Before 1956
A question now remains whether s. 1*+ (1) will apply to
grants made to females by will or by settlement inter vivos
on the part of persons who are under an obligation to maintain
them or whose estates would, in the ordinary way^be liable for
1
their maintenance under the HAMA. The problem is of some com­
plexity and must be construed in conjunction with the law relating 
to gift6 and bequests in the traditional law as modified by the 
statute of 1956.
Under the prior law, both in the Mitaksara and Dayabhaga 
schools, a Hindu even if he be joint, may be possessed of self­
acquired, or, where he has terminated his joint status,of separate 
property which belongs exclusively to him, and as no other member 
of the coparcenary, not even his male issue, acquires any interest 
in it by birth, the father has the unqualified right to deal with 
it as he pleases - and in a manner which denies any right of 
interference by the son either to enforce a partition or to inter­
dict an alienation. He may sell it, or make a gift of it, or
bequeath it, and as in such property
n(t)he other members of the family have neither
community of interest nor unity of possession,
the foundation therefore of a right to take such 
- property by survivorship fails.1*2 -
1. Derrett, *’Landmarks in Family op.cit., at 13*
2. Katama Natehiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga, (1863) 9 M.I.A. 5*0* 
at 615.-------  ---- ----------
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On the other hand, there is a significant difference in 
regard to the ancestral estate in the two systems. As the notion 
of acquisition by birth is a concept unknown at Dayabhaga law, 
ancestral property in the hands of the father is as much liable 
to be disposed of by gift or will as his separate or self- 
acquired property, subject of course to the claims of dependants 
for maintenance. Conversely, the general principle that a 
Mitaksara coparcener may not alienate, by sale or gift, his 
undivided assets is based on the theory of the right by 
birth in the joint stock, that community of interest, that unity 
of possession that is at the very core of the Mitaksara 
coparcenary. Neither could he bequeath by will what he could 
not have alienated by gift inter v i v o s for the right of 
survivorship being in conflict with the right by devise, 
the title by survivorship as a prior title takes precedence 
to the exclusion of that by devise; and it is in the con­
text of these principles as modified by ss. 1*+ and 30 of 
the HSA, that we must construe the effect of gifts and bequests
1. D.F. Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, l4th ed., by S.T. Desai, 
(Bom. Tripathi, 197*0« Rep* ,1?78* See also IMHL, op.cit., at 
437* where Derrett explains that, "A bequest of an individual 
interest made before 17 June, 1956,~will be inoperative as a 
bequest and can only operate with the approval of the surviving 
coparceners (if they estop themselves from disputing it) or 
by a family arrangement, which the law may infer from conduct, 
whereby the deceased's instructions are incorporated voluntarily 
in an agreement for the benefit of the entire family and thus 
binding upon minors."
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made by a Hindu male to a female, of bis separate as well as un­
divided assets.
(i) Gifts and Bequests of Separate Property
When a woman is selected, often against the general course of
the law of inheritance, it is reasonable to presume in the absence of
indications to the contrary that the testator thought her fit to deal
with the gift, and the same would apply, perhaps even more strongly,
1
when the property is actually given by deed inter vivos. But as it
is open to the grantor to make a gift of his choice, notwithstanding 
the general rule that bequests are construed as absolute gifts unless 
the will as a whole intends the contrary, in the construction of a 
deed of gift or a testamentary bequest, it is the obvious duty of the 
Court to give effect to the true intentions of the grantor and avoid 
any construction of the document that would defeat or frustrate or 
bring about a situation that is directly contrary to the intentions 
of the grantor.^
This position has not been affected by the extension of the 
property rights of women under the legislation of 1956, for if the 
test to apply is indeed the nature of the grantee's claim before 
the grant was madefto determine whether or not she could claim an 
absolute estate, then what one must bear in mind is that no female can 
cl aim a pre-existing right in a man's separate property; even the 
wife's right to be maintained ceases on her husband's death, and now 
under s. 21 (111) of the HAMA, she is merely a dependant like a 
mother or unmarried daughter, s. 22 (2) defining her claim to a mere
1. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 201.
2. Per Eamamurti, J., Manvala v. Ramanujam, (1971)t 1 M.L.J. 127, at 
135.
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maintenance grant:
n(W)here the dependant has not obtained, by testa­
mentary or intestate succession, any share in the 
estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of 
this Act, the dependant shall be entitled ... to 
maintenance from those who take the estate."
S. 14 (1) cannot therefore be brought in defense to plead that, 
where the female acquired a restricted estate under a gift deed or by 
testamentary disposition in the propositus1 separate estate, simply 
because it envisages the absolute ownership of women over property 
lawfully in their possession, the sub-s. must inevitably apply. For 
while Parliament has removed the compulsory limited estate, s. 14 (2) 
was specifically incorporated to equalise the claims of men and women 
in property over which the propositus had full disposing power, and 
as a testator or settlor can discriminate against males and give them 
limited interests, even when they are dependants, he can equally dis­
criminate against females, provided that their rights of maintenance
1
are not jeopardised thereby.
The general principle therefore that sub-s. (2) applies only
where the lady acquired for the first time without there being any
pre-existing right in her favour, as confirmed and settled by the
2Supreme Court in Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, must be the 
guiding principle, and the intention of the donor the acid test in 
determining whether the woman takes an absolute interest under 
s. 14 (1), or whether in conformity with any limitations of the 
grantor's choice, she takes a restricted estate under s. 14 (2). In 
other words, whereas the Hindu law had developed a rule discriminating 
against females, which Parliament has abolished, the general law of
1. Derrett, "Landmarks in Family op.cit., at 13•
2. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1963.
-635-
India has provided other possibilities wherever a division of bene­
fits between beneficiaries is intended, and since these do not dis­
criminate against females they are not within the mischief intended
The task that we must next turn to is to ascertain whether the 
Courts have indeed followed the well-known principle of endeavouring 
to occupy the testator's armchair to determine his wishes. In keep­
ing with the prevailing attitude towards the property rights of 
women, grants are nowadays construed as giving the donee absolute 
ownership unless the document expressly or as a whole intends the 
contrary. But even in the following of this principle, a distinction 
must be made, and where the female has a right to be maintained out 
of such estate, the deed of gift is, to an extent, more liberally 
construed in her favour than where a restricted estate is conveyed to 
a female who can claim no such right.
(i-a) Where the Female Has a Right of Maintenance in Such Property 
That the Hindu male has absolute powers of disposal over his 
separate property so as to enable him to give the gift of his choice, 
we have already established, and the task of the Courts in declaring 
in favour of the female donee becomes the easier where there are
husband had absolutely bequeathed his entire separate property and a 
half share in the joint-family property to his wife, Nayudu, J.,
■j
to be remedied by s. lh (1).
express words as to the absoluteness of the gift.
2v. Sankararao, for instance, where under the terms of his will the
1. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 2.0k.
2. A.I.E. I960 A.P. 359-
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concerned himself with the more intractable question as to the
widow's entitlement under such circumstances in the joint estate, for
there was no doubt in the learned Judge's mind that so far as the
separate property was concerned, since the will envisaged in clear
terms an absolute estate, the female's claim to absolute ownership
could not be subsequently questioned.
Neither may a "restricted" estate within the meaning of s. 1** (2)
be imputed merely because the terms of the will in so many words
specifies the giving of a "Hindu widow's estate" to the female. In
1
Shakuntala Devi v. Beni Madhav, the property in dispute having been
proved to be self-acquired, the question turned upon the right that
the widow acquired as a beneficiary under her husband's will which
gave her just such an estate. While admitting that, "the question is
2not free from difficulty," his Lordship, Katju, J., was of the view
that, as what the widow acquired under the terms of the will was not
merely a life estate but the technical Hindu "widow's estate", it
could not be interpreted as a restricted estate in the sense of an
estate for life. As such therefore, the learned Judge saw no reason
"(w)hy the provisions of sub-s. (2) would prevent 
the applicant's interest from being perfected 
into full ownership.
In other words, what the bequest gave the female was what she was en­
titled at law to get in case her husband predeceased her, and where 
the deceased who could well have disposed of his estate otherwise, 
chose instead to bequeath it to his widow in precisely the same terms
1. A.I.R. 196^ All. 165.
2. Ibid., at 167-
3. Ibid., at 168.
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as what she would have acquired as heir, any doubts that such
property would attract s. 1** (1) must be dispelled, for
lf(t)here can be no presumption that a limitation 
must be conveyed by the expression 'Hindu woman's 
limited estate.'"^
This it is submitted is the correct interpretation, and despite 
2expressions of doubt, establishes the important principle which must 
be the guideline in determining the claim of a female with a right to 
maintenance, as opposed to one who has no such right in the property, 
where both are awarded limited or restricted estates by gift inter 
vivos or under a testamentary disposition. What it amounts to is
this: As the female as a rule took a limited estate only in the prop­
erty given to her in lieu of maintenance or inherited by her from her 
male relatives, the position before the enactment of 1956 was that, if 
the property was given to her by gift inter vivos or under a will, the 
Court was entitled to assume that the donor intended the donee to take 
a limited estate, and to such cases s. l*f (1) would apply after 1956. 
On the other hand if the document in express words conferred a limited 
estate, s. Ik (1) could have no application, as this would be con­
strued as a restricted estate within the meaning of s. l*f (2). In
1. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 202.
2. See Derrett, "S- l*f (2) of the HSA: A Disturbing...," op.cit., at
72, where at that time he expressed the view that "Shakuntala 
Devi's case is...due for consideration and, I trust, overruling." 
However, in progressively appreciating the widow's inherent right 
in such property where they have not been testamentarily cut 
down, the same writer is amenable to the view that "it can be 
argued that both (Shakuntala Devi's case, cited above and 
Kaliammal v. AndLammal, A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 5^1» discussed below) 
were correct as they were (silently) based on the' widow's right, 
to maintenance from the estate": "S. l*f of the HSA, 1956, A
Deadlock...," op.cit., at 6.
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other words, the construction of the document is of the crux, and, it 
is submitted, unless the subsequent clauses indicate a restricted es­
tate, in the case at least of an heir or maintenance holder, a mere
prohibition on alienation must be construed to mean the giving of the 
’’Hindu widow’s estate” which is capable of converting to an absolute 
tenure under s. l*f (1), for the cardinal rule that one must bear in 
mind is that statutory provisions must prima facie be construed as 
conferringj^ in addition to, and not in derogation of, existing rights.
"I
This would seem to be a rational interpretation of s. lb as a whole, 
and in harmony with the view of the Supreme Court that it is erroneous 
to assume
”(t)hat is a settled principle of law that unless 
there are express terms in the deed of gift that
the donor who had an absolute interest, intended
to convey absolute ownership, a gift in favour of
an heir who inherits only a limited interest cannot 
be construed as conferring an absolute interest.”
1. If the present writer has erred, it may perhaps not be held against 
her as an inexcusable error of judgment. The problem has proved 
not a little troublesome to more knowledgable minds. Derrett for 
instance, was at one stage unwilling to concede this latitude, and 
held firmly to the view that, "whenever a female took a limited 
estate by will, it is to be supposed that the testator had full 
disposing power over the property. We are not to consider what her 
rights were against him prior to his death, nor what estate she 
might have had if the will had not been made. The fact is that he
could have cut her off altogether. He did not do so, she took
under the will, and s. l*t (2) must apply.”; ”S. 14 (2) of the HSA:
A Disturbing...” op.cit., at 72.
2. Nathoo Lai v. Durga Frasad, A.I.E. 19$b S.C. 355, at 358 , fol­
lowing Ram Gopal v. Nand Lai, A.I.E. 1951 S.C. 139» See also Smt. 
Tulsan v. Sahib Earn,'A.I.E. 19^ 6 Punj. 2&2', where following the 
Supreme Court and independently of the female's entitlement under 
s. lb, it was held under the rules of construction of wills that, 
as the two brothers and the wife of the testator were beneficiaries 
in equal shares and there was no suggestion in the will from which 
the wife could be presumed to have been given a life estate, there
could npt, in such a case, be any scope for the presumption of a
life estate being conferred on the female Hindu merely because she 
was a female.
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The mere giving of a limited estate cannot thus be meant to imply 
the giving of a restricted estate within the meaning of s. 1*+ (2), and 
neither, it might be added, may a limitation be imputed where none is 
intended, and in this regard the decision in Harnam Kaur v. Chanan 
Singh merits careful consideration. The presumptive reversioner 
having agreed to the gift by the husband to his wife of two-thirds of 
his separate property on the only stipulation that she was not to 
squander it, the will subsequently executed by her in 195**» bequeath­
ing the same property to a female relative was challenged. On appeal 
Khanna, J., arrived at the surprising conclusion that the Trial 
Court's finding that, as the gift was a mere provision for maintenance, 
s. 1*+ of the HSA which had in the meanwhile come into operation, could 
not validate the bequest by the widow, was unassailable, for
M(I)t is settled law that the High Court cannot 
in second appeal interfere with the finding of fact 
of the lower appellate Court however grossly erroneous 
that finding may be."^
One submits that as the entire question as to the entitlement of the
legatee as against the reversion rested precisely on that particular
"finding of fact," for the High Court not to have gone into the merits
of the case and to accept the lower court's view "however grossly
erroneous", is an instance of grave deviation from the principle that
3
law should correspond to facts. prohibition against waste can in
1. A.I.R. 1963 Punj. *+02........
2. Ibid., at *+03*
3. See Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 26-7* The 6ame author draws our 
attention at ibid., to this principle as enunciated by the Privy 
Council in Hunoomanpersaud1s case, (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393t *+10-1 
that, as the Courts must administer justice according to equity and 
good conscience "the substance and merits of the case are to be 
kept constantly in view."
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no wise be construed to mean a "restricted"estate within the meaning
of s. 1*+ (2) and the learned Judge's view therefore that
"(T)he aforesaid two-third share in land is covered 
by sub-s. (2) ... and as such the appellants cannot  ^
derive much benefit from s. 1*+ qua the two-third share."
unacceptable, for the survival of the widow after 195& having cured
the defect in the will, it must be held to take effect in accordance
with her wishes.
On the other hand, it may happen that the words used in the docu­
ment may allow for ambiguity, and in such cases
"(T)he golden rule of construction ... is to ascertain 
the intention of the parties to the instrument after 
considering all the words in their ordinary natural 
sense, (and) to consider the relevant portion of the 
document as a whole, and also to take into account the ^
circumstances under which the particlar words were used."
x
This formula came in handy in Manvala v. Ramanujam with 
attractive results. Shortly before his death, the testator 
executed a will whereby after excluding a particular item of 
property, he set aside the remaining estate for the charities of
his choice. The excluded property, a house, he gifted during his
lifetime to his wife, expressly stating in his will that it was 
to remain in her possession. After her death after 1956, the 
bequest by her of the house was challenged on the ground that
1. Harnam Kaur v. Chanan Singh, A.I.R. 19^3 Punj. *+02, at *+0*t. 
Contrast here the correct position as established in Sm. 
Sankaribala v. Sm. Asita, A.I.R! 1977 Cal. 289 (discussed below) 
where a similar gift for maintenance was rightly held to be 
incapable of converting to'an absolute“tenure under s. 1*+ (1), 
as the terms of the gift deed stated in unambiguous words the 
giving of a restricted estate.
2. Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan, A.I.R. 19&3 S.C. 890, at 893“***
3. (1971) 1 M.L.J. 127.
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corpus of the disputed property had been bequeathed to the trust for 
charities, and a limited right, a mere right of residence having been 
carved out in favour of the wife, she was under a total legal dis­
ability to claim absolute ownership either under the terms of the will 
or even on the basis of adverse possession. In negativing this con­
tention, Ramamurti, J., was of the view that as the words employed by 
the testator in the several clauses of the will undoubtedly disclosed 
a latent ambiguity, in that while on the one hand it designated "the
whole of my remaining estate," to the charities, on the other the
1
words "belonging to my estate" would have to be taken note of, and
the rule of construction in ss. 75* 77» 80 and 83 of the ISA applied
to ascertain the true intention of the testator. As such therefore,
much would depend upon
"(t)he true and correct interpretation of the will 
with such assistance or light thrown by the testator's 
own declaration and his conduct immediately after the 
execution of the will during his lifetime..."^
The will having specifically provided that the testator's wife would 
be in possession, it could not be construed to mean that he was there­
by giving her merely a restricted right of residence, for in such a 
case he would have employed entirely different language and made a 
distinct and separate provision for its devolution after her death. 
Moreover, the learned judge held, as the title deeds to the property 
had been handed over to the wife, and even on the evidence of the 
original trustees, there could be no„manner of doubt that the property 
in question had been deliberately excluded from the scope of the 
trust. Under such circumstances therefore, one of two things may be
1. Ibid., at 135*
2. Ibid., at 13^ .
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inferred: either that there had been a gift of the house to the wife,
though ineffectively in the absence of a registered gift deed, or
that that particular estate being outside the purview of the will,
the widow was entitled as heir, and by reason of the merger of both
interests, she became the sole and absolute owner under s. I1* (1).
Undoubtedly correct as the decision is, it is submitted that the
widow*s claim as heir apart, there can be no doubt but that, had she
not been related to the deceased, she would nevertheless have taken
absolutely as legatee under the terms of the will. That the testator
intended the gift made in his lifetime to take effect, is clear from
the express terms of the will which envisages
"(t)he whole of my remaining estate after excluding 
the properties which are hereinafter mentioned as 
those that should go to my wife ..."
be utilised for charities, and in view of this clearly-worded
provision no inference may be drawn that
M(t)he testator had died intestate with regard to this 
property except to the limited extent of the right of 
residence carved out in favour of his wife."-^
Neither could it be deduced that, simply because the will is silent 
about the powers of alienation, what the widow got was merely a res­
tricted estate under s. lh (2), for silence on such matters will
if.
operate in favour of the grant coming prima facie under s. 14 (1).
1. Emphasis mine.
2. Manvala v.Ramanujam, cited above, at 129.
3. Per Kamamurti, J., ibid., at 138. It is submitted that the reli­
ance on Mohanlal v. Habibullah, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 3^0, is misplaced 
here. In the latter decision, inasmuch as the bequest was of a 
maintenance grant, which in itself connotes a restricted estate un­
less a pre-existing right inheres in the legatee, the Court was 
perfectly within its competence to hold that the testator must be 
deemed to have died intestate, and to dec!tere in favour of the heirs.
Derrett, "Summary of Recommendations...," op.cit., at 2.
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To this extent, therefore, the judgment requires reconsideration, for 
in the complex issue of the construction-of wills, the Court's duty 
is, it is submitted, to be precise and unambiguous, and - in the 
setting out of the correct interpretation - to set a precedent and 
lay to rest subsequent judicial controversy as might arise on 
similar causes of action.
The same principle will apply conversely, and where the testator 
in so many words indicates a restricted estate, the harmonious con­
struction of the two sub-ss. of s. l*f cannot allow for the application
of s. 1^ (1). A case in point is the decision in Sobhabati v.
1
Raghunath, where the contention made on behalf of the widow was 
that, as the rights which she had acquired under her husband's will 
were no higher than the rights which she would have got over the 
properties on his death, and as her right to succeed to the property 
and her right to take it accrued simultaneously, the will must be con­
strued as giving her no higher rights than what she would have been 
entitled to as heir so as to allow for the operation of s. l*f (1). It 
was however rightly held that as the husband had not died intestate, 
the widow's only claim being that of a legatee under his will, it was 
not open for her to plead a pre-existing right as such in the 
property; and as what the will gave her was not the "Hindu widow's 
estate" which could attract s. Ik (1), but expressly prohibited her 
from making any alienation
"(a) feature which is foreign to the conception of 
a widow's estate where a widow has a certain restricted 
right of alienation of the corpus of the property,"3
such estate was incapable of being enlarged into am absolute tenure.
1. (1970) 36 Cut. l .T. 121.
2. See Shakuntala Devi's case, A.I.R. 196^ All. l65»
3. Per Patra, J., Sobhabati v. Raghunath, cited above, at 131*
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It is however submitted that a restriction on alienation, express or 
implied, does not necessarily connote a restricted estate; ve must 
note here once again that it is not merely the legal limited estate 
but other types of restricted estates as well that may well come 
within s. 14 (1), and indeed when we consider the distinction made in 
Muthu Bhattar's case,^  it could have been argued by an alert counsel 
that, as a grant for maintenance with no power of alienation is, 
strictly speaking, not the Hindu widow's estate but is nevertheless 
capable of attracting s. 14 (1), similarly the widow's claim in this 
case could well have been justified notwithstanding the stipulation 
against alienation, but that such an interpretation becomes impossible 
on a construction of the will as a whole, and the further clauses 
which clearly contemplate the cutting down of her tenure to something 
less than an absolute estate. In the first instance, the will postu­
lates the giving to the female of the income not the corpus, the words 
"without however any right of alienation,11^ merely reinforcing the
1. A.I.R. 1976 Mad. 8.
2. Ibid., discussed above at 598* . It may well be argued that this
is a principle applicable to a grant for maintenance out of the 
joint-family property only. But the overruling by the Supreme 
Court of the F.B. decision in Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh A.I.R. 1959 
J. & K. 92, (FB), (infra at 667-8 ), is significant and makes us 
pause awhile. The legacy of a restricted estate in the separate 
property of the Hindu male held originally to come under s. 12 (2) 
of the J. 8c K. Act (corresponding to s. l^f (2) of the HSA), was 
reconsidered in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1 9 7 7 S.C. 1 9 ^ , 
Fazal Ali, J., apologising in 1 9 7 5 • "la this case also the various 
aspects ... and the nature and extent of the Hindu women's right to 
maintenance were not considered at all, and the Court proceeded by 
giving an extended meaning to the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 1^  
which in that case was sub-s. (2) of s. 12 of the Jammu 8c Kashmir 
HSA, 1 95 6 . "  The issues involved ere of considerable complexity and 
deserve independent and careful scrutiny.
3. Sobhabati v. Raghunath, (1970) 36 Cut. L.T. 121, at 122.
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earlier clause. The insistence on the widow to adopt and the further 
provision of a haif hypothetically to her in the event of disharmony 
between her and the adopted son, only to revert at her death for him 
to take absolutely - provisions such as these, leave no room for doubt 
that, having secured her maintenance, it was never the intention of 
the testator to bequeath to her any but the restricted estate as 
contemplated in s. l*f (2).
Credence is lent to this line of thought by the Full Bench 
decision in Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh. Where the deceased 
owner of the estate had executed a will in respect of his entire 
property, bequeathing half of it to his younger brother, and the re­
mainder to his wife for the purposes of maintenance and the marriage 
expenses of their two daughters, with this stipulation^howeve^that 
she would not be competent to transfer the corpus, the same to revert 
to his brother after her death, it was the widow's claim that the 
alienations by gift, sale and mortgage effected by her could not be 
impeached as s. Ik (1) is applicable to property which is given by 
gift or will to a female who is not a stranger to the family and is 
entitled, either to inherit that property or to maintenance from the 
donor/testator. Their Lordships of the Full Bench were however 
clear that, as during the lifetime of her husband the female had no 
claim to the property, her rights accruing only by virtue of the will 
which envisaged the taking by her of a restricted estate, she would be 
bound by the terms of the document so as to bring the property 
squarely within s. I1* (2).
This lucid interpretation of the statutory intention apart, the
1. A.I.R. 1977 P. & H. 3^1 (F.B.).
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deeper significance of the decision lies in that, in accounting for
the inclusion of the words "devise" and "gift" in s. l*t (1), Mittal,
J., explained that
"(t)hese words are to be taken in the context in 
which these were taken under (the) Hindu law prior 
to the coming into force of the Act,"1
and while the Court was entitled to assume that the grant of such an
estate stricto sensu, would operate to attract the provisions of
s. Ik (1), there can be no such assumption where the testator in
express terms restricts the nature of the gift, and even the female
with a right of maintenance or one who but for the will, would have
taken as heir, cannot claim a greater right than what is given to her
under the gift deed or by bequest.
Thus in keeping with this principle, where the deceased husband
had executed a registered deed gifting certain properties to his wife
in life estate for her maintenance, the question in Sm. Sankaribala v. 
2Sm. Asita was whether, after her husband's death, as a consequence of
her subsequent remarriage after 1956, she had forfeited all her right,
2title and interest in the property of the deceased. Sen, J., 
rightly held that though the HWRA, 1856, applied neither to the prop­
erty which the female had taken in absolute interest as heir to her 
husband under the HSA, nor even to the gifted property, as it had not 
been acquired by her'in any of the three ways set out in s. 2 of the 
former Act, the life interest in the latter estate remained as such 
under s. 14 (2) of the 1956 Act, and the enabling provisions of 
s. l^f (1) could have no application to such property. That the gift 
deed did indeed stipulate a mere life estate there can be no doubt,
1. Ibid., at 3^ 5.
2. A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 289.
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for not only did it specify that any alienation by the female of the
property would be "void and invalid and disallowed in Court,1 the
further clauses specifying that after her ownership would revert back.
to him, the property to go to his heirs and those of his father's side
in the event of his demise prior to her, and the final conclusive
clause that "none of the heirs of your father's family shall become
2
the owner or possessor thereof," are words of unambiguous import 
indicating thereby that under no circumstances did the donor contem­
plate the taking by his wife of an absolute estate. Thus, the res­
tricted estate must stand, for in adding the various categories of 
acquisition to sub-s. (2) of s. 14, the intention of Parliament was 
merely to ensure that any transaction under which a Hindu female gets 
a new or independent title under any of the modes mentioned therein 
which prescribes a restricted estate, would not be disturbed and would 
continue to occupy the field covered by s. 14 (2).^
As the intention of the testator must be the guiding principle,
the construction of deeds of gift and wills presents problems of not 
inconsiderable complexity, and the onus upon the Courts to collect 
from the documents indications sufficient to provide an intelligible 
and workable disposition which does not frustrate the wishes of the 
donee or testator, is a heavy one.
1. Ibid., at 293-...  .....  ...... .......
2. Ibid.
3. Tulasamma v. Sesha Beddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944, at 19&7, h^e
learned Judge, Fazal Ali, J., further explaining at 1967-8: "This
would be the position even i£ a Hindu male was to get the property 
by any of the modes mentioned in s. 14 (2); he would also get only 
a restricted interest and therefore (the) Parliament thought that 
there was no warrant for making any distinction between a male or a 
female in this regard and both were therefore, sought to be equated."
4. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 232.
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That they are not always successful is illustrated by the recent 
decision of the Kerala High Court in Janki v. Govinda, where despite 
the obviously uncomplicated nature of the set of facts, his Lordship 
Vadakkel, J.'s inept ruling has little in it to commend. In 19^ 7* a 
testator bequeathed certain items of his property to his relatives 
with this provision that a specified quantity of paddy from the paddy 
lands so bequeathed should be supplied to his two widows for their 
lifetime. Provision was also made for them to reside in the family 
house, which however with certain other items of property (referred 
to as "Item No I") was to remain in the possession and enjoyment of 
the executor, the said properties including the residential house to 
be divided by metes and bounds only after the deaths of both the 
widows. Sometime during that period, one of the widows died, and 
after 1956, the surviving widow claimed that she was entitled to 
invoke s. l^f (1) in respect of the house.
V a d a k k e l ,  J . ,  h e l d ^ h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  d i d  n o t  c r e a t e  
a n y  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  f e m a l e ' s  f a v o u r  i n  l i e u  o f  m a i n t e n a n c e  s o  t h a t  
n e i t h e r  o f  t h e  t w o  s u b - s s .  o f  s. I 1* w a s  a t t r a c t e d .  T o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
t h a t  i t  w a s  t h e  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d ' s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  
m a i n t a i n  h i s  w i v e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  r e s i d e n c e  h a d  b e e n  i n c o r p o r ­
a t e d  i n  t h e  w i l l ,  h i s  L o r d s h i p  c o u n t e r e d  t h a t  a s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  m a i n t e n ­
a n c e  h a d  a l r e a d y  b e e n  m e t  w i t h  b y  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  f o r  c e r t a i n  p a y m e n t s
of both money and paddy, "the right if at all, is only a monetary
2claim, and not any right in Item No. I." Thus as the will conveyed 
merely a right of residence, and ho restricted right in respect of
1. A.I.R. 1980 Ker. 218.
2. Ibid., at 219.
the immovable property in question, sub-s. (1) of s. 14 would have no 
application. His Lordship further reasoned that there having been no 
allotment of any property under the will in favour of the widows, be 
it in lieu of maintenance or otherwise, and in effect no property hav­
ing been "acquired” within the meaning of sub-s. (2), the latter would 
not apply either.
On a less than careful assessment of the facts, it would seem 
that the widow's claim was right, and the disputed property could 
indeed attract s. Xk (1). She had, after all, a right to be main­
tained } indeed o J b ^ t v v c - e - ' A V v e ,  - X v - e x c ,  t o  A u x i v
and it could well be argued that what had been conferred upon her by 
the will was in lieu of just such a right. Vhat would seem to lend 
weight to this line of thought is the obviously faulty reasoning that, 
as a beneficiary under the will, all she was entitled to claim was a 
right of residence, the inference being that the right of residence 
was separate to, and distinct from, the right of maintenance to which 
had already been taken care of by the provision of paddy and money.
This argument, it is submitted, is untenable. Whatever the con­
troversy over the nature of the right of maintenance, i.e. whether or 
not it is a right of property, there is unity of view, and judicial 
decisions have some long time back established that, the right of 
residence in the family house is an indefeasible right, being a com­
ponent of the right of maintenance, and to quote the Supreme Court,
"(w)here (however) property is acquired by a Hindu 
female at a partition or in lieu of the right of 
maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing 
right, and such an acquisition would not be within 
the scope and ambit of sub-s. (2), even if the 
instrument, order or award allotting the property
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prescribes a restricted estate in the property.”
In the present case, his Lordship saw it fit to quote the selfsame 
2
words, but merely to reinforce his view that the right of residence 
not being a part of the right of maintenance, the widow could claim 
no pre-existing right so as to rule out the application of s. lk (1)!
At a glance therefore, one is tempted to sweep aside the judg­
ment, for it would seem that s. l*t (1) would indeed prevail. But on 
a more careful scrutiny, one is forced to an awareness of certain 
other subtleties that must be taken into consideration. VvJW&ml l^Ce- 
fxlxtad-'} evvfcii.fc.cL t was tkg testator's intention merely 
that his widows take the limited estate which was to revert to his 
heirs after them? If this were so, then in the event of the survival 
of either widow, the limited estate would transform to an absolute 
tenure after 1956. But this was clearly not his intention for in that 
event the necessity of testamentary disposition would have been ren­
dered superfluous. But having executed a will whereby the widows' 
maintenance and residence was provided for, there is categorical in­
struction that, at the death of one widow, the other would not be 
entitled to the share payable to her co-widow, and further that in 
spite of the right of residence, the house was to be in the enjoyment 
and possession of the executor, to be divided by metes and bounds and 
shared by the beneficiaries specified therein once that right was 
over. The testator's intention could not be clearer. What he was 
giving to his widows was not property in lieu of maintenance, nor 
even their entitlement of the limited estate under the i^irjLu- fcccur
but merely a grant for maintenance for life after which the estate
1. Per Ehagwati, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^»
at 19^ 8-92. Janki v. Govinda, cited above, at 221.
was to be disposed of in the mapper stated in the will.
At this stage it is possible to argue whether - given that the 
widow vv"as an heir in her own right in. foa- .btoAl&cwaJl Lsouu- - the husband 
had at all the power to be so restrictive in his will. If we bear in 
mind that as the owner of the "limited"estate, despite certain other 
legal limitations, the widow had nonetheless the right to alienate 
the corpus as well as the income for her necessary requirements - and 
such requirements having already been met with under the terms of the 
will - the testator was motivated by an obvious desire to prevent 
wasteful and unnecessary litigation, and in view of women's general 
inexperience and lack of knowledge in such areas, to protect the 
rights of both, the widows and the reversion. If it is true that un­
less the terms of the will as a whole suggest that the female shall
not have an absolute right of disposal over the property, a bequest
1
to a female imports as absolute an estate as a bequest to a male, 
the reverse too is in order, and the testator, it is submitted, was 
well within his powers to restrict her powers by testamentary 
disposition.
Since sub-s. 2 of s. 14 is based on the sanctity of contracts
and grants, the enhanced rights of the female under s. I1* (1) can, in
this instance, have no effect, and the testator's intention that his
widows take as legatees rather than as limited heirs, upheld. As
there was no subsisting right as such, the widow's title deriving
from the will, s. l*f (2) applied squarely to such property. The suit
by the widow for an absolute tenure must fail, as fail it did, except
that the learned Judge failed to recognise it as the "restricted"
estate envisaged in sub-s. (2) of s. l*t._________________________ _
1. See Ram Gopal v. Nand Lai, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 159*
-652-
The next problem that we must set ourselves to resolve is the 
proper construction of wills where the gift purports to make a 
bequest of the estate or part of it to the widow or another female 
heir, the subsequent clauses providing for others to take it after 
her death. The Court must, in such instances, ascertain whether the 
testator intended to give an absolute estate to the female if she 
survived him and added other provisions as afterthoughts in the event 
of her dying in his lifetime, or that the principal legatee was in­
tended to be given merely a limited or a life-estate with remainder 
over to others. Though the decision as between the two interpre­
tations is often a matter of great difficulty, where however the 
residuary bequest is to a male, the general principle, in view of the 
new property rights of women is to give the principal female legatee
an absolute estate unless it is clear that the testator intended to
2cut down or circumscribe the bequest.
But what where the principal and secondary legatees are both 
women related to the testator in a manner as would entitle them, at 
the time that the will was made, to claim maintenance as of right from 
the estate being disposed of? Just such a problem presented itself 
in Kaljammal v. Andiammal. ^  A Hindu male died leaving behind among 
others, his wife and unmarried daughter. In pursuance of the 
instructions of the deceased, there came into existence a division of 
the estate under which the property that fell to the widow's share was 
a life estate without power of alienation, the same to go to the 
daughter after her death. At the daughter's death in 1957» the widow 
after terminating her status of limited estate holder, asserted full
1. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 23**.
2. Ibid.
3- A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 1+51.
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ownership of the property and executed a sale deed in respect of it.
In upholding her claim, Venkatadri, J., was of the view that however
one looked at the case, the widow's contention was irrefutable.
1Reasoning along the lines of Shakuntala Devi's case, his Lordship 
held that, as in any case the widow would have inherited as heir at 
her husband's death, the limited estate in her possession must be held 
to have converted to an absolute tenure under s. Ik (1), the res­
triction on alienation in no way derogating from such absolute owner­
ship. In the alternative, his Lordship reasoned, even assuming that 
the female got the estate under the terms of the deed, there could be 
no question but that she was absolutely entitled, as at the daughter's 
death in 1957* she inherited the estate of the latter which was a 
vested remainder in her.
At this stage it is possible to distinguish Shakuntala Devi's
2case in that while the giving up of the "Hindu widow's estate" may be
unimpeachable, the express prohibition against alienation in
Kaliammal's case^ could well hold, and indeed disagreement followed
fast on the heels of the decision. Thus:
"(W)hether this (the dicta) is correct I beg leave 
to doubt. The husband could have bequeathed the 
entire estate to a home for cows, and unless she 
(the widow) could prove that she was as a dependant, 
entitled to some allowance for her maintenance, she 
could be disinherited, and would take for the first 
time any concessions made to her by the trustees of 
the cow's home.1
Though there is much truth in this assertion in that the owner is
1. A.I.R. 196^ All. 165.
2. Ibid.
3. Cited above.
k. Derrett, "S. Ik of the HSA and a Recent...," op.cit., at 51-2. To 
the same writer however, goes the credit of reversing his earlier 
stance to refer to Kaliammal's case, cited above, as supporting 
"the progressive view." See "S. 1^ of the HSA Once...," op.cit., 
at 22. See also supra at 637•
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at total liberty to dispose of his property in the manner he pleased,
one must here, it is submitted, revert to the well-known principles
of the construction of wills, i.e.
"(T)he crux in each case is to determine whether the 
words purporting to cut down the woman's freedom are 
precatory, and so capable of being disregarded. Or 
are they rather dispositive attempts to show an 
intention on the testator's part inconsistent with 
the legatee's taking an absolute estate?""*
In this case it is clear that the prohibition against alienation was a 
means employed by the testator as a safeguard of the property for the 
daughter. Once the reason for the restriction was removed, and con­
sidering the very real interest of the widow in the property, it is 
not improbable to assume that had the same conditions prevailed at the 
time the will was made, the testator would have given the property as 
unconditionally to his widow as to his daughter. Such a bequest can­
not therefore be regarded as a merely contingent bequest, for
"(T)he importance of the distinction between a vested 
and a contingentj^ is that if the legatee dies before 
he is entitled to possession the vested interest 
passes to his heirs, for it is part of his propertyi
while the contingent interest drops.
On the other hand, clear and unambiguous dispositive words are 
not to be controlled and qualified by any general expression of in­
tention. In Smt. Mango v. Smt. Joginder Kaur,^  where the husband had 
executed a will in favour of his wife conferring absolute interest in 
his property, and the widow, after the coming into force of the HSA,
bequeathed it in turn to one of her daughters to the exclusion of the
others, the latter bequest was upheld on the ground that, the subse­
quent clause in the will stating that the female would enjoy all the 
benefits during her lifetime, which implies a limited estate, would be
1. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at kjk-5^
2. Ibid., at 3. (1972) 7k Punj. L. R. 1050.
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by the earlier clause in the beginning of the operative
d o c u m e n t  w h e r e  t h e  t e s t a t o r  h a d  i n  u n a m b i g u o u s  t e r m s
s h e  w o u l d  b e  t h e  m a l i k  ( o w n e r )  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y .  T o r
" ( T ) h e  t r u e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  h a s  t o  b e  
g a t h e r e d  n o t  b y  a t t a c h i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  i s o l a t e d  
e x p r e s s i o n s ,  b u t  b y  r e a d i n g  t h e  w i l l  a s  a  w h o l e  
w i t h  a l l  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  i g n o r i n g  n o n e  o f  t h e m  
a s  r e d u n d a n t  o r  c o n t r a d i c t o r y . "
W o r t  t h e  C o u r t  h e l d ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  r a t i o  i n  B a m  v. L a c h m a n d a s ,^  
c o u l d  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r  t h a t  a f t e r  h i s  w i d o w ' s  d e a t h  t h e  
p r o p e r t y  s h o u l d  g o  t o  h i s  d a u g h t e r s ,  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a s  d e r o g a t i n g  f r o m  
t h e  a b s o l u t e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  w i d o w  f o r  w h e r e  t h e  d i s p o s i t i v e  w o r d s  a r e  
c l e a r  a n d  t h e y  i n d i c a t e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  a b s o l u t e  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  first 
d e v i s e e ,  a l l  s u b s e q u e n t  d e v i s e s  m u s t  f a i l  a s  b e i n g  i n  r e p u g n a n c e  w i t h  
t h e  c o n f e r r a l  o f  a n  a b s o l u t e  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e .  T h i s  i t  
i 6  s u b m i t t e d ,  i s  a  c l e a r  a n d  r a t i o n a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  k e e p i n g  w i t h  
t h e  v i e w  t h a t  s u b s e q u e n t  c l a u s e s  i n  d e r o g a t i o n  o f  a n  a b s o l u t e  e s t a t e  
i n i t i a l l y  g i v e n ,  a r e  m e r e l y  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  c o n t i n g e n c y  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  
t h e  l e g a t e e  d y i n g  i n  t h e  l i f e t i m e  o f  t h e  t e s t a t o r ,  a n d  s u c h  c o n ­
t i n g e n c y  n o t  h a v i n g  a r i s e n ,
" ( O ) n c e  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  h i s  ( t h e  t e s t a t o r ' s )  
d i r e c t i o n s  a r e  m e r e l y  r e q u e s t s ,  h o p e f u l l y  
s u g g e s t e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  m a n d a t o r i l y  i n s i s t e d  u p o n ,  
t h e y  a r e  i g n o r e d  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e s t a t e . "
1. "The presence of the word malik or tamlik or cognate expressions 
which ordinarily imply full ownership may assist the Court in 
arriving at a view that an absolute estate was intended, and such 
a construction will enable words to be disregarded as repugnant 
which subsequently direct that the female legatee shall abstain 
from waste or shall hand over the property to designated persons 
or which otherwise inhibit her management.” : Derrett, IMHL, op. 
cit., at V?4.
2. Navneet Lai v. Gokul, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 794, at 797.
3. A.I.R. 1954 All. 715.
4. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 468.
over-ridden 
part of the 
stated that
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A similar decision was arrived at in Lalit Mohan v. Profulla 
Mohan, made simpler by the fact that the testator having made the 
gift of an absolute estate to his wife, with full rights of alienation 
at her pleasure, their Lordships, Banerjee and Maitra, JJ., held that, 
the subsequent clauses providing that should she die leaving any 
portion of those properties, the testator's third, fourth and youngest 
sons, or in the absence of any of them, his or their heirs, would re­
ceive the same, could have no effect. As the will clearly contemplat­
ed the conferral of unfettered powers of alienation on the female, she 
could not be held to have acquired a mere life estate. The second 
part of the will is therefore an instance of a conditional bequest 
contingent upon the happening of an event, which never happened. The 
argument that could conceivably be put forward, i.e. that the contin­
gency contemplated in the will was still capable of happening, is, it 
is submitted, rendered nugatory, for under the enabling provisions of 
s. 14 (1), the widow constituted a fresh stock of descent, and the 
learned Judges rightly held that, under such circumstances, at her 
death, all the children of the testator, and not merely those of them 
who were named as beneficiaries in his will, would be equally entitled 
to the property as their mother's heirs.
A problem of some greater complexity presented itself in
2Venugopala Pillai v. Thayyanayaki Ammal, which was in appeal against 
the judgment of Mohan, J., in Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Venugopala Pillai? 
Prior to his death, the testator executed a will in 1921, whereunder 
he gave a life estate over the suit properties in favour of his wife, 
the said properties to be taken in equal moieties by his minor
1. A.I.R. 1982 Cal. 52.
2. (1979) 1 M.L.J. 87.
3. (1975) 2 M.L.J. 424.
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daughter and brother. The will further p/t-twUe-d that in the event of 
the daughter dying without male issue, her share was to pass on to the 
heirs of the brother. Subsequently the validity of the will having 
been challenged, a compromise was arrived at, under the terms of which 
the brother relinquished his half share on the stipulation that the 
tfidow would take the properties for her life as widow's estate without 
any powers of alienation, and after her, her daughter should enjoy 
the same as daughter's estate equally without any powers of alien­
ation. There was the further provision that if the latter left any 
male heirs they would be entitled absolutely, but on failure of them, 
the estate would be taken absolutely by the brother of the deceased or 
his heirs. Some time thereafter, the daughter died in 1940 without 
leaving male issue, and the heirs of her uncle challenged the pro­
priety of the widow's acts in having settled or testamentarily dis­
posed of the properties shortly before her death in 1966, their 
specific contention being that hers being a widow's estate without any 
contemporaneous powers of alienation, it was not enlarged into an 
absolute estate under s. 14 (1). In reversing the decision of Mohan,J., 
and in reliance upon the dicta in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, his Lord- ' 
ship, Rao, OCJ., held that, as the compromise was a distinct deed 
arrived at between members of a Hindu family under which the widow's 
established right to maintenance for life out of her husband's proper­
ties was recognised by a certain methodology or arrangement, it was 
merely a reiteration and a declaration of a pre-existing vested right, 
and after the coming into force of the HSA, the widow in possession of 
such properties must be deemed to have become absolute owner under 
s. 14 (1).
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C, 1944.
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It is submitted however that the decision in Tulasamma's case
can hardly be said to harmonise with the facts in the present 
2decision. A more apposite analogy which could have been relied upon 
is the correct approach obtaining in Shakuntala Devi’s case.^  After 
all the widow was heir to her husband, and but for the will, would 
have taken exactly the same widow's estate as envisaged in both the 
will and the compromise. But here we have to ask ourselves the ques­
tion whether it was at all in the contemplation of the husband to give 
her the Hindu "widow's estate", or indeed something other than that 
capable of being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of s. l*f (2). 
On a construction of the will as a whole the provisions for the subse­
quent devolution of the properties are such as can leave no room for 
doubt that it was the intention of the testator to confer on his 
widow a gift with such limitations as are known to the law generally, 
rather- than the legal limited estate under the provisions of the 
personal law of the Hindus. Under such circumstances therefore, she
cannot be held to have had a pre-existing right on the pattern of
I*
Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi; and if s. Ik (1) was not intended to inter­
fere with the freedom to give and the freedom to bequeath, it was 
likewise not intended to interfere with the freedom to contract, and 
where
"(a) Hindu female expressly enters into a contract 
restricting the interest already possessed by her,
1. Ibid.
2. The Supreme Court, it may be borne in mind, was dealing with the 
indefeasible claim of the widow to a pre-existing right of main­
tenance in the family property, as against the separate estate 
of the testator in the present dispute.
3- A.I.E. 196*+ All. 163.
k. Cited above.
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the interest so restricted of her own volition 
or agreement would not get enlarged as a result 
of s. Ik CD-”
Thus as the compromise was the basis of the creation of a new right in
the widow, the widow's estate that it gave her is as capable of coming
2
under s. 14 (2) as any other restricted estate,
"(a)s otherwise if it were to be held that it 
is a widow's estate (in the technical sense of 
the legal limited estate), it would defeat the 
latter clauses in the compromise relating to 
conferment of remainders."^
It is further submitted that even assuming that the attempt in 
the will to create an estate in tail male having failed on the basis 
of the ratio in Tagore v. Tagore, so as to negative the claim of the 
subsequent devisee, s. ik (1) cannot be invoked in aid of the widow. 
The compromise having been effected in the lifetime of the daughter, 
the creation by deliberate choice as between the parties, of a res­
tricted estate had already established the character of the widow's 
right so as to negative any hypothetical claim to absolute ownership 
in her as heir to her daughter.
1. Per Beddy, J., quoting from his own judgment in Sampuran Singh v. 
Labh Singh, A.I.R. 1977 P* & H. 17, at Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. 
Harpal Singh, A.I.B. 1977 P. & H. 3^ 1, at jRT.
2. A view that would lead to the harmonious construction of the two 
sub-ss. of s. 1^+ as we already noted in our study of the mainten­
ance rights of females, and authoritatively asserted in Tulasamma 
v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19kkt his Lordship, Fazal Ali, J., 
explaining at 1978 that, "... the words "restricted estate" used 
in s. Ik (2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in
s. l*fr (1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any 
other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee."
3* Per Mohan, J., Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Venugopala Pillai, (1975)
2. M.L.J. k2k) at 2^8.
k. (1872) 9* Beng. L.R. 377, where an attempt to create an estate in 
tail male was frustrated as an estate unknown to Hindu law and 
therefore void. As a consequence subsequent bequests dependent 
on the failure or determination of the previous estate were 
likewise held ineffective by reason of the illegality of the first 
disposition in tail male.
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From an analysis of decisions such as the foregoing, it would 
seem appropriate to deduce that grants for maintenance to women who at 
the time the grant was made, were entitled to no more than maintenance 
and but for that disposition would have no more than maintenance, 
should be understood to come within s. Ik (2), if the grant as a 
whole suggests that that was what the donor/testator intended. On the 
other hand, the mere giving of a widow’s estate does not, it is sub­
mitted, come within this category, and must be more liberally 
construed, for
”(S)ub-s. (2) of s. 1** is in the nature of a 
proviso, and has a field of its own without inter­
fering with the operation of s. l*f (1) materially.
The proviso should not be construed in a manner so 
as to destroy the effect of the main provision or 
the protection granted by s. 14 (1) or in a way 60 
as to become totally inconsistent with the main 
provision.”
(i-b) Where the Female is a Stranger to the Property
The death-knell of the legal ’’limited" estate may have been 
sounded on 17 June, 1956» hut though it no longer applies at law, it 
may well be created by volition of parties as much by gifts inter 
vivos and testamentary dispositions as by award, order or decree of 
court, or by compromise or settlement. If the test for the appli­
cation of s. 14 (1) is indeed that the female must have acquired some 
vestige of title in the property however restricted the nature of that 
interest may be,^ then the fundamental principle that
”(w)here a female Hindu became possessed of property 
not in virtue of any pre-existing right but otherwise, 
and the grantor chose to impose certain conditions 
........ on the grantee, the Legislature did not want to
1. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 223.
2. Per Fazal Ali, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19^t 
at 1978.
3. See Eramma v. Veerupana, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879, supra,at 488-9.
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interfere with such a transaction by obliterating 
or setting at naught the conditions imposed/’
becomes all the more reinforced in cases where the gift of the
separate property is to females who are strangers to the estate, as
for instance the married daughter. All such females take a windfall,
and must obey the limitations written into the grant, whether of the
"limited” kind or one of the newer variations of the restricted
2estate employed by modern testators.
In Radhakrishna v. Govindaswami,^  where the father's will made 
prior to 1937* expressly provided for his daughter to take the estate 
without power of alienation, the property to devolve thereafter on her 
male issue, the son subsequently born to her died, and at her own 
death in 19&1, the contention of the testator's adopted son was that, 
the child not having survived his mother, under the terms of the will 
he alone became entitled to the property as against the female's 
legatee. Ismail, J., however ruled that, as the son had, from the 
moment of his birth, acquired a vested remainder in the properties, he 
had immediately become a fresh stock of descent, and consequently at 
his death, his mother as his heir inherited the vested remainder 
alongside her own life interest; and by virtue of the operation of 
s. 14 (1), what would otherwise have remained a woman's estate, con­
verted to an absolute tenure capable of being transmitted or 
bequeathed by the female.
At a glance it would seem that the validity of the judgment could 
well be said to rest on the construction of the will and the intention 
of the testator as indicated therein. Had his intention merely been 
to give his daughter a restricted estate revertible to his own heir,
1. Per Fazal Ali, J., Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977, S.C. at
2. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 425. 1968. 
3* (1975) 1 M.L.J. 212.
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i.e. the adopted son, the stipulatory clause designating the property 
to her male issue, would have been unnecessary, and indeed it is not 
improbable that the restriction on alienation was by way of a pre­
cautionary measure not for his own family's benefit, but for his 
daughter's male line of descent. Yet the argument of the learned 
Judge that the lady was entitled as heir to her son must fail, for it 
is a cardinal principle of law that where the testator selects his 
first takers he is quite free, but once the vesting of the property 
has been achieved what is prevented is an attempt on his part to con-
trol its future devolution. In other words, the testator cannot pre-
2tend to legislate and derogate from the law of the land, and in 
accordance with this principle, a Hindu may not bequeath or provide by 
testamentary contract so that the property disposed of, or to be dis­
posed of, shall pass by a rule of succession differing from the 
current Hindu law of succession.^
Thus the attempt at the creation of an estate in tail male must
4
fail in keeping with the ratio in Tagore v. Tagore, and the mother
therefore accordingly disentitled to take as heir to her son. Neither
may it be argued that as any provision is void as would prevent an
estate which is intended to vest absolutely from passing by the
ordinary law of devolution, the legatee takes an absolute interest.
For the testator, it is submitted, explicitly gave the female an
estate such as was not intended to vest in her absolutely but which
5
was to pass on for the benefit of her male line of descent. Her
1. Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 467. -2. Ibid.
3- Ibid., at 466-7. 4. (1872) 9 Beng. L.R. 377.
5. It may well be contended that the learned Judge's ruling that the 
lady did indeed take a vested remainder at her son's death, is 
correct in view of Kaliammal's case. A.I.R. 19&5 Mad. 451. But the 
distinction to remember is that, as in the latter decision, the be­
quest was not in repugnance of the law of succession, the mother's
(continued on next page)
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acquisition under the will being an acquisition for the first time, 
the restrictions on alienation could not effect its conversion to an 
absolute tenure thus bringing the property squarely within the 
provisions of s. l*f (2).
This interpretation would harmonise with the correct approach ob- 
taining in Kashiram v. Shura. The testator in his will while creat­
ing demise in favour of his daughter, also provided that at her death
the estate conferred on her was to pass in the line of her male
issues. In the absence of such male issues, the property was to re­
vert to his sons, natural born or adopted, and in the event of their 
dying issueless, to his wives, and on their deaths as a last resort to
his brother. The transfer in 1971 of the property by the daughter
under a gift deed being challenged, Verma, J., on a close scrutiny of
the will was of the view that it conferred on her no such absolute
rights of ownership in the property. Relying upon the Supreme Court
2trailing in Navneet Lai v. Gokul that
fl(I)t is one of the cardinal principles of 
construction of wills that to the extent it is 
legally possible effect should be given to every 
disposition contained in the Will unless the law 
prevents effect being given to it,”
his Lordship held that the bequest in tail male clearly indicated the
testator’s intention of the giving to his daughter of a life estate,
the same to devolve on her male heirs after her death. But, the
learned Judge further clarified, as a will cannot create a course of
(continued from previous page)
claim as heir on the grounds of vested remainder was justified.
In the present case, the bequest itself being void, the question
of the mother obtaining a vested interest as remainderman could
not arise at all.
1. A.I.E. 1981 M.P. 236.
2. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 79*»-
3. Ibid., at 797*
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succession unknown to the Hindu law, the exclusion of the female 
heirs by the creation of an estate in tail male, being void, the 
estate conferred on the female would nevertheless lawfully take 
effect but merely as a life estate, particularly as the word malik 
used elsewhere in the will for other legatees, but conspicuous by its 
absence in regard to the daughter (as also the provisions for its 
subsequent devolution, it is submitted) was further confirmation of 
the view that such estate was not intended to attract s. l4 (1), and 
was in fact a restricted estate within the meaning of s. l4 (2). 
Neither, the learned Judge held, was there any credence to the argu­
ment that the sir (agricultural) lands having vested in the State on 
the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary 
Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands^Act, (1 of 1951)* the retain­
ing of the home farm lands under s. 4 (2)1 was a fresh grant to the 
female independent of the will. The term malik-makbuza in s. 38 (1) 
being merely descriptive of the home farm lands, his Lordship was 
rightly of the view that, it was not open for her to claim that it 
conveyed an absolute heritable and transferable title in her.
In view of the principle that an estate in tail male is invalid 
as being repugnant to the general law of succession, it is submitted 
that the reasoning of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the 
ratio In Appaswami v. Sarangapani^ requires careful reappraisal. The 
testator's daughter and her adopted son having effected certain
1. S. 4 (2) lays down: "Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub.s. (1), the proprietor shall continue to retain possession of 
his home-stead home-farm land, ..."
2. S. 38 (1) provides that, "Every proprietor who is divested of his 
proprietary rights in an estate or mahal shall, with effect from 
the date of vesting be a malik-makbuza of the home-farm land in 
his possession."
3- A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1031.
-665-
alienations of the property in December 195&, they were challenged by 
the reversioners as not binding on them beyond the lifetime of the 
female, their contention being that the adopted son could not claim 
either under the will or even on the basis of succession. The will 
provided that after the death of the testator's wife, the properties 
were to go to his daughter, and after her, to her Putra Pouthra 
Santhathies. Failing them, the estates were to go to the daughter's 
female descendants, and if they were not in case, to the daughter's 
husband, and after him, to his santhathies. The Madras High Court was
I *
j
| of the view that, as the will envisaged the taking of the property by
the husband on failure of male issue, the testator could not have 
intended to include any son by adoption, and the latter's claim rested 
: not on the strength of the will, but as heir to his adoptive father
I
j  who took a vested remainder.
ii
On appeal the Supreme Court agreed in the first instance with the 
High Court that, on a proper construction of the will, the life estate 
given to the daughter could not be held to have enlarged to an absolute 
estate after the coming into force of the HSA as s. l*f (2) would apply 
to such property. Their Lordships were likewise in agreement with the 
lower Court's ruling that the reversioner's claim could not be vali­
dated, they however holding that the will itself was the basis of the 
adopted son's rights as the words putra Pouthra Santhathies could not 
be interpreted to exclude an adopted son as the
1. Derrett explains at IMHL, op.cit. at VJ5-6, that where a bequest is 
made to 'X and his santana', "Eeferences to santana or putra-pautra- 
krama and the like are antiquated terms of art now used merely to 
convey what in English law is known as an 'estate of inheritance or 
an absolute estate,' and after the death of X (the legatee) any part 
of the property to remain will pass to his heirs by testamentary or 
intestate succession as if such words had not been used." Note here 
however, that the clause subsequent giving the property to the 
female descendants on failure of Putra Pouthra Santhathies, leaves 
no manner of doubt that what was intended to be created was an 
estate in tail male.
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"(H)indu Law has recognised the institution of 
adoption and once a boy has been adopted validly, 
he is for all purposes recognised as the son."**
Though one would have no quarrel with this view given the sacra­
mental nature of adoption in the Hindu law, one is nevertheless left 
wondering how the highest judicial authority could have omitted to 
take into consideration the fundamental principle that, where an 
estate in tail male is created, it must be held to be void as being in 
repugnance to the general law of succession. It is therefore sub­
mitted with respect that, the Supreme Court was in error in finding 
for the adopted son, for the earlier bequest to the heirs male being 
invalid, the successive bequests contingent upon the former must fail 
as well. The adopted son could claim neither as legatee nor as heir
to his adoptive father, and as the female continued to hold a life
2estate, the reversioners' impugning of the alienations justified.
Legal decisions generally surveyed, thus confirm that whatever 
the problems that the construction of gift deeds and wills might 
individually present, a Hindu male's absolute capacity to dispose of 
his separate property in the manner he wishes cannot be interdicted. 
Where the document purports to give a life estate, the donee takes 
subject to restrictions unless the reading of the gift deed or will as 
a whole suggests a contrary intention. The enlargement of women's 
rights under s. l*t (1) of the HSA was not intended to oust this rule 
of general application as the incorporation of the provisions of 
s. 1^  (2) clearly testifies and the Hindu female donee is as much 
bound by the wishes of the grantor as the male.
1. Per Kailasam, J., Appaswami v. Sarangapani, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 10^ 1, 
at 1060.
2. More credit therefore to the Madhya Pradesh High Court for not 
blindly toeing the line of the Supreme Court in ibid., and coming 
to an independent reasoned decision consistent with the general 
law in Kashiram v. Ehura, A.I.R. 1981 M.P. 236.
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In the face of this unalterable principle, we are at once in a
dilemma when we consider the Supreme Court's overruling of the Full
 1-
Bench decision of A jab Singh v. Ram Singh in Tulasamma v. Sesha
2Reddi. In giving his concubine an estate for life in his separate 
property, the testator expressly forbade her from alienating the 
corpus, the same to pass, after her death, to his collateral heirs and 
failing them, to the Arya Samaj. After 1956, on the female's absolute 
alienation of the property being challenged, their Lordships of the 
Full Bench reasoned that as the intention of the Legislature in en­
grafting sub-s. (2) of s. 12 of the J & K. Act of 1956 (corresponding 
to sub-s. (2) of s. 1^ of the HSA), was clearly to leave untouched 
transfers made by the last male holder in favour of the female where 
the grant contemplated the giving of a limited or restricted estate, 
it could not enlarge to an absolutej^ under s. 12 (1) (corresponding to |sjfcer\,u*e. 
s. 1** (1) of the Central Act), so as to make her a fresh stock of 
descent.
This seems to be to all intents and purposes, the correct inter­
pretation of the true function of the two sub-ss. of s. l*t. Yet the 
overruling of thoXdecision in Tulasamma's case^ makes one ponder.
Could their Lordships of the Supreme Court really have meant that the 
grant of maintenance even in separate property is of such moment that 
it interferes so as to take precedence over the absolute right of the 
grantor to grant the estate of his choice? Intriguingly enough the 
same learned Judge, Fazal Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the 
Full Bench, also spoke on behalf of the Supreme Court; but unfortu­
nately, in apologising for the decision, he gives no more than the
1. A.I.R. 1959 J. & K. 92 (F.B.).
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 19V*.
3. Ibid.
most cursory of explanations^ whiph touches not at all upon the principles 
involved. Left to one's own devices, one ponders in puzzlement at a 
stance which, if correct, renders purposeless s. 14 (2) and the function 
that its inclusion in the HSA was intended to serve.
When a female devotes her entire life to the services of one man 
alone, there is, it is submitted, only a very fine line of distinction 
between her status and that of the legitimately married woman. The ancient 
Fiis recognised this, and under the traditional law the concubine faithful 
to the memory of her deceased paramour, had as much a right to be main­
tained out of his interest in the joint assets as his widow. The "Hindu 
Code" on the other hand, leaves her out in the cold; she is neither an 
heir nor a dependant, and cannot claim as such against any part of the 
propositus' estate, and had the facts related to the period post-1956*
their Lordships could conceivably have called equity in aid to justify on 
2
moral grounds the adjusting of claims as between the rival claimants though 
not the giving to the concubine of an absolute estate where the terms of 
the will were of unambiguous import in giving her a restricted estate.
However, now that it has been established beyond doubt that s. 22 of 
the HAMA is prospective, -die concubine's right under the unamended law to 
claim maintenance from the joint-family property remains intact. Conse­
quently, s. 14 (2) must, in these circumstances be allowed to play its 
part, and the female necessarily confined to the restricted estate en­
visaged in the will. The overruling by the Supreme Court of the decision 
is quite as incomprehensible as the endorsement by the same bench of Kunji
if
Thomman's case in the list of approved decisions.
1. Ibid., at 1975.
2. See Derrett, IMHL, op. jcU., at 422; Critique, op. cit., at 267.
3. Supra, at 332.
4. A.I.R. 1970 Ker. 284.
5. Supra,at 571-3.
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(ii) Gifts and Bequests of the Ancestral Estate
An altogether different set of considerations must be taken into
account in determining the nature of the interest that a female takes
in property given to her under the terms of the gift deed or vill where
the estate is ancestral. A gift of the joint family properly by a
single coparcener without legal justification cannot create in the donee
a rig£t to demand partition against the coparceners for to be joint is
to be co-owner co-enjoyer of sources of income or properties which could
be sources of income: it is the condition psychologically of common
2
fortune and mutual dependence, and unauthorised gifts are therefore
3
usually described as ‘Void".
In exceptional circumstances, however, a substantial body of case
law endorses the Mitakgara view that a Hindu father or other managing
member has power to make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral
immoveable property for pious purposes.^ But such alienations must be
by acts inter vivos and not by wills, for though bequeBts stand sub-
5
stantially on the same footing as gifts, nevertheless a member of the 
joint family could not, until 17 June 1956, dispose by vill^any portion 
of the property even for charitable purposes and even if the portion bore 
a small proportion to the entire estate.
1. Derrett, JMHL. op.cit.. at 286.
2. Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 57*
3. So Mit. I. 1.25.op.cit lays down: "...properties other than immoveables 
were alone determined fit to be given away."
4« According to Mit. I. 1.28. op.cit.. "... Even a single individual may 
conclude a donation, mortgage or sale, of immoveable property during 
a season of distress, for the sake of the family and specially for 
pious purposes.
5* See Tagore v. Tagore. (1879) 9 Beng. L.R. 377» at 399» nhere it was held 
that, "Even if wills are not universally to be regarded in all respects 
as gifts to take effect upon death, they are generally to be so regarded 
as to the property which they can transfer, and the person to whom it can 
be transferred."
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The rules of the MitSkgarB coparcenary which the legislation of 
1956 has not disturbed otherwise than by ss. 6 and 14, still exist, and 
in the respects in i&ich they exist, they are still as vigorous as they 
were originally intended to be; thus despite the codification of the 
rules in view of the new rights retrospectively conferred on the female 
under s. 14, the alienation in her favour under a gift deed or by test­
amentary disposition must nevertheless be construed in conjunction with 
the law relating to the gratuitous alienation of the undivided interest.
(ii-a) Where the Female Has a Pre-Existing Right in Such Property.
The right to be maintained may not in all cases be a right of a 
certain and fixed nature^ but where a female does have a right to succeed
to the estate, or at the very least a right to be maintained out of it,
2
she has a precedent right, and though this might be postponed to certain
other rights which might emerge, she is in reality a qualified participant
3
and sharer; any share given to her in lieu of this subsisting right will
become her absolute property notwithstanding her consent to take it
subject to limitation and irrespective of the expectations and collateral
4
arrangements of the grantors. This principle is as much applicable to 
acquisitions of the ancestral estate inter vivos and by testamentary 
dispositions aB of acquisitions under any other arrangement, instrument, 
decree, order or award, for the gift or legacy not being at the root of 
the title, the law of survivorship in the Hindu law cannot be said to 
operate to the detriment of the female's entitlement under s. 14 (l)«
The omission to observe this fundamental guideline is to militate 
against the true function of s. 14 By excluding innumerable femaleb,
1. Derrett, "S. 14 (2) of the KSA : A Disturbing. op.cit., at 66.
2. Derrett, "The Tenure of Widows...,■ op.cit., at 73*
3. Derrett, Critique. op.cit.. at 221.
4. Ibid.. at 222.
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through no fault of their own, from the scheme of Parliament vhioh was 
to abolish the legal limited estate and to make women absolute owners 
of property of which they were lawfully possessed* Judicial decisions 
incompatible with this line of thought must therefore be rejected as 
inconsistent with the new awareness of the rightB of women as ushered 
in by the "Hindu Code”
^ In Annapurnamma v. Sankararao^ for instance, where the deceased
husband had in 1950 bequeathed absolutely a half share in the joint /
family properties to his wife, the contention of the son after 1956 was
that all that the lady had acquired was a restricted estate to last for
her lifetime* Ruling in favour of an absolute estate for the widow, his
Lordship was of the view that while she could lay no claim to the property
on the basis of the will as
"(O)bviously the will did not take effect in respect 
of the (disputed) properties and by the time the will 
could come into operation, the doctrine of survivorship 
would also have operated and the property must be 
deemed to have reverted back to the other joint-family 
member," ^
nevertheless as under the HVRPA, 1957* ®^ le was heir to her husband's 
interest in the joint stock, the effect of s* 14 (l) was to convert her 
limited estate to an absolute tenure* This, it is submitted, is „ 
the correct method of approach^ W- dieeoc that, but for her entitlement 
as heir, the female would have been disqualified, oa
CLcu^ gccJ ^  i K  vwaJLc • c x ^ c ^ j3 ti*J L  -
- um xjlX cL  D^e-nTcCt'edL l^ o JtSve " (£|. \KLe- -
. fttob cti. the female was heir to her husband's interest 
in the joint-family property, it was precisely because this pre­
existing ri^it inhered in her that the validity of the bequest in her
^ lo A.I.E. I96O A.P. 559* Vi , A.t.fc-Puwj. 3^  ^bdouj
2* Per Hayudu J., ibid, at 360.
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favour could not be questioned, and the extinguishment of survivorship 
by reverter *s»AjWch the consequence of her entitlement under the ve.s_^  
statute of 1937* Vlb cu/\. 1. lU-Oi •
lb is rvdb open to the Courts to construe the will of a sole
surviving coparcener in such a manner as to give the female a restricted
right in the legacy where she has a right of maintenance in the property,
simply because the male in question who has as much a right to dispose
of the joint assets in his hands as if it were his separate property,
chooses to insert restrictions* In the Second Appeal in Gopisetti18
Case.'*' the Pull Bench, while recognising that
"(T)he Legislature by this provision intended to give 
effect to the long-felt need to remove the fetters 
upon the right of a Hindu female to hold and dispose 
of property, and by emancipating her from tutelage, 
which otherwise would be contrary to the changed social 
consciousness which desired equality of treatment of 
both sexes," 2
nevertheless ruled that as the subsisting right of maintenance is not 
a right of property^ the title of the widov-mother was the grant of a 
fresh right created under the instrument itself, and as under the terms 
of the latter she was conferred a restricted estate, such property was 
incapable of attracting s* 14 (l).^
1. (1968) 2 An. V.R. 455, discussed at supra. 579 ff*
2. Per Reddy, C.J., ibid., at 4^ 1* In view of the eventual decision in 
derogation of the female* s rights, the unconscious irony of the 
learned Chief Justice's words is much to be appreciated.
5. Derrett makes the perceptive observation that, "On. the surface this 
error (of judgement in the Second Appeal) appears to be due to the 
notion that a right to be maintained is not a right to property. But 
in reality and substance the Court favoured the claims of the widow, 
seeing the discretion of the testator as an interference with the 
expectations of the latter," a value judgement about the exercise 
” by the testator of his undoubted discretion, which in the writer's 
view was "unwarranted." See "S. 14 (2) of the 5SA t A Disturbing." 
op. cit., at 69-70*
4. Or in other words, where the female "might seek the suit property 
under a will, for example, for the first time, having no previous
(continued on next page)
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It is however submitted that such a view cannot be countenanced, 
for the only relevant question is whether the restricted estate was 
granted in recognition of a pre-existing right in satisfaction of 
claims operating in respect of, or over the property prior to the dis­
position. ^ Though she took under the will, the widow-legatee was a 
dependant of the joint-family entitled to be maintained out of its 
properties, and but for the will, such right of maintenance would have 
continued unaffected in the hands of any heir or legatee of the son.
The effect of the bequest in settlement of this antecedent right in
the joint-family property was thus the conversion of her existing light
2
into a different right; it was not the conferral of a new rigit, an
acquisition under the deed, so as to attract s. 14 (2), but merely the
confirmation of a pre-exiBting right. The will did not create but
merely transmuted,^ and as such, the restrictions must be ignored and
her rights held to have enlarged under s. 14 (l), for
"(p)arliament,s intention ... was not to place women 
at the mercy of male draughtsmanship, but to secure 
that women should take no limited estate when rights 
devolved an them by law, but only where they acquired 
a right for the first time subject to a limitation of 
the grantor,8 discretion (as in the case of a male 
grantee)." 4
Equally reprehensible is the Supreme Courts dicta in Mst. Karnd 
v. Amru.5
(continued from previous page)
right to the properly beyond the right to be maintained (which their 
Lordships held was no right to property in itself...), it would not 
be turned into an absolute estate under s. 14 (l) if the testator 
indicated that she should have a limited estate in the property...,"*
Derrett, Critique, op.cit.. at 203*
1. Derrett, "S. 14 (2) of the HSA s A Disturbing...," op.cit.. at 71*
2. Ibid.. at 69.
3. Derrett, "The Tenure of Widows...," op.cit.. at 33»
4. Derrett, "S. 14 (2) of the HSA * A Disturbing...," op.cit.. at 69.
5. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 745.
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Under the terms of the will executed hyl the sole surviving coparcener, P,
the entire estate, after his death}vas to devolve on his widow V, for
her lifetijne9 the Bame to go to his collaterals there after*. In 1938
V in turn bequeathed it to SD, and when at her death a fev years later
the collaterals asserted their claim on the basis of the earlier will,
their Lordships were of the view that V, having succeeded to the
properties under the strength of her husband's will, she could not
claim any rigits in them over and above that given to her by testamentary
disposition* As such therefore,
”(T)he life estate given to her under the will cannot 
become an absolute estate tinder the provisions of the 
HSA.” 1
The legacy to the female was obviously in fulfilment of a pre­
existing rigfrt, and yet the award to her of a restricted estate in a 
judgement as brief as it is inexplicable, where their Lordships were
not even willing to concede that the widow as heir had a claim to the
2
estate independently of the will, leaves one wondering whether this was 
not indeed a straightforward case of a misconstruction of s. 14 sb a
1. Per Hegde, J., ibid at 746.
2. Along the lines of Anna-purnamma v. Sankararao, A.I.E. i960 A.P. 359*
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conBequence of the apparently simple wording of sub-s* (2) of the
section* The assumption without overt argument or proof that the
widow had no antecedent claim, is an extraordinary state of affairs,
and can only be rationalised on the assumption that if the Court did
not go into these matters, it does not mean that they were not evident
from the paper book.^ That it was held that s* 14 (2) applied
fl(C)an only be accounted for an the basis that 
she was disqualified from maintenance or from claiming 
as a dependant on the basis of facts not disclosed in 
the judgement* The case of Kami must therefore be  ^
confined to its own facts, which may never be divulged."
Thus this, it has been conjectured, must have been by evil chance one 
of those rare instances that occurs once in a thousand whereby the 
widow is disqualified from claiming a precedent right even of mainte­
nance from the estate, as for example where she may have had such large 
means that she could not have effectively claimed any maintenance under 
the HAMk; on the other hand, it might equally have been that by reason 
of her adultery, the recognition of a pre-existing right inhering in her 
could have been prevented, or likewise if she had been criminally res­
ponsible for the death of P, or even by reason of gifts made to her by 
P during his lifetime whereby all claims to maintenance were already 
secured.^
This attemptjf^ to reconcile the obviously faulty ratio on hypotheti­
cal suppositions, is an effort to restore a degree of credence to a 
decision otherwise singularly at variance with the settled principle 
that s* 14 (2) cannot apply where the lady acquired her right otherwise 
than under the instrument etc* One submits that even supposing that 
any of such reasons w pertinent, where clarity is the order of the
1* Derrett, "A Hindu Law Miscellany," (1971)# QUoCit*, at 82.
2. Derrett, "The Tenure of Widows...," op.cit., at 33*
3. Derrett, "A Hindu Law Miscellany," (1971) op.cit., at 83*
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day, ‘brevity is hardly a merit. The Supreme Court could ill have
afforded to h&se its decision on undisclosed facts, for the dr Lordships
could hardly have "been unaware that the case was entirely capable of
being "misunderstood and misused,leading to the kind of protracted,
dreary and costly litigation as has marked the construction of s. 14
as of its inception. The failure an its part to reduce uncertainty
and to establish a more positive approach an the basis of given facts
does not - it has to be said with all due respect - call for an
apologist attitude towards the Supreme Court, and the decision, judged
on its merits, must be held to be wrong. The Supreme Court, highest
judicial authority though it may be, is not infallible, and has been
2known in the past to resile from its own correct dicta; this, it is 
submitted, is a similar instance w W ac the proper principle obtaining 
in Seth Badri Prasad v. Sint. Kanao Devi^d is regarded for a literal and 
oppressive construction of s. 14 (2).
Decisions such as the foregoing are regressive, and lacking in that
perspicacity so necessary for the judicious construction of
s. 14 so as not to detract from the rights that it was in the con­
templation of the Legislature to confer an women. Fortunately several 
other decisions, in taking the reverse view, confirm that an acquisition 
under a deed of gift or testamentary disposition is as capable of 
enlarging to an absolute estate as under any other instrument, 
notwithstanding the imposition of restrictions in it, where an ante­
cedent right inheres in the female. ^
In Blanda v. Duni Chand,^  where in settlement of a dispute and under
1. Derrett, "Die Tenure of Widows...," op.cit., at 33*
2. Ve have already noted the resiling of the Supreme Court in flaraini 
Devi v. Ramo Devi, A.I.R. 1976 S.C 2198, from its own earlier view 
in Rani Bai v. Yadunandan. A.I.R. 1969 S.C 1118, of
the right of maintenance as a pre-existing right.
3. A.I.R. 1970 S.C 1963.
4. A.I.R. 1963 Punj. 34.
k gjMe t A. t. fls . A .P. 35^ (j*Jbov/«L ojc k“W -2»V
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a compromise, the sole surviving coparcener having made a gift of the 
property to his widowed dau.g£iter-in-law for her maintenance, expressly 
restricted her from either selling or mortgaging the same, the conten­
tion of his collaterals was that the gift of such property by the 
widow after 1956 was devoid of all validity, as what the lady had 
acquired was a limited estate incapable of being enlarged to a full 
tenure under s. 14 (l)« The learned Judge, Mahajan, J., though dis­
missive in the first instance of the contention that a gift, orally 
made, could not attract the provisions of s. 14 (2),^ ruled in '
favour of an absolute estate for the widow. In his lordship* s 
reasoning, despite the prohibition against sale and mortgage, as it 
was nowhere stated that,at the female's death, the property must revert 
to the heirs of the donor, the contention that a restriction on her 
right to make a gift should be implied, could not be upheld in view of 
the clear provisions of s. 14 (2) which stipulate the spelling out 
rather than the implication of such restrictions* Thus for all that 
it was not the Hindu widow's estate that was gifted to her, as the
female was possessed of property in lieu of maintenance, s. 14 (l)
2
would have the effect of transforming it to a full tenure.
It is submitted that on a careful analysis of the decision one is 
not quite in agreement with the rationale of the learned Judge. Where
I, The Court clarifying at 35 that, "The use of the term 'gift' ... 
refers to all gifts valid at law whether oral or written and the 
connotation of the term 'gift' cannot be deemed to have been 
abridged by the use later on, of the term 'or other instrument'
(in s. 14 (2))."
The moral obligation of the father-in-law to maintain his widowed 
daughter-in-law from out of his separate property is a legal liability 
in the hands of his heirs, and as much enforceable under s. 14 (l) as 
is such ri^ rfc in the ancestral estate. In view of this, the incorrect 
approach obtaining in Kun.ji Thomman v. Meenakshi, A.I.R. 1970 Eer©
284, provides an interesting contrast to our present study. On the 
other hand, like the present case, in Chinnappa v. Yalliammal, A.I.R. 
1969 Mad. 187, "th© execution of a maintenance deed in satisfaction
(continued on next page)
2.
/
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the express stipulation is as to restrictions by sale or mortgage, it 
is clear that the tenor of the grant is against alienations in general, 
including, by implication, gratuitous alienations. What however 
nullifies such restrictions is, as was rightly held, the claim of the 
widowed daughter-in-lav to a subsisting right of maintenance out of 
the property in the hands of the sole surviving coparcener; in view of 
this indefeasible right, such property, whether there was an embargo 
or not on alienations by gift or otherwise, must convert to an 
absolute estate under s. 14 (l).
The sole surviving coparcener may have an absolute disposable 
interest in the property, yet where the language employed in the dis­
position allows for ambiguity, the Court is entitled to look at the 
surrounding circumstances^- at the time of execution to determine the 
estate that the female takes in the ligit of legislative changes. An
(continued from previous page)
of the daughter-in-law1 s claim to maintenance from out of the 
joint properties, was likewise rightly held to attract s. 14 (l).
But there the similarity ends, for the statement of his Lordship, 
Ismail, J., at 191 that, the transaction not being a gift, it was 
therefore "not open to (the) challenge," could by implication be 
construed to mean that a gift deed under the exact circumstances 
could indeed be challenged - a point of view not to be countenanced, 
for what is of the essence is not the nature or character of the 
document, but the indefeasibility of ihe right of maintenance.
1. This formula is of the essence and came in handy in Gopala Menon 
v. Sivaraman. A.I.R. 1979 S.C 1345, the Supreme Court confirming 
the decision of the Kerala Higfr Court in Sivaraman v. Gopala 
Menon. A.I.R. 1969 Ker® 246. Notwithstanding s. 48 of the Madras 
Marumakkattayam Act 22 of 1932, which stipulates that where a 
person bequeathes any property to his wife alone, such property 
shall, unless a contrary intention appears from the will, (emphasis 
mine), be taken as tavazhi property by the wife, her sons and 
daughters, (see also Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 355-6), their 
Lordships held that where the gift conveys by words of unambiguous 
import an unrestricted estate "with power of alienation," the 
bequest would not be in repugnance with s. 48. The fact that the 
testator had made additional stipulations as to the use of the 
income, would not detract either, from the absolute estate of the 
female as the absolute and unrestricted power to dispose of 
property is a necessary incident of an absolute estate.
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example of this is Isakki v» Pappajpiaal« A husband entering in his
third marriage in 1927 executed a settlement deed which provided for
a portion of the property to be enjoyed by the settlor and settles
jointly during their lives, with neither of them during the lifetime
of the other having the power to alienate the same. Qhe deed further
stipulated that after their deaths, the settled property and the
remainder of the estate were to be taken absolutely by their male
heirs, and failing them, the female heirs, including the settlor's
daughter from his first marriage, should take equally. The deed also
provided that in the event of the settles having no children, the
scheduled properties under the deed were to be taken by her with
absolute rights. At his death in 1937, leaving as his only children
two daughters, one by his first wife and the other the child of the
settlee, while the widow claimed that though she took a life interest
in the properties, the subject of the settlement deed, the interest
which she had acquired as heir to her husband in the remainder of the
estate had converted to an absolute and heritable tenure under the Act
of 1956, the heirs of the step-daughter contended that, the settled
properties apart, as the rest of the estate had been testamentarily
disposed of as well, they were entitled to set up title as co-owners
along with the widow. In the opinion of Natesan, J., however, this
latter contention was difficult to uphold given the surrounding circum- 
2
stances, and while he was agreed that the female would take a life
1. A.I.B. 1968 Mad. 61.
2. The Court holding at 64, ibid., that to read the deed as such would 
be to construe it as envisaging the postponing of the son's interest 
till after the lifetime of the widow; and to accede to such a 
construction would be to ascribe to the testator whose anxiety for
a son was in such evidence, a desire not in consonance with the 
normal wishes and attitudes of the class of people to which he 
belonged. The learned Judge was equally convinced at 64 that, 
despite the sole surviving coparcener's unfettered powers of disposal,
(continued an next page)
interest in the settled properties, his lordship held that as no
testamentary disposition could he spelt out in regard to the remainder,^
the limited estate that the widow took as her husband* s heir, would
become her absolute property under s. 14 (l), notwithstanding that
n(l)f the settlor could be consulted today he 
may vehemently assert in the background of the 
subsequent events and legislation that his intention 
was as now interpreted by the appellate Court• " ^
3
In Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Kumar the inherent right of the female 
in the joint-family property reinforced by the sole surviving copar­
cener* 8 right to make the gift of his choice , was the basis of the 
ruling in favour of the daughter-in-law. Hie sole surviving coparcener 
executed a will in texmB whereof he bequeathed one of the properties 
absolutely to his son*s widow, and then proceeded to create two further 
successive life estates in respect of the other properties, one in 
favour of the widow, and the other in favour of her infant daughter, 
the latter estate to devolve absolutely on her male issue. Prior to 
her death, the widow alienated the property given to her in absolute 
estate, and in recognition (one assumes) of the testator*s volition to
(continued from previous page)
"all the same I do not think that any Hindu could postpone his son 
taking his estate after him for the lifetime of his widow when the 
son is yet to be bom and nothing can be predicted about him." 
Significantly too, his Lordship added, the absence of any provision 
for the maintenance of the first wife, did not warrant imputing a 
testamentary intent to the settlor where the just and lawful claims 
and demands on his dispositive powers are ignored.
1. The "remainder” would exclude an item of property set out in schedule 
8 of the deed, which, the parties had agreed among themselves, would 
vest in the defendants absolutely.
2. Isakki v. Pappammal, A.I.R. 1968 Mad. 6l at 65, Derrett explaining 
the underlying rationale as, "He (the settlor never contemplated 
that they (the ladies concerned) should have a disposable, 
absolute estate in them. But since these arrangements were in ful­
filment of an obligation he already had towards them, the settlees 
were held entitled to the properties absolutely under s. 14 (l) of 
the ESA." : Critique, op.cit., at 203.
3. A.I.R. 1983 NOC 48 (Delhi), reported in A.I.R. 1983 HOC 21.
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give Buch an estate, the alienation was accepted as in exercise of her 
absolute right over it. At her death therefore in 1967, the Bole 
question for decision was whether the life estate in her possession 
had converted to an absolute tenure despite the widow's unchastity and 
the birth of an illegitimate son to her. In view of the decisive ruling
in Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi,^  his Lordship Anand, J., was in no doubt
that, as the bequest in its totality indicated that both the absolute 
as well as the life estates had been given for the same reason, it was 
not possible to apportion the right of maintenance against any particu­
lar part of the property, and
"(T)he limited estate conferred on her by the testator 
was a clear recognition of the obligation of the 
testator to provide maintenance for her out of the 
property..." 2
Thus as the grant was in recognition of a pre-existing right, notwith­
standing that such right was merely a right of maintenance and 
therefore distinguishable from the Hindu "widow's estate", the grant 
of such a life estate simpliciter. even under a will, would operate to 
bring it outside the purview of the exception to s. 14 (l), for
"(t)he bequest in (her) favour ... was not only not 
in derogation of her right to maintenance but in 
furtherance or recognition of that right and to 
effectuate it." 3
Further, his Lordship clarified, the rule of Hindu law, that of
forfeiture in the event of unchastity, could not be retrospectively
applied, for once the estate had vested on the death of the testator,
there could not be a subsequent divesting,^ and as such, the wide
amplitude of s. 14 (l) was sufficient to bring it within the scope
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944.
2. Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Kumar, cited above, at 22.
3. Ibid.
4. For confirmation of 1his rule see Punithavalli Ammal v. Ramalingam, 
A.I.R. 1970 S.C 1730, supra, at $11.
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of the sub-s.^
The right of alienation in the sole surviving coparcener apart,
ve must next consider the gift made by a single coparcener and its
validity if any, in the light of the cardinal principle that it is only
a gift of all the coparceners, which would, under certain conditions,
o
be a gift attributable to the coparcenary body and therefore valid*
Inevitably, where such consent was not forthcoming, the resulting 
dissension and its veracity would depend essentially upon the nature 
of the female’s claim in the ancestral property; a pre-existing claim, ' 
it is submitted, would operate to modify the rule, so asj^ bring the 
property within s. 14 (l) to the detriment of the survivorship.
The decision in Earl Putt v* Shiv Ram  ^vindicates this view. A 
Hindu female having acquired certain items in the ancestral estate in 
1926 by way of an absolute gift from her father-in-law for her main­
tenance, her husband brought a suit against both donor and donee for 
declaring the gift invalid on the grounds that it was made without the
1. The case reported in note form is obviously confined to the property 
in dispute. But what of the life estate acquired by the testator*s 
grand-daughter? It is submitted that, as in 1927 when the gift was 
made to her she was an infant, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that she had been married prior to the passing of the HSA.
The daughter* s right to maintenance from out of the ancestral 
estate ceases on her marriage; the life estate given to her for 
Just such a purpose could not have enlarged under s. 14 (l). The 
attempt at the creating of an estate in tail male must also be held
to be void as being in repugnance to the general pattern of
inheritance, notwithstanding that coincidently the female’s heirs 
happened to be sons, so that at her death the taking of the estate 
by her male heirs would be valid, not on the basis of the will, but 
only if they happened to be the next reversioners of the deceased 
testator.
2. Derrett, XM5L, op.cit.. at 286, who further explains that, "If there 
is no son of a living or deceased coparcener in the womb and no minor 
coparcener or owner of a coparcenary interest, all the coparceners
etc., together will be able to give, sell, exchange or mortgage the
Joint-family property (subject to rights of maintenance) and the 
alienee need fear no suits to set aside the alienation.” * Ibid.
at 284*
3. A.I.R. 1979 H.P 41.
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consent of the other coparcener of the family,^ " i.e. himself* The suit
was compromised and a life estate created in favour of the lady. After
1956, the gift by her of the property under a testamentary disposition
was challenged9 the usual contention being that the restricted estate
given to her under the consent decree was an acquisition for the first
time so as to attract the provisions of s. 14 (2)* In the view of the
Court however9 the right of maintenance which the female had in the
family properties, was a right acquired independently and even prior
2
to the gift which was made an recognition of Just such a right. But 
even assuming that the gift could not have been made without the con­
sent of the other coparcener, the transaction, his Lordship, Mehta C.J., 
held, was not void ab initio but merely voidable* Having been chal­
lenged, the subsequent obtaining of a consent decree and the award of 
a life estate could not be said to altogether obliterate the gift but 
merely to limit its operation the lifetime of the female. In
other words,
compromise resulted merely in the adjustment 
of (the female’s) right in the property. Such 
adjustment cannot be said to have brought forth or 
created a right which was not in existence," 3
and to such property, the right to which the lady had already acquired
from the moment she had entered into the family of her husband on
1. The rule that where all the coparceners together make a gift, it is 
unassailable is indicated in Smt. Basant Kaur v. Smt. Tej Eaur. 
A.I.R. 1967 P. & H. 429, where independently of the HSA. it was 
held that where the last male holders made a gift of the property to 
their mother for her maintenance, as there was no indication in the 
document that the property was given for life, the mere fact that
it was given for purposes of maintenance did not mean that the 
property was not given absolutely.
2. See also Tirath v. Manmohan Singh. A.I.R. 1981 P. & H. 174j where 
Gupta, J., likewise held that, as the gift of property to the widow 
of a pre-deceased son was in recognition of her pre-existing right 
of maintenance, the restrictions put on her by way of a' subsequent 
compromise, would cease to have effect after the commencement of 
the HSA.
3. Per Mehta, C.J., Hari. Dubty. -Shiv Ram, cited above, at 45.
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marriage, s. 14 (l) would apply and the restrictions in the compromise 
ignored•
The ruling in Baijaath Kuer v. Kaheshwari^ is along similar lines*
The husband having executed a Mokarrari Heyati deed (a. deed conferring 
a life estate) in 1922 in favour of his wife for her maintenance, the 
widow after his death executed a deed of relinquishment in favour of 
the surviving coparcener, and in consideration thereof, the latter 
executed a maintenance deed in favour of the female in 1935• Subse­
quently as a consequence of a change of heart, on the widow’s challeng­
ing the deed of relinquishment as being a sham and invalid document 
and therefore inoperative and ineffective, the suit was referred to 
arbitration, and in 1947 she was awarded lands in life interest for 
her maintenance• His Lordship, Sinha, J., keeping in mind the view 
taken by the Supreme Court authorities of the pre-existing nature of 
the rigjit of maintenance in coparcenary property, held that as the 
Mbkarrari Heyati deed as also the deed of maintenance executed in 1935* 
were precisely in recognition of this antecedent right, the acquisition 
under the arbitration award being likewise clearly a provision by way 
of maintenance, it could not be said to be an "acquisition" within the 
meaning of s* 14 (2)*
In a resum^ of the foregoing, one therefore comes to the 
inescapable conclusion that for the purposes of a pre-existing right in 
the joint estate, acquisition by way of gift or under a testamentary
1* A.I.R* 1981 Pat. 255.
2. See also Jinnappa v. Smt* Kallawa, A.I.R. 1983 Kant. 67, where on a 
similar reliance on the Supreme Court rulings in Seth Badri Prasad 
v. Smt. Kan so Bevi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C 1963* Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, 
A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944, Bai Yajia v. Thakorji, A.I.R. 1979 S.C 993* 
and the view taken in them of the antecedent nature of the right of 
maintenance in the joint-family property, the Karnataka High Court 
likewise held that the restricted estate acquired by the widow in 
the family property, was converted to an absolute right under s. 14 (l)«
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disposition is essentially the same as acquisition under any other 
instrument, decree, order or award, and seen in the light of this 
construction, the inclusion of the words "devise" and "gift" in the 
Explanation to s. 14 (l) confirms the view that, it was not in the 
contemplation of Parliament to discriminate between females with like 
rights but which may be awarded to them under a motley array of 
instruments.
(ii-b) Where the Female is a Stranger to the Coparcenary Property
The problem that next awaits us in this, the penultimate section 
of this part of our study, is the effect of s. 14 where a gift is made 
to a female who has no antecedent claim either of maintenance or as heir 
under the HVRP&., 1937» ^  the joint estate. It is submitted that in 
such cases sub-s. (2) of s. 14 would operate to exclude the property 
from the wide spectrum of s. 14 (l), for the female being a stranger to 
the property or family, the instrument is the source or foundation of 
her title; she must take subject to the restricted estate irrespective 
of whether or not there were restrictions in the instrument, for despite 
the dent made by 8. 6 of the USA, on the right to take by survivorship, 
the reverter by survivorship is still capable of asserting itself in 
cases where improper alienations - gratuitous or otherwise - were 
effected prior to 1956.
It is a settled principle of the Punjab Customary law that the 
daughter is a better heir than the collaterals, but only in respect of 
the non-ancestral property belonging to her deceased father. Thus in 
Mst. Bakhtawari v. Sadhu Singh, ^ where a gift to the daughter of the 
ancestral property was made in 1949* on the coming into effect of the 
HSA., the donee’s plea was that in view of her new right as preferential 
heir under the statute of 1956, the reversionary right stood extinguished.
1. A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 558.
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Their Lordships, Gosain and Grover, JJ., however negatived this con­
tention to hold that while such a claim would certainly have had force 
if the donor had died after the HSA had come into force,^ the con­
sequence of his death in 1955 had considerably affected the position 
to the detriment of the female. In 1955 when succession opened out, 
the collaterals who were better theirs qua ancestral property, became 
entitled; their position changed from that of reversioners to that of 
owners, and property once vested could not be divested merely because 
subsequently a new rule of succession had come into force, and as such 
the claim of the female under ss. 8 and 1^ (l) could not be validated.
1. That this is certainly the correct interpretation has been demonstra­
ted in Giani Ram v. Ram.ji Lai, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 11^, where prior to 
the HSA, the father's improper alienation by sale of the ancestral 
lands having been declared null and void as against the reversionary 
claims of the sons, after the former's death in 1959# it was held 
that, had the testator died prior to the Act of 1956, his three sons 
would have taken to the exclusion of his widow and daughters. But as 
the death took place after 1956, the property must be deemed to have 
reverted to the estate, and all persons who would, but for the alienar- 
tion, have taken the estate, must be held entitled to inherit the 
same. Thus under the new rules of succession, the widow and the 
daughters would take equally and along with the sons. The decision
in Smt. Manshan v. Tej Ram, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 558, is even more apposite 
to our discussion here. The gift to the daughters of the ancestral 
estate having been challenged, a decree was passed declaring in favour 
of the reversionary right at the moment of the donor's death. On 
the latter dying after the HSA had come into effect, it was held that 
the daughters in supersession of the prevalent custom became the 
preferential heirs, and were entitled to inherit their fathers interest 
in the ancestral property to the exclusion of the collaterals. Note 
though, that if under the exact circumstances, the gift had been a 
bequest, the legatee daughters would have taken absolutely not only 
to the exclusion of the reversion, but to the exclusion of all other 
heirs as well on the established principle that, the will speaks at 
the death of the testator.
2. A principle of moment in that it establishes that s. 8 has no retros­
pective application, and of value in determining the identity of the 
next reversioner under such circumstances.
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Credence is lent to this line of reasoning in Jagir Sin^i v. Baboo 
Singh.^  The gift to the married daughters having been challenged, a 
compromise was arrived at and a decree for declaration was granted to 
the effect that the gift would be ineffective as against the reversion 
in respect of half of the gifted land, and in respect of the other half, 
the donees were to be in possession with no power of alienation, the 
same to revert to the collaterals at the death or remarriage of the 
last survivor of the three daughters 0 In 1965 the last surviving 
sister claimed to have become absolute owner entitled to make an alien­
ation by gift inter vivos under s« 14 (l). Mittal, J., however, in
reliance upon the interpretation of the two sub-ss. of s* 14 by the 
2
Supreme Court, was rightly of the view that as under the Customary 
law of the Punjab, the married daughters have no pre-existing right in 
the property of their father, the acquisition of the property by virtue 
of the deed of gift was the root of their title, and having agreed under 
the compromise to the taking of a life estate, s* 14 (2) operated to 
prevent it from converting to a full tenure*
However, that the female, stranger though she may be, is still 
capable of asserting absolute ownership over property which she has 
acquired by gift inter vivos if all the coparceners together assent to 
the making of the gift to her, we have already noted* Just such a 
situation occurred 
his sons settled property on his daughter with the provision that she 
was to enjoy the income during her lifetime, and after her, her children
1. A.I.R. 1982, P. & H. 208.
2* His Lordship referred to the Supreme Court authorities of Santhanam 
Km Curukkal v. Subramanya Gurukkal, A.I.R. 1977 S.C 2024; Bai Vajia 
v. Thakorbhai, A.I.R* 1979 S.C 995* and particularly, Tulasamma v. 
Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944.
3* A.I.R. 1972, A.P. 192.
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vere to take the property absolutely* The female haying died issue less 
in 1964» ber brothers claimed that they were entitled to the suit land 
as against the husband* His Lordship, Eao, J, however held otherwise, 
for in his view the settlement deed indicated the award of an estate 
as was clearly capable of attracting s* 14 (l)* It was rightly 
construed that the injunction against damage to the property could not 
be regarded as a condition against alienation* Moreover the incorpora­
tion of the words, "from today we and our representatives have no 
concern at all with this property,’* the more reinforced by the additio­
nal clause that after the female*s death, her children were to take the 
lands absolutely were definitive proof that the estate intended to be 
conveyed was a heritable estate and not a life estate, and the donee*s 
acquisition coming within s* 14 (l), it was not open for any of the 
donors to reclaim it*^
A careful review of judicial decisions thus indicates a persistence 
as between the Courts, of a conflict of opinion as to the proper con­
struction of s* 14 (2) and the purpose that it was meant to serve*
The authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Tulasamma v*
2
Sesha Heddi, in so fax as it goes, has served its purpose well, but 
despite the reiterating by their Lordships of the established principle 
that s* 14 (2) may only apply where the female has acquired the 
property for the first time, there is nevertheless in evidence a certain 
_ confusion, a certain dichotomy of view in a failure to grasp the essential
1# In Guramma v. Mallappa, A*I*R. 1964 S.C 510, the Supreme Court had 
laid down that gifts of affection by fathers to daughters in per­
formance of the duty to see to their welfare even after their 
marriages, were valid and binding an the coparceners provided that 
such gifts were reasonable relative to the wealth of the family. It 
is however submitted that, while the gift of affection in our present 
case is, as a whole, endorsed by the Supreme Court ruling, the 
implication in the latter of need in the donee, is of no relevance 
here, as the gift was a gift together, and on the volition of the 
father and brothers*
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944-
-689-
distinction between the pre-existing right that the female acquires 
in the ancestral estate by reason of her right to maintenance or 
otherwise, and her right in the prspositus* separate property where 
her claims are regulated by the disposing powers of the donor where 
she is not an heir under the HWRPAt 1937#
This confusion, all the more compounded where the acquisition, 
the object of the quarrel, is by way of gift inter vivos or under a 
testamentary disposition, calls for urgent resolution, and as judicial 
solution on the pattern of Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi  ^is nowhere in 
sight, the Legislature must be called upon to play its part in an effort 
to cut the Gordian knot* The amendment; of se 14 (2) is, it is sub­
mitted, of pressing necessity, and if the sub-s. is amended to the 
effect that
"(N)othing contained in sub-s* (l) Bhall apply 
to any property acquired by way of gift or under 
a will ••• where the terms of the gift will or 
other instrument ... prescribe a restricted estate 
in (omit 1 such property*) the separate -property of 
a male Hindu or where the female Hindu acquires an 
interest for the first time in Mitakshara coparce­
nary property,1
such amendment would, one feels certain, serve the dual purpose of 
obviating the misery and financial loss — which profits none but the 
legal profession - that the parties to protracted litigation are 
inevitably brought upon to bear, and lend at the same time, that 
"clarity, certainty and simplicity" to the law which Bhagvati, J.,^had 
pleaded as far back as 1977*^
(iii) Bie Position After 1956
While the HSA has brought about no change in the inability of a 
male Hindu to dispose^  by gift inter vivost1 his share of the joint-family I of
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944.
2. Ibid., at 1946.
property, b. 30 of the Act read with s. 6 confers upon the Mitakgara 
coparcener and likewise a member of the joint-family governed by 
Punjab Customary law, the power of testamentary disposition over his 
undivided assetB provided that a female heir in Class I of the Schedule 
to the HSA or a daughter's son capable of inheriting, survives the 
testator.
Keeping in mind this scheme and in the light of the revolutionary 
provisions of s. 14, the final problem awaiting resolution in this 
section, is an attempt at ascertaining the position after 1956 where 
grants are made by settlements inter vivos or by will to females on the 
part of persons who during their lifetime were under an obligation to 
maintain such donees.
Once Parliament has allowed a coparcener to dispose of his interest,
virtually all a male,s property is capable of being disposed by will,
and this is controlled by nothing but the rights of dependants under
s. 22 of the Thus where a grant is made by will to a woman who
would have had a right to be maintained had the testator died prior to
1956, does sWe. literally have a subsisting right at his death after
1956! The case would not be otherwise where the female is the widow of
a coparcener in the Mitaksajg Joint-family, for his interest passes by
succession under s. 6, and is as much liable to be disposed of by will
2or other instrument as his separate estate. The Court may however 
consider that since she could have forced} as a dependant, seme provision 
out of the heirs or legatees, she has the same right to an absolute 
estate as one who had a right to be maintained.
In this dilemma, it is possible to argue on the one hand that, 
women taking restricted rigjhts by will are in the same position as
1. Lerrett, Critique, op.cit., at 224..
2. Derrett, "S. 14 (2) of the HSA s A Disturbing op»cit0, at ^0o
those who took restricted estates by law* All pre-1937 widows and
widows post 1937 who did not demand partition were put in the same
position by s* 14 (l) if the former had been given land for their
maintenance, and a vidov-dependant who takes under her husband's will
should be entitled to no less on equitable grounds*
On the other hand, it is equally possible to argue that
"(O)nce this freedom (of testamentary disposition) 
has been consigned it seems impossible ... to 
suppose that Parliament denies the right to create 
restricted grants for those who have no certain 
prospects, but for that grant, of obtaining rights 
larger than maintenance," 1
and where the Court is satisfied that a restricted estate deliberately
created by the testator is such as would satisfy the demands of the
HSA relative to dependants' rights, the female must either take the
legacy subject to the restriction or exercise the option open to her
of renouncing it, and claim her rights as a dependant under the HAMA.
Judicial development in this area is only just about beginning,
but the proper construction would seem to be that, as the testator
would be well within his rights to leave the estate to the legatee of
2his choice, and thereby exclude the female altogether reducing her 
status to that of a dependant compelled to claim as such under the 
HAMA* the position of the widow:, or daughter, or other female depend­
ant of the estate, is akin to that of any other female; where she 
takes a restricted or limited estate under the testator's will, she is
1. Derrett, Critique * op.cit*, at 224*
2. An example of this is to be seen in Smt* Mohinder Kaur v. Wassan 
Singh* A.I.E. 1968 P. A H. 389» where staking into account the new 
law of succession under the HSA, and in an attempt to prevent liti­
gation after his death, the testator bequeathed his entire estate to 
his two sons expressly excluding his wife and two daughters after 
having made adequate provisions for their maintenance* Subsequently 
by reason of the disqualification of one of the sons, the Court 
upheld the claim of the other that, no intestacy may be construed
in regard to the half share of the former, for where the testator 
had deliberately excluded the female heirs, his intention was clear 
beyond doubt that they were not intended to be benefit ted. beyond 
what the terms of the will had envisaged.
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confined by the restriction and cannot escape it, because the question, 
one submits, of a pre-existing right does not arise at all*
The basis of the reasoning in Jagdish Prasad v. Mauleshwar,^  
though not, it is respectfully submitted, the construction of the will, 
would bear out the viewpoint adopted above as correct* The testator, 
the bulk of whose estate comprised bhumidhari (agricultural) holdings, 
specified in his will that his widow after him was to take the property 
for her life with power of alienation, the same to devolve, after her 
death, on his grandsons including those descended from his first wife* ‘ 
The question for decision was whether the will could be so construed 
as to have conferred on the female a full heritable estate so as to 
exclude from succession, upon her dying intestate without alienating 
the property, the grandsons of the first wife* The giving of a life 
estate with power of alienation would seem to many to be a contradict­
ion in terms, and the ingenious attempt of the learned Judge, Nar^ o-ix, 
J*, at resolving this inconsistency, though laudable, is entirely
misplaced, one submits* In reliance upon the dicta in Beni Madho v.
2
Earihar Prasad* his Lordship expressed the view that there is nothing
in the law that prohibits the grant of a life estate with full power of
transfer during the donee*s lifetime by a testator in his property, for
"(w)here there is a bequest to A even though 
it may be in terms apparently absolute followed
by a gift of the same to B absolutely *on* or
* after* or *at* A*s death, A is prima facie held 
to take a life-interest and B an interest in 
remainder, the apparently absolute interest of A 
being cut down to accomodate the interest created 
in favour of B." 3
— Vhile there can be no disputing that the testator was favourably
1. A.I.R. 1982 All. 162.
2. A.I.R. 1946 Oudh 20.
3* Per Randan, J., Jagdish Prasad v. Mauleshwar, cited above, quoting 
from Ramchandra v. Mrs Hilda Brite, A.I.R. 1964 S.C 1323.
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inclined towards all his grandsons as the inclusion of their names in
the will clearly testifies, it is equally certain that his very real
concern was for his wife given her advanced age* In the passage
quoted from the Supreme Court judgement the emphasis is clearly on
2
the words Apparently absolute interest" the word "apparently" allow­
ing for that latitude of construction upon an inherent ambiguity in 
the wording employed in the will* On the other hand, where the estate 
is conferred "with power of alienation", no ambiguity may be imputed, 
and the will must be construed as contemplating the conferral of an 
absolute estate*
To augment the correctness of this construction, one has only to 
turn to the learned Judge's own admission which concedes in so many
words that, having devised an absolute estate, the testator must have
5 4hoped at the same time that the widow would not alienate the property*
But, it is submitted, to hope is one thing, to specify expressly quite
another, and we must refer back to the principle that mere requests
hopefully suggested, cannot be equated to the force of mandatory 
5
injunctions*
This must therefore be construed as of an instance where the sub­
sequent absolute bequest to the male descendants was a provision by 
way of a precautionary measure in the possible circumstance of the 
female legatee's own death prior to that of the testator's - an 
eventuality not to be ruled out in view of the former's advanced age* 
Thus to hold that,
1. Ramchandra v* Mrs Hilda Brite* cited above.
2* Emphasis mine*
5. Emphasis mine.
4* Jagdish Prasad v* MauleshwarT cited above, at I65.
5* Derrett, IMHL, op.cit., at 468.
"(h)is wife though old, probably older than 
himself was alive, and the testator had a 
foreboding that she would survive him," ^
is to attribute to the testator a sense of prescience nowhere supported 
by the facts*
Untenable as this construction of the testator's intention 
certainly is, the correct approach obtaining in the other more vital 
aspect in the decision has much in it to commend* To the further con­
tention that notwithstanding the restrictions, if any, on the estate 
conferred on her by will, the widow must be deemed to have become full 
owner under s* 14 (l) by reason of her pre-existing ri^it of mainte­
nance and even of inheritance in the estate, the view taken was that 
quite apart from the fact that, as the bulk of the property which
passed under the will "was agricultural land .*. to which the HSA. did 
2
not apply,« what the testator as full owner with power of disposition 
had purported to give, was not to give to his wife an estate in lieu 
of maintenance, but to give to the donee of his choice, the estate of 
his choice at his pleasure*
This view sums Tip in a nutshell the exact position, and the only 
criticism that may be forthcoming is the regrettable brevity and the
1* Jagdish Prasad v* Mauleshwar, cited above, at 165. Neither, it is 
submitted, is there any validity to his Lordship's ruling at ibid*, 
that as the creation under a will of a Hindu woman's limited estate 
was out of question as no longer known to law, the giving of the 
power of alienation must have been considered necessary in order to 
make it appear that the estate conferred by the will in the property 
devised was in conformity with the law. One is tempted to ask 
where the learned Judge had been all these years when just this 
problem of whether or not the "limited" estate could be created by 
testamentary or other instruments was being fought out and resolved 
by the Judiciary.
2, Ibid., at 167-8. The same view was taken in Smt* Prema Devi v* Jt. ^ 
Director of Consolidation, A.I.R* 1970 All* 238, but not to be 
nrnmtpnfmnpd and rightly refuted in Smt. Laxmi Devi v* Surendra 
Kumar Panda, A.I.R. 1957 Or. 1; Sant Bam v. Ouniev Singh, A.I.R*
I960 Punj. 462; Mst Taro v. Darshan Singh-, A.I.R* i960 Punj. 145»
See also Lerrett, Critique, op.cit*, at 230-2.
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lack of a fuller projecting of the picture as set out above* Conse­
quently it may well be that in litigation as must inevitably arise in 
the future, the courts are apt to be misled, and failing to grasp 
entirely the significance of the change of status of the female after 
1956, to rule in her favour on the basis of a non-existent pre-existing 
right •'
To reiterate the correct stance is to attempt to obviate this 
danger, and the present writer would consider herself sufficiently 
reconqpensed for her labours were the Judicial machinery to bear in 
mind that a testator, disposing of property to one whose rights commence 
only at his death, is equally capable of creating a restricted right 
in her favour under s* 14 (2), as a full one, and in such instances, 
as she does not have a legal subsisting right superior to the grant, 
she is thereby not disadvantaged by it*^ " This would be well within the 
Legislative intendment in engrafting sub-s. (2) of s* 14 which, every­
one is agreed, was enacted with a view to equalising the claims of the 
2
two genders, and in keeping with the eminently rational notion that,
"(v)hile there can be no presumption that a 
grant to a woman is for a limited estate, it is 
equally true that where an existing right is 
being recognised no statute lays down a hard and 
fast method whereby it must be satisfied and if 
•women's rights' mean what they are claimed to 
mean, women are not privileged as against men*" 5
This view, and the setting out of the proper function of s* 14 (2)
after 1956, iB borne out by the Judgement in Chanan Singh v* Balwant
S i n The dispute was in regard to the power of the legatee-daughter
1* Derrett, Critique, op.cit., at 224*
2* In other words, "as a testator or settlor can discriminate against 
males, and give, them limited estates, even when they are dependants, 
he can equally discriminate against females, provided that their 
rights of maintenance are not jeopardised thereby." s Derrett, 
"Landmarks in Family...," at 1%
3. Ibid.
4. A.I.R. 1984 P. & H. 203
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to bequeath, in her turn, the property which she held in life estate
under the terms of her father's will executed in 1959» His Lordship
Gupta, J., held that as the testator
"(w)as the absolute owner of the land in dis­
pute, and therefore*• • was competent to will 
away the property in any manner he liked," ^
where the document in clear terms restricted the enjoyment of the 
property to the produce thereof, and expressly prohibited the alienat­
ion of the corpus with the further proviso that, after the daughter's 
death, the gift was to revert to his two brothers, and failing them 
to their male descendants, in such circumstances, the legatee's claim 
to an absolute estate under s* 14 (i) must fail, specially as on her 
own admission, she was given merely a life estate in the property* 
Interpretation to this effect puts into proper perspective the law*
No doubt s* 14 (l) has a part to play in the scheme of the Hindu Code, 
but 8* 14 (2) - of equal significance - may not be ignored, and while 
an alert counsel could well have brought to the attention of the Bench, 
the invalidity of the creation of an estate in tail male, the position
of the female, it is submitted, would not thereby be affected despite
2
the description of her as Malik, as the tenor of the will as a whole 
is unequivocally to the contraiy.
(12) The Effect of S, 14 Where the Female is Not "Possessed" of 
Property
However persistent the right of maintenance may be, that it is 
not in itself a right of a certain and fixed character, it has already 
been ascertained; obviously therefore, where the husband had died
1* T b i d > , at' 20*f.
2* The use of the word malik may not in all cases be inferred as 
connoting absolute ownership. The word merely means "owner", 
and its use in the context of a restricted estate is qqiially 
congruous, as for instance, "the owner of a restricted estate,"
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joint prior to the passing of the 5WRPA, 1937» neither had any 
property been allotted to the widow in lieu of her maintenance, in 
such conditions she is confined to a mere maintenance right, and 
despite the amplified judicial construction of the word "possessed* in 
s« 14 (l)» the joint effect of the sub-s. and the Explanation thereto, 
is to exclude all such females from its ambit, as acquisition and 
possession "in lieu of maintenance" is made the pre-requisite for the 
operation of s. 14 (l) and the absolute ownership of property contem­
plated therein.^ "
The Courts have construed accordingly and negatived every claim 
under s. 14 (l) where the pre-condition of "possession" has not been 
met with.
2In IfcLiflodhar Bao v. Bhima Rao. we have an example of such ruling 
His Lordship, Tukol, J., in explaining the basic rules governing 
onership as envisaged in 8* 14 (l)» held that where the husband had 
died in 1929 and the provisions of the HVRPA applied to the Hyderabad 
State only in 1953 > the alienation by the widow of the property could 
not be validated, for as the suit house had not been allotted to her 
in lieu of her right to separate residence and maintenance, the mere 
right of residence could not create in her the power of alienation that
z
she claimed under s. 14 a).'
1* This their Lordships of the Supreme Court had made clear as far back 
as 1959 in Kotturswami v. Veeravva, A.I.R. 1959 s*c 577> at- 581» : 
"Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act 
certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective, but 
even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female 
Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the pro­
visions of the section applicable."
2. A.I.R. 1965 Mys. 290.
3. On a similar count of non-possession it was held in Anandibai v. 
Sonabai, A.I.R. 1974 Mys. 1, that a mere right to maintenance would 
not attract the provisions of s. 14 (l)» the Court further negativ­
ing the contention that as the suit was one for possession of the
(continued on next page)
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Ra.1 Kumar v. Prem Prakash^ provides another such instance. At 
the widow*s death in 1961, the question for determination was whetherf 
having been expressly restricted under the terms of her husband* s will 
to a mere right of residence in the property, there was any legality 
to the lease effected by her after the commencement of the HSA. In 
elucidating the essential characteristics of s. 14 (l), the learned 
Judges, Mahajan and Singh, JJ*i held that the word "acquired" in the 
sub-s. implies that there fell to the female some right, title or 
interest in the property by virtue of which she could claim to be in 
exclusive possession, and property so acquired and possessed could 
then mature into full ownership. On the other hand,j^ mere right of 
occupation and user, with no right of ownership - however limited - is
(continued from previous page)
properties, it implied that the female was in possession of them in 
lieu of maintenance. See also Hussain v. Venkatachala. A.I.R. 1975 
Mad. 8, supra at 5&1 , f.n. 1, where despite the vindication of the 
view of maintenance as a pre-existing right which could effectively 
nullify all restrictions in the instrument conferring it, it was
held on the facts and on "abundant authority" that the widow not
being in possession on 1706.56, she could not claim the benefit of 
s. 14 (l). Why she was not in possession, we are not told, but were 
she to have been physically ousted as a consequence of the illegal 
possession of another, it is submitted that she would still be held 
to have been "possessed" within the meaning of s. 14 (l)# See 
Kan gal Singh v. Smt. Rattno. A.I.R. 1967 S.C 1786, supra, at 485 • 
Also of relevance are the decisions in Ramcharitra Singh v. Soneful 
Devi, A.I.R. 1977 Rtt. 201, the Court holding that as the estate 
had passed by survivorship at the death of the husband prior to 
1937f the widow could not be said to be in constructive- f. Smt. Ram f 
Devi v. Prakash Narain, A.I.R. 1979 NOC 54 (All.), an^  Pachi v. 
Kumran, A.I.R. 1982 Ker. 137» where the obiter dicta in the former 
was in consonance with the view taken in the latter that, bo long 
as the sons remained Joint, the widow could not be recognised as the 
owner of property, her right being restricted to a mere rig£it of 
residence; Sulabha v. Abhimanya, A.I.R. 1983 Or. 71» 3 ^  Smt. Ram 
Rakhi v. Amar Hath, A.I.R. 1983» P* & H. 156, Gupta, J., explaining 
in the latter at 159 that limited ownership being the sine qua non 
for the applicability of s. 14 (l), "property must vest in her (the
widow), and she should have the occupation, control and usufruct of
it to the exclusion of all other members of the coparcenary."
1. A.I.R. 1972 P. & H. 458.
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incapable of attracting the provisions of s. 14 (l), and such property 
nmst he held to be a restricted estate within the meaning of s. 14 (2), 
in keeping with the wishes of the testator, it is submitted.^
However, what has to be borne in mind is that the principle must 
be rigidly confined to the narrow limit it was meant to encompass, and 
where property is mutated in the female*s name, the view of the Bombay 
High Court that it is not acquisition within the meaning of s. 14 (l) ** 
not to be countenanced.
2In Nara.yanrao v. State, the husband, as a consequence of matri­
monial disharmony, handed over to his separating wife certain items 
of property and fuU^ completed the formalities in regard to the nec­
essary mutation entries. Subsequently harmony having been restored, 
the wife returned to the matrimonial home, and in 1959 affected an 
alienation of the said lands. In 1962 when under the Maharashtra 
Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act. 1961, the husband was 
called upon to declare his surplus holdings, he excluded those items of 
property, on the ground that possession having been delivered to his 
wife in 1955 ia lieu of her maintenance, the effect of s. 14 (l) was 
to make her absolute owner. In a thoroughly reprehensible ruling, the 
Bombay High Court held that unless there is an instrument of transfer,
1. This view is confirmed in Kusnmgauri v. Umiben, A.I.E. 1975 GuJ.
126, where the Court likewise held that, a mother*s right of resi­
dence under her son*s will could not be equated to a share in the 
property, as a general right of residence is one thing, and property 
allocated in lieu of that right, quite another. Note however, Desai, 
J*s dissenting comment at 131-2, of the view expressed in Bai Parsan 
v. Bhagwandas, (1972) 13 Guj. L.R 123 of the right residence as 
being a purely personal right, * ’’Sheth, J., took the view (in the 
latter case) that a bare right of residence created no estate in 
favour of a Hindu widow and the provisions of s. 14 ... were not 
attracted ... In our opinion with respect, the observations made 
by the learned Judge are very wide, "for,4 as the learned Judge 
explained, acquisition for such purpose would attract s. 14 (l).*1
2. A.I.R. 1981 Bom. 271.
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the mere handing over of property would not amount to the acquisition 
contemplated in s. 14 (l), and while mutation of names in the revenue 
records may
M(a)t the most serve as evidence of possession, 
and on occasion, even as presumption of title,"
nevertheless for the vesting under the sub-s*, the possession must
refer to some legitimate claim of title* Such a view, it is submitted,
is as incomprehensible as it is untenable for its blatant disregard of
the very essentials upon which s* 14 (l) rests* To regard the right
of maintenance as incapable of referring to some legitimate claim or
title is to Join ranks with the view long since made obsolete by the
2
Supreme Court ruling in Tulasamma v* Sesha Reddi, and where property
had been actually physically handed over, for the Court to postulate
that as no document had been executed
"(i)n accordance with the provisions of law 
transferring the suit lands* •• in the year 
1953 or any time thereafter, the fact that 
(the female’s) name was shown in the Kabjedar 
column as the occupant of the suit land, could 
not confer any title upon her," 5
is to adhere to the formalities to the detriment of the true purpose of
s. 14 (l). Self-contradictory» and violative of the Legislative intend-
ment, the Judgment must be rejected out of hand, aB much for the view
it takes of maintenance as for the wrong construction of the important
Patna decision in Sumeshwar v* Swami Nathft to suit its own purposes.
In vindicating the notion of maintenance as a pre-existing right
capable of attracting s* 14 (l)» his Lordship, Untwalia, J*, had
further declared in unequivocal terms that
1* Ibid.* at 274.
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C 1944.
5* Narayanrao v. State, cited above, at 275*
4. A.I.R. 1970 Pat. 348.
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"(W)here in mutation proceedings a “bona fide 
dispute between the parties iB compromised. •. 
there,is no necessity to have the petition 
registered... as it is merely a recital of a 
fact "by which the Court is informed that the 
parties have come to an arrangement• " ^
CiiB, it is submitted is the correct position, for where the lady is
"possessed" non-compliance with registration formalities does not
render her any less possessed of AcmvL . The Bombay High Court was not
unaware of this, but perversely cut down its significance to hold that,
"(T)he (Patna) Court held that even assuming 
that the document required registration, still 
the absense of registration would be of no avail 
because in that case (the widow) must be held to 
have acquired title.•• by adverse possession." 2
But this, it is submitted, was merely an incidental remark, the more to
reinforce the widow18 claim, and certainly not the basis of the Patna
ruling, as the Bombay Court implies.
3
The correct position obtains in Bishwanath Pandey v. Badami Raur. 
In a brief but forceful construction of the law, their Lordships of 
the Supreme Court held that, where in 1931» the widow of the deceased 
was mutated as such, the plea of the reversioners that the mutation 
was only by way of consolation without any rights in the property, 
could be of no avail, for after the coming into force of the HSA, and 
the conferral of absolute proprietary rights an the widow, their locus 
standi to challenge her status had come to an end. In other words, 
the mutation itself was sufficient indication of the possession and 
acquisition that is the pre-requisite for the operation of s. 14 (l).
Thus non-delivery of possession does hot thereby rob the widow of
her rightful possession within the meaning of s» 14 (l), and the sig­
nificance of Gupta, J.,»s statement in Tirath v. Manmohan Singh#^
1. Ibid, at.3^ 9- '.
2. Harayanrao v. State, cited above, at 275.
3. A.I.R. 1980 S.C 1329.
4. A.I.R. 1981 P. & H. 174.
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to the effect that, where a gift deed has been signed by the donees
in token of their acceptance of the same,
"(i)t is only the donor who could object 
to the delivery of possession. If the donor 
supports that a valid gift was made, then 
non-delivery of possession, if any, becomes 
immaterial," 1
may be taken to be the rule of general application.
To the extent therefore that it excludes from its ambit widows 
entitled to maintenance but not "possessed" of any property, s. 14 (l) 
is, one submits, unduly discriminatory. Somewhat reminiscent of the 
late unlamented EVRPA, 1937. -  in that both statutes indicate a decided 
partiality for some females to the exclusion of others of similar 
status - the bias of the HSA in favour of those in actual possession 
as a consequence of their own assertiveness or other chance circumstan­
ces, is a partisan approach somewhat difficult to comprehend.
If the right of maintenance is itself recognised as a pre-existing 
right, the source and foundation of that right which emanates from the 
sub-s., the actual "possession" of property should surely not have 
been made the fundamental criterion for the accrual of the benefits of 
s. 14 (l)o It is therefore submitted that, on purely humane and 
equitable grounds Parliament could well have considered extending its 
bounty to include within the purview of the new law, all such widows - 
progressively fewer as the years go by - who may not be possessed of 
property but whose claim to the pre-existing rigfct is not thereby lesser 
than those in actual possession in lieu of that self-same pre-existing 
right* However, inequitable as this may seem, as parliament in its 
wisdom saw fit to exclude such females, we must resign ourselves to its 
express intention, and the Judiciary - the function of which is to read 
into a statute, what it. states, not add to its meaning - has'in the
1. Ibid.^ at 177-
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construction of the section, adhered accordingly as to the legislative 
intendment.
The story must necessarily close with a reference to where it began - 
to Article 44 of the Constitution and the promise in it of a uniform 
civil code for the entire nation. Intractable as the fulfilment of that 
promise may seem at the moment, and as fragmentary as the legislative 
attempt to codify the Hindu law certainly is, we must not in our haste 
and impatience dismiss as insignificant what is in effect, a momentous 
step towards the greater goal.
Problems of construction and anomalies - inevitably the result of 
piecemeal attempts at reform, and perhaps nowhere in greater evidence 
than in the interaction of s. 14 with the uncodified law - have indis­
putably crept in, but once these are resolved either try legislative 
amendment or by judicial pronouncements, and the period of transition 
over, Hindus, who constitute about eighty per cent of the population, 
may hopefully look forward to a more settled and satisfactory era in the 
realm of their personal law. The majority community would then have set 
the pace, and it may well be that, in the light of these improvements,a 
law of uniformity may evolve - a synthesis of the existing personal laws, 
a coherent and codified body of rules applicable to all alike irrespective 
of their personal affiliations to the varying religious denominations 
that are so intrinsically part of the scene in secular India.
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(13) The Progression, at a Glance, of the Femalefs Right to Own 
Property Leading to S. 14 of the HSA, 1956
died before. 14 th April 193? s j j  n died a fte r 17th June 1956
w
died a fte r  i! 14thApnl 1337
w
1. Where she is merely 
confined to a right 
of maintenance, s.
14 (l) has no 
application.
2. Where she is possessed 
of property, the pre­
sumption is that it is 
in lieu of her main­
tenance so as to 
attract s. 14 (l).
3* Where under an 
instrument, order, 
award or decree, she 
is allotted property 
in lieu of maintenance, 
she takes absolutely 
under s. 14 (l) 
notwithstanding 
restrictions in the 
instrument.
4* Where his separate 
property is gifted to 
her either inter vivos. 
or under a testamen­
tary disposition, s.
14 (l) or s. 14 (2) 
will apply according 
to the terms of 
the document.
5. Where his interest in 
the joint-family pro­
perty is gifted to her, 
it is related to her pre­
existing right of main­
tenance so as to attract 
s. 14(1) notwithstanding 
restrictions in the 
instrument.
1. Her entitlement 
under s. 3(3) of 
the HWRPA. 1937, 
to limited owner­
ship of his 
separate property 
under s. 3 0 ) of 
the Act is conver­
ted to an 
absolute estate 
under s. 14 (l).
2. Her entitlement 
under s. 3 (3) of 
the HWRPA, 1937, 
to limited owner­
ship of his 
interest in joint- 
family property 
under s. 3 (2) of 
the Act is conver­
ted to an 
absolute estate 
under s. 14 (l) 
whether or not 
she had exercised 
her claim to 
partition under
s* 3 (3) of the 
Act of 1937.
w
1. She is class I heir under 
the Schedule to the HSA, 
1956, and takes equally 
with other class I heirst
a) His separate estate 
provided it has not been 
disposed of by gift inter 
vivos or by testamentary 
disposition.
b) His interest in the joint- 
family property provided 
it has not been testament- 
arily disused of.
2. In cases of gift inter 
vivos or of testamentary 
disposition of his sepa­
rate estate, or of the 
testamentary disposition 
of his interest in the 
joint-family property, 
she is entitled as a 
dependant under s. 22 of 
the HAMA, 1956, to claim 
maintenance from those 
who take the estate.
3* Where his separate pro­
perty is gifted to her 
either inter vivos or 
under a testamentary dis­
position, s. 14 (l), or 
s. 14 (2) will apply’ 
according to the terms 
of the instrument.
4* Where his interest in the 
joint family property is 
testamentarily gifted to, 
her, s. 14 (l) or s. 14 
(2) should apply accord- 
ing to the terms of 
the instrument.
CONCIUSION
In an overview of the study, it is evident that in the professedly 
secular democracy of the Republic of India, the Constitutional promise 
in Article 44 of a uniform civil code for the entire nation, assumes the 
greater significance in opening up new vistas for women in the male- 
oriented Indian social set-up.
A major step towards the implementation of this goal was the codifi­
cation in large measure, in 1955-6 of the personal law of the majority 
community, and despite certain obvious flaws, onQ.ssions and contradictions 
the "Hindu Code" accords to the female new rights in matters concerning 
Marriage and Divorce, Succession, Guardianship and Adoption and Maintenance 
which go a long way towards the equalising of the status of the two sexes, 
and of the elimination of restrictive and antiquated rules.
On the other hand, the personal laws of the minority communities 
remain as yet unamended, and while no opposition is anticipated from the 
numerically smaller denominations, Muslim intransigence towards codifica­
tion is notorious, and any suggestion at reform is resisted as interference 
with the fundamental right of the practice of their faith.
But in the quest to subjugate existing personal laws to a common law 
for all, the Legislature has put on the statute book a common secular 
law of marriage, divorce and inheritance and all Indians irrespective of 
their religious affiliations, may now resort to the provisions of the SMA, 
195^ , should they so desire. The DPA, 1961, weak and ineffectual as it 
may be, is a measure aimed at the eradication of the evil of the dowry 
system, while the amended Cr. P. C., 1973»j^ ot‘ particular value in the 
protection that it affords from vagrancy to destitute divorced females, 
laudatory as these measures are, a law of uniformity has yet to emerge. 
Muslim intransigence continues to be a major stumbling block, and while
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to many the woes of* this most vocal of minorities might appear self-imposed 
and imaginary, the tilt in the Constitution in favour of Hindus and those 
culturally allied to them, does nothing to allay their fear of losing 
their identity as a community. So as to reassure them of the bona fides 
of the Constitution and make that much easier the implementation of Article 
44, it is recommended thatx
1. Explanation (l) of Article 25 be abrogated.
2. As a corollary to Article 48, a new measure be legislated banning the 
slaughter of cows in public places only.
3- Article 290 (A) be either abrogated, or amended with an Explanation 
thereto for this unusual provision.
So as to rectify the weaknesses and oiQ.ssions in the "Hindu Code", 
it is suggested that:
1. Ss. 11 and 17 of the HMA be amended, and the condition of monogamy be 
replaced by a carefully regulated polygamy.
2. S. 18 (b) be amended, and the lenient penalisation in it replaced by a 
more rigorous form of punishment.
3. S. 23 of the HSA be amended, and the rule of residence in the family 
dwelling house applicable to daughters, extended to the mother, son's 
daughter and daughter's daughter.
4. S.24 be amended, and the rule extended to include the father's widow.
5* S. 21 (vi) of the HAMA be amended, and the word "her" included.
6. S. 22 be amended, and the list of dependants extended to include the 
divorced daughter deprived of alimony, the paternal grandmother up to 
two generations, and the permanently kept concubine.
In regard to social legislation other than the "Hindu Code", changes 
are called for in:
1. S.2 of the DPA, and the abrogation suggested of Explanation I.
2. Ss. 3 an& 4, and the lenient penalisation therein, replaced tjy a more 
rigorous form of punishment.
The DPA, 1961, was recently amended by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 
1984. As yet to arrive in the libraries in London, the amending Act, - a 
copy of which the present writer was able to consult by courtesy of Dr. V. 
Menski, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, - incorporates in substantial measure the suggestions 
made in this study.
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3. S. 8 and the breaking of the law made a cognisable offence which
would include not only the demanding of dowry, but also the taking 
1*of it.
4. S. 127 (3) (b) of the Cr. P.C., and its amendment in the light of 
the Supreme Court's construction. The amended sub-s. may be put 
thus:
"(t)he woman ... has received, ... 
the whole of the sum which, under 
any customary or personal law ... 
was payable on such divorce, (delete 
'cancel such order') take into con­
sideration such sum in determining 
her maintenance under s. 125 "
In its construction of these enactments, the Judiciary must bear 
in mind their social purpose, and in areas of ambiguity interpret 
accordingly. Thus:
1. In the application of s. 13 (l-A) (i) to s. 23 (l) (a) of the HMA, 
it must adhere to the construction that, a party cannot take advan­
tage of his own wrong and turn the judicial relief therein into the 
first stage of divorce.
2. A narrow and literal construction of s. 20 (3) of the HAMA be avoided, 
and the words "unmarried daughter" interpreted to include a major 
unmarried daughter, as the latter's entitlement under the tradi­
tional law has not been expressly abrogated, and this definition 
must necessarily encompass divorced and widowed daughters.
3. Similarly, a liberal construction of s. 21 (ix) is in order, and 
in view of the revised rules for women, the words "so long as she 
remains unmarried", which would naturally suggest "until her first 
marriage", be given wider latitude of interpretation than the words 
would suggest.
The Hindu female's rights in property in the traditional law, and 
the restrictions in her powers of enjoyment of the same, were to a 
significant extent determined by her status of subordination in the 
patriarchal familial structure.
Given the sacramental nature of a Hindu marriage, the wife as the 
companion of the married householder had a vital role to play in assist­
ing him in the fulfilment of his religious duties. At what precise mo­
ment the decline in her status from honoured companion to subordination 
took place it is difficult to gauge.What is certain is that, both in the 
smrti and the Epic literature, while women are generally reviled and 
opprobrium heaped upon them, the exacting ideal of pativrata is insisted 
upon as the only means of their salvation.
The widow's status was correspondinly a degraded one. With the fall 
in popularity of the practice of niyoga which had served as a substitute 
for remarriage, widow remarriage too began to be looked upon with distaste, 
for the insistence on virginity as a pre-condition for the sacramental 
marriage rites precluded its approval. Child marriages inevitably led to 
child widows whose rank and file swelled, and doomed from the moment of 
widowhood, these little ones were made to expiate the impieties of a 
previous existence in shame and suffering.
Henceforward, if the widow chose to survive her husband, the harshest 
of austerities were prescribed for her both in appearance and in demeanour, 
an added indignity being the custom of tonsure so as to harmonise her 
outward appearance with the ideals of renunciation that she was expected 
to follow.
Satl. the barbarous relic of a dim past, but which fitted quite well 
in the frame of the brahminical law of marriage as a sharpened form of the 
severe demands made on the matrimonial fidelity of the widow, survived till 
well into the nineteenth century, but its outlawing by the British in 1829, 
paved the way for an era of social reform headed by the crusaders of the 
Bengali renaissance. The HWRA, was passed in I856, and this was followed 
“by the Child Marriage Restraint Act in 1929, though in tradition-bound 
India these measures, for decades to come, were quietly ignored and the 
practices continued.
Despite the emergence of IirLia as a rapidly developing nation, by and
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large, traditional attitudes still persist, and the Hindu woman is at heart 
the traditional Hindu wife in whom the ideal of pativrati hums quite as 
brightly as when it was first propounded. Consequently the trappings of 
widowhood may be on the wane, but if the traditional shackles still bind 
the Hiiilu widow, her own attitude no less than the male-oriented society 
she lives in is the cause of her plight. The time has now surely come 
for her to -assert her individuality - to marry or not to marry according 
to her preferences rather than remain a prisoner, in the grip, as it were, 
of the ancient smytis.
The concept of female tutelage in the Hindu law has had, till recently, 
lasting repercussions on the scheme of succession. Apart from the share 
that a female takes at a partition of the family property, the widow, in 
default of male issue, was entitled to succeed both to her husband's 
separate estate as well as to his interest in the joint-family property 
in the Dayahhaga system, and to the latter only in the Mitakgara school, 
provided that she had been chaste up to that time.
The texts in the Mitakgara indicate unambiguously that every descrip­
tion of property belonging to a woman, be it inherited from a male or 
obtained at a partition, becomes her stridhana, though it is not a 
necessary corollary that her power of alienation is the same over every 
variety of it. Conversely, the Dayabhaga limits her interest to mere 
enjoyment with moderation, for the property to devolve at her death, 
not to her stridhana heirs, but to the next heirs of her husband.
The characteristics of the woman's estate, and the restrictions 
inherent in it as they emerge in the Dayabhaga system, are indications 
in themselves as to how far removed the concept of the "limited estate" 
is from woman's property as envisaged in the Mitakgam. But in the 
extending of these principles to the Mitakgara school, the Privy Council 
drastically limited the scope of stridhana, and in a series of momentous 
decisions that august body established - despite dissident opinion of 
eminent authorities and those learned in the s as trie lore - that all
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property, whether moveable or immoveable, inherited by a widow, daughter, 
or mother, must be held subject to the limitations known to the Dayabhaga 
law in all the schools.
In an assessment of the "limited estate" and the-incidents attendant 
upon it, it is clear that the institution was a contrived device to keep 
intact the patriarchal power and strength of the joint-family, and the 
Privy Council, more than anything or anybody else, was instrumental in 
perpetrating this inequitable system of female inheritance so out of 
tune with the precepts of the sages of old, without any proof that such 
precepts had become obsolete.
Where she is not an heir, the widow if not unchaste, has an absolute 
right of maintenance from both the separate, as well as the interest in 
the joint estate, of her deceased husband. As the claim arises only 
against those who take the property, the donee or devisee is as much 
bound as the heir or coparcener. This would apply equally to the bona 
fide purchaser for value if he has notice of the claim, thou^i equity 
steps in to protect the bona fide purchaser who purchases without notice 
of the right. However, the creditor's priority of claim militates against 
the right of the maintenance holder, provided that the deceased's debts 
are not "tainted", as do debts incurred by the karta for justifiable 
legal necessity.
While it was early recognised that the father's liability to main­
tain his son's widow is a merely moral obligation, as the heir - and dike- 
wise the donee or devisee - take.the property subject to the Pious Obliga­
tion, it ripens into a legal liability in their hands. In the hands of 
the stranger donee or devisee, the property assumes the nature of a trust 
from which is exigible the maintenance of the son's widow.
No stridhana in the widow's possession - except income-producing 
stridhana, the gift to her by her husband or his father - may affect the 
rate of maintenance, though the rate must necessarily, be. affected by the
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assets in her hands of her husbantl, whether joint or separate. Beyond 
these fundamental rules the rate - like arrears of maintenance for which 
neither demand nor refusal need precede the claim, and .which is defeasible 
only on proof of waiver, abandonment, estoppel, or limitation - is 
dependent upon a great category of circumstances small in themselves 
which determine an increase or decrease in it.
Unchastity on the widow's part disentitles her to maintenance, but 
on her return to a life of continence, the law allows her a starving 
maintenance. Whether or not remarriage, where it is permissible under 
oaste custom, affects the right under the HWRA, I856, is a moot question, 
but where maintenance is secured by decree, or under a will, agreement 
or compromise, the claim remains unaffected, unless there is a provision 
to the contrary in the document.
In an assessment of the right of maintenance, while there can be no 
gainsaying its essentially compassionate nature, it is equally evident 
that, by far the more pressing motivation was surely the time-hallowed 
notions of family probity and prestige, as it was a means of securing 
the joint stock from fragmentation, the insistence on chastity and penance 
on the widow's part further circumscribing any tendency towards extrava­
gance and waste.
In the new awareness for reform that swept the country in the first 
half of this century, the Legislature took a step in this direction in 
1937 when the HWRPA became law. While the three categories of widows 
mentioned in the Act took "the same share as a son" in the separate, and 
"the same interest" as the deceased husband, in the joint, assets, they 
took it subject to the limited estate - creating in the latter entitlement 
a palpable anomaly which gave rise to grave constructional problems in 
the Mitakgara school.
While on the one hand, the Act conferred on the widow a statutory 
interest in Mitakgara coparcenary property, what it did not and could 
not convey to her was the Kitaksara "birthright", and she was thus
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precluded from the status of a coparcener, though she was not thereby 
debarred from assuming managerial responsibilities, particularly if she 
was the only member left sui juris in the joint-family. At the same time 
however, as the owner of a coparcenary interest, she was impliedly 
accorded unier the statute the right to question alienations made by the 
karta, and by the same token it imposed on her the karta's authority 
to bind her interest for justifying legal necessity. The widow's general 
right to be maintained out of the joint assets was still available, 
the option resting with her, to claim maintenance or to take a share at 
partition - which right the Act accorded to her - but not both.
In certain other respects her lack of status as a coparcener worked 
to her disadvantage. The fluctuation of her share ceased with the death 
of the sole surviving coparcener and the extinction of the joint-family, 
and as she was not a coparcener, her rights by survivorship could not arise, 
and she was confined to her interest under s. 3 (2). Additionally, be­
cause she took the "same interest" as her deceased husband,
subject to the limited estate, added restrictions were imposed upon 
her power of alienation, and those who took her interest after her death 
or surrender were not o^ tj jbound by those alienations which were out- 
side a widow's normal powers, but 1 outside the powers of a coparcener as well.
Where the widow died without effecting severance of status, the rule 
of survivorship was upheld in the devolution of her interest, but as the 
institution of a suit for partition is evidence of a definite and unambig­
uous intent to separate, her share was deemed to have devolved accord­
ingly where she died pending a suit for partition. Where partition was 
effected by metes and bounds, the separated interest devolved as such 
under the ordinary Hindu law.
The changes effected by the Act were thus^in a sense, dramatic, ard 
inept as the provisions were, the status of the widow - and therefore 
of the wife — was upgraded. But such benefits as it conferred, were at
best minimal. Of its many limitations, the retention in it of the "limited 
estate" was its undoing. Partial, imperfect, transitional, it could not 
stand the test of time, and not long thereafter, Parliament in Independent 
India undid this piece of unintentional mischief.
By far the most radical departure from tradition is the incorporation 
in the HSA, 1956, - which repeals the HWEPA, 1937 - of s. l*k In abolish­
ing the legal "limited estate", s. 1^ (l) confers on the Hindu female 
the status of an independent and absolute owner of any property possessed 
by her, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act.
But so as not to give females the edge over males, sub-s. (2) of the 
section is more in the nature of an exception to s. l*f (l), and has been 
construed to mean that where the instrument conferring the property 
confers it for the first time, and does so with a limitation cutting down 
the tenure, the woman takes subject to the "restricted" estate.
Judicially, the word "possessed" in s. lh (l) has been construed in 
a broad sense to include not only actual physical possession, but also 
constructive possession as well as possession in law, including the 
female's acquisition by prescriptive title though not of property of which 
she is illegally possessed.
As possession is a prerequisite for the application of s. l*f (l), 
where the widow had remarried prior to the commencement of the Act, the 
rule of forfeiture precludes its operation, but if the remarriage is sub­
sequent to the acquisition of the absolute estate, it cannot work a divesta- 
tion of the property already vested in the widow. The son's widow and 
the brother's widow are disqualified if they remarry in the lifetime of 
the propositus, but the mother's remarriage is no bar to succeeding to her 
son.
An adoption made prior to the HAMA could not work a defeasance of the 
absolute estate on the principle that the old law stood abrogated to the 
extent it conflicted with the new, and the reprieval of the doctrine of 
"relation back" in the HAMA does not make any difference where the widow
is the sole heir. But where she Is joined by other heirs mentioned in 
class I of the Schedule, the fiction is a reality and the adoptive son 
participates in the notional partition envisaged in s. 6, to determine 
the shares that pass by succession including that of the widow.
The share of the female, declared in a preliminary decree of partition 
is property within the meaning of s. l^f (l)» as is the widow's interest in 
the undivided assets, notwithstanding the resultant anomaly that her 
powers of alienation in the coparcenary property are thereby upgraded 
beyond even that of the coparcener's. As the acquisition of property "in 
lieu of maintenance" is an acquisition related to a right antecedently 
acquired, a grant for such a purpose, despite the imposition of restrictions
However, as the traditional law is abrogated only to the extent of its 
repugnance with the new, s. 14 (l) benefits neither the female nor her 
alienee, and the reversion subsists^  in oases of improper alienations by 
sale of the limited interest. Similarly, as the limited owner was in­
capable of alienating other than her limited interest, after her death prior 
to 17 June, 1956, the gift by her inter vivos or by devise to a female, is 
incapable of attracting s. l*f (l). Nor could she or her female alienee 
claim an absolute estate in property gifted inter vivos in the event of her 
survival till after that date, for in the first instance the parting of 
possession hinders the application of s. l*f (l), while the donee is inhi­
bited in that she is incapable of taking more than the donor could give.
In all such cases^  though, these principles are inapplicable where the donee^  
or devisee has an indefeasible subsisting right of maintenance in the 
property, the force of which is to render impotent all reversionary claims. 
Equally, a testamentary disposition made prior to 1956, but given effect 
to at the death of the testatrix after 1956, effectively extinguishes the 
reversion on the principle that the will speaks at the death of the testator.
On the other hand, as a Hindu male possesses full disposing power
over his separate property, the construction of the deed of gift or will is
of the crux, and where it purports to give a life estate, the female 
takes under S .  14 (2) unless the tenor of the document as a whole suggests 
a contrary intention. The gift inter vivos or by will of joint-family 
property prior to 1956, is as capable of enlarging to an absolute estate 
as under any other instrument notwithstanding the imposition of restric­
tions in it, where a pre-existing right inheres in the female, though the 
position is otherwise where the female is a stranger to the family. As 
the gift or devise is the source of her title, she takes a restricted 
estate under s. 14 (2), and the intention of the donor is immaterial, for 
in all such oases of improper alienations, the principle of survivorship 
operates to the detriment of the female's claim to absolute ownership.
After 1956 the position must be otherwise. The right of the Hindu 
male to the absolute disposal of his interest by devisejjjprecludes the 
notion of a pre-existing right in the joint assets, and the position of 
the mother, or daughter, or other female dependant is akin to that of any 
other female. Where under the testator's will she is given a restricted 
estate, she either takes subject to s. 14 (2), or exercises the option 
open to her of renouncing the legacy and claiming as a dependant under 
s. 22 of the HAMA, 1956.
As the acquisition and possession of property is a pre-condition for 
the application of s. 14 (1), where the female is confined to a right of 
maintenance, mere occupation and user with no right of ownership - how­
ever limited - in her, is incapable of attracting s. 14 (1), and inequitable 
as this may appear, as Parliament in its wisdom saw fit to exclude such 
females, we must resign ourselves to its express intention.
The story must necessarily close with a reference to where it began - 
to Article 44 of the Constitution and the promise in it of a uniform civil 
code for the entire nation. Thus codified, and in time shorn of its anoma­
lies and contradictions, the personal law of the majority community may 
well have set the pace for the emergence of a codified body of rules 
applicable to all alike, irrespective of personal affiliations to the vary-
ing religious denominations that are so intrinsically part of the scene 
in secular India.
In the ligit of our investigation, it is suggested that the time has 
come for the Legislature to consider:
1. Abolishing the Mitak^ara "birthright", and the amending of s. 6 and its
Proviso to the effect that,
"(W)hen a male Hindu dies after the com­
mencement of this Act, having at the time 
of his death an interest in a Mitakshara 
coparcenary property, his interest in the 
property shall devolve (delete 'by sur­
vivorship . •. Provided that ... shall 
devolve') by testamentary or intestate 
succession, as the case may be, under 
this Act and not by survivorship."
2. Amending s. 14 (2) to the effect that,
"(N)othing contained in subsection (l) shall 
apply to any property acquired by way of gift 
or under a will ... where the terms of the 
gift, will or other instrument ... prescribe 
a restricted estate in (delete 'such pro­
perty ') the separate property of a male 
Hindu, or where the female Hindu acquires 
an interest for the first time in a Mitak­
shara coparcenary property."
3. Amending s. 30 to the effect that,
"(A)ny Hindu may dispose by gift inter 
vivos or by will or other testamentary 
disposition any property ... applica­
ble to Hindus."
While these amendments would, it is hoped, play a significant role 
m  equalising claims and resolving ambiguities, the Judiciary must bear in 
mind that*
1. Where the widow takes along with any other class I heir, the principle 
that an estate once vested cannot be divested is subject to the fiction 
of relation back if the adoption is effected after 21 December 1956. -
2. The nature of the interest that the female devisee takes in coparce­
nary property devised after 1956, is still a matter of debate. To prog­
nosticate what dimensions the controversy may assume is to rush in where
angels might fear to tread. But the eminently equitable construction must 
be that, as a pre-existing right in the property is precluded, all females
take the interest envisaged in the will.
FINIS
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AFFENDDIX I
C U R R E N T  I N D I A N  S T A T U T E S
HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 
HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIA1EHIP ACT, 1956 
HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956 
DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1973
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SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 195*+
(Act No 43 of 195*+ 33 amended by Act No 32 of 19&3* 
29 of 1970 anl 68 of 76*)
(19 October, 195*0
An Act to provide a special form of marriage in certain cases, for the 
registration of such and certain other marriages and for divorce.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifth Year of the Republic of India 
as follows;
CHAPTER I —  Preliminary
1. Short title, extent and commencement
(1) This Act may be called the Special Marriage Act, 195*+*
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir, and applies also to citizens of India 
domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends 
who are in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (See sec.
29 (a) of The Foreign Marriage Act, 1969).
(3) —
2-3. —
CHAPTER II —  Solemnization of Special Marriages
4. Conditions relating to solemnization of special Marriage
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time 
being in force relating to the solemnization of marriages, a marriage
between any two persons may be solemnized under this Act, if at the
time of the marriage the following conditions are fulfilled, namely;
(a) neither party has a spouse living;
(b) neither party —
(i) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence
of unsoundness of mind; or
(ii) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering
from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to
be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
(iii) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity of epilepsy.
1. ml(a)a, 1976.
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(c) the male has completed the age of twenty-one years and the 
female the age of eighteen years;
(d) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relation­
ship;
Provided that when a custom governing at least one of the parties permits 
of a marriage between them, such marriage may be solemnized, notwith­
standing that they are within the degrees of prohibited relationships and
(e) where the marriage is solemnized outside the territories to 
which this Act extends, both parties are citizens of India 
domiciled in the said territories.
Explanation —
5. Notice of intended marriage
When a marriage is intended to be solemnized under this Act, the 
parties to the marriage shall give notice thereof in writing in the 
form specified in the second Schedule to the Marriage Officer of 
the district in which at least one of the parties to the marriage 
has resided for a period of not less than thirty days immediately 
preceding the date on which such notice is given.
6. Marriage notice book and publication
(1) The Marriage Officer shall keep all notices given under section 
5 with the records of his office and shall also forthwith 
enter a true copy of every such notice in a book prescribed 
for that purpose to be called the Marriage Notice Book, and 
such book shall be open for inspection at all reasonable 
times, without fee, by any person desirous of inspecting the 
same.
(2)-(3) —
7-14. —
CHAPTER III —  Registration of Marriage 
celebrated in other forms
15. Regitration of marriages celebrated in other forms
Any marriage celebrated, whether before or after the commencement 
of this Act, other-jthan a marriage solemnized under the Special 
Marriage Act, 1$12 or under this Act, may be registered under 
this Chapter by a Marriage Officer in the territories to which 
this Act extends if the following conditions are fulfilled namely 1-
(a) a ceremony of marriage has been performed between the parties 
and they have been living together as husband and wife ever 
since;
1. 3 of 1872.
-720-
(b) neither party has at the time of registration more than one 
spouse living;
(c) neither party is an idiot or a lunatic at the time of regis­
tration;
(d) the parties have completed the age of twenty-one years at the 
time of registration;
(e) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relation­
ship* Provided that in case of a marriage celebrated before 
the commencement of this Act, this condition shall be subject 
to any law, custom or usage having the force of law governing 
each of them which permits of a marriage between the two; tc^vdL
(f) the parties have been residing within the district of the 
Marriage Officer for a period of not less than thirty days 
immediately preceding the date on which the application is made 
to him for registration of the marriage.
16-18. —
CHAPTER IV —  Consequences of 
Marriage under this Act
19. Effect of marriage on member of undivided family
The marriage solemnized under this Act of any member of an un­
divided family who professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina 
religion shall be deemed to effect his severance from such family.
20. Rights and disabilities not affected by Act
Subject to the provisions of section 19, any person whose marriage 
is solemnized under this Act, shall have the same rights and shall 
be subject to the same disabilities in regard to the right of 
succession to any property as a person to whom the Caste Disabili­
ties Removal Act, 1850 (XXI of I850) ^-applies.
21. Succession to property of parties married under Act
Notwithstanding any restrictions contained in the Indian Succession 
Act, 1925** with respect to its application to members of certain 
communities, succession to the property of any person whose mar­
riage is solemnized under this Act, and to the property of the 
issue of such marriage shall be regulated by the provisions of 
the said Act' and for the purposes of this section that Act shall 
have effect as if Chapter III of Part V (Special Rules for Parsi 
Intestates) had been omitted therefrom.
21A. Special provision in certain cases
Where the marriage is solemnized under this Act of any person who 
professes the Hindu, Budhist, Sikh or Jaina religion with a person
1. 21 of I850.
2. 39 of 1925.
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who professes the Hindu, Budhist, Sikh or Jaina religion, section 
19 and section 21 shall not apply and so much of section 20 as 
creates a disability shall also not apply.
CHAPTER V —  Restitution of Conjugal 
Rights and Judicial Separation
22. Restitution of conjugal rights
When either the husband or the wife has without reasonable excuse, 
withdrawn from the society of the other the aggrieved party may 
apply by petition to the District Court for restitution of conjugal 
rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the state­
ments made in such petition, and that there is no legal ground why 
the application shall not be granted, may decree restitution of 
conjugal rights accordingly.
Explanation —  Where a question arises whether there has been reason­
able excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving re- 
sonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.
23. Judicial Separation
(1) A petition for judicial separation may be presented to the 
District Court either by the husband or the wife, —
(a) on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (l) and sub­
section (l-A) of Sec. 27 on which a petition for divorce 
might have been presented; or
(b) on the ground of failure to comply with a decree for restitu­
tion of conjugal rights;
and the court on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in 
such petition, and that there is no legal ground why the application 
should not be granted, may decree judicial separation accordingly.
(2) Where the court grants a decree for judicial separation, it 
shall be no longer obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit 
with the respondent, but the court may, on the application 
by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the 
truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the 
decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.
CHAPTER VI —  Nullity of Marriage and Divorce
24. Void marriages
(l) Any marriage solemnized under this Act shall be null and void 
and may on petition presented by either party thereto against 
the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if, —
any of the conditions specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), and
(d) of section 4 has not been fulfilled; or
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(ii) the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage
and at the time of the institution of the suit.
(2) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to any
marriage deemed to he solemnized under this Act within the 
meaning of section 18, hut the registration of any such 
marriage under Chapter III may be declared to be of no effect 
if the registration was in contravention of any of the con­
ditions specified in clauses (a) to (e) of section 15*
Provided that no Bueh declaration shall be made in any case where an 
appeal has been preferred under section 17 and the decision of the 
District Court has become final. —
25- Voidable marriages
Any marriage solemnized under this Act shall be voidable and may
be annulled by a decree of nullity if, —
(i) the marriage has not been consummated owing to the wilful 
refusal of the respondent to consummate the marriage; or
(ii) the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by 
some person other than the petitioner; or
(iii) the consent of either party to the marriage was obtained
by coercion or fraud, as defined in the Indian Contract Act, 
18721:
Provided that, in the case specified in clause (iii), the court shall 
not grant a decree unless it is satisfiedx-
(a) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage igno­
rant of the facts alleged;
(b) that procedings were instituted within a year from the date 
of the marriage; and
(c) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner 
has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner 
of the existence of the grounds for a decrees
Provided further that in the case specified in clause (iii), the court
shall not grant a decree if —
(a) proceedings have not been instituted within one year after
the coercion had ceased or, as the case may be, the fraud
had been discovered; or
(b) the petitioner has with his or her free consent lived with 
the other party to the marriage as husband and wife after the 
coercion had ceased or, as the case may be, the fraud had 
been discovered.
26. —
1. 9 of 1872.
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27. Divorce
(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made
thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the 
District Court either by the husband or the wife on the 
ground that the respondentj-
(a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary 
sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her 
spouse; or
(b) has, deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not 
less than two years immediately preceding the presentation 
of the petition; or
(c) is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for seven years or 
more for an offence as defined in the Indian Penal Code^; or
(d) has, since the solemnization of the marriage treated the 
petitioner with cruelty; or
(e) has been, incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering 
continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such 
a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation —  In this clause, —
(a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental illness, 
arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic 
disorder or any other disorder of disability of mind and 
includes schizophrenia;
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent 
disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including 
sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part 
of the respondent, and whether or not it requires or is 
susceptible to medical treatment; or
(f) has been, suffering from venereal disease in a communicable 
form; or
(g) has been, suffering from leprosy, the disease not having 
been contracted from the petitioner; or
(h) has not been, heard of as being alive for a period of seven 
years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard 
of the respondent if the respondent had been alive;
(Explanation —  In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means 
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without 
reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such 
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other 
party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate ex­
pression shall be construed accordingly.)
1. 45 of i860.
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(i) has not resumed cohabitation for a period of one year or 
upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separa­
tion against the respondent? or
( j) has failed to comply with a decree for restitution of con­
jugal rights for a period of one year or upwards after the 
passing of the decree against the respondent.
(l-A) A wife may also present a petition for divorce to the 
District Court on the ground,—
(i) that her husband has, since the solemnization of the mar­
riage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality?
(ii) that in a suit under Bection 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956^ » or a proceeding under section 125 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (or under the corresjr 
ponding section 4-88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I898) 
a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed 
against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife not­
withstanding that she was living apart and that since the 
passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the 
parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards.
27A. Alternate relief in divorce proceedings
In any proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution 
of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as the pe­
tition is founded on the ground mentioned in clause (h) of sub­
section (l) of section 27, the court may, if it considers it just 
so to do having regards to the circumstances of the case, pass 
instead a decree for judicial separation.
28. Divorce by mutual consent
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made 
thereunder a petition for divorce may be presented to the 
District Court by both the parties together on the ground 
that they have been living separately for a period of one 
year or more, they have not been able to live together and 
they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dis­
solved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than
six months after the date of the presentation of the petition 
referred to in sub-section (l) and not later than eighteen 
months after the said date if the petition is not with­
drawn in the meantime the District Court shall on being 
satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such 
inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been sole­
mnized under this Act and that the averments in the petition 
are true, pass a decree declaring the marriage to be dis­
solved with effect from the date of the decree.
1. 78 of 1956.
2. 2 of 197*+.
3. 5 of 1898.
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29. Restriction on petitions for divorce during first one year after 
marriage
(1) No petition for divorce shall be presented to the District 
Court unless at the date of the presentation of the petition 
one year has passed since the date of entering the certifi­
cate of marriage in the Marriage Certificate Booki
Provided that the District Court may, upon application being made to it, 
allow a petition to be presented before one year has passed on the 
ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship sufferred by the 
petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, 
but if it appears to the District Court at the hearing of the petition 
that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any mis­
representation or concealment of the nature of the case, the District 
Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition 
that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one
year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition, without
prejudice to any petition which may be brought after the expiration of 
the said one year upon the same, or substantially the same facts as those 
proved in support of the petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave 
to present a petition for divorce before the expiration of 
one year from the date of the marriage, the District Court 
shall have regard to the interests of any children of the
marriage, and to the question whether there is reasonable
probability of reconciliation between the parties before the 
expiration of the said one year.
30. Remarriage of divorced persons
Where a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce, and 
either there is no right of appeal against decree or if there is 
such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired with­
out an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been pre­
sented but has been dismissed, either party to the marriage, may 
marry again.
CHAPTER VII —  Jurisdiction and Procedure
31-3**. ~
35* Relief for respondent in divorce and other proceedings
In any proceeding for divorce or judicial separation or restitution 
of conjugal rights, the respondent may not only oppose the relief 
sought on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or deser­
tion, but also make a counter-claim for any relief under this Act 
on that ground, and if the petitioner's adultery, cruelty or 
desertion is proved, the court may give to the respondent any 
relief under this Act to which he or she would have been entitled 
if he or she had presented a petition seeking such relief on that 
ground.
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36. Alimony pendente lite
Where in any proceeding under Chapter V or Chapter VI It appears 
to the District Court that the wife has no independent income 
sufficient for her support and the necessary expenses of the 
proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife, order the 
husband to pay to her the expenses of the proceeding, and weekly 
or monthly during the proceeding such sum as having regard to the 
husband's income, it may seem to the court to be reasonable.
37. Permanent alimony and maintenance
(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under Chapter V or Chap­
ter VI may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time 
subsequent to the decree on application made to it for the 
purpose, order that the husband shall secure to the wife for 
her maintenance and support, if necessary, by a charge on the 
husband's property such gross sum or such monthly or perio­
dical payment of money for a term not exceeding her life, 
as, having regard to her own property, if any, her husband's 
property and ability and the conduct of the parties and
other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court
to be just.
(2) If the District Court is satisfied that there is a change
in the circumstances of either party at any time after it
has made an order under sub-section (l), it may, at the 
instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such 
order in such manner as it may seem to the court to be just.
(3) If the District Court is satisfied that the wife in whose
favour an order has been made under this section has re­
married or is not leading a chaste life, it may, at the 
instance of the husband vary, modify or rescind any such 
order and in such manner as the court may deem just.
38-41. —
CHAPTER VIII —  Miscellaneous
42. Saving
Nothing contained in this Act shall affect the validity of any
marriage not solemnized under its provisions; nor shall this Act
be deemed directly or indirectly to affect the validity of any
mode of contracting marriage.
43. Penalty on married person marrying again under this Act
Save as otherwise provided in Chapter III, every person who, being
at the time married, procures, a marriage of herself or himself to
be solemnized under this Act shall be deemed to have committed an 
offence under section 494 and section 495 of the Indian Code,^  as 
the case may be and the marriage solemnized shall be void.
1. 45 of i860.
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44. Punishment of bigamy
Every person whose marriage is solemnized under this Act and who, 
during the lifetime of his or her wife or husband, contracts any 
other marriage shall be subject to the penalties provided in 
section 494 and section 495 of the Indian Code (Act XJW of i860) 
for the offence of marrying again during the lifetime of a hus­
band or wife, and the marriage so contracted shall be void.
45-50. —
51. Repeals and Savings
(1) The Special Marriage Act, 1872^ , and any law corresponding 
to the Special Marriage Act, 1072, in force in any Part B 
State immediately before the commencement of this Act are 
hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal. —
(a) all marriages duly solemnized under the Special Marriage 
Act, 1872 or any such corresponding law, shall be deemed 
to have been solemnized under this Act;
(b) —
(3) —
THE HIKDU MARRIAGE ACT. 1955
(Act XXV of 1955 3^ amended by Act No. 73 of 1956, 
58 of I960, 44 of 1964 and 68 of 19761)
(18 May, 1955)
An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Sixth Year of the Republic of India 
as follows:
CHAPTER I —  Preliminary
1. Short title and extent
(l) This Act may be called The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*
1. ML(A)A, 1976.
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(2) It extends to the Whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the 
territories to which this Act extends who are outside the 
said territories.
2. Application of Act
(l) This Act applies —
(a) to any person who is Hindu by religion in any of its forms
or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a
follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samajj
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion; 
and
(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories to which 
this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or
Jew by religion, unless it is proved, that any such person
would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any 
custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the 
matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been pas sad.
Explanation —
(3) The expression "Hindu" in any portion of this Act shall be 
construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu 
by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act 
applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section.
3- —
4. Overriding effect of Act
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, —
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom 
or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with 
respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of 
this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is incon­
sistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.
CHAPTER II —  Hindu Marriages
5* Conditions for a Hindu Marriage
A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the follow­
ing conditions are fulfilled, namely:-
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage
(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party —
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(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in conse­
quence of unsoundness of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffer­
ing from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an ex­
tent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of 
children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity or 
epilepsy;
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of eighteen years and 
the bride the age of fifteen years at the time of the 
marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited rela­
tionship, unless the custom or usage governing each of 
them permits of a marriage between the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the 
custom or usage governing each of them permits of a mar­
riage between the two;
(vi) where the bride has not completed the age of eighteen years, 
the consent of the guardian in marriage, if any, has been 
obtained for the marriage.
6. —
7. Ceremonies for a Hindu Marriage
(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the 
customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi (that 
is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the 
bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes 
complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.
8. Registration of Hindu marriages
(1) For the purpose of facilitating the proof of Hindu marriages, 
the State Government may make rules providing that the par­
ties to any such marriage may have the particulars relating 
to their marriage entered in such manner and subject to such 
conditions as may be prescribed in a Hindu Marriage Register 
kept for the purpose.
(2 ) -W  -
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the
validity of any Hindu marriage shall in no way be affected 
by the omission to make the entry.
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chapter III —  Restitution of Conjugal
Rights and Judicial Separation
9- Restitution of conjugal rights
When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable ex­
cuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved 
party may apply, by petition to the District Court, for resti­
tution of conjugal rights and the Court, on being satisfied of
the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there
is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may 
decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.
Explanation —  Where a question arises whether there has been reason­
able excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving 
reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the 
society.
10. Judicial separation
(1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or 
after the commencement of this Act may present a petition 
praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the 
grounds specified in sub-section (l) of Section 13, and in 
the case of a wife, also, on any of the grounds specified 
in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which a petition 
for divorce might have been presented.
(2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed it 
shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit 
with the respondent, but the Court may, on the application 
by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the 
truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the 
decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.
CHAPTER IV —  Nullity of Marriage and Divorce
U. Void marriages
Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall 
be null and void and may, on a petition presented 'by either party 
thereto, against the other party be so declared by a decree of 
nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in 
clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section 5«
12. Voidable marriage
(l) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the com­
mencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled 
on any of the following grounds, namely, —
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the 
impotence of the respondent; or
(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the conditions 
specified in clause (ii) of Section 5? or
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(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent 
of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner is required 
under Section 5» the consent of such guardian was obtained 
by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or 
as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the 
respondent; or
(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage preg­
nant by some person other than the petitioner.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (l), no
petition for annulling a marriage —
(a) on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section (l), 
shall be entertained if —
(i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force 
had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had 
been discovered* or
(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with 
the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the 
force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the 
fraud had been discovered;
(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (l) 
shall be entertained unless the Court is satisfied —
(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant 
of the facts alleged;
(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a 
marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act 
within one year of such commencement and in the case of 
marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year 
from the date of the marriage; and
(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner 
has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of 
the existence of the said ground.
13. Divorce
(l) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the com­
mencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either 
the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce 
on the ground that the other party —
(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary
sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her 
spouse; or
(ia) has, after the solemnization of marriage, treated the peti­
tioner with cruelty; or
(ib) has, deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not 
less than two years immediately preceding the presentation 
of the petition; or
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(ii) has ceased to he a Hindu by conversion to another religion? 
or
(iii) has, been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering 
continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such 
a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation —  In this clause, —
(a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental illness, 
arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic 
disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and 
includes schizophrenia:
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent 
disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including 
subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part 
of the other party, and whether or not it requires or
is susceptible to medical treatment? or
(iv) has, been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of 
leprosy? or
(v) has, been suffering from venereal disease in a communi­
cable form? or
(vi) has, renounced the world by entering any religious order? or
(vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven 
years or more by those persons who would naturally have 
heard of it, had that party been alive?
Explanation —  In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means 
the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage with­
out reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such 
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other 
party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate ex­
pressions shall be construed accordingly.
(lA) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or
after the commencement of this Act, may also present a pe­
tition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of 
divorce on the ground —
(i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as be­
tween the parties to the marriage for-a period of one year 
or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial se­
paration in a proceeding to which they were parties? or
(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as 
between the parties to the marriage for a period of one 
year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitu­
tion of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were 
parties).
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(2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of
her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground, —
(i) in the case of any marriage solemnized before the commence­
ment of this Act, that the husband had married again before
such commencement or that any other wife of the husband 
married before such commencement was alive at the time of 
the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner*
Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the 
presentation of the petition; or
that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality; or
(iii) that in suit under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956^ » or in a proceeding under Section 
125 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973^ , (or under 
the corresponding Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Pro­
cedure 1898 3j, a decree or order, as the case may be, has 
been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the 
wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that 
since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation 
between the parties has not been resumed for one year or 
upwards or
(iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solem­
nized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she 
has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but 
before attaining the age of eighteen years.
Explanation —  This clause applies whether the marriage was solemnized
before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 
1976.
13-A. Alternate relief in divorce proceedings
In any proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution of 
marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as the petition 
is founded on the grounds mentioned in clauses (ii), (vi) and (vii) 
of sub-section (l) of Section 13» the court may, if it considers 
it just so to do having regard to the circumstances of the case, 
pass instead a decree for judicial separation.
13-B. Divorce by mutual consent
(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dis­
solution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be pre­
sented to the District Court by both the parties to a 
marriage together whether such marriage was solemnized be­
fore or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amend­
ment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living 
separately for a period of one year or more, that they have
1. 78 of 1956.
2. 2 of 1974.
3. 5 of I898.
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not been able to live together and that they mutually agreed 
that the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six 
months after the date of the presentation of the petition 
referred to in sub-section (l) and not later than eighteen 
months after the said date, if the petition is not with­
drawn in the meantime, the1 court shall, on being satisfied, 
after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as 
it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that 
the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of 
divorce declaring the marriage to be disssolved with effect 
from the date of the decree.
14. No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall 
not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for 
dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless at 
the date of the presentation of the petition one year has 
elapsed since the date of the marriage*
Provided that the Court may, upon application made to it in accordance 
with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow 
a petition to be presented before one year has elapsed since the date 
of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hard­
ship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the 
respondent, but, if it appears to the court at the hearing of the peti­
tion that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any 
misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the Court 
may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the 
decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from 
the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice 
to any petition which may be brought after the expiration of the said 
one year upon the same or substantially the same facts as those alleged 
in support of the petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for 
leave to present a petition for divorce before the expira­
tion of one year from the date of the marriage, the Court 
shall have regard to the interest of any children of the 
marriage and to the question whether there is reasonable 
probability of a reconciliation between the parties before 
the expiration of the said one year.
15. Divorced persons when may marry again
When a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce and 
either there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there 
is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired with­
out an appeal having been presented or an appeal has been pre­
sented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party 
to the marriage to marry again*
16. —
l?. Punishment of bigamy
Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement
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of this Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party 
had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of Sections 494 
and 495 of the Indian Penal Code^ shall apply accordingly.
18. —
CHAPTER V —  Jurisdiction and Procedure
19-23. —
23-A. Relief for respondent in divorce and other proceedings
In any proceeding for divorce or judicial separation or restitu­
tion of conjugal rights, the respondent may not only oppose the 
relief sought on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or 
desertion, but also make a counterclaim for any relief under this 
Act on that ground; and if the petitioner's adultery, cruelty or 
desertion is proved the court may give to the respondent any re­
lief under this Act to which he or she would have been entitled 
if he or she had presented a petition seeking such relief on that 
ground.
24. Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings
Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court 
that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no 
independent income sufficient for her or his support and the 
necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application 
of the wife or the husband order the respondent to pay to the 
petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the 
proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own 
income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the 
court to be reasonable.
25. Permanent alimony and maintenance
(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at
the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent 
thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either 
the wife or the husband, as the case may be order that the 
respondent shall, pay to the applicant for her or his main­
tenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or perio­
dical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant 
as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other 
property, if any, the income and other property of the 
applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circum­
stances of the case it may seem to the court to be just,
and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a
charge on the immoveable property of the respondent.
(2) If the court is satisfied that there is change in the cixv 
cumstances of either party at any time after it has made
1. 45 of i860.
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an order under sub-section (l), it may, at the instance 
of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order 
in such manner as the court may deem just.
(3) If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour 
an order has been made under this section has remarried, 
or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained 
chaste, or, if such party is the husband, that he has had 
sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it may 
at the instance of the other party vary, modify or rescind 
any such order in such manner as the court may deem just.
26. Custody of children
In any proceeding under this Act, the court may, from time to 
time pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the 
decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the cus­
tody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently 
with their wishes, wherever possible, and may, alter the decree 
upon application by petition for the purpose, made from time to 
time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, 
maintenance and education of such children as might have been 
made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for 
obtaining such decree were still pending, and the court may, also 
from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and 
provisions previously made.
27-28A. —
CHAPTER VI —  Savings and Repeals
29. Savings
(1) A marriage solemnized between Hindu before the commencement 
of this Act, which is otherwise valid, shall not be deemed 
to be invalid or ever to have been invalid by reason only 
of the fact that the parties thereto belonged to the same 
gotra or nravara or belonged to different religions, castes 
or sub-sections of the same caste.
(2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect 
any right recognised tjy custom or conferred by any special 
enactment to obtain the the dissolution of a Hindu marriage, 
whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this 
Act.
(3) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any proceeding
under any law for the time being in force for declaring any
marriage to be null and void or for annulling or dissolving
any marriage or for judicial separation pending at the 
commencement of this Act, and any such proceeding may be 
continued and determined as if this Act had not been passed.
(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the
provisions contained in the Special Marriage Act, 1954 ,
1. 43 of 1954.
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with respect to marriages between Hindu solemnized under 
that Act, whether before or after the commencement of this 
Act.
THE HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 
(No. 30 of 1956)
(17 June, 1955)
An Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession 
among Hindus.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Republic of 
India as follows:
CHAPTER I —  Preliminary
1. Short title and extent
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu-Succession Act, 1956.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
2. Application of Act
(1) This Act applies —
(a) to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms 
or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a 
follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj,
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, 
and
(c) to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi
or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person
would not have been governed by the Hindu Law or by any 
custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the 
matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.
Explanation —
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Overriding effect of Act
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act —
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any cus­
tom or usage as part of that law in force immediately be­
fore the commencement of this Act shall cease to have 
effect with respect to any matter for which provision is 
made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement 
of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it
is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in
this Act.
(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing 
contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the pro­
visions of any law for the time being in force providing 
for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings 
or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of 
tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.
CHAPTER II —  Intestate Succession
General
5. —
6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property
When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having 
at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary 
property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivor­
ship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in 
accordance with this Acts
Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative 
specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in 
that class who claims throu^i such female relative, the interest of the 
deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by tes­
tamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act 
and not by survivorship.
Explanation 1. —  For the purpose of this section the interest of a 
Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the 
property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the 
property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective 
of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.
Explanation 2. —  Nothing contained in the proviso to this section 
shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from 
the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs 
to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein.
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7. —
8. General rules of succession in the case of males
The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve accord­
ing to the provisions of this chapter —
(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in 
class I of the Schedule}
(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the 
heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the 
Schedule;
(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, 
then upon the agnates of the deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of 
the deceased.
9. Order of succession among heirs in the Schedule
Among the heirs specified in the Schedule, those in class I shall 
take simultaneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs; those 
in the first entry in class II shall be preferred to those in the 
second entry; those in the second entry shall be preferred to 
those in the third entry; and so on in succession.
10. Distribution of property among heirs in class I of the Schedule
The property of an intestate shall be divided among the heirs in 
class I of the Schedule in accordance with the following rules:
Rule 1. The intestate's widow, or if there are more widows than 
one, all the widows together, shall take one share.
Rule 2. The surviving sons and daughters and the mother of the 
intestate shall each take one share.
Rule 3* The heirs in the branch of each predeceased son or each 
predeceased daughter of the intestate shall take bet­
ween them one share.
Rule k. The distribution of the share referred to in Rule 3 —
(i) among the heirs in the branch of the predeceased son 
shall be so made that his widow (or widows together) 
and the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions; 
and the branch of his predeceased sons gets the same 
portion;
(ii) among the heirs in the branch of the predeceased 
daughter shall be so made that the surviving sons and 
daughters get equal portions.
11-13. —
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l*f. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired 
before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held 
by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation —  In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable 
and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance, or 
device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of main­
tenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, 
at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by pur­
chase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also 
any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the 
commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (l) shall apply to any 
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any 
other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil 
Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will 
or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe 
a restricted estate in such property.
15* General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus
The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve
according to the rules set out in section 16 —
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children 
of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (l) —
(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or 
mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter 
of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased 
son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in 
sub-section (l) in the order specified therein, but upon 
the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband 
or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of 
any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children 
of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs 
referred to in sub-section (l) in the order specified there­
in, but upon the heirs of the husband.
16-20. —
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21. Presumption in cases of simultaneous deaths
Where two persons have died in circumstances rendering it un­
certain whether either of them, and if so, which survived the 
other, then, for all purposes affecting succession to property, 
it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the 
younger survived the elder.
22. —
23. Special provision respecting dwelling-houses
Where a Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male 
and female heirs specified in class I of the Schedule and his or 
her property includes a dwelling-house wholly occupied by mem­
bers of his or her family then, notwithstanding anything con­
tained in this Act, the right of any such female heir to claim
partition of the dwelling-house shall not arise until the male
heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein; but the 
female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein*
Provided that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled 
to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried
or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow.
24. Certain widows remarrying may not inherit as widows
Any heir who is related to an intestate as the widow of a pre­
deceased son, the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased 
son or the widow of a brother shall not be entitled to succeed 
to the property of the intestate as such widow, if on the date 
the succession opens, she has remarried.
2> 26. —
27. Succession when heirs disqualified
If any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under 
this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before 
the intestate.
28. Disease, defect, etc., not to be disqualified
No person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property 
on the ground of any disease, defect or deformity, or save as 
provided in this Act, on any other ground whatsoever.
29. —
CHAPTER III —  Testamentary Succession
30. Testamentary succession
Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposi­
tion any property, which is capable of being so disposed of by
-74 2-
himf in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession 
Act, 1925* or any other law for the time being in force and 
applicable to Hindus.
Explanation —  The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary 
property ... shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or 
in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to property 
capable of being disposed of by him or by her < within the meaning of 
this section.
CHAPTER IY —  Repeals
31. (Repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act $8 of i960)
THE SCHEDULE 
(See section 8)
Heirs in class I and class II 
Class I
Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a predeceased son; daughter of a 
predeceased son; son of a predeceased daughter; daughter of a prede­
ceased daughter; widow of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased son 
of a predeceased son; daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased 
son; widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son.
Class II
(i) Father.
(ii) (l) Son's daughter's son, (2) son's daughter's daughter, (3) 
brother, (4) sister.
(iii) (1) Daughter's son's son, (2) daughter's son's daughter, (3) 
daughter's daughter's son, (4) daughter's daughter's daughter.
(iv) (1) Brother's son, (2) sister's son, (3) brother's daughter,
(4) sister's daughter.
(v) Father's father; father's mother.
(vi) Father's widow; brother's widow.
(vii) Father's brother; father's sister.
(viii) Mother's father; mother's mother.
(ix) Mother's brother; mother's sister.
Explanation —  In this Schedule, references to a brother or sister do 
not include references to a brother or sister by uterine blood.
1. 39 of 1925.
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HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 1956 
(No. 32 of 1956)
(25 August, 1956)
An Act to amend and codify certain parts of the law relating to mino­
rity and guardianship among Hindus
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Republic of
India as follows:
1. Short title and extent
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Minority and Guardianship 
Act, 1956.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the 
territories to which this Act extends who are outside the 
said territories.
2. —
3. Application of Act —
(l) This Act applies —
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms 
of developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a 
follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samajj
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion; 
and
(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories to which 
this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or 
Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person 
would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by custom 
or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters 
dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.
Explanation —
Definitions —  In this Act —
(a) "minor" means a person who has not completed the age of 
eighteen years;
(b) "guardian" means a person having the care of the person of a 
minor or of his property or of both his person and property, 
and includes —
(i) a natural guardian,
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(ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor's father or 
mother,
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared "by a court, and
(iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment 
relating to any Court of Wards;
(c) "natural guardian" means any of the guardians mentioned in 
section 6.
5- Overriding effect of Act
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom 
or usage as part of that law in force immediately before 
the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with 
respect to any matter for which provision is made in this 
Act j
6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor
The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's 
person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding
his or her undivided interest in joint-family property), are —
(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl —  the father,
and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of
minor who has not completed the age of five years shall
ordinarily be with the mother;
(b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or illegitimate un­
married girl —  the mother, and after her, the father;
(c) in the case of a married girl —  the husband:
Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian
of a minor under the provisions of this section —
(a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or
(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by
becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or 
sanyasi).
Explanation —  In this section, the expressions 'father* and 'mother'
do not include a step-father and a step-mother.
7. Natural guardianship of adopted son
The natural guardianship of an adopted son who is a minor passes, 
on adoption, to the adoptive father and after him to the adoptive 
mother.
8. —
-7^ 5-
9. Testamentary guardians and their powers
(1) A Hindu father entitled to act as the natural guardian of 
his minor legitimate children may, by will, appoint a 
guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person 
or in respect of the minor's property (other than the tin- 
divided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect 
of both.
(2) An appointment made under sub-section (l) shall have no 
effect if the father predeceases the mother but shall re­
vive if the mother dies without appointing, by will, any 
person as guardian.
(3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural guardian of 
her minor legitimate children, and a Hindu mother entitled 
to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate 
children by reason of the fact that the father has become 
disentitled to act as such, may, by will, appoint a guar­
dian for any of them in respect of the minor's person or 
in respect of the minor's property (other than the undivied 
interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both.
(*4-) A Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of 
her minor illegitimate children may, by will, appoint a 
guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person 
or in respect of the minor's property or in respect of both.
(5) The guardian so appointed by will has the right to act as 
the minor's guardian after the death of the minor's father 
or mother, as the case may be, and to exercise all the 
rights of a natural guardian under this Act to such extent 
and subject to such restrictions, if any, as are specified 
in this Act and in the will.
(6) The right of the guardian so appointed by will shall, where 
the minor is a girl, cease on her marriage.
10-11. —
12. Guardian not to be appointed for minor's undivided interest in
joint-family property
Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint-family property 
and the property is under the management of an adult member of
the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in res­
pect of such undivided interest.
13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration
(1) In the appointment or declaration of any person as guar­
dian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor 
shall be the paramount consideration.
(2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue 
of the provisions of the Act or of any law relating to 
guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of 
opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the 
welfare of the minor.
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HINDU ADOPTION AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956 
(Act 78 of 1956 as amended by Act **5 of 1962)
21, December, 1959
An Act to amend and codify the law relating to Adoptions and Mainte­
nance among Hindus
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Bepublic of 
India as follows:
CHAPTER I —  Preliminary
1. Short title and extent
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act, 1956.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir.
2. Application of Act
This Act applies —
to any person, who is a Hindu by religion in any of its 
forms or developments, including a Vaishaiva, a Idngayat or 
a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj,
to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by reli­
gion any child, legitimate or illegitimate, who has been 
abandoned both by his father and mother or whose parentage 
is not known and who in either case is brought up as Hindu, 
Buddhist, Jaina and Sikh; and
to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi 
or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such 
person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or 
by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of 
any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not 
been passed.
Explanation —  (l)-(2) —
(3) The expression "Hindu" in any portion of this Act shall be 
construed as if it included a person who, though not a 
Hindu by religion, is nevertheless, a person to whom this 
Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this 
section.
3* Definitions
is,
(a) —
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(T>) "maintenance" includes —
(i) in all cases, provisions for food, clothing, residence, 
education and medical attendance and treatment;
(ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reason­
able expenses of and incident to her marriage;
(c) "minor" means a person who has completed his or her age of 
eighteen years.
*f. Overriding effect of Act
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, —
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom 
or usage as part of that law in force immediately before 
the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect 
with respect to any matter for which provision is made in 
this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement 
of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it 
is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in 
this Act.
CHAPTER II —  Adoption
5. Adoptions to be regulated by this Chapter
(1) No adoption shall be made after the commencement of this
Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the provisions
contained in this Chpater, and any adoption made in con­
travention of the said provisions shall be void.
(2) An adoption which is void shall neither create any rights 
in the adoptive family in favour of any person which he or 
she could not have acquired except by reason of the adoption, 
nor destroy the rights of any person in the family of his
or her birth.
6. Requisites of a valid adoption
No adoption shall be valid unless —
(i) the person adopting has the capacity, and also the rig£rt, 
to take in adoption;
(ii) the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so;
(iii) the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption;
and
(iv) the adoption is made in compliance with the other con­
ditions mentioned in this Chapter.
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7. Capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption
Any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the
capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption:
Provided that, if he has a wife living, he shall not adopt except with
the consent of his wife unless the wife has completely and finally 
renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared 
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.
Explanation —  If a person has more than one wife living at the time 
of adoption, the consent of all the wives is necessary unless the con­
sent of any one of them is unnecessary for any of the reasons specified 
in the preceding proviso.
8. Capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption
Any female Hindu —
(a) who is of sound mind,
(b) who is not a minor, and
(c) who is not married, or if married, whose marriage has been
dissolved or whose husband is dead or has completely and 
finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or 
has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to 
be of unsound mind,
has the capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption.
9. Persons capable of giving in adoption
(1) No person except the father or mother or the guardian of 
a child shall have the capacity to give the child in 
adoption.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) and sub-seo- 
tion (^+) the father, if alive, alone have the right to 
give in adoption, but such right shall not be exercised, 
save with the consent to the mother unless the mother has 
completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased 
to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.
(3) The mother may give the child in adoption if the father is 
dead or has completely and finally renounced the world or 
has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court 
of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.
(*0 Where both the father and mother are dead or have com­
pletely and finally renounced the world or have abandoned 
the child or have been declared by a court of competent 
jurisdiction to be of unsound mind or where the parentage 
of the child is not known, the guardian of the child may 
give the child in adoption with the previous permission 
of the court to any person including the guardian himself.
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(5) Before granting permission to a guardian under sub­
section (*f), the court shall be satisfied that the adop­
tion will be for the welfare of the child, due considera­
tion being for this purpose given to the wishes of the 
child having regard to the age and understanding of the 
child and that the applicant for permission has not re­
ceived or agreed to receive and that no person has made 
or given or agreed to make or give to the applicant any 
payment or reward in consideration of the adoption except 
such as the court may sanction.
Explanation —  For the purposes of this section —
(i) the expression "father'* and "mother" do not include an
adoptive father and an adoptive mother;
(ia) "guardian means a person having the care of the
person of a child or both his person and property
and includes —
(a) a guardian appointed by the will of the child's 
father or mother; and
(b) a guardian appointed or declared by a court; and
(id —
10. Persons who may be adopted
No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely, —
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has hot been married, unless there is a custom
or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons 
who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, un­
less there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties
which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen 
years being taken in adoption.
11. Other conditions for a valid adoption
In every adoption the following conditions must be complied with:
(i)-(ii) —
(iii) if the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted 
is a female, the adoptive father is at least twenty-one 
years older than the person to be adopted;
(iv) if the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted
is a male, the adoptive mother is at least twenty-one years
older than the person to be adopted;
(v)-(vi) —
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12. Effects of adoption
An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her 
adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the 
date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the
child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be
severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the 
adoptive family:
Provided —
(a) —
(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the 
adoption, shall continue to vest in such person subject 
to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership 
of such property including the obligation to maintain 
relatives in the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate 
which vested in him or her before the adoption.
13. Right of adoptive parents to dispose of their properties
Subject to any agreement to the contrary, an adoption does not 
deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of 
his or her property by transfer inter vivos or by will.
1*K Determination of adoptive mother in certain cases
(1) Where a Hiniu who has a wife living adopts a child, she
shall be deemed to be the adoptive mother.
(2) Where an adoption has been made with the consent of more
than one wife, the seniorraost in marriage among them shall 
be deemed to be the adoptive mother and the others to be 
step-mothers.
(3) Where a widower or a bachelor adopts a child, any wife 
whom he subsequently marries shall be deemed to be the 
step-mother of the adopted child.
(*f) Where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any
husband whom she marries subsequently shall be deemed to 
be the step-father of the adopted child.
15. Valid adoption not to be cancelled
No adoption which has been validly made can be cancelled by the 
adoptive father or mother or any other person nor can the adopted 
child renounce his or her status as such and return to the family 
of his or her birth.
16-17. —
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chafter III —  Maintenance
18. Maintenance of wife
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu wife, 
whether married before or after the commencement of this 
Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband 
during her lifetime.
(2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her 
husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance —
(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandon­
ing her without reasonable cause and without her consent 
or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her;
(b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a 
reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be 
harmful or injurious to live with her husband.
(c) if he is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy;
(d) if he has any other wife living;
(e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his
wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine 
elsewhere;
(f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another 
religion;
(g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separetely.
(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence 
and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or 
ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.
19. Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law
(1) A Hindu wife whether married before or after commencement
of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the
death of her husband by her father-in-law*
Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out 
of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of 
her own, is unable to obtain maintenance —
(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or
(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.
(2) Any obligation under sub-section (l) shall not be enforce­
able if the father-in-law has not the means to do so from 
any coparcenary property in his possession out of which 
the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share,, and any 
such obligation shall cease on the remarriage of the 
daughter-in-law.
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20. Maintenance of children and aged parents
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu is bound 
during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legiti­
mate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or in­
firm parents.
(2) A legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance 
from his or her father or mother so long as the child is 
a minor.
(3) The obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or 
infirm parent or a daughter who is unmarried extends in so 
far as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case 
may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his 
or her own earnings or other property.
Explanation —  In this section, the word "parent" includes a childless 
step-mother.
21. Dependants defined
For the purposes of this chapter, "dependants" means the following
relatives of the deceased:
(i) his or her father;
(ii) his or her mother;
(iii) his widow, so long as she does not remarry;
(iv) his or her son or the son of his predeceased son or the
son of a predeceased son of his predeceased son, so long as 
he is a minor: provided and to the extent that he is unable 
to obtain maintenance in the case of a grandson, from his 
father's or mother's estate, and in the case of a great 
grandson from the estate of his father or mother or father's 
father or father's mother;
(v) his or her unmarried daughter, or the unmarried daughter 
of his predeceased son, or the unmarried daughter of a 
predeceased son of his predeceased son, so long as she 
remains unmarried: provided and to the extent that she is 
unable to obtain maintenance, in the case of a grand­
daughter, from her father's or mother's estate and in the 
case of a great grand-daughter from the estate of her 
father or mother or father's father or father's mother;
(vi) his widowed daughter: provided and to the extent that she 
is unable to obtain maintenance —
(a) from the estate of her husband; or
(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate;
(c) from her father-in-law or his father or the estate
of either of them;
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(vii) any widow of his son or of a son of his predeceased son, 
so long as she does not remarry: provided and to the 
extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her 
husband's estate, or from her son or daughter, if any, or 
his or her estate; or in the case of a grandson's widow, 
also from her father-in-law's estate;
(viii) his or her minor illegitimate son, so long as he remains 
a minor;
(ix) his or her illegitimate daughter, so long as she remains 
unmarried.
22. Maintenance of dependants
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the heirs 
of a deceased Hindu are bound to maintain the dependants 
of the deceased out of the estate inherited by them from 
the deceased.
(2) Where a dependant has not obtained by testamentary or 
intestate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu 
dying after the commencement of this Act, the dependant 
shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this Act, 
to maintenance from those who take the estate.
(3) The liability of each of the persons who takes the estate 
shall be in proportion to the value of the share or part 
of the estate taken by him or her.
(^ ) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) or 
sub-section (3) > no person who is himself or herself a 
dependant shall be liable to contribute to the maintenance 
of others, if he or she has obtained a share or part of the 
value of which is or would, if the liability to contribute 
were enforced, become less than what would be awarded to 
him or her by way of maintenance under this Act.
23* Amount of maintenance
(1) It shall be in the discretion of the court to determine whe­
ther any, and if so, what maintenance shall be awarded under
the provisions of this Act, and in doing so the court shall 
have due regard to the considerations set out in sub­
section (2) or sub-section (3)» as the case may be, so far 
as they are applicable.
(2) In determining the amount of maintenance, if any, to be 
awarded to a wife, children or aged or infirm parents under 
this Act, regard shall be had to —
(a) the position and status of the parties;
(b) the reasonable wants of the claimant;
(c) if the claimant is living separately, whether the claimant 
is justified in doing so;
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(d) the value of the claimant's property and any income 
derived from such property, or from the claimant's 
own earnings or from any other source;
(e) the number of persons entitled to maintenance under 
this Act.
(3) —
2*4—25. —
26. Debts to have priority
Subject to the provisions contained in section 27, debts of every 
description contracted or payable by the deceased shall have 
priority over the claims of the dependants for maintenance under 
this Act.
27. Maintenance when to be a charge
A dependant's claim for maintenance under this Act shall not be 
a charge on the estate of the deceased or any portion thereof, 
unless one has been created by the will of the deceased, by a 
decree of court, by agreement between the dependant and the owner 
of the estate or portion, or otherwise
28. —
CHAPTER IV —  Repeals and Savings
29. Repeals
The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and 
Maintenance Act, 1946* and, sub-section (2) of section 30 of the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 2 , are hereby repealed.
30. Savings
Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any adoption made 
before the commencement of this Act, and the validity and effect 
of any such adoption shall be determined as if this Act had not 
been passed.
1. 19 of 1946.
2. 30 of 1956.
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THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT 
Act 28 of 1961 
(20 May, 1961)
An Act to prohibit the giving or taking of dowry
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twelfth Year of the Republic of 
India as follows:
1. Short title, extent and commencement
(1) This Act may be called the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on 1st July, 1961.
2. Definition of "dowry"
In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security 
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly —
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any 
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any 
other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for
the marriage of the said parties, but does not include
dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim 
Personal law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation 1. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that 
any presents made at the time of a marriage to either party to the 
marriage in the form of cash, ornaments, clothes or other articles, 
shall not be deemed to be dowry within the meaning of this section, 
unless they are made as consideration for the marriage of the said 
parties.
Explanation 2. The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning 
as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code.
3* Penalty for giving or taking dowry
If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes 
or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable 
with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine 
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
-756-
4. Penalty for demanding dowry
If any person, after the commencement of this Act, demands, 
directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardian of a bride 
or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punish­
able with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with 
fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both; 
Provided that no courts shall take cognizance of any offence 
under this section except with the previous sanction of the State 
Government or of such officer as the State Government may, by 
general or special order, specify in this behalf.
5. Agreement for giving or taking dowry to be void
Any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry shall be void.
6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs
(1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the 
woman in connexion with whose marriage it is given, that 
person shall transfer it to the woman —
(a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within one year 
after the date of marriage; or
(b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the
marriage, within one year after the date of its receipt; or
(c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, with­
in one year after she has attained the age of eighteen
years; and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust 
for the benefit of the woman.
(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required 
by sub-section (1) and within the time limited therefor, 
he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend 
to six months, or with fine which may extend to five 
thousand rupees, or with both; but such punishment shall 
not absolve the person from his obligation to transfer the 
property as required by subsection (l).
(3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section
(l) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall 
be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for 
the time being.
(4) Nothing contained in thii section shall affect the provi­
sions of section 3 ot section 4.
7- Cognizance of offences
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898*, —
1. 5 of I898.
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(a) no court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or 
a magistrate of the first class shall try any offence 
under this Act;
(b) no court shall take cognizance of any such offence except 
on a complaint made within one year from the date of the 
offence;
(c) it shall be lawful for a Presidency Magistrate or a 
magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence autho­
rized by this Act on any person convicted of an offence 
under this Act.
8. Offences to be non-cognizable, bailable and non-compoundable
Every offence under this Act shall be non-cognizable, bailable 
and non-compoundable.
9. —
10. Repeals
The Andhra Pradesh Dowry Prohibition Act, 1958, Andhra Pradesh 
Act*-, and the Bihar Dowry Restraint Act, 1950» Bihar Act1, are 
hereby repealed.
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 
No 2 of 1974
(25 January, 1974)
An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-fourth Year of the Republic 
of India as follows:
CHAPTER I —  Preliminary
1. Short title, extent and commencement
(l) This Act may be called the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973.
1. 1 of 1958. 2. 25 of 1950.
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(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir.
Provided —
t o ­
ft)—
Explanation —
(3) It shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 197^ »
2-3-4. —
C H A P T E R  II-VIII —
CHAPTER IX —  Order for 
Maintenance of Wives, Children and Parents
125. (l) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses
to maintain —
(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
(b)-ft)-(d) -
A Magistrate of the first class may upon proof of such neglect or 
refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the main­
tenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly 
rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate 
thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may 
from time to time direct:
Provided —
Explanation —  For the purposes of this chapter,—
(a) —
(b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has 
obtained a divorce from, her husband, and has not remarried.
(2)-(3) —
Provided —
Provided further —
Explanation —  If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman 
or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his 
wife's refusal to live with him.
/
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(*f) No wife shall he entitled to receive an allowance from her 
husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or 
if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with 
her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual 
consent.
(5) —
126. —
127. (l)-(2) —
(3) Where any order has been made under section 125 in favour 
of a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a 
divorce from, her husband, the Magistrate shall, if he is 
satisfied that —
(a) the woman has, after the date of such divorce, remarried, 
cancel such order as from the date of her remarriage;
(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she 
has received, whether before or after the date of the said 
order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or 
personal law applicable to the parties, was payable on 
such divorce, cancel such order, —
(i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, 
from the date on which such order was made,
(ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, 
if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by 
the husband to the woman;
(c) the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that 
she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance 
after her divorce, cancel the order from the date thereof.
(4) At the time of making any decree for the recovery of any 
maintenance or dowry by any person, to whom a monthly 
allowance has been ordered to be paid under section 125* 
the Civil Court shall take into account the sum which has 
been paid to, or recovered by, such person as monthly 
allowance in pursuance of the said order.
128. —
C H A P T E R  X - X X X V I  —
C H A P T E R  X X X V I I  —  M i s c e l l a n e o u s
W-83. —
*f8^ . ( l )  T h e  C o d e  o f  C r i m i n a l  P r o c e d u r e ,  1898, i s  h e r e b y  r e p e a l e d .
(2)-(3) —
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appendix ii
S E L E C T E D  I N D I A N  S T A T U T E S  
(AS AMENDED)
PRIOR TO THE "HINDU CODE"
HINDU WIDOW'S REMARRIAGE ACT, 1856 
HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1929 
HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937
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THE HINDU WIDOWS * REMARRIAGE ACT
Act 15 of I856 
(25 July, I856)
An Act to remove all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows
Preamble —  Whereas it is known that, by the law as administered in 
the civil courts established in the territories in the possession and 
under the Government of the East India Company, Hindu widows with 
certain exceptions are held to be, by reason of their having been once 
married, incapable of contracting a second valid marriage, and the 
offspring of such widows by any second marriage are held to be ille­
gitimate and incapable of inheriting property; and
Whereas..., and
Whereas...; It is enacted as follows*
1. Marriage of Hindus widows legalized
No marriage contracted between Hindus shall be invalid, and the 
issue of no such marriage shall be illegitimate by reason of the 
woman having been previously married or betrothed to another 
person who was dead at the time of such marriage, any custom and 
any interpretation of Hindu law to the contrary notwithstanding.
2. Rights of widow in deceased husband's property to cease on her 
remarriage
All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased 
husband's property by way of maintenance or by inheritance to 
her husband or to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will 
or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express 
permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property 
with no power of alienating the same shall upon her remarriage 
cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs 
of her deceased husband or other person entitled to the property 
on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same.
3. —
k. Nothing in this Act to render any childless widow capable of
inheriting
Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to render any 
widow who, at the time of the death of any person leaving any 
property, is a childless widow, capable of inheriting the whole 
or any share of such property, if before the passing of this Act 
she would have been incapable of inheriting the same by reason 
of her being a childless widow.
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5. Saving of rights of widow remarrying, except as provided as 
ss. 2 to 4
Except as in the three preceding sections is provided, a widow 
shall not by reason of her remarriage forfeit any property or any 
right to which she would otherwise be entitled; and every widow 
who has remarried shall have the same rights of inheritance as 
she would have had had such marriage been her first marriage.
6. —
7. Consent to remarriage of minor widow
If the widow remarrying is a minor whose marriage has not been 
consummated, she shall not remarry without the consent of her 
father, or if she has no father, of her paternal grandfather, or 
if she has no such grandfather, of her mother, or failing all 
these, of her elder brother or failing also brothers, of her next 
male relative.
Punishment for abetting marriage made contrary to this section —  
Effect of such marriage: proviso —
Consent to remarriage of major widow. In the case of a widow 
who is of full age, or whose marriage has been consummated, her 
own consent shall be sufficient consent to constitute her re­
marriage lawful and valid.
THE HINDU LAW OF INHERITANCE 
(AMENDMENT) ACT
Act 2 of 1929
(l October, 1929)
ItfHEBEAS it is expedient to alter the order in which certain heirs of a 
Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his estate; it is 
hereby enacted as follows:
1. Short title, extent and application
(l) This Act may be called the Hindu law of Inheritance 
(Amendment) Act, 1929.
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(2) It extends to the whole of India, except Part B States, but
it applies to persons who, but for the passing of this Act,
would have been subject to the law of Mitakshara in respect
of provisions herein enacted, and it applies to such persons 
in respect only of the property of males not held in copar­
cenary and not disposed of by will.
2. Order of succession of certain heirs
A son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister, and sister's son 
shall, in the order so specified, be entitled to rank in the order 
of succession next after father's father and before a father's 
brother:
Provided that a sister's son shall not include a son adopted after 
the sister's death.
3* Savings
Nothing in this Act shall:
(a) affect any special family or local custom having the force 
of law, or
(b) vest in a son's daughter, daughter's daughter or sister an 
estate larger than, or different in kind from, that possessed 
by a female in property inherited by her from a male accord­
ing to the school of Mitakshara law by which the male was 
governed, or
(c) enable more than one person to succeed by inheritance to the 
estate of a deceased Hindu male which by a customary or other 
rule of succession descends to a single heir.
THE HINDU WOMEN'S RIGITS TO PROPERTY ACT
Act 18 of 1937* as Amended by Act II 
of 1938
(1^  April, 1937)
An Act to amend the Hindu law governing Hindu women's rights to property
WHEREAS it is expedient to amend the Hindu law to give better rights 
to women in respect of property; it is hereby enacted as follows:
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1. Short title and extent
(1) This Act may be called the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property 
Act, 1937.
(2) It extends to the whole of India, except Part B States.
2. Application
Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu Law or custom to the contrary, 
the provisions of section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intes­
tate.
3* Devolution of property
(l) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law 
dies intestate his property, and when a Hindu governed by 
any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies 
intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there 
are more than one widow all his widows together, shall, 
subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)» be entitled 
in respect of property of which he dies intestate to the 
same share as a son;
Provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit 
in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of 
such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a 
son's son if there is surviving a son or son's son of such 
predeceased son;
Provided further that the same provision shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased 
son.
(2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than 
the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the 
time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint-family pro­
perty, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub­
section (3)# have in the property the same interest as he 
himself had.
(3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions 
of this section shall be the limited interest known as a 
Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have 
the same right of claiming partition as a male owner.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an estate 
which by a customary or other rule of succession descends to 
a single heir or to any property to which the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925*1 applies.
4. Saving
Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying
intestate before the commencement of this Act.
1. 39 of 1925.
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5- Meaning of the expression wdie intestate"
For the purposes of this Act, a person shall he deemed to die 
intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a 
testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect.
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